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If we were to compile a list of Frequently Asked Questions about narrative 
theory, we would put the following two at or near the top: “what is narrative 
theory?” and “how do different approaches to narrative relate to each other?” 
Narrative Theory: Core Concepts and Critical Debates addresses both ques-
tions and, more significantly, also demonstrates the extent to which the ques-
tions themselves are intertwined: how one defines narrative theory shapes 
one’s understanding of how the different approaches are related, and vice 
versa. At the same time, the structure of the book reflects our assumption 
that promoting dialogue among practitioners in the field is the best way to 
address both of these interlinked questions.
 Thus, in Part One, we address the first question by taking turns exploring 
core concepts of narrative theory—authors, narrators, and narration; plot, 
time, and progression; space, setting, and perspective; character; reception 
and the reader; and issues of value—from four distinct theoretical perspec-
tives. Jim Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz demonstrate a rhetorical approach 
to narrative theory; Robyn Warhol, a feminist approach; David Herman, an 
approach emphasizing the interconnections between narrative and mind; 
and Brian Richardson, an antimimetic approach focused on a tradition of 
storytelling that violates conventions of realism and conversational storytell-
ing and that thus calls for the development of an “unnatural” narratology. In 
addition, Part One demonstrates the interpretive consequences of our four 
perspectives by focusing on the analysis of four particular narratives: Phelan 
and Rabinowitz work with Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, Warhol explores 
Jane Austen’s Persuasion, Herman examines Ian Mcewan’s On Chesil Beach, 
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and Richardson investigates Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children. Then, in 
Part Two, we address the second question—“how do different approaches 
to narrative relate to each other?”—by taking turns discussing one another’s 
contributions to Part One. In effect, we revise this second question by mak-
ing it much more pointed: “how does my/our preferred approach relate to 
the other three approaches?” In staging this dialogue, Part Two not only 
highlights some key debates in contemporary narrative theory but also pro-
vides a navigational aid for readers seeking to orient themselves within the 
general landscape of narrative studies.
 Of course, there are many other Approaches to This and That books 
on the market, and, in fact, some of us have had a hand in producing such 
books. Narrative Theory is fundamentally different for two reasons. First, our 
contributions are the latest chapter in conversations that the five of us have 
been having for years. Although the sections in Part One were written inde-
pendently of one another, we each worked with a strong sense of (and respect 
for) what the others would be saying, and with a commitment to framing 
our arguments in terms of this continuing discussion. What we have, then, 
is four separate voices working not in absolute independence but rather in 
counterpoint. Second, for all our disagreements (some of them contentious), 
we all consider ourselves to be contributing to a shared project: developing 
ways of understanding what stories are and how people engage with them. 
Consequently, as will become especially clear in Part Two, it is not surpris-
ing that issues on which we disagree are flanked by other issues where our 
positions converge, overlap, or intertwine in complicated ways. To put this 
second point another way, the “navigational aid” that we offer here aims not 
to steer our readers in particular directions but rather to give them the means 
to pick their own routes through major debates within the field—routes that 
may well differ from any of ours.
 We have written Narrative Theory for teachers, graduate students, and 
advanced undergraduates as well as for specialists in narrative theory. Given 
its combination of theory and interpretation, its range of approaches and 
illustrative narratives, and its unusual feature of having the co-authors 
responding directly to one another’s contributions, we hope that the book 
could be the basis for courses (or a substantial part of courses) in narrative 
fiction, narrative theory, or literary theory. At the same time, we believe that 
specialists can benefit from the book’s compact presentation—and demon-
stration—of four approaches to narrative, as well as our conversation in Part 
Two about the possibilities and limitations of those approaches. Indeed, as 
we explain below, we view the book as (literally) an invitation for readers at 
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all levels to engage in a broader discussion about core concepts and critical 
debates in narrative theory. 
 Our organization in Part One allows readers to choose different paths 
through that section depending on their own backgrounds and interests. 
Because we take turns addressing key concepts, readers concerned with com-
paring approaches can readily consider similarities and differences between, 
say, rhetorical and feminist conceptions of plot, just as they can juxtapose 
the treatment of character or space in an approach that foregrounds issues 
of narrative and mind against their treatment in an approach that concen-
trates on experimental, antimimetic narratives. And because we arrange the 
approaches in the same sequence (rhetorical, feminist, mind-oriented, anti-
mimetic) within each chapter, readers who want to trace a single perspective 
through several different concepts will easily be able to do so.
 We should also note that although we have each developed analyses 
that are meant to reflect current practices within different traditions in the 
domain of narrative theory, we have written our contributions with a view to 
articulating our own take on the issues. Thus rather than acting as spokes-
persons for an entire group or school, where appropriate we have made it a 
point to note ways in which our own positions differ from the positions of 
others developing the same general approach—with those very differences 
indicating productive areas of debate within as well as across approaches. 
Finally, we recognize that the four approaches discussed here do not cover 
the entire field and that there are many theorists doing valuable work that 
does not fit comfortably under any one of the four rubrics we use to describe 
our work. But we happily acknowledge this limitation because it underscores 
the diversity and vitality of contemporary narrative theory. In that spirit, we 
view Part Two as only the starting point for a broader dialogue about the core 
concepts, methods, and goals of narrative theory, and we invite all our read-
ers to contribute to the blog that The Ohio State University Press has gener-
ously created for purposes of further discussion. The web address is https://
ohiostatepress.org/Narrative_Theory_Debates. your participation, we are 
confident, will add greatly to the further development of our individual and 
collective thinking even as it expands the frontiers of our field.
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3Narrative as rhetoric
James Phelan and Peter J. rabinowitz
As rhetorical narrative theorists, we look at narrative primarily as a rhetori-
cal act rather than as an object. That is, we see it as a purposive communica-
tion of a certain kind from one person (or group of persons) to one or more 
others. More specifically, our default starting point is the following skeletal 
definition: Narrative is somebody telling somebody else, on some occasion, and 
for some purposes, that something happened to someone or something. every 
part of this definition after “is” deserves further commentary—and we will 
provide such commentary in the following chapters. Before we do so, how-
ever, we’d like to start out by identifying six main principles that underlie 
our approach.
 1. Narrative is often treated as a representation of a linked sequence of 
events, but we subsume that traditional viewpoint under a broader concep-
tion of narrative as itself an event—more specifically, a multidimensional 
purposive communication from a teller to an audience. The focus on narrative 
as purposive means that we are interested in the ways in which the elements 
of any narrative (e.g., character, setting, plot structure) are shaped in the 
service of larger ends. The focus on narrative as multileveled communication 
means that we are interested not simply in the meaning of narrative but also 
in the experience of it. Thus, we are as concerned with narrative’s affective, 
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 Of course, the underlying rhetorical situation varies in different kinds of 
narrative. For instance, in fictional narratives such as Adventures of Huckle-
berry Finn, the occasion/teller/audience situation is at least doubled: shortly 
after the events (before he lights out for the Indian Territory), Huck tells his 
story to his audience for his own purposes, while at a much later historical 
moment, Twain communicates both Huck’s story and Huck’s telling of it 
to his audience for his own purposes. (As actual readers, we read it on yet 
another occasion—and attending to the differences that these different occa-
sions make is one way in which we bring history into rhetorical analysis.) To 
put these points another way, a fictional narrative is a single text combin-
ing multiple tracks of rhetorical communication. As this way of describing 
the communication implies, the rhetorical approach is ultimately most con-
cerned with the author’s telling to his or her audience. We will come back to 
these tracks of communication and the roles of various audiences in them in 
chapter 6.
 In nonfictional narrative, the extent to which the rhetorical situation 
is doubled will depend on the extent to which the author signals her dif-
ference from or similarity to the “I” who tells the story and the extent to 
which the author posits an internal audience different from his or her read-
ers. Sometimes authors of nonfiction speak directly in their own voices (as, 
for example, Joan Didion does in The Year of Magical Thinking), but at other 
times authors of nonfiction distance themselves from their narrators (as, for 
example, Frank McCourt does in Angela’s Ashes). Sometimes an author of a 
nonfictional narrative will address a specific audience who is clearly distinct 
from the author’s larger audience (think, for example, of an elegiac narra-
tive addressed to a deceased subject, such as Marilyn Hacker’s poetic tribute 
“elegy for a Soldier, June Jordan, 1936–2002”).
 We characterize our definition as “default” rather than “definitive” for 
two reasons. 
(a) We believe it captures essential characteristics of most of those works 
that are widely considered to be narratives in our culture, even as 
we recognize that individual narratives may not conform exactly to 
every element of the definition. Thus, for example, we say “something 
happened,” because the telling of events typically occurs after their 
occurrence. But we also recognize that the telling can sometimes be 
simultaneous with the events (as in J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Bar-
barians) or before the events (as in narratives written in the future 
tense, such as Lee K. Abbott’s “As Fate Would Have It”—which also 
shifts from the default of the indicative mood to the subjunctive). 
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Characterizing the definition as “default” helps us recognize both that 
there will be deviations and that such deviations tend to be significant.
(b) We do not believe that there is a single, best definition of narrative. 
Rather, any definition, because it implies a particular orientation, 
brings with it a particular set of emphases and serves a particular set 
of interests. That is, any definition highlights certain characteristics 
of individual narratives while obscuring or even effacing others. Our 
default definition reflects our special interest both in the multidi-
mensional purposes of narrative acts and in the relationships among 
authors, narrator(s), and audiences.
 2. In interpreting narrative, rhetorical narratologists adopt an a posteriori 
instead of an a priori stance. Rather than declaring what narratives invariably 
do or how they invariably do it, we seek to understand and assess the variety 
of things narratives have done and the variety of ways they have done it. In 
practical terms, this principle means that rhetorical narrative theory does 
not preselect for analysis particular issues such as gender or cognition or 
particular kinds of narratives such as those deploying antimimetic elements 
of story or of discourse—though of course we recognize that some narratives 
give special prominence to those issues or elements. More generally, rhetori-
cal narrative theory maintains its interest in how narratives seek to achieve 
their multidimensional purposes even as it strives to be sufficiently flexible 
to respond to the diversity of narrative acts.
 3. In explaining the effects of narrative, rhetorical narrative theory iden-
tifies a feedback loop among authorial agency, textual phenomena (including 
intertextual relations), and reader response. In other words, our approach 
assumes that texts are designed by authors (consciously or not) to affect 
readers in particular ways; that those authorial designs are conveyed through 
the occasions, words, techniques, structures, forms, and dialogic relations of 
texts as well as the genres and conventions readers use to understand them; 
and that since reader responses are ideally a consequence of those designs, 
they can also serve as an initial guide to (although, since misreadings are 
possible, not as a guarantee of) the workings of the text. At the same time, 
reader responses, including affective and ethical ones, can be a test of the 
efficacy of those designs. Thus, for example, we would expect any adequate 
analysis of the Phelps farm episodes of Huckleberry Finn—the episodes in 
which Tom Sawyer orchestrates an unnecessarily elaborate plan by which 
he and Huck free Jim—to account for the tedium most readers experience 
as they slog through the seemingly interminable section and the disappoint-
ment they feel in Huck’s ethical decline in his relationship with Jim. For that 
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reason, we find many thematic defenses of Twain’s design to be unpersuasive: 
they neglect the evidence of readerly response or regard it as less significant 
than the thematic meanings they find in the design. We will return to this 
issue in more detail in chapter 7.
 4. We regard the progression of a narrative—its synthesis of textual and 
readerly dynamics—as the key means by which an author achieves his or her 
purposes, and we therefore look to a study of progression for key insights 
into understanding how a narrative works. Since we are interested in why 
the narrative text is the way it is and not some other way, we are interested in 
understanding the principles of its construction. Coming to understand the 
principles that underlie its progression from a particular starting point to a 
particular ending point provides an excellent way to understand a narrative’s 
design and its purposes.
 Textual dynamics are the internal processes by which narratives move 
from beginning through middle to ending, and readerly dynamics are the 
corresponding cognitive, affective, ethical, and aesthetic responses of the 
audience to those textual dynamics. The bridge between textual dynam-
ics and readerly dynamics is formed by narrative judgments of three kinds: 
interpretive, ethical, and aesthetic. These judgments constitute a bridge 
because they are encoded in the narrative yet made by readers, and, once 
made, their various interactions lead to readers’ multilayered responses. (For 
more on these responses see point number 6.)
 5. With regard to fictional narrative, the approach identifies three key 
audiences involved in the rhetorical exchanges, though it is just as accurate to 
say that it focuses on the actual audience (the flesh-and-blood readers, both 
as individuals and as a group) and two primary positions that the actual audi-
ence typically adopts. First, readers typically join (or try to join) the authorial 
audience, the hypothetical group for whom the author writes—the group 
that shares the knowledge, values, prejudices, fears, and experiences that 
the author expected in his or her readers and that ground his or her rhetori-
cal choices. Second, the actual audience pretends to join the narrative audi-
ence, the audience that receives the narrator’s text—an audience that exists 
in the narrator’s world, that regards the characters and events as real rather 
than invented, and that accepts the basic facts of the storyworld regardless of 
whether they conform to those of the actual world. The narrative audience 
does not necessarily accept the narrator’s portrayal as accurate, any more 
than the reader of a nonfictional text necessarily accepts everything repre-
sented as true; but the narrative audience does, as its default position, accept 
the world presented in the text as a “real” one. With some narratives (e.g., 
epistolary novels), it may also be useful to distinguish between the narrative 
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audience and the narratee, the intratextual audience specifically addressed by 
the narrator. The terms are sometimes used almost as synonyms, but the dif-
ferences are often significant. The narrative audience is a role that the actual 
reader takes on while reading; the narratee, in contrast, is a character posi-
tion in the text, one that the narrative audience in a sense observes. Thus, 
when we begin Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, we do not pretend to be Mrs. 
Saville, to whom Captain Walton is addressing his letters; rather, we pretend 
to be a narrative audience that views her as a real person and that, in a sense, 
reads over her shoulder.
 One final (for now) note on audiences that also applies to our other ana-
lytic concepts. Our approach is profoundly pragmatic, in the everyday rather 
than philosophical sense, and when studying particular texts, we’re apt to 
glide over distinctions that don’t bear significant interpretive weight. Thus, 
for instance, although Huckleberry Finn begins with a direct address to “you,” 
the narratee is not characterized, and the distinction between narrative audi-
ence and narratee does not have a sufficient payoff for us to use it in our 
analysis of Twain’s rhetorical communications.
 6. Audiences develop interests and responses of three broad kinds, each 
related to a particular component of the narrative: mimetic, thematic, and 
synthetic. Responses to the mimetic component involve readers’ inter-
ests in the characters as possible people and in the narrative world as like 
our own, that is, hypothetically or conceptually possible and still compat-
ible with the laws and limitations that govern the extratextual world. These 
responses to the mimetic component include our evolving judgments and 
emotions, our desires, hopes, expectations, satisfactions, and disappoint-
ments. Responses to the thematic component involve readers’ interests in the 
ideational function of the characters and in the cultural, ideological, philo-
sophical, or ethical issues being addressed by the narrative. Responses to the 
synthetic component involve an audience’s interest in and attention to the 
characters and to the larger narrative as artificial constructs, interests that 
link up with our aesthetic judgments. The relationship among an audience’s 
relative interests in these different components will vary from narrative to 
narrative depending on the nature of its genre and progression. Some nar-
ratives (including most so-called realistic fiction) are dominated by mimetic 
interests; some (including allegories and political polemics such as Animal 
Farm) stress the thematic; others (including the nouveau roman and much 
postmodern metafiction) put priority on the synthetic. But the interests of 
many narratives are more evenly distributed among two or three of the com-
ponents (Dostoevsky’s novels, for instance, promote both the mimetic and 
the thematic). Furthermore, developments in the course of a narrative can 
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generate new relations among those interests. Indeed, many narratives derive 
their special power from shifting our attention from one kind of component 
to another: Nabokov’s Bend Sinister, for instance, has the effect that it does 
in part because, in the closing pages, the mimetic is drowned out by the syn-
thetic. In Huckleberry Finn, our main interest is in the mimetic and thematic 
components, with the synthetic remaining in the background.
 In the chapters that follow we will elaborate on these six principles and 
demonstrate their consequences for interpreting—and evaluating—the 
novel that ernest Hemingway claimed was the fountainhead of all American 
literature.
9a feminist approach to Narrative
robyn warhol
Like feminist theory itself, feminist narrative theory has consistently increased 
in its scope of interest. What began as a “feminist narratology” that focused 
on the impact of culturally constructed gender upon the form and reception 
of narrative texts has broadened to feminist narratologies that include race, 
sexuality, nationality, class, and ethnicity as well as gender in their analysis 
of texts. As I use the term now, in the wake of the third-wave critique of 
white-liberal feminism and in opposition to the postfeminist assumptions 
that prevail in the U.S. mainstream, “feminism” denotes the conviction that 
dominant culture and society are organized to the disadvantage of everyone 
who does not fit a white, masculine, middle- or upper-class, euro-Ameri-
can, not-yet-disabled, heterosexual norm. Feminist analysis today must take 
what Kimberlé Crenshaw named an “intersectional” approach because white 
privilege, class privilege, heteronormativity, and other positions of relative 
power complicate hierarchies of gender. As a feminist, I recognize that the 
“patriarchy” we understand to underwrite male dominance relies on the col-
lusion of women and other marginalized groups even though it serves only a 
small minority of the people in the world: if everyone who is disadvantaged 
by it were to end the collusion and positively revolt, patriarchy would not 
stand a chance. As it is, however, patriarchal arrangements still govern West-
ern culture and institutions, including (and for our purposes especially) the 
institution of literary theory and criticism.
 As the original feminist narratologists pointed out, classical narratology 
developed in a pointedly masculinist academic culture, based on theories 
developed by men who grounded their models in the study of male-written 
texts. The idea behind feminist narratology was that examination of non-
mainstream texts could yield generalizable observations about narrative 
that might be invisible in the mainstream canon. That idea was based on 
the feminist assumption that texts are always linked to the material circum-
stances of the history that produces and receives them, an assumption that 
contradicted the formalist stance of classical narratology and that through 
the intervention of such influential figures as Gerald Prince has come to be 
accepted within the broader practice of narrative theory, especially as it is 
applied to ethnically marked or postcolonial texts.1 Because the term “nar-
ratology” still connotes for many a theoretical approach cut off from ques-
tions of history and context, some critics—myself among them—have begun 
using “feminist narrative theory” or “queer and feminist narrative theories” 
to name the field.
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 My assigned task in this book is not to provide a detailed history or over-
view of the many ways in which feminist narrative theory has come to be in 
use today, but rather to demonstrate my own reading practice by bringing 
feminist theory together with narrative theory as I look closely at a favor-
ite text of mine, Jane Austen’s posthumously published Persuasion (1818). 
One of the great advantages of narrative theoretical criticism for feminism 
is its self-consciousness about methodology, its insistence on being clear 
about what questions we bring to bear upon texts and about how we will go 
about answering them. Ironically, apolitical narratology’s self-consciousness 
combines well with feminist criticism’s explicitly political agenda. Founda-
tional narrative theorists (e.g., Gérard Genette) did not pretend to be mak-
ing objective or even empirical pronouncements in their descriptions of how 
texts are put together, and Genette’s work especially reflects his awareness 
that another critic might find different patterns in Proust.2 It is a small step 
from admitting that one’s observations are affected by one’s subjective posi-
tion to identifying that position’s affiliation with a specific set of convictions, 
like feminism. In this sense feminist criticism and narrative theory form a 
suitable match.
 Of the varieties of theoretical orientation represented in this volume, 
feminist narrative theory has most in common with the rhetorical and anti-
mimetic approaches and least in common with cognitive narratology. Rhe-
torical narrative theory, like feminist narrative theory, considers the narrative 
text not just to represent but actually to constitute a transaction between an 
author and a reader. For rhetorical narrative theorists like James Phelan and 
Peter J. Rabinowitz, however, considerations of gender, sexuality, race, or class 
are only incidental to the fact that a genuine communication occurs when a 
person picks up a narrative text and reads it. Feminist narrative theory takes 
that communication as a given but tries always to frame its analysis with as 
much socio-historical context as can be known for the author and readers in 
question. Antimimetic narrative theory can also overlap in productive ways 
with the feminist approach, in that many modern and postmodern experi-
mental narratives, from virginia Woolf ’s The Waves (1931) to Jeanette Win-
terson’s Written on the Body (1994) to Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home (2006), 
are thematically linked to gender and sexuality, and the very act of writing 
outside generic realist boundaries has been seen by many feminist novelists 
and theorists as itself a subversive gesture.3 An antimimetic critic like Brian 
Richardson will often attend to the sexed and gendered implications of the 
forms he analyzes, though the question of feminist politics is not central to 
his method. Of the contemporary approaches current in narrative theory, 
cognitive narratology of the kind that David Herman practices is the least 
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closely linked to feminist narrative theory, because the study of processes in 
the human brain necessarily privileges similarities among people over dif-
ferences. The fact of difference—and more importantly, the fact that social 
inequities are still grounded in culturally produced differences—means that 
feminist narrative theorists are not yet willing to make the jump from the 
culturally constructed to the universal, which seems to resonate with the 
essentialism most poststructuralist feminists strive to undermine. Still, work 
such as Frederick Luis Aldama’s in neuroscience and narrative joins up with 
feminist narrative theory through its interest in the affective and emotional 
impact of narrative texts, as well as its attention to the impact of cultural dif-
ference on the activity of reading.4 Nothing in any of the other contemporary 
versions of narrative theory prohibits attention to gender, sexuality, class, 
or other politically significant and historically grounded differences. What 
chiefly sets feminist narrative theory apart is its insistence5 on placing those 
issues at the center of the inquiry.
 Looking over what I have written for this volume, I can draw some gener-
alizations about what I do when I am practicing feminist narrative criticism. 
In the analysis of Persuasion, I tend to look primarily for ways in which Aus-
ten’s novel deconstructs binary oppositions underlying mainstream assump-
tions about gender, sexuality, and class. That is, if the dominant culture of 
Austen’s period promoted the ideology of separate spheres—assigning public 
life, professions, and power to men and relegating women to domesticity, 
marriage, and submission—I am interested in reading Austen’s novels as 
responses to and critiques of that ideology. This goes far beyond the time-
honored feminist practice of examining “images of women” in order to 
expose stereotyping and to praise authors’ ability to move outside expected 
sex roles in creating their characters. even the most stereotypical of Austen’s 
characters embody contradictory traits that complicate her novels’ repre-
sentations of gender and sexuality. In the spirit of poststructuralism, the 
feminist narrative critic seeks to identify those contradictions and to resist 
reconciling or resolving them, always keeping in mind the complexity of nar-
rative technologies for endowing a literary character with an interiority and 
a persona.
 At the thematic level of analysis, I confess I am always alert to anything I 
can see as signs of feminism in Jane Austen’s texts. This is attributable partly 
to my conviction—reinforced by biographical evidence—that Austen either 
read Mary Wollstonecraft or was exposed secondhand to her ideas about 
the rights of women, and partly to my sincere wish (shared, I believe, by 
many contemporary Austen fans) for my favorite author not to have been an 
instrument of patriarchal oppression, in her day or in ours. I do not look so 
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much for characters’ expressions of feminist sentiment (though in Persua-
sion I find significant ones) as I do for narrative practices that pull against 
received notions of what is suitable to a female character’s life or a female 
novelist’s text. When in the early 1980s D. A. Miller revealed the resistance to 
conventionally neat marriage-plot closure in Austen’s novels, he set a pattern 
for feminist narrative critics of her work. At the same time that it constitutes 
a critique of gender norms in society and in narrative, Austen’s feminism can 
become manifest as a defense of the values her world and ours have tended 
to decry as excessively feminine. Granting ample narrative space, for exam-
ple, to the minute and seemingly trivial details of women’s conversations in 
domestic settings adds up to a literary form quite distinct from what Austen’s 
male contemporaries like Sir Walter Scott were writing. For the feminist nar-
ratologist as for Miller, theme is always manifest in form. Deviations from 
formal norms make deviations from dominant ideology visible.
 In the same spirit, I am also looking for positions the text takes on class, 
race, and the history of colonialism, as well as gender and sexuality. Many 
feminist critics, having learned from bell hooks to read “from margin to 
center,” scrutinize details that nonfeminist criticism might find trivial or 
peripheral. In studying Austen, this means paying attention to what is not 
represented in the text as well as to what is. The anonymity of servants, the 
scarcity of working-class or impoverished characters, the implicit beliefs 
about income, privilege, and status in Austen’s storyworld all signify, in the 
sense of the word that Austen herself employed. edward Said famously 
showed how Mansfield Park (1814) both acknowledges and ignores the fact 
that Sir Thomas Bertram’s Antiguan slaves enable the existence of the upper-
class British lifestyle the novel posits as normal and desirable. Feminist the-
ory suggests, however, that considerations of colonialism and race must also 
take gender, sexuality, and class into consideration, as Susan Fraiman has 
shown in her brilliant response to Said’s argument—not a rebuttal, really, 
but a trenchant revision of his reading. Class, race, nation, gender, sexuality, 
ethnicity, dis/ability: feminist narrative theory tries to keep as many of those 
balls in the air as possible, accepting responsibility for critiquing narrative 
manifestations of all categories of oppression based on socially constructed 
identities.
 Interdisciplinary feminist theory underlies the attitudes and practices I 
have been describing, just as it provides a gender-centered platform from 
which to view elements of narrative such as plot, perspective, voice, and 
space. Feminist epistemology, feminist geography, feminist historiography, 
and feminist ethnography are politically engaged modes for framing research 
in fields such as philosophy, history, and the social sciences which strive to 
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account for truth. Feminist literary and cultural criticism benefits from the 
insights of these theoretical approaches, though always keeping in the fore-
ground the fact that texts are not reproductions of “reality” but rather are 
representations. What can be deduced from literary texts are attitudes toward 
gender oppression, not facts about how it occurs in the material world. But 
feminist narrative theorists also keep in mind the fact that literature has its 
own impact on the material world and that popular texts like the novels Jane 
Austen wrote can work to constitute real people’s gendered assumptions and 
behaviors as much as to reflect them. “Real” gender does not exist—gender 
is always and only a virtual construction (or, as Judith Butler calls it, a per-
formance) built along a continuum between material practices and reading 
practices. The more we can understand about narrative’s role in the consti-
tution of gender, the better positioned we are to change the oppressive ways 
that gender norms work in the world. As she can in so many other matters 
having to do with how to conduct ourselves, Jane Austen can help.
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exploring the Nexus of Narrative and mind
david Herman
My contributions to this volume outline an approach that focuses on the 
nexus between narrative and mind, using Ian Mcewan’s 2007 novel On Che-
sil Beach as a case study. Research on the mind-narrative nexus, like femi-
nist narratology, work on narrative across media, and other approaches to 
narrative inquiry can be described as a subdomain within “postclassical” 
narratology (Herman, “Introduction” to Narratologies). At issue are frame-
works for narrative research that build on the ideas of classical, structuralist 
narratologists but supplement those ideas with work that was unavailable to 
story analysts such as Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, Algirdas J. Greimas, 
and Tzvetan Todorov during the heyday of the structuralist revolution. In the 
case of scholarship bearing on narrative and mind, theorists have worked to 
enrich the original base of structuralist concepts with research on human 
intelligence either ignored by or inaccessible to the classical narratologists, 
in an effort to throw light on mental capacities and dispositions that provide 
grounds for—or, conversely, are grounded in—narrative experiences.
 To explore these interfaces between stories and the mind, I use the idea of 
narrative worldmaking as a central heuristic framework, drawing on the pio-
neering insights of Nelson Goodman, Richard Gerrig, and other theorists. In 
my usage of the term, worldmaking encompasses the referential dimension 
of narrative, its capacity to evoke worlds in which interpreters can, with more 
or less ease or difficulty, take up imaginative residence.6 I argue that world-
making is in fact the hallmark of narrative experiences, the root function of 
stories and storytelling that should therefore constitute the starting-point 
for narrative inquiry and the analytic tools developed in its service. yet the 
structuralist narratologists, for their part, failed to investigate issues of nar-
rative referentiality and world-modeling, not least because of the Saussurean 
language theory they used as their “pilot-science.” Of key importance here is 
Saussure’s bipartite analysis of the linguistic sign into the signifier and signi-
fied7 to the exclusion of the referent, as well as his related emphasis on code 
instead of message—that is, his foregrounding of the structural constituents 
and combinatory principles of the semiotic system of language over situ-
ated uses of that system. By contrast, in the years since structuralism, con-
vergent research developments across multiple fields, including discourse 
analysis, philosophy, psychology, and narrative theory itself, have revealed 
the importance of studying how people deploy various sorts of symbol sys-
tems to refer to, and constitute, aspects of their experience. Building on this 
work, the approach I outline in this book assumes that a crucial outstanding 
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challenge for scholars of story is to come to terms with how narrative affords 
methods—indeed, serves as a primary resource—for world-modeling and 
world-creation.
 A focus on narrative worldmaking studies how storytellers, using many 
different kinds of symbol systems (written or spoken language, static or mov-
ing images, word-image combinations, etc.), prompt interpreters to engage 
in the process of co-creating narrative worlds, or “storyworlds”—whether 
they are the imagined, autonomous worlds of fiction or the worlds about 
which nonfictional accounts make claims that are subject to falsification. 
As this last formulation suggests, although narrative provides the means for 
creating, transforming, and aggregating storyworlds across various settings 
and media,8 different kinds of narrative practices entail different protocols 
for worldmaking, with different consequences and effects. I argue that illu-
minating these protocols will require bringing scholarship on narrative into 
closer dialogue with developments in the sciences of mind. More than this, 
however, I suggest that moving issues of worldmaking to the forefront of 
narrative inquiry opens up new directions for basic research in the field, in 
part by underscoring the need to reframe the kinds of questions theorists ask 
about narrative itself.
 In this respect, my emphasis on narrative worldmaking takes inspiration 
from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, or rather what has come to be 
called the metaphilosophy embedded in texts such as the Philosophical Inves-
tigations. According to this metaphilosophy, the role of philosophy is to dis-
pel, through analysis of the way particular expressions are used in particular 
contexts, conceptual problems caused by overgeneralization of any specific 
usage—as when expressions involving numbers are conflated with expres-
sions involving physical objects, such that numbers start to be treated as 
things (Horwich 165–67).9 Put another way, the later Wittgenstein’s central 
metaphilosophical insight is that the grammar with which a question is for-
mulated, or the language in which a problem is cast, can close off other ways 
of surveying a given area of inquiry or mapping out a problem space being 
investigated. Similarly, in reorienting narrative theory around questions of 
worldmaking, and in turn situating storyworlds at the nexus of narrative and 
mind, I seek to recontextualize existing heuristic schemes for narrative study, 
or rather shift to an alternative vantage point from which those schemes’ 
underlying “grammar” can be surveyed anew.10 Hence my contributions have 
been designed to serve not just narratological purposes, by suggesting how a 
focus on worldmaking affords productive strategies for studying stories, but 
also metanarratological purposes, by using this same focus to reassess the 
terms in which questions about narrative have been formulated up to now.11
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 For example, in the chapters that follow and also in my response to my 
coauthors’ contributions in Part Two, I revisit the grammar of questions 
about narrative premised on the concept of mimesis. On the one hand, if 
mimesis is defined narrowly as imitation or reproduction, the very con-
cept becomes untenable—since there can be no direct representation of the 
world, no bare encounter with reality, without mediating world-models.12 
On the other hand, if mimesis is defined as part of a family of strategies for 
deploying world-models, then the concept cannot do the work my coauthors 
try to get it to do—for example, when they set mimesis up as a standard or 
touchstone against which “antimimetic” stories, or the “synthetic” and “the-
matic” dimensions of narrative, can be measured. But changing the gram-
mar of the question—asking not about mimesis or its absence but about how 
story designs can be arranged along a scale corresponding to more or less 
critical and reflexive methods of worldmaking—opens up new avenues for 
narrative inquiry. Along similar lines, my focus on issues of worldmaking 
leads me to reconsider (ways of asking) questions associated with the narra-
tive communication diagram, a widely used heuristic scheme that has given 
rise to the constructs of the implied author and the implied reader, among 
others. Shaped by the anti-intentionalist arguments of the Anglo-American 
New Critics, these constructs are embedded in a grammar that can be sur-
veyed from a different position when processes of worldmaking, which are 
grounded in defeasible or possibly wrong ascriptions of intentions to story 
creators, become the key focus. This new vantage point suggests how the 
communication diagram not only proliferates heuristic constructs but also 
reifies them—obscuring how the constructs at issue are ways of describing 
phases or aspects of the inferential activities that support worldmaking, not 
preconditions for understanding stories. Again, then, by keeping the focus 
on narrative’s root function as a resource for world-modeling and world-cre-
ation, new ways of formulating questions about stories suggest themselves. I 
argue that these questions cannot be fully articulated, let alone addressed, in 
the terms afforded by previous nomenclatures and the grammar of inquiry 
with which they are bound up.13
 By the same token, my emphasis on worldmaking as a framework for 
exploring the mind-narrative nexus has required that I tweak the template 
designed to provide readers with a basis for comparing and contrasting the 
four approaches covered in this volume. Unlike the other three approaches, 
my approach treats the creation of and (more or less sustained) imaginative 
relocation to narrative worlds not as a way of analyzing issues of space, set-
ting, and perspective in particular, but rather as a core aspect of all narrative 
experiences—as an enabling condition for storytelling practices as such (see 
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also Herman, Basic Elements 105–36). In turn, narrative worldmaking is 
imbricated with—both supports and is supported by—basic mental abilities 
and dispositions that constitute focal concerns of research on the intercon-
nection between narrative and mind. Hence in my approach, time, space, 
and character can be redescribed as key parameters for narrative world-
building. Through acts of narration, creators of stories produce blueprints 
for world construction. These blueprints, the complexity of whose design 
varies, prompt interpreters to construct worlds marked by a particular spa-
tiotemporal profile, a patterned sequence of situations and events, and an 
inventory of inhabitants.14
 Accordingly, extending scholarship that adapts ideas from psycholin-
guistics, discourse analysis, and related areas of inquiry to characterize pro-
cesses of narrative understanding,15 I suggest that engaging with stories 
entails mapping discourse cues onto when, what, where, who, how, and 
why dimensions of mentally configured worlds; the interplay among these 
dimensions accounts for the structure as well as the representational func-
tions and overall impact of the worlds in question. I emphasize throughout 
how the making of storyworlds depends on the reader or interpreter, and 
I expand upon that claim in chapter 6 while using chapter 7 to explore the 
broader contexts and consequences of such worldmaking practices. Narra-
tives do not merely evoke worlds but also intervene in a field of discourses, 
a range of representational strategies, a constellation of ways of seeing—and 
sometimes a set of competing narratives, as in a courtroom trial, a political 
campaign, or a family dispute (see Abbott, Introduction 175–92). Under its 
profile as a reception process, then, narrative worldmaking entails at least 
two different types of inferences: those bearing on what sort of world is being 
evoked by the act of telling, and those bearing on why (and with what con-
sequences) that act is being performed at all.
 I should also emphasize at the outset that although I explore issues 
of broad relevance for the study of narrative and mind, a mind-oriented 
approach to narrative inquiry can be pursued along lines different from the 
ones sketched here. For one thing, my example narrative is a (monomodal) 
print text, and different tools are needed to explore the mind-narrative nexus 
in storytelling practices that recruit from more than one semiotic channel 
(see Herman, “Directions”). Further, whereas my approach is synchronic 
rather than diachronic, focusing on acts of narrative worldmaking that it is 
currently within humans’ capacity to perform, evolutionary-psychological 
perspectives explore ways in which features and uses of narrative can be 
traced back to mental abilities that have evolved over time (Austin; Boyd; 
easterlin; Tooby and Cosmides).16 What is more, in contrast with research-
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ers (e.g., Hogan) who have appealed to the neurobiology of the brain to posit 
mapping relationships between aspects of narrative production or process-
ing, on the one hand, and specific structures and processes in the brain, on 
the other hand, my approach remains situated at the person level—the level 
of the medium-sized, human-scale world of everyday experience (Baker, 
Persons and Metaphysics; see chapter 5 of this volume and also my response 
in Part Two). Since narratives and narrative scholarship both have much 
to say about this world of everyday experience, by focusing on the person 
level I seek to substantiate one of the basic assumptions of my approach: 
namely, that the study of narrative worldmaking can inform, and not just be 
informed by, understandings of the mind.
The CaSe STUdy
mceWan’S On Chesil BeACh
I use On Chesil Beach to examine key aspects of stories and storytelling from 
a perspective that foregrounds issues of worldmaking; focusing on these 
issues will allow me to outline, in turn, strategies for investigating the mind-
narrative nexus. I have chosen Mcewan’s novel17 for a number of reasons, 
including its powerful exploration of how interpersonal conflicts are rooted 
in larger familial and social contexts, and its reflexive investigation of the 
way stories provide scaffolding for making sense of one’s own and others’ 
actions (see Herman, “Storied”). I discuss these and other aspects of Mce-
wan’s text in the chapters that follow; however, according to the needs of the 
discussion, I alternately zoom in on and back out from the novel, which I 
sometimes use as the basis for theory building and sometimes as a means for 
testing the possibilities and limits of an approach oriented around issues of 
worldmaking—and for gaining a new vantage point on the grammar of nar-
rative inquiry itself. In any case, a brief synopsis of the novel here will help 
lay groundwork for the ensuing analysis.
 On Chesil Beach opens in medias res with two inexperienced and under-
informed newlyweds trying to navigate the complexities of their wedding 
night on the eve of the sexual revolution in england in 1962. The first sen-
tence sets the scene: “They were young, educated, and both virgins on this, 
their wedding night, and they lived in a time when a conversation about sex-
ual difficulties was plainly impossible” (3). The first part of the novel explores 
the characters’ states of mind as they sit down to dinner in their honeymoon 
suite in a Georgian inn on the Dorset coast. For edward Mayhew, the groom, 
and the son of a father who is headmaster of a primary school and a mother 
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who suffered brain damage because of a freak accident on a railway platform, 
the idea of having sex with his new wife is at once tantalizing and a source 
of worry. But for Florence Mayhew (née Ponting), a professional musician-
in-the-making whose mother is a professor of philosophy and whose father 
owns an electronics company, the prospect of consummating her marriage 
with edward causes a deep, paralyzing anxiety.18 Thus, whereas edward 
“merely suffered conventional first-night nerves, [Florence] experienced a 
visceral dread, a helpless disgust as palpable as seasickness” (8).
 From this point until the final ten pages of Mcewan’s 203-page novel, the 
narrative alternates between, on the one hand, periodic shifts back in time 
that provide information about the main characters’ family backgrounds, 
life stories, and courtship and, on the other hand, a detailed, blow-by-blow 
recounting of the events of the present moment. The present-day events lead 
up to what proves to be a disastrous attempt at sexual intercourse by edward 
and Florence and an angry, marriage-ending exchange on the beach—Chesil 
Beach—afterward. Then, in the final portion of the novel, the pace of narra-
tion speeds up drastically, covering some forty years of story time in about 
5 percent of the page space used previously to narrate events lasting just a 
few hours. Most of this final section is refracted through the vantage point 
of edward, who eventually comes to the realization that though all “[Flor-
ence] needed was the certainty of his love, and his reassurance that there was 
no hurry when a lifetime lay ahead of them” (202), on that night on Chesil 
Beach he had nonetheless “stood in cold and righteous silence in the sum-
mer’s dusk, watching her hurry along the shore, the sound of her difficult 
progress lost to the breaking of small waves, until she was a blurred, reced-
ing point against the immense straight road of shingle gleaming in the pallid 
light” (203).
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antimimetic, Unnatural, and Postmodern 
Narrative Theory
Brian richardson
Fictional representation may take several forms. There is a realistic tradition, 
which I will call “mimetic,” that attempts to provide narrators, characters, 
events, and settings that more or less resemble those of our quotidian expe-
rience. Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina is a paradigmatic example of this form; it 
attempts to reproduce in the fiction the salient features of typical people and 
the historical world of mid-nineteenth-century Russia. By contrast, antimi-
metic or antirealist modes of narrative representation play with, exaggerate, 
or parody the conventions of mimetic representation; often, they foreground 
narrative elements and events that are wildly implausible or palpably impos-
sible in the real world. Nabokov’s Ada, or Ardor (1969), for example, opens 
by quoting a mistranslation of the first sentence of Anna Karenina and goes 
on to construct a parallel universe, Antiterra, that regularly parodies various 
literary representations of the actual world. It should be noted from the out-
set that most postmodern works of fiction are antimimetic narratives; insofar 
as they problematize their own ontological status, they are by that very fact 
antimimetic.19
 virtually every narrative has two aspects, one mimetic, the other arti-
factual; one concerning what is represented, the other how it is represented. 
Furthermore, nearly every narrative represents some portion of the world 
we inhabit in one way or another, and it does so in a particular manner. That 
manner of representation may be conventional or unconventional, stylized 
or straightforward, unmarked or outrageous, clumsy or artistic; it is always 
constructed. Mimetic narratives typically try to conceal their constructed-
ness and appear to resemble nonfictional narratives, while antimimetic nar-
ratives flaunt their artificiality and break the ontological boundaries that 
mimetic works so carefully preserve. Henry James once objected to Anthony 
Trollope’s narrators’ unnatural practice of suggesting to the reader that the 
events in the novel did not really happen and that they could therefore give 
the story any turn they chose; James felt such admissions were “a betrayal of 
a sacred office,” even a “serious crime,” by the novelist (30). Insofar as a work 
strives to adhere to a mimetic framework, such a practice is a significant vio-
lation, even a betrayal. But of course the author of a work of fiction can give 
the events any turn he or she prefers; at these moments, Trollope is following 
instead the more playful, antimimetic role of the anti-illusionistic writer who 
acknowledges the fictionality of the fiction.
 My own work is part of a larger critical and theoretical movement known 
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as “unnatural narratology”; in what follows, I will use the term “unnatural” 
as a synonym for “antimimetic.” Other theorists of unnatural narratives have 
rather different perspectives and provide alternative or adjacent definitions; 
among the most notable of these is Jan Alber’s statement that unnatural nar-
ratives are those that include physically or logically impossible scenarios or 
events (Alber 2009; for a comparison of such definitions, see Alber, Iversen, 
Nielsen, and Richardson, forthcoming). Thus, not every theorist working 
within the domain of unnatural narratology would subscribe to the claims 
I develop in the pages that follow. Finally, I wish to note that while I will 
be focusing on Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children as my primary text, I will also 
allude to a wide range of even more extreme works in order to indicate the 
scope, extent, and significance of antimimetic strategies in texts that for too 
long have been dismissed or neglected as minor, marginal, or transitory.20
 In nearly all approaches to narrative theory, past and present, there is a 
significant and unusual gap: a sustained neglect of antimimetic narratives 
and, most importantly, an absence of comprehensive theoretical formula-
tions capable of encompassing these works. Most narrative theories are thus 
substantially incomplete. Nearly all are based on mimetic presuppositions 
and start from the position that narrators are rather like human storytellers, 
that characters resemble people, that the settings and events we encounter 
in a narrative are comparable to those we might meet up with in life, and 
that readers process characters and events in a work of fiction roughly in the 
same manner that they comprehend people and events in daily experience. 
This mimetic approach is useful; all authors striving for realism or verisi-
militude will naturally try to reproduce the conditions of lived experience; 
thus, an author of a novel written in the first person will try to approximate 
as closely as possible the conventions of an autobiography. This is why the 
terms “true to life,” “lifelike,” “faithful,” “realistic,” and other synonyms have 
been terms of high praise for many fictional works.
 Of course, not all narratives strive to be mimetic. Nonmimetic works 
of fantasy, for example, postulate very different worlds, entities, and behav-
iors. More radically, antimimetic narratives refuse to obey or openly flout 
mimetic conventions; instead of imitating nonfictional discourses, they tra-
duce their conventions. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy (1776) 
does not reproduce the form of an autobiography, it travesties it. Tristram 
begins his narrative with the story of his own conception and then devotes 
so many chapters to explaining the family circumstances before and during 
his natal state that he doesn’t get around to narrating his birth until a couple 
of hundred pages into his story. The narrator of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s 
Children (1980), Saleem Sinai, has the same problem. More radical is Anto-
1 :  I n T r o d U C T I o n
22
nio Machado de Assis’s Posthumous Memoirs of Bras Cubas (1888), a Shan-
dean memoir written after the death of its author, and still more unnatural 
is e. T. A. Hoffmann’s Life and Opinions of the Tomcat Murr (1822), which 
purports to be the memoirs of a cat inappropriately interspersed within the 
biography of a man. Most extreme is Beckett’s The Unnamable, composed by 
someone who does not know who or what he is and who cannot in fact dif-
ferentiate himself from others. Alain Robbe-Grillet has succinctly articulated 
the viewpoint of the antimimetic author. He refuses “to reproduce a pre-
existing reality” (New 146); he chooses instead to create that which has never 
existed. He further notes, “I do not transcribe, I construct. This had even 
been the old ambition of Flaubert: to make something out of nothing, some-
thing that would stand alone, without having to lean on anything external to 
the work” (162). Robbe-Grillet and numerous authors like him do not wish 
to reproduce the world of our experience; they want instead to create original 
or unprecedented scenes, figures, progressions, and worlds. Their works are 
part of an alternative tradition that has not yet been properly accounted for 
by narrative theory.
 Antimimetic narrative theory attempts to provide a conceptual frame-
work for works that refuse to follow the conventions of ordinary storytelling 
(or conversational “natural narratives”) or mimetic (realistic) forms of nar-
rative representation. Antimimetic narratives play with, ignore, or transgress 
these conventions. A natural or a realistic narrative has a speaker, recogniz-
able characters, a set of related events with a certain degree of “tellability,” a 
consistent ontological frame, and a more or less defined audience. But anti-
mimetic narratives challenge rather than conform to these conventions. If a 
natural narrative consists of someone telling someone else that something 
significant has happened within a recognizable storyworld, an antimimetic 
narrative may contest each of the terms in this statement. More specifically, 
it may dispense with a single, consistent, human-like speaker, using only 
inconsistent, nonhuman, or collapsed voices; it may represent insubstantial 
or inconsistent fictional artifices rather than human figures; it may recount 
events that seem unworthy of being narrated or that are hopelessly confused 
or contradictory; it may locate these events in an unrecognizable kind of 
world; it may project a receiver of the story that is as unusual as its narrator.
 When doing narrative theory and analysis, we must recognize the cen-
tral, crucial status of fiction. No matter how closely it tries to imitate nonfic-
tional discourses, narrative fiction is always a very different kind of speech 
act. Its functions, intentions, and effects diverge substantially from those 
of nonfiction. Nonfiction is falsifiable and can be tested against other non-
fictional accounts of the same events; fiction can never be falsified by real-
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world sources. Fiction offers narrating animals, corpses, and even machines; 
in the actual world, only humans can narrate. Temporal sequences that are 
impossible in the real world, contradictory spatial configurations, and the 
inversion of causal sequences where the effect precedes its cause can exist 
only in a work of fiction. Fictional characters can personify ideas as part of 
a larger allegory, they can be known more intimately than the people around 
us can be, and characters can even realize that they are fictional creations. 
The fundamental nature of the difference between fiction and nonfiction is 
most prominent once death appears. In fiction, characters can plead with 
their authors to spare their lives, temporality can be run backwards so that 
the dead come back to life, or a figure can die several times in fiction and 
miraculously  be alive again in the next chapter. In life, there is only one 
death, and it is irreversible.
 Salman Rushdie provides an excellent example of this crucial difference. 
Part way through  Midnight’s Children, the narrator, Saleem Sinai, realizes 
that he has made a mistake: “Rereading my work, I have discovered an error 
in chronology. The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi occurs, in these pages, 
on the wrong date” (189–90). Saleem, however, does not correct his text: 
“in my India, Gandhi will continue to die at the wrong time” (190). In a 
work of fiction, an author can kill off any character, even historical ones, at 
any time. Rushdie’s deliberate reconfiguring of historical events in a work 
of fiction is not merely a game. Instead, it is pointedly juxtaposed with and 
powerfully opposed to the Pakistani government’s falsification of historical 
facts. Thus, during the invasion of east Pakistan, we read “Shaheed and I saw 
many things which were not true, which were not possible, because our boys 
would not, could not, behave so badly; we saw men in spectacles with heads 
like eggs being shot in side-streets, we saw the intelligentsia of the city being 
massacred by the hundred, but it was not true because it could not have been 
true” (432). Saleem reenacts in a satirical manner the government’s censor-
ship of news of these actual atrocities. We are vividly shown the difference 
between altering the historical record in a work of fiction and falsifying his-
torical facts in nonfictional discourse. The former is a serious kind of play, 
the latter a sordid lie.
narraTIve Theory  has long had a bias toward the representational aspects 
of narrative. At the very inception of narrative theory is the Poetics of Aris-
totle, with its pronounced focus on mimesis and lifelike representations of 
human behavior. Literary theory from the Renaissance to the nineteenth cen-
tury continued to insist on literature’s duty to “hold a mirror up to nature,” 
1 :  I n T r o d U C T I o n
24
and nearly all twentieth- and twenty-first-century narrative theories are like-
wise grounded in a mimetic conception of narrative. This is even true of a 
theoretical approach like structuralism that purports to sidestep questions of 
representation and bears no particular allegiance to mimesis. Nevertheless, 
it often limited itself to mimetic models. The central category of the highly 
influential structuralist account of narrative time, for example, is that of 
“order,” or the way the story (fabula) is actually arranged in the text (sjuzhet). 
Such a conception is perfectly adequate for all nonfictional works and for 
most works of fiction. One event comes earlier or later in the story; it is pre-
sented either earlier or later in the text. We can say “World War I preceded 
World War II” or we can say “World War II was preceded by World War I”; 
though the order in which the events are presented (the sjuzhet) is different 
in each sentence, the sequence of events in the story (the fabula) remains the 
same. As long as we are dealing with nonfiction or fiction that imitates the 
conventions of nonfiction, there is no problem. However, the many works 
that do not have a single, recoverable story or a single, fixed presentation are 
necessarily omitted from this account; we will need to reconceptualize the 
entire nature of the representation of temporality if we are to have a complete 
theory that includes the unnatural and impossible chronologies that exist 
only in fiction. As we will see, attention to antimimetic narratives regularly 
demands that we extend or reconstruct basic categories of narrative theory.
 Antimimetic narratives have been around since the time of Aristophanes 
and Petronius, and they were common in the Middle Ages (dream visions, 
Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel) and the Renaissance (especially Shake-
speare’s more fanciful and self-conscious dramas such as The Winter’s Tale). 
Antimimetic strategies inform the entire tradition of works inspired by Tris-
tram Shandy and are especially prominent in postmodern fiction and the 
theater of the absurd. Popular narrative media are also well stocked with 
antimimetic series and genres, from tongue-in-cheek Broadway musicals 
to comic books to children’s cartoons to the Bob Hope–Bing Crosby “road” 
movies. even natural narrative contains its own antimimetic examples, like 
the “shaggy dog” story that continues endlessly or the more extreme kind of 
tall tale.
 There are several reasons why antimimetic narratives need to be included 
within narrative theory. Such an inclusion will allow us to have a comprehen-
sive theory of narrative rather than merely a theory of mimetic narratives; it 
will enable us to come to terms theoretically with some of the most interesting 
literature of our time: avant-garde, late modernist, and postmodern; it helps 
us understand and appreciate the distinctive nature of narrative fiction; and 
it provides a set of terms and concepts for the analysis of hypertext fiction. 
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In addition, the inclusion of antimimetic works opens up to narrative theory 
a vast segment of the history of literature that has until now been largely 
excluded. Including unnatural narratives reconnects modern experimental 
literature with experimental work in other genres, especially painting, whose 
extreme, unnatural, antirealist, impossible, and nonrepresentational works 
have provided inspiration for writers of prose for over a century. Finally, the 
goal of narrative theory is to provide a theoretical account of all narratives. 
A theory of narrative that excludes antimimetic works is as incomplete as 
a theory of art that treated all art as representational and could not discuss 
abstract art. The goal of my work is to expand or re-form the categories of 
narrative theory so that it is able to circumscribe these playful and outra-
geous kinds of texts.
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 1. See, for example, Prince’s “On a Postcolonial Narratology.” [RW]
 2. I am referring to Genette’s many disclaimers in Narrative Discourse: An Essay in 
Method. [RW]
 3. For a classic discussion of this link between experimental fiction and feminism 
that greatly influenced feminist narratology, see duPlessis. [RW]
 4. See, for example, Aldama’s Your Brain on Latino Comics. His corpus is made up 
of pointedly non-meanstream texts; in keeping with the larger project of cognitive nar-
rative theory, however, his work is focused on the commonalties among human brains 
and bodies. [RW]
 5. I am referring to the mid-1980s, when Susan Lanser’s work and my own first 
began defining the term “feminist narratology.” See Lanser, “Towards a Feminist Nar-
ratology,” and Warhol, Gendered Interventions. [RW]
 6. As will become clear in what follows, I use the term “referential” in a broader 
sense than does Dorrit Cohn in The Distinction of Fiction, for example. Discussing ideas 
also explored by theorists such as Philippe Lejeune, Lubomír Doležel (Heterocosmica), 
and Marie-Laure Ryan (Possible Worlds), Cohn argues that fictional narratives are non-
referential because, in contrast with historiography, journalistic reports, biographies, 
autobiographies, and other narrative modes falling within the domain of nonfiction, 
fictional works are not subject to judgments of truth and falsity (15). As Cohn writes, “in 
fictional poetics, though the concept of reference has recently been reinstated, its qualifi-
cation by such terms as fictive, nonostensive, or pseudo- sufficiently indicates its nonfac-
tual connotations, even when it denotes components of the fictional world taken directly 
from the world of reality” (113). In my approaches to the present volume, however, I 
link worldmaking to “the referential dimension of narrative” to preserve the intuition 
that fictional as well as nonfictional narratives consist of sequences of referring expres-
sions (see also Schiffrin), whose nature and scope will vary depending on the storytelling 
medium involved. Through these referring expressions, narratives prompt interpreters 
to co-construct a discourse model or model-world—that is, a storyworld—containing 
the situations, events, and entities indexed by world-evoking expressions at issue (for 
further discussion, see Herman, Basic Elements and Story Logic). In other words, narra-
tives refer to model-worlds, whether they are the imagined, autonomous model-worlds 
of fiction or the model-worlds about which nonfictional accounts make claims that are 
subject to falsification. [DH]
 7. With signified and signifier, compare story (fabula) and discourse (sjuzhet). [DH]
 8. In Basic Elements, I more fully characterize narrative as a mode of representation 
that (a) must be interpreted in light of a specific discourse context or occasion for tell-
ing; (b) focuses on a structured time-course of particularized events; (c) concerns itself 
with some kind of disruption or disequilibrium in a storyworld inhabited by intelligent 
agents; and (d) conveys what it is like for those agents to live through the storyworld-
in-flux. [DH]
 9. Compare Brenner’s account of how, for Wittgenstein, “[p]hilosophical investiga-
tion recollects the grammar of terms that are deeply embedded in everyday language” 
(7). [DH]
 10. Here I am drawing on Wittgenstein’s discussion, in section 122 of the Philosophi-
cal Investigations, of the key concept of “surveyability.” Suggesting that the purpose of 
philosophy is to provide an overview or survey of the different ways in which uses of 
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words fit together in a language, Wittgenstein writes: “A main source of our failure to 
understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words.—Our grammar 
is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of 
understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’” (54). [DH]
 11. For more on the scope and aims of the project of metanarratology, see Herman, 
“Formal Models.” [DH]
 12. As Goodman puts it, “If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell me how it 
is under one or more frames of reference; but if I insist that you tell me how it is apart 
from all frames, what can you say? We are confined to ways of describing whatever is 
described. Our universe, so to speak, consists of these ways rather than of a world or of 
worlds” (2–3). Compare Merlin Donald’s complementary account of the evolution and 
functions of mimesis or “mimetic skill.” For Donald, such skill “usually incorporates 
both mimicry and imitation to a higher end, that of re-enacting and re-presenting an 
event or relationship” (169). Hence, extended to the social realm, mimetic skill “results 
in a collective conceptual ‘model’ of society” (173). See also my contribution to Part 
Two. [DH]
 13. See chapter 5 for analogous remarks concerning the need to reassess the gram-
mar of questions about narrative that feature the concept of “Theory of Mind.” [DH]
 14. In characterizing narrative texts as blueprints for building storyworlds, I am 
drawing on Reddy’s critique of what he termed the “conduit metaphor” for communica-
tive processes (see Green, 10–13, for a useful discussion). Reddy suggested that rather 
than being mere vessels or vehicles for channeling thoughts, ideas, and meanings back 
and forth, utterances are like blueprints, planned artifacts whose design is tailored to the 
goal of enabling an interlocutor to reconstruct the situations or worlds after which the 
blueprints are patterned. Further, in contrast with the conduit metaphor, which blames 
miscommunication on a poorly chosen linguistic vessel, the blueprint analogy predicts 
that completely successful interpretation of communicative designs will be rare—given 
the complexity of the processes involved in planning, executing, and making sense of 
the blueprints. Hence my emphasis in this volume on the defeasibility of inferences 
about story creators’ intentions. [DH]
 15. Relevant studies include Doležel; Duchan, Bruder, and Hewitt; emmott; Gerrig; 
Herman, Story Logic and Basic Elements; Pavel; Ryan, Possible; and Werth. [DH]
 16. Conversely, Donald explores how narrative, among other semiotic and thus 
cultural practices, itself contributed to the development of humans’ cognitive abilities 
(201–68). [DH]
 17. There are as yet few critical studies of this recently published text. But see Head, 
“Novella,” and, for background on the novel’s composition, Zalewski, who reports that 
Timothy Garton Ash’s comments on an early draft caused Mcewan to remove more ex-
plicit references to Florence’s sexual abuse at the hands of her father (see my discussion 
in chapter 3). Meanwhile, Head’s Ian McEwan provides invaluable insights into Mce-
wan’s oeuvre prior to the publication of On Chesil Beach. [DH]
 18. Readers of On Chesil Beach familiar with Ford Madox Ford’s 1915 novel The 
Good Soldier will recognize that the first names of Mcewan’s two main characters echo 
those of edward Ashburnham and Florence Dowell, whose ill-fated, destructive affair is 
narrated ex post facto—and through a complex layering of time-frames—by Florence’s 
perversely obtuse husband, John Dowell. [DH]
 19. There are still other forms of representation as well, such as what I call the non-
mimetic, that includes genres like fairy tales, animal fables, and fantasy, whose charac-
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ters and events do not primarily reproduce people and situations in life. Thus, it does 
not make sense to say that the depiction of a particular fairy or talking pig is realistic 
or unrealistic. Antimimetic authors can also parody these forms as well, as we see in 
Angela Carter’s postmodern rewrites of classical fairy tales. In my sections I will be con-
cerned with narratives that are predominantly and, in fact, flagrantly antimimetic, since 
I find antimimetic texts more challenging than nonmimietic narratives in the ways they 
contest the conventions of nonfictional and realistic representation. [BR]
 20. For further reading on these issues, see Alber and Heinze; Alber, Iver sen, 
Nielsen, and Richardson (2010); Richardson, “Narrative Poetics”; and the Unnatural 
Narratology website homepage http://nordisk.au.dk/forskning/forskningscentre/nrl/
unnatural/. [BR]
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James Phelan and Peter J. rabinowitz
“Somebody tells.” This chapter will begin to sketch out the rhetorical tangles 
around the apparently simple phrase that begins our definition. Reading lit-
erary narrative is typically more difficult than reading, say, physics textbooks 
because the “somebody” who tells is neither simple nor stable—and because 
the resulting complexity and instability are not weaknesses to be minimized 
but key components of the experience, including the particular pleasures it 
brings.
 Most obviously, from the rhetorical perspective, in many texts (includ-
ing all fictional narrative) the somebody who tells is split into at least two 
figures, the author and the narrator. There’s little need to rehearse this dis-
tinction here: it’s something pointed out in nearly every manual on narrative 
fiction, and it’s something that children learn fairly quickly. Only the most 
unschooled reader doesn’t understand that Huck is not Twain. But while the 
distinction itself is relatively unproblematic, there are complications with 
each of the terms. Furthermore, once we shift our attention to “narration,” 
we need to recognize that authors often use the dialogue between characters 
to accomplish telling functions.
aUThorS
Surprisingly, it’s the concept of “author” that nowadays generates the greater 
authors, Narrators, Narration
2
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theoretical wrangling. Two issues are particularly vexed. First, especially in 
the wake of poststructuralism’s provocative proclamation of “The Death of 
the Author,” there is serious disagreement about whether we should be talk-
ing about authors at all, especially about authors as . .  . well, authorities on 
or even designers of texts whose designs are of any significant consequence 
for interpretation—if they can be recovered at all. As committed pluralists, 
we believe that the question ought not to be posed as an either/or: valuable 
critical work can be done by ignoring authors and their purposes, and just 
as valuable work can be done by attending to them. A purely formal descrip-
tion such as vladimir Propp’s account of the grammar of Russian folktales, 
can be highly illuminating without any discussion of authorial participation. 
So too can an ideologically oriented analysis such as D. A. Miller’s Foucauld-
ian account in The Novel and the Police of victorian fiction’s role in enforc-
ing certain cultural prescriptions. But to the extent that you are considering 
narrative as a communicative process, then authors, and their communicative 
purposes, matter: there can be no rhetoric without a rhetor. Our commit-
ment to pluralism interacts with our commitment to rhetorical theory in our 
claim that viewing narrative as a communicative process is one valuable (and 
widely practiced) way of thinking and that certain consequences follow from 
looking at narrative in this way.
 In stressing the author’s decisive role, however, we are not suggesting 
that the task of interpretation (or the goal of reading) should be reduced 
to the discovery of the author’s conscious intentions. As we noted in the 
introduction, we account for the effects of narrative by reference to a feed-
back loop among authorial agency, textual phenomena, and reader response. 
Furthermore, the exercise of authorial agency entails necessary sacrifices: 
as Wayne C. Booth—whose 1961 book The Rhetoric of Fiction persuasively 
demonstrated the advantages of approaching narrative as rhetorical action—
eloquently argues, the choice to do one thing inevitably blocks your ability 
to do other things. For example, once Twain decides to tie Huck’s growing 
ethical maturity to his ability to negotiate the conflict between his feelings 
for Jim as a man and his sense of how whites act toward slaves, Twain has 
to set his novel before the Civil War, which in turn means that there are cer-
tain of his favorite themes (for instance, his criticisms of postwar economic 
excesses) that he cannot take up. Then, too, there can be unintended (or 
sometimes unanticipated) consequences of some things an author chooses to 
do: as Ralph Rader has pointed out, certain “indirect facts” of the text, certain 
aspects of a text pointed to by persistent responses to it—for example, the 
impression that Milton’s God in Paradise Lost speaks like a school divine—
may be “simply . . . the unintended and unavoidable negative consequence of 
31
J a m e S  p h e l a n  a n d  p e T e r  J .  r a b I n o W I T z
the artist’s positive constructive intention” (in order to justify the ways of 
God to men, Milton needed to have God speak, but it was inevitable that the 
transcendent Being would sound disappointingly human) (Rader 38).
 Still, such authorial limitations do not undermine our key point: once 
you decide to take a rhetorical perspective, the best way to make initial sense 
of texts is to treat them as if they are intended to be made sense of—and then, 
once we’ve reconstructed that multidimensional sense, we can take the next 
step of evaluating the author’s communication. Thus, when Huck heartlessly 
answers Aunt Sally’s question about whether anybody was hurt by the blown-
out cylinder head—“‘No’m. Killed a nigger’”—and when she replies equally 
heartlessly—“‘Well, it’s lucky; because sometimes people do get hurt’”—as 
rhetorical theorists we can reasonably assume that Twain designed those 
responses as something for us to interpret. He didn’t want us to stop at their 
literal meaning but wanted us to go further, to decide what they reveal about 
each character, how those revelations influence our ethical judgments of 
them, and how the exchange affects our understanding of the larger narra-
tive. Those decisions may not be easy—is Huck reverting to his old self? is 
he simply playing a role for safety?—but they become either impossible or 
arbitrary if we don’t assume that someone chose those words for a reason. 
Once we make those decisions about the implied Twain’s reasons, we are in 
a good position to evaluate his choices, including the specific diction and 
syntax of the exchange, his placement of it at this point in the progression, 
and, indeed, his decision to include it at all. In contrast, deciding to censure 
or defend Twain’s choice before considering his purposes typically means 
projecting our values onto Twain’s novel—and thus forgoing our chance to 
understand its designs on us, much less to be influenced by them.
 While our most important commitment is to the role of authorial agency 
in narrative communication, we also endorse the concept of the implied 
author that Booth introduced in The Rhetoric of Fiction. Booth defined the 
implied author as the version of himself or herself whom the actual author 
constructs and who communicates through the myriad choices—conscious, 
intuitive, or even unconscious—that he or she makes in composing and 
revising a narrative. The concept has subsequently been contested, with 
some theorists such as Gérard Genette—and our collaborator David Her-
man—saying that it is unnecessary and others such as Mieke Bal saying that 
it is too imprecise. At the same time, others have found it very valuable. We 
side with the last group for a number of reasons:
 1. It recognizes that writing narrative is inevitably an act of self-presenta-
tion. Booth points out the often significant difference between the biographi-
cal authors we learn about from reading their biographies (or even from 
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personal acquaintance) and the versions of those authors we come to know 
from encountering them in their narratives. Not all writers are self-conscious 
as they create their implied authors, but many—like Mark Twain—are. In his 
texts, Samuel Clemens constructed an image of himself (or more accurately 
a series of images of himself) that he believed deserved its own name. Strik-
ingly, that name and the dominant image associated with it had effects that 
the biographical Clemens could not completely control: for example, many 
of his occasional political writings from the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury remained unpublished at the time he wrote them at least partly because 
they upset the image of the implied author of the popular texts.
 The concept of the implied author also gives us purchase on a number 
of serious social and historical questions that are otherwise hard to navigate. 
Consider, for instance, the relations between gay writers and the images of 
themselves they construct when writing under conditions that make com-
ing out dangerous. Consider, alternatively, the literature of self-justification, 
works by authors who are trying to present selves that counter widespread 
criticism of their actions (for instance, the multiple “authors” of the film On 
the Waterfront, some of whom were at least in part trying to present their 
decisions to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 
a favorable light).
 2. It gives us a useful way to talk about intention. A rhetorical approach 
is inevitably tied up with intention; yet, as many critics have rightly pointed 
out, the actual intentions of the actual author are often—even usually—
unknowable. Furthermore, the actual author is not always the best judge 
of his design. ernest Hemingway, when asked about an apparent contra-
diction in the attribution of dialogue to the two waiters in “A Clean, Well-
Lighted Place,” said that he thought the story was fine. But after his death, 
some Hemingway critics persuaded his publisher Scribners’ that the implied 
Hemingway could not have intended the contradiction and so Scribners’ 
agreed to amend the text (rightly in our view). More generally, the aim of the 
rhetorical approach is not to determine the conscious intention of the actual 
author (although, if available, that may be one piece of relevant information) 
but rather to discern the system of intentionality that explains why the text 
has this particular shape rather than some other one.
 3. It helps explain why we often come to know different versions of the 
same actual author in different texts. The version of himself that Twain 
constructs in Adventures of Tom Sawyer is far less pessimistic than the ver-
sion he constructs in “The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg,” much less 
“The United States of Lyncherdom.” The attitudes toward women in the 
implied ernest Hemingway’s “The Short, Happy Life of Francis Macomber” 
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are markedly different from the attitudes toward women in his “Hills Like 
White elephants.” In these cases, we have the same actual author but distinct 
implied authors.
 4. It gives us a way to talk about texts with problematic authorship. This 
includes, for instance, ghostwritten, anonymous, and fraudulent texts. It also 
includes collaboratively written texts (such as the one we’re writing here): the 
two (or more) actual authors construct a hybrid version of their actual selves, 
and it is that hybrid version that readers come to know.
 We want to stress that in our view the implied author, though knowable 
through the text, is not a textual construct equivalent to one of the characters 
but rather the agent who constructs the text. In other words, in the light of 
our main commitment, to authorial agency, we are less invested in the dis-
tinction between actual and implied author than we are in the view that texts 
are not collections of free-floating signifiers but purposive communicative 
actions designed by some authorial agent.  At the same time, as we noted in 
our introduction, we are interested in analytic categories only to the extent 
that they have some significant payoff—and we recognize that in many criti-
cal discussions the key distinction is between authorial agency and textual 
free play rather than between the actual and the implied author. In those 
cases, we will often use the name of the author to cover both the real author 
and the implied author.1
narraTorS
One of the most important choices an author makes is about the kind of nar-
rator to employ. Working in a specific context—in particular, trying to coun-
ter the prevalent orthodoxy that placed “showing” in a position over “telling,” 
and trying to get beyond the easy, but misleading, distinction between first- 
and third-person narration—Booth was especially concerned with the dis-
tinction between dramatized and undramatized narrators. His most durable 
contribution, though, was his development of the concept of the “unreliable 
narrator.”
 Booth’s initial conception was relatively simple: a narrator is “reliable 
when he or she speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work 
(which is to say, the implied author’s norms), unreliable when he does not” 
(158–59). Since then, however, rhetorical narrative theorists have intro-
duced a number of refinements. For instance, Jim has developed a distinc-
tion between restricted narration and unreliable narration2 and a taxonomy 
of six types of unreliability. Both developments arise from his observation 
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that narrators perform three primary tasks: they report (along the axis of 
facts, characters, and events), interpret (along the axis of knowledge or per-
ception), and evaluate (along the axis of ethics). When a narrator performs 
only one of the three tasks and the author uses that restriction to communi-
cate something that the narrator is unaware of, the implied author is using 
restricted narration. In the most common kind of restricted narration, the 
implied author will have a naïve narrator reliably report the events but not 
attempt to interpret or evaluate them, and in so doing communicate an 
interpretation or evaluation that is beyond the capacity of the naïve narra-
tor. Here’s an example from Huckleberry Finn: “Tom Sawyer, he hunted me 
up, and said he was going to start a band of robbers, and I might join if I 
would go back to the widow and be respectable. So I went back” (32). Twain 
restricts Huck to the task of reliably reporting events, thereby implying that 
Huck fails to grasp the irony of what he reports: the contradiction in Tom’s 
logic that allows him to use respectability as an eligibility condition for join-
ing a band of robbers.
 When a narrator performs any of the three tasks inadequately (as mea-
sured against how the implied author would perform it), then we have 
unreliable narration. But narrators can be inadequate in two main ways: by 
distorting things or by failing to go far enough. Consequently, narrators can 
be unreliable by misreporting, misinterpreting, and misevaluating (in these 
cases readers need to reject the narrator’s version and, if possible, replace it 
with another one) and by underreporting, underreading, and underevaluat-
ing (in these cases readers need to supplement the narrator’s version).
 Just as significant is Jim’s more recent distinction between estranging 
unreliability (“unreliable narration that underlines or increases the distance 
between the narrator and the reader”) and bonding unreliability (“unreliable 
narration that reduces the distance between the narrator and the reader”) 
(Phelan, “estranging” 222–23). In the wake of Booth’s work, the default posi-
tion was that unreliability served to distance us from the narrator—to be 
an unreliable narrator was, ipso facto, to be somehow deficient (in particu-
lar, given Booth’s ethical emphases, morally deficient). But in fact our rela-
tions to unreliable narrators, like our relations to other people, are more 
complex than this kind of judgmental clarity would suggest, and authors 
use this complexity to create a range of emotional and ethical effects. The 
bonding/estranging distinction recognizes that with unreliable narration, 
this range extends from affective and ethical repulsion at one end to affective 
sympathy and ethical admiration at the other. Booth’s original conception 
privileged the relationship of reader and implied author: “the emotions and 
judgments of the implied author are . . . the very stuff out of which great fic-
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tion is made” (86)—and Booth eloquently demonstrated how sharing those 
emotions and judgments often involves our communion with the implied 
author either through her surrogate, the reliable narrator (as in Jane Austen’s 
Emma) or “behind [the] back” (Rhetoric 159) of the unreliable narrator (as 
in Ring Lardner’s “Haircut”). Recognizing bonding effects illuminates the 
importance of a different kind of communion accompanying the behind-
the-back connection of unreliability: a communion between readers and a 
narrator who could never be mistaken for the implied author’s surrogate. In 
this way, the bonding/estranging distinction adds an important dimension 
to our understanding of the workings of narrative communication.
 We can clarify these theoretical points by exploring the varying nature 
and effects of unreliable narration in Huckleberry Finn. First, a fairly simple 
example: Huck describes the widow Douglas’s response to his return to her 
home this way: “The widow she cried over me, and called me a poor lost 
lamb, and she called me a lot of other names, too, but, she never meant no 
harm by it” (32). This passage uses a combination of reliable reporting, misin-
terpreting, and underevaluating in the service of bonding effects. Huck mis-
interprets the widow’s joyous religious references as name-calling because he 
doesn’t recognize the New Testament source—and that misinterpreting leads 
him to undervalue the ethical quality of her response. yet this comic failure 
of understanding simultaneously reveals a moral strength. Although Huck’s 
ignorance means that he fails to grasp both the extent of the widow’s joy and 
her beliefs about what his return means, Twain demonstrates that Huck’s 
ethical compass is sufficiently sensitive for him to appreciate that she “never 
meant no harm.” Again, the overall effects are to bring us affectively and ethi-
cally closer to Huck even as we continue to register our interpretive distance 
from him. Simply to call him an “unreliable narrator” fails to capture these 
effects and, consequently, is itself a kind of underinterpreting.
 The same kind of interplay—with more subtlety and greater conse-
quences—marks Huck’s self-examination in Chapter XXXI, which leads to 
his famous decision to go to hell rather than inform Miss Watson of Jim’s 
whereabouts.
I know very well why [the words of my prayer] wouldn’t come. It was 
because my heart warn’t right; it was because I warn’t square; it was because 
I was playing double. I was letting on to give up sin, but away inside me I 
was holding on to the biggest one of all. I was trying to make my mouth 
say I would do the right thing and the clean thing, and go and write to that 
nigger’s owner and tell where he was; but deep down in me I knowed it 
was a lie—and He knowed it. you can’t pray a lie—I found that out. (200)
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Here we have a case of misevaluating being used for bonding effects. Huck 
judges himself to be ethically deficient, while the implied Twain guides us to 
judge Huck’s inability to act against Jim’s interest as a sign that he is acting 
according to a higher ethical standard.
 Huck then writes the letter to Miss Watson, revealing Jim’s location, so 
that he’ll be able to pray for help to stop sinning. He immediately feels better; 
but before he prays, he starts thinking about the River trip:
And I got to thinking over our trip down the River; and I see Jim before 
me, all the time, in the day, and in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, 
sometimes storms, and we a floating along, talking, and singing, and 
laughing. But somehow I couldn’t seem to strike no places to harden me 
against him, but only the other kind. . . . and at last I struck the time I saved 
him by telling the men we had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, 
and said I was the best friend old Jim ever had in the world, and the only 
one he’s got now; and then I happened to see to look around, and see that 
paper. (200–201)
At this moment, Huck is reliable as reporter, interpreter, and evaluator—and 
this burst of insight serves to reinforce the previous bonding unreliability. 
It does so by revealing the ethical heart of Huck’s previous misevaluating, 
showing us that it applies not to his judgments of Jim but to his conception 
of “the right thing and the clean thing” in this situation. To send the letter 
would be to follow the dictates of conventional Christianity, but it would 
simultaneously follow the dictates of a slave society that has used Christi-
anity as one of its buttresses. Huck intuitively recognizes that by following 
both sets of dictates, he would be going against everything his experience of 
Jim has taught him about the right and clean thing to do. Thus, when Huck 
makes his decision to tear up that paper and—in a return to unreliability—
evaluates his action most negatively, we feel our strongest sympathy and our 
greatest ethical approval of his actions.
“All right, then, I’ll go to hell”—and tore it up.
 It was awful thoughts, and awful words, but they was said. And I let 
them stay said; and never thought no more about reforming. I shoved the 
whole thing out of my head, and said I would take up wickedness again, 
which was in my line, being brung up to it, and the other warn’t. (201)
With this climactic misevaluation, the bonding unreliability reaches its apex. 
In particular, having trained us with comic passages about religion, including 
37
J a m e S  p h e l a n  a n d  p e T e r  J .  r a b I n o W I T z
the one discussed earlier, Twain is now asking us to work through something 
far deeper. On the one hand, there’s still a level of broad comedy, since, for 
Twain and his authorial audience, Huck’s fear of going to hell is just as much 
a superstition as Jim’s fear of taking up a snakeskin in his hand. At the same 
time, we transcend Huck’s misinterpretation and admire the courage that his 
choice reveals. While Huck is sure that he’s damned, Twain’s audience is even 
more certain that he is making the right ethical choice.
 As our tone suggests, we greatly admire Twain’s handling of the relation-
ships among author, narrator, and audience in this passage, and we extend 
our admiration for his craft to the whole first two-thirds of the narrative. In 
chapter 7, which explicitly takes up the question of evaluation, we will dis-
cuss what we regard as Twain’s far less successful narration in the last third 
of the novel, the infamous evasion section.
ConverSaTIon aS narraTIon
One consequence of viewing narrative primarily as a communicative event 
rather than primarily a textual structure is that we are less beholden to the 
distinction between story and discourse than many other theorists. That dis-
tinction neatly separates elements of story (events and existents, including 
settings and characters) from elements of discourse (structure and modes 
of narration) in the interests of analytical precision. In this view, scenes of 
character–character dialogue are part of story, since they are events involv-
ing characters, while any narratorial commentary on the dialogue is part 
of discourse. But from the perspective of rhetorical theory, such analyti-
cal precision comes at the cost of explanatory power, since authors can use 
character–character dialogue both as events and as modes of narration. 
Thus, scenes of character–character dialogue with interspersed narratorial 
commentary often show an author using different resources of narrative 
(characters, the narrator, the occasion of the dialogue) in order to combine 
the representation of an event with reporting, interpreting, and evaluating.
 At the end of Chapter XII, Twain tells about a climactic moment in Huck 
and Jim’s experience on board the wrecked steamboat The Walter Scott. Huck 
has been reporting the conversation he overhears between Jake Packard and 
Bill about whether they should kill Jim Turner, which ends with Packard 
convincing Bill that they can leave the wreck by using its small boat and then 
watch to make sure he drowns when the wreck breaks up. That dialogue itself 
is obviously full of reporting, interpreting, and evaluating, but even more 
salient are the narrative functions of the dialogue between Huck and Jim 
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about what they need to do in light of what Huck has overheard. Huck has 
just heard Jim moan, when Twain gives us the following exchange:
“Quick, Jim, it ain’t no time for fooling around and moaning; there’s a gang 
of murderers in yonder, and if we don’t hunt up their boat and set her drift-
ing down the river so these fellows can’t get away from the wreck, there’s 
one of ’em going to be in a bad fix. But if we find their boat we can put all 
of ’em in a bad fix—for the Sheriff ’ll get ’em. Quick—hurry! I’ll hunt the 
labbard side, you hunt the stabbard. you start at the raft, and—
 “Oh, my lordy, lordy! Raf ’? Dey ain’ no raf ’ no mo,’ she done broke 
loose en gone!—en here we is!” (86–87)
 In Huck’s portion of this dialogue, Twain shows him offering to Jim—and 
by extension to Twain’s actual audience—ethical judgments about “these fel-
lows” as well as interpretive judgments about what he and Jim need to do. 
These judgments are as clear and significant as they would be if Twain had 
switched the mode to Huck’s telling his narratee about how he’d sized up the 
situation. However, by conveying Huck’s judgments in his address to Jim, 
Twain also tells us about the way Huck implicitly trusts Jim even as he shows 
Huck’s instinctively clear ethical judgments and his shrewd strategy for deal-
ing with the situation. Jim’s line in turn reports a significant new event, which 
is itself a serious local complication of the instabilities, along with his affec-
tive response. Twain also invites us to infer the significance of what Jim does 
not say, namely, “I told you so,” since Jim had advised against leaving the raft 
to board The Walter Scott. The larger point here is that Twain is using the 
resources of character-character dialogue as narration by other means.3 
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Who is speaking? To whom? In what circumstances? These most basic ques-
tions of classical narrative theory provide the starting place for a feminist 
narratological study of narration. For a gender-centered analysis, the per-
sonification of narrator and narratee implied in the usage “who?” and “to 
whom?” is entirely appropriate, because feminist narratology so often treats 
a text’s situation of enunciation as if it were an exchange between embodied 
persons. “Who is speaking?” refers not just to the narrator(s) but also to the 
author; “To whom?” asks about actual audience, as well as narratee. And for 
the feminist narratologist “In what circumstances?” means “At what moment 
in history?” as well as “At which diegetic level?” or “With what degree of 
focalization?” A text has its origin in the material world, a world where gen-
der shapes perceptions and realities that go into the writing and reading 
of books. Therefore the identity, experience, and socio-cultural-historical 
circumstances of the author—not to mention the reader—are important in 
understanding the ways that narrative participates in the politics of gender.
 In this belief, feminist narratology departs radically from its classical 
roots. For Gérard Genette, Gerald Prince, and Dorrit Cohn—the three most 
influential of the theorists whose narratological models served as the jump-
ing-off point for the first generation of feminist narratologists—narrative 
discourse is an abstract structure, to be rigorously distinguished from its 
real-world creator or receivers. Feminist critics from virginia Woolf forward 
have regarded abstractions suspiciously, however, constantly aware of the 
gendered body that writes or reads every text. For this reason, the person 
who wrote the text is a living presence in feminist narratology. Too deeply 
invested in poststructuralism to place much value on “authorial intention,” 
feminist narratology nevertheless asks how the author’s gendered experi-
ences of a particular time in a particular place affect the structures he or she 
employs in putting together the story and discourse that comprise narra-
tive. Unlike classical narratologists, critics who use feminist narrative theory 
tend to be as interested in the interpretation and evaluation of texts as in the 
description of how texts work. In asking “What does this narrative mean?” 
or “Is this text any good—in terms of aesthetics, ethics, or politics?” the femi-
nist narratologist is not barred, as are her classical forebears, from consulting 
what is known about the Author herself.
 Jane Austen’s history, then, as a genteel clergyman’s daughter writing in 
england during the early nineteenth century colors the feminist narratolo-
gist’s analysis of Persuasion. Because she has become a cult figure both inside 
and outside academia, Austen is particularly present in most analyses of her 
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work. Often, author and narrator are elided in what is understood as “Aus-
ten’s voice,” a distinctive blend of ironic hyperbole, orderly syntax, parallel 
phrasing, free indirect discourse, and periodic sentences. From the begin-
ning many critics have tended to regard that voice as a representation of Aus-
ten herself. Departing from the sentimentalized victorian image of “gentle 
Jane” disseminated by her nephew J. e. Austen-Leigh’s biography of Austen, 
and taking a cue from the mid-twentieth-century belief, articulated by D. W. 
Harding, that Austen’s voice speaks with “regulated hatred” about charac-
ters “she herself detests and fears” (12), many feminist critics identify the 
novelist’s persona with Cassandra Austen’s one surviving sketch of her sis-
ter: critical, quizzical, sharp, humorous, impatient, penetrating, active.4 Aus-
ten’s evident authorial investment in the conventional marriage plot posed 
a stumbling block for some second-wave feminist critics, but the kind of 
gender-centered narrative criticism I practice finds Austen’s feminist mes-
sage less in the details of her stories than in her handling of narration.5
 Austen’s famous irony provides a classic example of what feminist narra-
tologists have called “double-voicing,” in that her narrator characteristically 
makes utterances that appear to mean something other than precisely what 
is said. Thus, one voice speaks the literal meaning of the utterance, and a sec-
ond, implicit voice ironizes that literal meaning. But sometimes the narrator 
will set up the double-voicing by straightforwardly describing characters or 
situations as the narrator of Persuasion does in this early pronouncement on 
Anne’s father: “vanity was the beginning and the end of Sir Walter elliot’s 
character; vanity of person and of situation” (10). In the beginning of Persua-
sion, as in her other novels, Austen’s narrator lays out the basic characteristics 
as well as the familial and financial situations of all her principal characters, 
thus setting up the range of possibilities for ways the story might develop. 
Having made so clear a statement of “the beginning and end” of Sir Walter’s 
character, the narrator thereafter freely exercises her penchant for explain-
ing Sir Walter’s thoughts and actions as though they were perfectly sensible, 
while silently communicating the ludicrousness of what the character says 
and does. For instance, once Lady Russell has persuaded Sir Walter that his 
straitened financial circumstances require him to rent out Kellynch Hall, the 
narrator deadpans her description of his attitude, a deadpan that depends on 
our recognizing her mingling of Sir Walter’s voice with the narrator’s in free 
indirect discourse:
Sir Walter could not have borne the degradation of being known to design 
letting his house.—Mr. Shepherd had once mentioned the word “adver-
tise;”—but never dared approach it again; Sir Walter spurned the idea of its 
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being offered in any manner; forbad the slightest hint being dropped of his 
having such an intention; and it was only on the supposition of his being 
spontaneously solicited by some most unexceptionable applicant, on his 
own terms, and as a great favour, that he would let it at all. (19)
Austen’s narrator thus exposes Sir Walter’s silliness without directly criti-
cizing it. One way to think about how her irony works is to realize that if 
Sir Walter could read this passage, he would recognize what the narrator is 
overtly saying as “quite right.” This realization, in turn, opens up the presence 
of Sir Walter’s voice and the beliefs associated with it in this passage, espe-
cially in “degradation,” “spurned,” “forbad,” “most unexceptionable applicant” 
and “great favour.” Austen’s narrator—or rather the implied author informing 
that figure—counts on the authorial audience to recognize the vainglori-
ous overstatement in Sir Walter’s language, especially when juxtaposed with 
such plain speaking as “advertise,” and thus get the joke. This is classic femi-
nist “double-voicing”: in this paragraph Austen’s narrator takes the patriarch 
down without uttering a single word against him.
 As this passage indicates, Austen’s ironic, double-voiced narration is 
intimately tied to her trademark use of free indirect discourse. Moving 
seamlessly between the narrator’s opinions and the characters’ thoughts or 
utterances, the narrator uses the characters’ own words against them. In Per-
suasion Austen uses this technique not only when representing characters 
who are being satirized—Sir Walter, Lady Russell, Anne’s sisters elizabeth 
and Mary, the Musgrove girls, Mrs. Clay, Mr. William Walter elliot, to men-
tion just a few—but also when representing the heroine herself. Frequently 
the narrator renders Anne’s thoughts as Anne might have voiced them had 
she spoken, seldom shielding the heroine from the narrator’s usual ironic 
practice. For example, in one of the scenes where Anne anticipates seeing 
Frederick Wentworth eight years after the rupture of their love affair, the 
narrator writes, “What was it to her, if Frederick Wentworth were only half 
a mile distant, making himself agreeable to others!” (51). The exclamation 
point expresses the energy Anne must exert to convince herself that Went-
worth’s whereabouts are nothing to her, at the same time that it indicates the 
narrator’s ironic take on Anne’s thoughts. When Anne hears from her sister 
Mary what Wentworth has said upon seeing Anne again, the free indirect 
discourse with which the narrator renders the heroine’s thoughts again gives 
the heroine the lie:
“So altered that he should not have known her again!” These were words 
which could not but dwell with her. yet she soon began to rejoice that she 
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had heard them. They were of sobering tendency; they allayed agitation; 
they composed, and consequently must make her happier.” (54)
Succeeding events—not to mention the state of anxiety that persists for her 
throughout the rest of the novel—show the momentary self-delusion Anne 
indulges during this burst of rationalization. even this most admirable of 
Austen’s heroines is not immune from the narrator’s ironic double-voiced 
discourse.
 Austen’s narrators speak from the position that used to be called by the 
oxymoronic term “limited omniscience,” more properly described as het-
erodiegetic narration focalized almost exclusively through the protagonist. 
What the narrator “knows” is a question I will take up later, when discuss-
ing perspective below; who the narrator “is” can be understood as a sepa-
rate question. For the most part a disembodied voice, Austen’s narrator only 
rarely uses the first person, most often near the end of her novels. Persuasion 
is no exception, as the narrator’s rare “I” appears in the first paragraph of the 
novel’s final chapter. Because Austen’s narrator is never a character within 
the diegetic world, the brief appearances of her “I” make for moments of 
metalepsis, reminders that the diegesis hangs by the thread of the narrator’s 
words and, in turn, by the novelist’s invention. Significantly, these metalepses 
frequently coincide, as in Persuasion, with the much-longed-for resolution 
of the marriage plot. Just when she comes to an opportunity to give juicy 
details about the heroine’s blissful union with the hero, Austen’s narrator 
pops up with a self-reference, explicitly refusing, in Austen’s characteristic 
way, to narrate those very details. In Persuasion, the narrator’s “I” appears in 
a moment of unnarration, relegating romantic details to rhetorical questions 
and declining to draw a conventional moral:
Who can be in doubt of what followed? When any two young people take 
it into their heads to marry, they are pretty sure by perseverance to carry 
their point, be they ever so poor, or ever so imprudent, or ever so little 
likely to be necessary to each other’s ultimate comfort. This may be bad 
morality to conclude with, but I believe it to be truth; and if such parties 
succeed, how should a Captain Wentworth and an Anne elliot, with the 
advantage of maturity of mind, consciousness of right, and one indepen-
dent fortune between them, fail of bearing down every opposition? (199)
The moral of a story is attributable to the author, as Austen’s narrator is well 
aware; and Persuasion is not the only one of Austen’s novels that ends on 
a moral the narrator declares to be questionable. Northanger Abbey, pub-
43
r o b y n  W a r h o l
lished posthumously together with Persuasion, comes to a similarly open 
conclusion:
To begin perfect happiness at the respective ages of twenty-six and eighteen 
is to do pretty well; and professing myself moreover convinced that [his 
father’s] unjust interference, so far from being really injurious to their felic-
ity, was perhaps rather conducive to it, by improving their knowledge of 
each other, and adding strength to their attachment, I leave it to be settled, 
by whomsoever it may concern, whether the tendency of this work be alto-
gether to recommend parental tyranny, or reward filial disobedience. (240)
“Professing [her]self convinced” that Henry and Catherine’s relationship has 
benefited from adversity, the narrator refers to them as though the characters 
inhabited the same plane as the narrator. Referring in the same sentence to 
their status as creatures of a narrative creation (by mentioning “this work”), 
she immediately undermines the suggestion that Henry and Catherine have 
any substance beyond the fictitious world. That the narrator steps into the 
diegetic frame to draw attention to herself by making jokes about the morals 
of her marriage-plot conclusions should come as a surprise. These metaleptic 
moments are serving a feminist purpose, destabilizing what is supposed to 
be the conventional resolution of the happy ending. What is the moral of the 
story, or what should the moral of the story be? Austen’s narrator isn’t telling.
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In this chapter I focus on narration as a mode of situated communicative 
action, which can be analyzed, on the basis of textual performances, in the 
same way that other sorts of action are—namely, in terms of reasons for act-
ing. We can think of a nested structure of actions in this connection: local 
textual choices subserve the more global purposes of narrative worldmaking, 
which are nested in turn in a still broader ecology of representational goals. 
In everyday discourse I can recruit from words, gestures, and other commu-
nicative resources to construct a narrative that I use in turn to account for (or 
repudiate) someone’s conduct, for example, or to justify the attachment I feel 
for a particular place. Likewise, written, literary narratives like Mcewan’s can 
be characterized as a form of communicative action, for the uptake of which 
inferences about authors’ (and sometimes narrators’) reasons for acting are 
not only pertinent but necessary.
narraTIonal aCTS and reaSonS for Them
What distinguishes actions from mere behaviors is that whereas both are 
the effects of causes that can be described in physical or material terms, only 
in the case of actions does it make sense to ask, too, about reasons—that is, 
about why an agent has chosen to act in a particular way instead of in other 
possible ways (Brockmeier; Malle).6 For example, anatomical structures and 
physiological mechanisms provide the causal basis for my ability to extend 
my index finger outward while curling my other fingers in against the palm 
of my hand. But when it is situated in the frame of (communicative) action, 
this bodily movement or behavior can also be parsed as a pointing gesture, 
which I perform for reasons that you provisionally ascribe to me as part of 
the process of interpreting my behavior as a gesture, rather than an uncon-
trolled reflex or unintentional tic. Reasons for acting can be analyzed, in turn, 
into interlocking sets of beliefs and desires (or, more generally, propositional 
and motivational attitudes), as when you interpret my bodily movement as 
a pointing gesture by ascribing to me the belief that there is something in 
our shared environment that is worth calling to your attention, as well as the 
desire to elicit your attention by pointing at the object in question.7
 Narrational acts do stem in part from causes—for example, the move-
ment of vocal cords or of fingers on a computer keyboard. But beyond this 
they result in textual performances on the basis of which reasons for act-
ing—reasons for producing a narrative that has a particular plot structure, 
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mode of temporal sequencing, thematic focus, etc.—can be ascribed to those 
who engage in narrational conduct. Narration, in other words, does involve 
behavior that is explicable in causal terms; yet it cannot be exhaustively 
described as behavior but rather falls in the subcategory of behaviors that 
constitute actions and that are engaged in for reasons. Interpreters impute 
these reasons to narrating agents to make sense of their behaviors as com-
municative actions in the first place.
 Thus, though it is of course possible to explore what physical mecha-
nisms and processes may have caused a writer’s behavior, when one moves to 
the domain of narrational action why-questions, or questions about reasons, 
become pertinent. Why does Mcewan use analepses or flashbacks to Flor-
ence’s and edward’s courtship and earlier family histories, instead of a more 
straightforwardly chronological presentation of events? Likewise, what is the 
reason for the text’s periodic shifts between Florence’s and edward’s vantage 
points over the course of the story, when in principle Mcewan could have 
used a distanced, authorial mode of narration throughout or, alternatively, 
a single reflector or center of consciousness for the duration of the novel 
(Stanzel)? In connection with the novel’s non-chronological narration, to be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3, I impute to Mcewan the belief that (in 
the context of this fictional world) Florence and edward act the way they do 
in the present moment in part because of how they have been shaped by past 
situations and events; I also impute to the author the desire to foreground 
the impact of those earlier contexts on the newlyweds’ current choices and 
experiences. Similarly, to anticipate issues discussed more fully in chapter 4, 
in connection with the text’s use of what Genette would term “variable focal-
ization” (Narrative Discourse 191), or the adoption of shifting perspectives 
on the world of the narrative, I impute to Mcewan the aim of underscoring 
the very different profiles that events can assume depending on one’s back-
ground assumptions, life history, and gender identity—as well as the impor-
tance of facing such differences squarely and negotiating them carefully.
 Clearly, these are only initial, rough characterizations of the sorts of rea-
sons for narrational acts that interpreters might ascribe to Mcewan on the 
basis of the text. A fuller account would need to specify more precisely the 
procedures for ascription, the textual designs that motivate those ascrip-
tions, and the pairings of propositional attitudes (believing, doubting, or 
imagining x) and motivational attitudes (desiring, loathing, or feeling indif-
ferent toward y) that help constitute the reasons being ascribed. Along these 
lines, the technical concepts and nomenclatures developed by theorists of 
narrative can be viewed as frameworks for categorizing and differentiating 
among textual features in ways that bring to light their functions as story- 
2 :  a U T h o r S ,  n a r r a T o r S ,  n a r r a T I o n
46
conveying elements within larger narrative designs. Such analytic schemes 
make those features more amenable to being analyzed via reasons for (nar-
rational) action that help explain their use in a given context. In this respect, 
narrative theory can be compared with a science; but it is a science of rea-
sons rather than causes. Whereas sciences such as anatomy and physiology 
explore the causal basis for bodily behaviors, by identifying various physical 
structures, mechanisms, and processes, narrative research aims for increas-
ingly precise characterizations of reasons for acts of narration, by focusing 
on the textual structures that provide warrant for inferences about those 
reasons.
agenTS of narraTIon
Up to now, I have focused on the process of narration rather than on the 
agent or agents who carry it out, or the (more or less direct or oblique) infer-
ential pathways that lead from acts of narration to performers of those acts. 
Granted, along with any previous familiarity that a reader may have with a 
given writer’s work, paratextual features of novels like Mcewan’s—for exam-
ple, a title page that includes the phrase “A Novel” under the main title—
already help channel and delimit inferences about the reasons for acting 
that can be assumed to underpin specific textual choices in the narrative. 
But though paratextual cues and prior knowledge help mold one’s general 
or global approach to narrational acts, making sense of those acts on a local, 
moment-by-moment basis entails grounding them in reasons for acting, 
which in turn entails moving along an inferential route that points in the 
opposite direction—from the act to the agent of narration. To sketch out how 
one might begin describing this pathway and some of the implications of 
pursuing it, I turn now to broader issues that arise when one approaches the 
telling of stories as a form of communicative action whose uptake requires 
reasoning about tellers’ reasons.
 Two key concerns can be singled out. For one thing, a focus on nar-
ration as action exposes the limitations of anti-intentionalism in narrative 
study, bringing to the fore how ascriptions of communicative intentions 
lie at the foundation of narrative experiences. But to what agent or agents 
can (or should) these intentions be ascribed? Here emerges a second set 
of issues, concerning the notions of author and narrator and the relation 
between them. In an approach that openly acknowledges the need to ascribe 
intentions to narrating agents, I argue, authors or story creators become 
centrally important, while the category of “narrator” will be more or less 
salient depending on the profile of a given narrational act. Furthermore, I 
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suggest that an approach to narration as action removes the basis for appeals 
to an implied author as the source of intentions projected in or assumed by 
a narrative.
 1. Reclaiming intentions: The approach to narration being sketched here 
develops further the critique of anti-intentionalist assumptions that I out-
lined in a previous study (Herman, “Intentional”). Characterizing narration 
as a form of communicative action whose interpretation involves—indeed, 
requires—ascriptions of reasons for acting is a manifestly intentionalist line 
of inquiry.8 Hence my approach contrasts starkly with W. K. Wimsatt and 
Monroe Beardsley’s discipline-shaping essay “The Intentional Fallacy” (orig-
inally published in 1946), which argued that using an author’s intentions as 
a yardstick for literary interpretation is neither possible nor desirable. More 
specifically, Wimsatt and Beardsley argued against confusing the author’s 
designing intellect, which they admit to be the cause of the poem, with a 
standard for judging or interpreting the poem; this is the broader “genetic 
fallacy” (confusing the nature of a thing with its origin) of which for Wimsatt 
and Beardsley the intentional fallacy is a special case. As the previous discus-
sion indicates, however, origins can be subdivided into reasons and causes, 
depending on whether one is examining actions or behaviors, respectively. 
To reiterate: construing people’s doings in terms of reasons for acting is the 
basis for understanding those doings as actions in the first place.
 Thus Wimsatt and Beardsley begged the question, arguably, when they 
equated (a) an interpretive practice based on ascriptions of intention with (b) 
commission of the genetic fallacy. Interpreting an act of narration by ascrib-
ing reasons for it is no more a confusion of the act with its causal origins 
than is interpreting someone’s rude behavior by appealing to reasons why he 
or she is acting that way. To the contrary, it is indeed part of the nature of 
an action for it to be explicable through an account of how it arises from or 
originates in a reason (or set of reasons) that involves intentions and other 
motivational and propositional attitudes. In this same connection, note that 
Booth developed the concept of the implied author to be able to factor in 
readers’ inferences about the communicative intentions and purposes mani-
fested in narrative texts, but at the same time avoid running afoul of the 
anti-intentionalist strictures set out by Wimsatt and Beardsley. The better 
solution, I argue in my next subsection, is to dispute the anti-intentionalist’s 
premises from the start, anchoring the process of narrative interpretation 
in defeasible or possibly wrong inferences concerning authors’, not implied 
authors’, communicative intentions.
 2. Authors and narrators: But shouldn’t reasons for telling be ascribed 
to narrators rather than authors? There is no one-size-fits-all answer to this 
question; rather, the structure of a given narrational act, the profile it mani-
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fests as it unfolds in a particular context of storytelling and story interpreta-
tion, determines the nature of the inferential pathway that leads back to the 
agent or agents who performs/perform it. The pathway may be relatively 
direct, as in (some) autobiographical narration, or relatively indirect, as in 
first-person or homodiegetic narratives that feature unreliable tellers—with 
an intermediate position being occupied by texts that, like Mcewan’s, are 
narrated heterodiegetically. The pertinence of the concept of “narrator” var-
ies across these and other storytelling situations. In On Chesil Beach, the nar-
ration is conducted in a way that suggests the presence of a teller arranging 
the sequence in which events are recounted, filtered through edward’s and 
Florence’s perspectives, and so on. But this teller remains nonpersonified, 
uncharacterized, all but obviating the need to draw inferences concerning 
the teller’s (in contradistinction to the author’s) reasons for narrating events 
in the way they are presented (compare Walsh 69–85).
 By contrast, Mcewan’s 1978 novel The Cement Garden is recounted by 
Jack, one of the family members whose responses to the death of their par-
ents constitute the subject of the narrative. Here two levels of narrational 
action (and the reasons that respectively underpin them) need to be consid-
ered: that by means of which the author evokes Jack as a character who tells 
about his efforts to bury his dead mother in concrete, his incestuous relation-
ship with his sister, and so forth; and that by means of which Jack produces 
the narrative that details these same events, with Jack’s own reasons for tell-
ing his story in the way that he tells it now coming into question. Drawing 
inferences about the motivational and propositional attitudes that account 
for Jack’s narration thus requires navigating a nested structure of reasons 
within reasons, whereby readers frame inferences about Jack’s intentions and 
other attitudes by grounding them in inferences about Mcewan’s reasons for 
creating Jack as a fictional person who has such attitudes.9
 This nested structure assumes a different shape in the 1993 film version 
of The Cement Garden. In this case there is a diversified set of narrating 
agents, including cinematographers, the film’s director (Andrew Birkin), and 
its editors, among other story creators, who collaborate on the production 
of what viewers construe as a more or less unified narrational action (Bor-
dwell). In this complex, collaborative act of narration the characters’ own 
reasons for acting once again figure, at the diegetic level, as key targets for 
interpretation. But arguably the inferential processes activated by the film, 
like those triggered by a ghostwritten text or a hoax such as James Frey’s A 
Million Little Pieces, are of the same basic kind as the inferences prompted by 
third-person “authorial” narration or first-person narration, whether reliable 
or unreliable. Thus, whereas Genette in using Occam’s razor to critique the 
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concept of the implied author made an exception for ghostwritten narratives 
and hoaxes (Revisited 146–47), I suggest that in these cases too an inten-
tionalist approach grounded in the logic of narrative worldmaking warrants 
greater parsimony.
 Here I target for critique ideas associated with what has become known 
as the narrative communication diagram, which features not only authors 
and readers but also implied authors and implied readers, as well as nar-
rators and narratees. My argument is that this diagram, precisely by hedg-
ing against intentionalism, opens the door to what Alfred North Whitehead 
(58–59) once described as the problem of “misplaced concreteness.” This 
problem comes into play when the heuristic status of models for inquiry 
becomes obscured or forgotten. In direct proportion with the force of its ban 
against ascriptions of intentions to authors, the diagram invests the construct 
of implied author with operative power, that is, knowable reasons for acting; 
and an entity originally designed to serve heuristic purposes thus becomes 
reified as the basis for interpretations of a text. But an openly intentionalist 
approach to worldmaking avoids such misplaced concreteness. From the 
perspective afforded by this approach, hoaxes and collaboratively authored 
texts (like other narrational acts) cue interpreters to frame defeasible or pos-
sibly wrong inferences about story creators’ reasons for narrating. Accord-
ingly, rather than distinguishing between the actual Frey and an implied 
author projected by his text, I can more parsimoniously characterize the text 
as one that, like all other narratives, was designed as a blueprint for world 
building. If I do not know about the controversy surrounding the text and 
Frey’s eventual confession that he fabricated key elements of his narrative, I 
will assume that the storyworld evoked by the text is capable of being dis-
confirmed through triangulation with other accounts of the events at issue. 
Once I know that James Frey concocted incidents in his putatively nonfic-
tional account, however, I will use different strategies for world-construc-
tion, modifying the inferences I initially drew concerning Frey’s reasons for 
narrating in the way that he did the events associated with his addiction and 
recovery. Specifically, I will interpret the text as one purposely—intention-
ally—designed by its author to prompt infelicitous modes of world-building; 
in other words, I will factor this additional assumption into the broader con-
text that allows me to situate Frey’s narrating act and explicate it in terms of 
reasons. And the same goes for collaboratively created narratives like mov-
ies. Once I have been schooled in how movies are actually made, I will be 
able to situate Birkin’s version of The Cement Garden in a different con-
text. I can now see the film as the result of a sustained effort on the part of 
the movie’s multiple creators to coordinate local feats of story-elaboration, 
2 :  a U T h o r S ,  n a r r a T o r S ,  n a r r a T I o n
50
cobbled together more or less seamlessly, to produce the effect of a single act 
of narration.
 I am advancing, then, a two-part argument against models based on the 
notion of the implied author. The first part of the argument is that the idea of 
the implied author arises from efforts to accommodate an anti-intentionalist 
position that I believe it is preferable to dispute from the start, by grounding 
the worldmaking process in defeasible ascriptions, to authors or story cre-
ators, of reasons for performing acts of narration. The second, related part of 
the argument is that talk of implied authors entails a reification or hypostati-
zation of what is better characterized as a stage in an inferential process (see 
also my contributions to chapter 6 and to Part Two of this volume). At issue 
is the process by which interpreters, by ascribing to story creators reasons for 
performing acts of narration, build and rebuild narrative worlds whose con-
tours may change in light of ongoing attempts to factor in textual as well as 
contextual information. If, for instance, it emerged that the details of edward 
Mayhew’s life history exactly paralleled Mcewan’s own (in a kind of reverse-
Frey scenario), then I would have to alter my understanding of the relation 
between the author and the narrator, the actual world and the storyworld. 
But instead of trying to account for this change by multiplying explanatory 
entities, and by distinguishing between an author implied in or by the text 
and an author who actually created it, in my approach I assume that there are 
only authors or story creators whose reasons for producing a given narrative 
I may well need to recontextualize and thus interpret differently over time.
 In turn—to anticipate issues discussed in chapter 6—an intentionalist 
approach to worldmaking has major consequences for accounts of the role of 
the reader in narrative contexts. Suffice it to say for now that the approach I 
sketch out in this volume is premised on an intentionalism without implied 
authors—and thus without implied readers. In place of the narrative com-
munication diagram, my approach to narrative world-building grows out of 
a rigorously intentionalist but more minimal explanatory model that I abbre-
viate as capa. This model encompasses Contexts for interpretation (includ-
ing contexts afforded by knowledge about narrative genres, an author’s 
previous works, or Frey-like confessions); storytelling Actions performed 
within those contexts, and resulting in texts that function as blueprints for 
worldmaking; Persons10 who perform acts of telling as well as acts of inter-
pretation; and defeasible Ascriptions of communicative and other intentions 
to performers of narrative acts—given the contexts in which the persons at 
issue perform those acts and the structure that their resulting narratives take 
on. I provide more details about the capa model, and its advantages over the 
narrative communication diagram, in my contribution to Part Two.
51
Brian richardson
I will start with a standard account of author-narrator relations and then go 
on to see how antimimetic writers play with these boundaries. The author is 
the human being who actually puts pen to paper (or fingers to the keyboard) 
and puts his or her royalties in the bank; the implied author is the figure or 
sensibility we imagine the author to be, based primarily on our reading of 
the work; and the narrator is the fictional person (or persons) who is respon-
sible for transmitting the narrative. Or, in the useful formulation of William 
Nelles: “The historical author writes, the implied author means, and the nar-
rator speaks” (22). As the classic example has it, in Huckleberry Finn, the 
author is Samuel Clemens, the implied author or sensibility is that of “Mark 
Twain,” and the narrator who relates the story is Huck Finn. The concept of 
an implied author is especially important when discussing co-written, ghost-
written, or anonymous works: political speechwriters all want to sound like 
the candidate who will speak their words; the multiple authors of a religious 
work, modern novel, or Hollywood movie want the material to sound as if 
it came from the same person; and the concept is essential when we ascribe 
anonymous works to a historical author or construct a single figure on the 
basis of a style that is repeated (e.g., “the ‘Pearl’ Poet” or “the Wakefield Mas-
ter”). Two historical authors may also combine to provide a single authorial 
voice, as Conrad and Ford do in Romance. The concept of the narrator has 
been important historically for correctly dissuading readers from simplisti-
cally equating the author of a text with its speaker: T. S. eliot is not J. Alfred 
Prufrock, and vladimir Nabokov is not to be equated with the narrator of 
Lolita: “my creature Humbert is a foreigner and an anarchist, and there are 
many things, besides nymphets, in which I disagree with him,” explained the 
author (317). It is also possible for us to detect the views of an actual author 
in the mouth of a narrator or other character, including an unlikely one. I call 
this “transparent narration,” a more direct and even nonillusionistic type of 
narratorial communication than what James Phelan has called “mask narra-
tion” (Living 201–4). For Phelan, mask narration occurs when an author uses 
a character narrator to express the author’s beliefs; the masking can be subtly 
or sloppily done. By contrast, transparent narration breaks the frame of fic-
tionality by making nonfictional statements in the narrative. There is no pre-
tense of hiding; the mask is simply discarded as the line between author and 
narrator is erased. Thus, in Kurt vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five, the narrator 
identifies himself as a character in the novel’s storyworld and simultaneously 
affirms the reality of the novel’s historical testimony of the Allied firebomb-
ing of Dresden: “That was me. That was the author of this book” (125).
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 The concept of an implied author is particularly useful for discussing the 
variously unreliable narrators of modernist fiction; a fallible narrator presup-
poses a cunning implied author who wants the intended reader to perceive 
the strategy of unreliability and thereby “get the joke.” Postmodern and other 
antimimetic authors, however, delight in collapsing established categories, 
and the triad of author, implied author, and narrator too has been a source 
of that delight, as the distinctions essential to modernism are exploded by 
postmodernism. Kurt vonnegut, Paul Auster, and Richard Powers all have 
written works of fiction that include characters bearing the author’s name 
and some of his characteristics; they deliberately conflate these different ver-
sions of themselves. Nabokov is especially cunning in hiding figures of him-
self within his fictional texts, even to the point of including anagrammatic 
forms of his name (“vivian Darkbloom”). In some instances (“First Love,” 
“Mademoiselle O”), Nabokov has published essentially the same text both 
as fiction and as autobiography, while Bend Sinister (1947) ends with by the 
protagonist’s metafictional intuition that he is returning to the bosom of his 
creator (see Richardson, “Nabokov’s”). Such interpenetrations point to the 
inherent constructedness of our notions of the author or implied author as 
well as all notions of the self. They also identify and reaffirm fiction’s status 
as fiction.
 The last half of the twentieth century has seen an explosion of experi-
ments with narrators and narration. Although many of these experiments 
have been tried before, postmodernism has returned to them and explored 
their capacity for defamiliarizing our perceptions and otherwise responding 
to our contemporary world. Modern authors have employed first-person 
plural (“we” narration), third-person plural (where the persons depicted 
are nearly always multiple and referred to as “they” or “them”), passive 
voice narration in which the speaker and/or agent remains anonymous and 
unidentified, and multiple kinds of narration within the same text. All of 
the forms just mentioned appear in Joseph Conrad’s The Nigger of the ‘Nar-
cissus’ (1899), including the regular juxtaposition of first- and third-per-
son plural accounts, as a position of objectivity does battle with the fact of 
human subjectivity. Other works start in one form and end up in the other, 
as what seems to be an omniscient third-person perspective turns out to be 
the voice of a single individual, as in Iris Murdoch’s The Philosopher’s Pupil 
(1983). In the contemporary novel, Carlos Fuentes alternates among first-, 
second-, and third-person narration in The Death of Artemio Cruz (1962), 
as does Nuruddin Farah in Maps (1986).This kind of multiperson narra-
tion forces together opposed narrative perspectives that mimetic authors 
rigorously keep separate. Another compelling modern narrative stance is 
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second-person narration, where the protagonist is referred to in the second 
person. In Mary McCarthy’s “The Genial Host” (1942), we read: “Now you 
hesitated, weighing the invitation. Sooner or later you would break with him, 
you knew. But not yet, not while you were still so poor, so loverless, so lonely” 
(163). Second-person fiction cannot easily be reduced to either homodi-
egetic or heterodiegetic status, but hovers ambiguously between these two 
conventional positions. Narrative theory needs a more capacious and flexible 
model of narration in order to circumscribe the full range of modern and 
contemporary practices.
 The practice of unreliable narration, in which it is apparent that the nar-
rator is deficient in factual knowledge, interpretation, or judgment, has been 
clearly set forth by Phelan and Rabinowitz. These categories, however, are 
all based on a mimetic model of narration, that is, of human-like narrators 
making typically human distortions as they narrate. What happens when an 
antimimetic author employs this strategy? Here is Saleem critiquing his own 
reliability: “Why did Saleem need an accident to acquire his powers? Most 
of the other children [born the same day] didn’t.” He points out that some-
times “Saleem appears to have known too little, at other times, too much” 
(530)—this formula is a good description of antimimetic unreliability, by the 
way. Postmodernism produces still more extreme kinds of unreliability. We 
have a “fraudulent” narrator when the stated narrative situation is impos-
sible, as when a child displays verbal powers available to only a few adults. A 
“contradictory” narrator presides over a text that is a mass of contradictions 
(Robbe-Grillet’s Jealousy [1957]), and a “permeable” narrator has a mind 
that, like Saleem Sinai’s in Midnight’s Children, can be invaded by the private 
thoughts of others. A “dis-framed” narrator is one whose discourse violates 
the narrative frame that is supposed to contain it, as when a character narra-
tor claims to have written other books by the author that created him. each 
of these possibilities can be seen as radical extensions of the practice of the 
unreliable narrators of romantic and modernist narratives, but in each case 
these practices are pushed into the realm of the impossible. The reader is 
thus shown the fabricated nature of the fictional narrator and, by extension, 
the artificiality of mimetic limitations that realism imposes on his or her 
narration. Fictional narrators can do virtually anything, and it is the goal of 
antimimetic fiction to radically extend practices far beyond what has been 
expected, imagined, or considered possible.
 Antimimetic narrators often include unusual, unnatural, or nonhuman 
speakers. These include the deranged narrators of Beckett and Nabokov, 
the mute narrators of Calvino’s The Castle of Crossed Destinies (1969), the 
dead narrator of Beckett’s “The Calmative” (1946), a narrating horse in John 
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Fowles’s Sweet William (1993), and story-telling machines in Stanisław Lem’s 
The Cyberiad (1967). Postmodern narration can become even more unstable 
as it presents divergent or disparate textual fragments that seem impossible 
for a single human individual to have composed. Beckett’s “Unnamable” is an 
especially antihuman narrator: its identity is constantly fluctuating, inconsis-
tent, and self-contradictory. We can conclude that the death of the traditional 
narrator is a key precondition for the creation of new forms with other, dis-
parate, decentered voices. A simple humanistic framework cannot begin to 
encompass such acts of narration.
 Rushdie plays impressively with the conventions of ordinary narration in 
Midnight’s Children. On the last page of the book, Saleem wishes for gram-
matical options that exceed the normal three persons: “I have been so-many 
too-many persons, life unlike syntax allows one more than three” (533). But 
this limitation is hardly a problem for this narrator. He is, after all, able to read 
the minds of other individuals born on the same day, a possibility normally 
reserved for omniscient novelists. His mother, it might be noted, seemed to 
have similar powers and was said to be able to eavesdrop on her daughter’s 
dreams (58). At one point in his narrating, he is so ashamed of his actions 
that he refuses the first-person pronoun: “‘I am glad,’ my Padma says, ‘I am 
happy you ran away.’ But I insist: not I. He. He, the Buddha. Who . . . would 
remain not-Saleem” (414). At other times, he narrates as if his novel were 
a film: “Close-up of my grandfather’s right hand: nails knuckles fingers all 
somehow bigger than you’d expect” (30). Throughout the text, Rushdie both 
evokes and transgresses the possible knowledge of a human narrator and 
often winds up with extrahuman powers. Once again we see a refusal of 
conventional parameters, an insistence on creating new, unusual forms, an 
underscoring of the artificiality of all narrative construction, and an asser-
tion of the power of fictions in human existence.11
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 1. For additional discussion of our views of the implied author, see Peter’s “‘The 
Absence of Her voice from that Concord’: The value of the Implied Author” and Jim’s 
“The Implied Author, Deficient Narration, and Nonfiction Narrative: Or, What’s Off-
Kilter in The Year of Magical Thinking and The Diving Bell and the Butterfly?” [JP/PJR]
 2. The distinction is not a binary one, since the criteria for determining unreliable 
narration are of a different order from those for determining restricted narration. Un-
reliable narration is a function of distance between implied author and narrator, while 
restricted narration is a limitation on the narrator’s activity. Thus, restricted narration 
can be either reliable or unreliable. [JP/PJR]
 3. For a fuller discussion of conversation as narration see Jim’s “Rhetoric, ethics, 
and Narrative Communication; Or from Story and Discourse to Authors, Resources, 
and Audiences.” [JP/PJR]
 4. A docent at the Jane Austen Centre in Bath recently showed museum visitors 
both Cassandra’s portrait and the prettied-up victorian revision of it, explaining that 
the latter circulates more widely because “the family always thought Cassandra’s portrait 
of Jane didn’t look very flattering, or very feminine” (July 7, 2009). That is precisely the 
quality of Cassandra’s drawing that has attracted feminist critics, for reasons well laid 
out by Margaret Kirkham. [RW]
 5. elsewhere I have developed an extended argument about the relationship be-
tween Anne’s placement as focal character and the agitated state of her body. See “The 
Look, the Body, and the Heroine of Persuasion.” [RW]
 6. Here it should be noted that, for his part, Davidson (3–19) characterized expla-
nations that appeal to reasons as a species of causal explanation. [DH]
 7. The situation is more complicated than this brief characterization would sug-
gest. As Tomasello stresses, when one performs a communicative action, one intends 
for someone to recognize not only what one is trying to communicate but also one’s 
intention to perform that communicative act (94–133). See also H. Clark (129–32) and 
Grice (217), as well as my contribution to Part Two of this volume. [DH]
 8. Abbott (Introduction 100–111) places intentional interpretations on the same 
footing as symptomatic and adaptive interpretations, which involve reading texts as 
symptoms of the conditions (social, ideological, or other) out of which they arise or as 
the starting point for radically transformative retellings, respectively. However, I would 
argue that intentional readings are more basic or fundamental than the other two types. 
you can interpret a text as a narrative without reading it symptomatically or adaptively; 
but you cannot read a story symptomatically or adaptively without having first estab-
lished that it is a narrative produced for particular reasons—reasons that you then work 
to background, or bracket, in order to read for symptoms or else engage in transforma-
tive adaptations. [DH]
 9. In my response in Part Two, I argue that in order to characterize the world-
building activities cued by such nested communicative situations, one need not appeal 
to the multiple reading positions described—and I would suggest reified—by theorists 
who draw on the narrative communication diagram. [DH]
 10. I discuss the concept of “person” in more detail in chapter 5, in connection 
with issues of character and characterization. As I note there, work by Peter Hobson, 
P. F. Strawson, and others suggests that part of what it means to be a person is to have a 
mind as well as a body, that is, a constellation of mental and material predicates. More 
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than this, the idea of person entails that mental predicates will be self-ascribable in one’s 
own case and other-ascribable in the case of others. In turn, because narrative texts 
result from actions performed by that subclass of persons known as authors, it is argu-
ably built into the experience of narrative to engage in (defeasible) ascriptions of mental 
predicates to story creators—that is, to other-ascribe to authors reasons for their textual 
performances. [DH]
 11. For further reading on these issues, see Hansen, Iversen, Nielsen, and Reitan; 
Heinze; Nielsen; Mäkelä; and Richardson, Unnatural Voices. [BR]
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James Phelan and Peter J. rabinowitz
In the introduction we identified attention to narrative progression as one 
of the core elements of the rhetorical approach, noting that we regard the 
progression of a narrative—its synthesis of textual and readerly dynamics—
as the key means by which an author achieves his or her communicative 
purposes and the study of progression as a key source of insights into under-
standing how a narrative creates its effects. As we elaborate on these points 
and analyze the progression of Huckleberry Finn, we also seek to contribute 
to the long-standing debate about Twain’s treatment of race in the novel. We 
begin with an explanation of why we prefer the term progression to the tra-
ditional term plot.
progreSSIon vS. ploT
Definitions of plot range from minimalist ones that make it synonymous 
with fabula—the chronological sequence of events in a narrative—to maxi-
malist ones that characterize it as the larger principle of organization of a 
narrative (see, for example, Crane; Peter Brooks; and Ricoeur). But even 
the maximalist definitions give pride of place among the elements of nar-
rative to events, their ordering, and their interconnections (causal, acci-
dental, analogical, etc.) Our concept of progression arises from a different 
Time, Plot, Progression
3
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way of thinking about the larger principle of organization of a narrative, 
one grounded in the link between the logic of the text’s movement from 
beginning to middle through ending (what we call textual dynamics) and 
the audience’s temporal experience (readerly dynamics) of that movement. 
The logic of the text’s movement encompasses not only the interconnec-
tions among events but also the interaction of those story-level dynamics 
with the discourse-level dynamics arising from the interrelations of implied 
author, narrator, and audience. The audience’s temporal experience consists 
of its evolving (or shifting) understandings, judgments, emotions (including 
desires), and expectations as it follows the textual dynamics. Furthermore, it 
is the author’s desire to create this experience—the authorial purpose in the 
broadest sense—that determines the author’s choices for the textual dynam-
ics. Thus, like other narrative theorists, we are interested in a given narra-
tive’s handling of the relation between story-time and discourse-time, and, 
like Genette, we find it useful to attend to order, duration, and frequency 
of narration. But we approach those relationships in terms of their conse-
quences for textual and readerly dynamics. Ultimately, it is by studying the 
complex interplay between authorial choices and their consequences that 
we can come to a better understanding of how a given narrative works as a 
communicative act, an understanding in which events and their intercon-
nections are only one part of the totality.
 Our concept of progression both subsumes and revises the maximal-
ist definitions of plot by acknowledging the importance of events and their 
interconnections (the “something happened” that anchors our rhetorical def-
inition) in the overall shape of a narrative but also reconceiving their role in 
the achievement of that shape. First, our concept explicitly reconceptualizes 
the notion of a narrative’s “shape” so that it includes not only the events and 
their interconnections (plot dynamics) but also the trajectory of the authorial 
audience’s judgments, interests, and responses, including the various interac-
tions among them (readerly dynamics). This position means not only that 
we regard the plot dynamics as having a significant influence on audience 
response but also that we regard the implied author’s interest in guiding the 
audience’s response as having a significant influence on the construction of 
the plot dynamics.
 For example, before Twain has Huck tell us about being kidnapped by 
Pap Finn, Twain has Huck narrate the episode of Pap’s experience with the 
new judge in town. In this episode the judge preaches temperance to Pap, 
Pap vows to reform, and the judge gives Pap a room in his own house. But 
Pap sneaks out, trades the new coat the judge has given him for “a jug of 
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forty-rod” (49), and ends up destroying the room, rolling off the porch roof, 
and breaking his arm. The judge concludes that “a body could reform the ole 
man with a shot gun, maybe, but he didn’t know no other way” (49). If we 
ask why Twain includes the episode and why he places it before Pap’s kidnap-
ping of Huck, we get better answers by focusing more on readerly dynamics 
than on plot dynamics. Since the episode is self-contained—once it is over, 
the Huck–Pap relationship returns to the status quo ante—it is, from the 
perspective of plot dynamics, extraneous: if Twain excised it, we wouldn’t 
say that there was a connection missing between events. But from the per-
spective of readerly dynamics, the episode is well motivated. Twain uses it to 
guide our interpretive and ethical judgments of Pap so that even as we reg-
ister the comedy, we also register that Pap is both incorrigible and a serious 
threat to himself and others, especially Huck. Among other things, this rev-
elation means that we recognize the woeful inadequacy of Huck’s judgment 
of his situation after the kidnapping when he says, “it warn’t long . . . till I was 
used to being where I was, and liked it, all but the cowhide part” (50). This 
recognition in turn influences our positive ethical judgment of Huck’s later 
decision to fake his own murder.
 The second way our concept of progression both subsumes and revises 
general understandings of plot is by combining the category of plot dynam-
ics with the category of narratorial dynamics into the larger category of tex-
tual dynamics. Plot dynamics, as we’ve suggested, refer to the instabilities 
and complications related to characters, events, and their interconnections 
(in the terms of the traditional story/discourse distinction, plot dynam-
ics involve elements of story). Narratorial dynamics refer both to what we 
call tensions arising from discrepancies of knowledge, understanding, and 
values among author, narrator, narrative audience, and authorial audience 
(elements of discourse) and to the ongoing relationships established by the 
author’s use of the resources of narration (narrator–narratee relationships, 
character–character dialogue, etc.). We locate narratorial dynamics as part of 
textual dynamics (rather than readerly dynamics) because, like instabilities, 
they are encoded in the text. As we have argued in chapter 2, for example, 
Twain uses multiple textual signals to mark Huck’s declaration, “All right, 
then, I’ll go to hell,” as unreliable narration. Just as instabilities and their 
complications generate readerly responses (and vice versa) as we make inter-
pretive, ethical, and aesthetic judgments of them, so too do tensions. As we 
have seen, Huck’s unreliable declaration actually increases our admiration of 
his own ultimate ethical judgment and that in turn heightens our sympathy 
and affection for him.
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begInnIngS, mIddleS, endIngS
Since we view progression as a synthesis of textual and readerly dynamics, we 
include aspects of both kinds of dynamics in our understandings of begin-
nings, middles, and endings. In Experiencing Fiction, Jim proposes the fol-
lowing model (with the single difference that what we here call “Completion/









The items in the first two rows are aspects of plot dynamics (instabilities 
and their contexts); those in the third are aspects of narratorial dynamics. 
The items in all three rows have consequences for readerly dynamics, con-
sequences rooted in our interpretive, ethical, and aesthetic judgments and 
that influence the larger movements of readerly dynamics identified in the 
fourth row.
 exposition includes everything that provides information about the nar-
rative or narration, including the occasion of the telling (sometimes the 
author’s occasion as well as the narrator’s), the characters (listings of traits, 
past history, etc.), the setting of the action (time and place), and the events of 
the narrative. In beginnings, this exposition can include such things as front 
matter, prefaces, illustrations, notices (as in Huck), and epigraphs. In endings, 
this exposition can include such things as afterwords and epilogues. In addi-
tion, sometimes this ending exposition can include a signal that the narrative 
is coming to an end (e.g., Huck’s “so there ain’t nothing more to write about” 
[263]), and in that way it contributes to the audience’s sense of closure.
 Launch, voyage, and arrival signify respectively the introduction, compli-
cation, and resolution (in whole or in part) of the global instabilities or ten-
sions. We adopt the travel metaphor to signal that progression in narrative 
involves the representation of change over time.1 Beyond that general point, 
accepting this model does not commit us to a preference for any particular 
trajectory of the instabilities: the initial ones may be introduced before or 
after the initial exposition, the complications in the voyage may arise out of 
tight causal links between events or from relatively discrete episodes, and the 
arrival may signal strong or weak resolution.
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 Initiation, interaction, and farewell signify respectively the initial narra-
torial dynamics, the continuation, alteration, or other development of them 
over the course of the narrative, and their final stage. To name just one of 
countless possibilities, in A Farewell to Arms the implied Hemingway ini-
tially establishes Frederic Henry as an unreliable interpreter and evaluator 
of his situation and then traces Frederic’s gradual movement toward nearly 
complete reliability.
 entrance, intermediate configuration, and completion/coherence desig-
nate the general readerly decisions, at each stage of the narrative, that follow 
from the interaction of the textual and readerly dynamics. More specifically, 
entrance identifies both the imaginative movement of the actual reader into 
the storyworld at the moment of launch and the authorial audience’s initial 
hypothesis (often inchoate) about the overall direction and shape of the nar-
rative as it is experienced during the time of reading, what we call its configu-
ration. Intermediate configuration, then, identifies the ways in which that 
hypothesis gets confirmed, revised, or otherwise complicated throughout 
the middle. For instance, our hypotheses about the future direction of Huck-
leberry Finn change dramatically when the King and the Duke join Huck 
and Jim in their journey. Most progressions involve a series of intermediate 
configurations as the textual dynamics develop.
 Completion/coherence refers to the authorial audience’s final and retro-
spective sense of the shape and purposes of the narrative as a whole, which 
may or may not require a significant reconsideration of earlier hypothe-
ses about configuration—as when Tom’s revelation that Jim had been freed 
changes our understanding of the final section’s shape by altering our inter-
pretive and ethical judgments of Tom’s motives for wanting to set Jim free. 
Completion/coherence includes the authorial audience’s interpretive, ethical, 
and aesthetic judgments of the whole narrative. We may, for example, make 
the interpretive judgment that the arrival provides a very weak resolution 
to the global instabilities and tensions and then go on to make the ethical 
and aesthetic judgments that such a weak resolution is appropriate (or inap-
propriate) given the progression of the beginning and middle and what they 
suggest about the overall purposes of the narrative.
The progreSSIon of ADvenTures Of huCkleBerry finn
We have touched on aspects of the progression in chapter 2, but here we 
offer a synoptic view of the whole. We identify the beginning as Chapters 
I through vII. When Huck escapes to Jackson’s Island in Chapter vII after 
faking his murder, Twain completes the launch. These first seven chapters 
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activate not only our mimetic interest in Huck through his vernacular nar-
ration and initial characterization but also our thematic interest in him as 
an outsider who does not fit comfortably anywhere in his world. Huck, the 
lower-class Irish-American, is clearly out of place among the genteel english-
American women, Douglas and Watson, and in their extremely conventional 
Christian household. Furthermore, though he likes and looks up to that 
other British-American Tom Sawyer, Huck finds much of Tom’s behavior 
incomprehensible. And Tom, for all his adolescent shenanigans, is ultimately 
a conventional boy (the equivalent of Tom in our contemporary world would 
be using social media for practical jokes one day and figuring out how to get 
into Harvard Law School the next). Huck’s life with Pap represents an alter-
native to “sivilized” society, but, as we see right away and as Huck eventually 
realizes, it’s a constricting and dangerous alternative. By faking his murder, 
Huck launches himself into the unknown—and Twain launches a narrative 
that implicitly promises to resolve the global instability of Huck’s relation to 
his society.
 The initiation provided by these first seven chapters is crucial to our 
affective and ethical responses to Huck and his situation. Twain uses Huck as 
a reliable reporter (for the most part) but varies Huck’s reliability as an inter-
preter and an evaluator. When Huck is unreliable, his unreliability almost 
always has bonding effects: his naïveté often provides an insightful, defamil-
iarizing look at aspects of conventional society, and his instinctive ethical 
judgments—for example, that he doesn’t want to go to the “good place” if 
Miss Watson will be there—are often not only funny but apt. Consequently, 
at the moment of entrance we are sympathetic to Huck and his situation and 
strongly desire that he will find his way in the world, even as we have no clear 
expectation about how the global instability will be resolved.
 We identify the middle of the narrative as Chapters vIII through the 
middle of Chapter XXXI, that is, from Huck’s finding his way to Jackson’s 
Island through the episodes on the raft and along the Mississippi shore right 
up until Huck faces his crisis of conscience about helping Jim run away. 
Huck’s decision to resolve the crisis by deciding to go to hell is actually the 
first part of the arrival and, thus, ought to be part of the novel’s ending. But 
the novel famously does not end for another twelve chapters. An analysis of 
the middle can help explain both why Huck’s decision is part of the arrival 
and why the evasion serves to destabilize it.
 The first major complication of the initial global instability is Huck’s 
discovering Jim on Jackson’s Island. Huck now has the companionship of a 
fellow outsider and of an adult who, by virtue of his slave status and his per-
sonality, is completely different from any other significant adult figure in his 
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life to this point. Nevertheless, because Jim is a slave, neither he nor Huck 
recognizes that his greater age and life experience should give him a greater 
authority, and so sometimes Huck will be guided by Jim, as when Jim advises 
him not to look at the dead man on the Lallah Rook, and at other times 
Huck is sure that he knows better, as when he decides to board The Walter 
Scott, despite Jim’s objections. In this way, Huck’s relationship to Jim becomes 
another ongoing instability, one that deepens the novel’s mimetic interests 
and adds to its thematic component. The principals are not just Huck and 
Jim but also a white boy and a black man.
 Just as significantly for the overall progression, Twain ties this compli-
cation in Huck’s trajectory to a second global instability in the narrative 
as a whole: Jim’s decision to become a fugitive and seek his freedom and 
a reunion with his family rather than to stay with Miss Watson and allow 
her to sell him “down to Orleans.” This dual function of Jim’s flight—global 
instability in his own trajectory, complication in Huck’s—initially works very 
well for both the textual and readerly dynamics, but it eventually sets Twain 
up for his flawed ending and leads to questions about his attitudes toward 
race.
 With respect to readerly dynamics, the dual function of Jim’s flight ini-
tially works well for two reasons: (1) Jim’s presence adds another layer to our 
affective and ethical responses, as we sympathize with Jim’s plight, endorse 
his ethical judgments, and desire his reunion with his family. (2) Huck’s 
interactions with Jim deepen and add nuance to our readerly responses to 
both characters. Take, for example, Huck’s decision to play a practical joke 
on Jim by putting the rattlesnake skin in his blanket, a forerunner of Huck’s 
joke about Jim’s dreaming that he got lost in the fog, a joke we will examine 
in the next chapter. Huck is careless about Jim throughout the episode—so 
careless that he forgets not only that he’d planted the snakeskin but also that, 
according to the lore that governs his beliefs, a dead rattler will attract its 
mate. Huck acts promptly to kill the mate after it bites Jim, and he is genu-
inely remorseful, but he is also not about to “let Jim find out it was all [his] 
fault” (73). The episode not only increases our sympathy for Jim as the inno-
cent victim of Huck’s failed joke but also leads us to make negative ethical 
judgments of Huck for his disregard for Jim and his failure to own up. Twain 
ensures that we will stop short of fully condemning Huck, however, by rep-
resenting Huck’s quick response and his clear (if secretive) regret.
 With respect to the plot dynamics, the dual function of Jim’s flight gener-
ates the rest of the events of the voyage. It is the threat of Jim’s being discov-
ered by Judith Loftus’s husband that propels both Huck and Jim (“They’re 
after us!” Huck shouts) off the island, onto the raft, and into their adventures 
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on the River and along the shore, the adventures that comprise the rest of the 
middle.
 After Huck and Jim pass Cairo in the fog, the general pattern of the pro-
gression involves the juxtaposition of Huck’s experiences of life on shore 
(which get the bulk of the narrative’s attention) with his time on the raft with 
Jim (time that becomes rarer once the King and the Duke take over in Chap-
ter XIX). The exact sequence and the exact number of the adventures do 
not matter a great deal—though the Wilks episode, in which Huck’s ethical 
judgment leads him to betray the King and the Duke, needs to follow epi-
sodes in which Huck’s judgment does not spur him to act against them—as 
long as Twain has enough adventures to accomplish his thematic purpose of 
exposing the deficiencies of shore society. Huck’s experiences then provide 
the backdrop for his arrival in his decision to go to hell. Since we’ve already 
analyzed this scene in detail in chapter 2, we will not go over it again but sim-
ply add here that it takes on additional affective and ethical force precisely 
because it comes after the middle’s exposure of the deficiencies of a slave-
owning society.
 Huck’s decision constitutes his arrival because Twain represents it as a 
final decision: Huck says that he “never thought no more about reforming” 
(201), and the rest of the book bears him out. Huck doesn’t exactly choose to 
reject the beliefs of civilized society (after all, he still believes that he will be 
damned). Rather, he refuses to let those social values and beliefs govern his 
ethical decisions about Jim. Instead he will live according to his own intui-
tive values as they’ve been reinforced—and even to some extent shaped—by 
his friendship and shared experiences with Jim. Huck’s understanding, in 
a sense, is another instance of bonding unreliability: Huck’s false belief in 
the consequences of his decision, and his willingness to accept those conse-
quences, only serves to enhance our sense of his ethical strength. From this 
perspective, Huck’s report at the end of his telling that he plans to “light out 
for the Territory” rather than to stay and be “sivilized” by Aunt Sally follows 
logically from this arrival, and we can imagine his going to the Territory as 
the launch for his next set of adventures. Thus, we can conclude that a signif-
icant part of Twain’s purpose is to give his audience this multilayered experi-
ence of participating in Huck’s gradual evolution to this point, an experience 
that includes our multiple judgments of Huck, of Jim, of shore society, and 
our corresponding thematic conclusions.
 The problem in Twain’s successful execution of this part of his purpose is 
that the evasion intervenes between Huck’s arrival and his decision to light 
out for the Territory—and that its textual and readerly dynamics erode the 
sense of resolution accompanying his arrival because they erode our sense of 
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the finality of Huck’s ethical decision about Jim. Indeed, the dynamics of the 
evasion erode our confidence that Twain himself took the global instability 
about Jim all that seriously.
 Note that in working out Huck’s arrival, Twain subordinates Jim’s sto-
ryline to Huck’s. Once the King and the Duke enter, Jim’s instability and its 
complications get put on the back burner—they barely affect the forward 
movement of the narrative. At first, this decision in itself seems defensible, 
since Twain offers us such a rich experience as we follow Huck. At worst, 
Twain’s subordinating Jim to Huck during the shore episodes is a sacrifice 
or perhaps what Rader would call an unintended negative consequence of 
Twain’s positive constructive intention. But such defenses are contingent on 
what Twain will do with Jim’s storyline after Huck’s arrival—and given what 
Twain does, the defenses seem less persuasive than the hypothesis that Twain 
never regarded Jim’s storyline as especially worth his attention.
 One consequence of the positive focus on Huck is that when Twain 
returns to Jim’s situation, he has to deal with the additional complication that 
the journey into the slave states puts Jim further away from freedom than he 
was on Jackson’s Island. Twain faces the difficult challenge of constructing a 
plausible and efficient means to resolve Jim’s storyline, a means that would 
also include a role for Huck consistent with his decision in Chapter XXXI.2 
Unfortunately, in writing the evasion, Twain falls into implausibility (Tom 
Sawyer turns out to be the Phelps’s nephew; Miss Watson conveniently dies 
and frees Jim in her will) and extreme inefficiency (the seemingly endless 
series of steps Tom insists on). What’s worse, Huck’s role involves giving way 
to Tom Sawyer and becoming complicit in Tom’s demeaning treatment of 
Jim, a complicity that threatens our ethical admiration for Huck. (In chapter 
7 we discuss how even Huck’s narration alters for the worse during the eva-
sion.) In so doing, Twain betrays the implicit promise about Huck’s ongoing 
behavior that accompanies the arrival in Chapter XXXI and fails to resolve 
Jim’s storyline in a way that maintains the dignity Jim displays when he calls 
Huck out for making fun of his dream interpretation when they reunite after 
getting separated in the fog. In other words, although Twain in the first two-
thirds of the progression uses Huck’s relation to Jim as the crucial measure 
of Huck’s progress, Twain also reneges on the ethical-aesthetic obligations to 
Jim’s storyline that his construction of the progression implicitly promises. 
We submit that any discussion of Twain’s treatment of race in the novel would 
do well to pay attention to both of these central aspects of the progression.
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Story-time in Jane Austen’s novels covers a single period in a heroine’s life, 
from the point in her life when she is eligible for marriage to the event of her 
wedding. everything else that has happened to the heroine gets summarized 
in the expository passages at the novel’s beginning, and everything that is 
to happen after her engagement—including the wedding itself—is summed 
up even more briefly. With the exception of Mansfield Park, the dramatized 
action always unfolds over a period of just a few months, from the introduc-
tion of a potential hero onto the heroine’s scene to the time when she and 
her true love (not always the man who was the initial candidate) declare 
their mutual affection. Sometimes—as in Pride and Prejudice as well as Per-
suasion—the hero and heroine have one or two conversations at the end 
about the events that have led to their union, but (as in Mansfield Park and 
Northanger Abbey), this is not obligatory. For Austen, as for many British 
authors writing novels about heroines in her period, these months are the 
only part of a woman’s life that meets the threshold of narratability. As D. A. 
Miller has observed, narratability comes to closure in Austen’s novels when 
“the ending of the marriage plot disarms the threat of frustration and sus-
pense, and the narrative of circumstance is concomitantly abridged under an 
‘etc. principle’” (Narrative and its Discontents, 43). In other words, the future 
life of the heroine is assumed to be so obvious as to be boring. The marriage 
plot has reached its climax and its closure, and there is nothing left to tell.
 In terms of deep structure, one can outline the Austen plot with that 
improbably unshakable confidence vladimir Propp exhibited in his analy-
ses of folk tales. Resembling nothing so much as a theme and variations in 
classical music, the pattern of her plots follows a feminine inversion of the 
ancient “boy meets girl” romance plot: girl meets boy, girl loses boy, girl and 
boy are united in the end. With equal consistency Austen introduces a good 
suitor (Colonel Brandon, Mr. Darcy, edgar Bertram, Mr. Knightley, Henry 
Tilney, Captain Wentworth) and a bad suitor (Willoughby, Wickham, Henry 
Crawford, Frank Churchill, John Thorpe, William Walter elliot). As so often 
happens with musical variations, the final one—Persuasion—appears most 
different from the announced theme, not just because the good suitor’s name 
begins with “W” (usually a dead giveaway for the wrong choice), but more 
importantly because Anne elliot’s original marriage plot is behind her, hav-
ing gone wrong “more than seven years” before the novel’s opening (28). 
Persuasion’s marriage plot begins when the heroine’s former suitor comes 
back; their history together is backstory. Arguably, Anne elliot at nineteen 
was not yet really eligible for the Austenian happy ending. “young and gentle 
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as she was” (28), she had found that the feelings Lady Russell’s opposition to 
her engagement had produced were “more than Anne could combat” (27). 
In retrospect Anne tells Frederick she believes she was “perfectly right in 
being guided by” Lady Russell at nineteen (198), but when he asks whether 
she would have renewed the engagement if he had contacted her again when 
he returned to england two years later, her reply is an energetic (and very 
modern-sounding) “Would I!” (199). In other words, Anne elliot at twenty-
one was eligible in a way that her teenaged self had not yet been; by the time 
she is twenty-six she is more than ready to play her role in Austen’s typical 
plot.
 Given the predictability of the outlines of Austen’s plots, the interest is 
of course all in the details, the subtle renditions of conversations and situa-
tions adding up to the powerful illusion that these figures are people (I’ll say 
more about this in the section titled “Character”). The closure is always the 
same—girl and boy are united in the end—but Persuasion presents an inter-
esting case in that the novelist drafted two endings, two different paths to the 
consummation of the heroine’s desire. Both endings are extant, and though 
the revised ending appears within the text of all editions of the novel, many 
editors include the “Cancelled Chapters” as an appendix. The alterations in 
plot that Austen introduced in her revision make profound changes in the 
novel’s thematics. Most significant is an alteration in the degree of the hero-
ine’s agency, an important consideration for feminist critics. A passive and 
unwilling participant in an awkward encounter during the original ending, 
Anne in the revision takes independent action toward her desired end.
 In the canceled chapters, Anne encounters Admiral Croft on the street, 
and he ushers her into his house to visit his wife, assuring her all the while 
that there is no one with Mrs. Croft except the mantua-maker. Not want-
ing to intrude, Anne holds back, but the Admiral almost drags her into his 
drawing room, mentioning just by the way that Anne “will find nobody to 
disturb [her]—there is nobody but Frederick here,” shocking Anne with this 
offhand reference to his brother-in-law. Before leaving them together, the 
Admiral privately commissions Wentworth to ask Anne whether rumors of 
her engagement to Mr. elliot are true, as their marriage would have implica-
tions for the Crofts’ remaining in Kellynch Hall. This leads to an exchange in 
which Wentworth hesitantly asks her about the rumor, and Anne blushingly 
denies it. On hearing there is no truth in the report, Wentworth
now sat down—drew [his chair] a little nearer to her—& looked, with an 
expression which had something more than penetration in it, something 
softer;—Her Countenance did not discourage.—It was a silent, but a very 
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powerful Dialogue;—on his side, Supplication, on her’s acceptance.—Still, 
a little nearer—and a hand taken and pressed—and “Anne, my own dear 
Anne!”—bursting forth in the fullness of exquisite feeling—and all Sus-
pense & Indecision were over.—They were re-united. (207)
“A silent . . . Dialogue” leaves the heroine nothing to say; “a hand taken and 
pressed,” in its disembodied grammatical passivity, leaves her no action to 
take. All Anne has to do is to sit and meet the hero’s gaze, and she gets her 
happy ending.
 Anne’s meek passivity in this episode departs from the gradually increas-
ing actions she has been taking to let Wentworth know how she feels. 
Uncharacteristically bold, she steps forward to greet him on his entrance 
to the Octagon Room assembly: “He was preparing only to bow and pass 
on, but her gentle ‘How do you do?’ brought him out of the straight line to 
stand near her, and make enquiries in return” (146). Anne’s action precipi-
tates her learning from him that he has no lingering attachment to Louisa, 
and furthermore she feels that “[h]is choice of subjects, his expressions, and 
still more his manner and look, had been such as she could see in only one 
light” (150), favorable to her wishes. They are divided by the flow of people, 
and Anne ends up seated at the concert next to Mr. elliot, though she is 
thoroughly distracted by looking around for Captain Wentworth. When the 
group she is with shift their places on the benches, Anne contrives to “place 
herself much nearer the end of the bench than she had been before, much 
more within reach of a passer-by” (153) so that Wentworth, when he finally 
walks through that part of the room, has the opportunity to speak to her 
again.
 Anne’s comparative forwardness at the Assembly Rooms disappears in 
the canceled chapters, but in the revision Anne takes even bolder steps. 
Instead of a chance encounter with Admiral Croft, the novelist introduces 
a gathering at the Musgroves’ apartment in Bath’s White Hart Inn, at which 
Wentworth and his friend Captain Harville are present. Here Anne famously 
debates with Captain Harville the question of women’s constancy in love, 
making some observations worthy of Mary Wollstonecraft in their feminist 
thrust. She argues that women’s focus on romantic love arises from their rel-
egation to the domestic sphere: “We live at home, quiet, confined, and our 
feelings prey upon us. you are forced on exertion. you have always a profes-
sion, pursuits, business of some sort or other, to take you back into the world 
immediately” (187). When Captain Harville supports his case with literary 
references (“I do not think I ever opened a book in my life which had not 
something to say upon woman’s inconstancy. Songs and proverbs, all talk 
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of women’s fickleness” (188), he anticipates Anne’s response: “But perhaps 
you will say, these were all written by men” (188). Aware by now that Went-
worth is probably straining to hear their conversation, Anne seizes the point, 
outlining what would, a hundred years later, become a central argument in 
virginia Woolf ’s A Room of One’s Own: “yes, yes, if you please, no reference 
to examples in books. Men have had every advantage of us in telling their 
own story. education has been theirs in so much higher a degree; the pen has 
been in their hands. I will not allow books to prove anything” (188). What 
makes Anne’s assertiveness important for the plot is her consciousness that 
Wentworth is seated at a desk nearby, listening to what she says. Her spirited 
defense is another Austenian example of feminist double-voicing, as she car-
ries on her side of the debate with Captain Harville while communicating 
to her other audience, Captain Wentworth, her own continuing devotion. 
For someone as shy as Anne, the exertion is heroic. And it works—the letter 
Wentworth composes while listening to her argument brings her the “over-
powering happiness” every Austen heroine deserves (191).
 Having two possible endings, then, highlights the importance of plot in 
interpretation of the novel’s themes. The only really startling action in Per-
suasion is Louisa’s accident on the Cobb. The rest of what happens hinges 
for its interest on what someone says (or doesn’t say) to someone else or on 
how he or she looks or seems to feel while saying it. Narrative progression 
proceeds through dialogue and the heroine’s reflections on the utterances of 
others; in Persuasion, action is consistently precipitated by words. For this 
reason, too, the revised ending improves on the canceled chapters in that 
its resolution of the action depends not on “a silent, but very powerful Dia-
logue” but on something the heroine says aloud, as if she were self-conscious 
about the power that language wields in this narrative world.
 Persuasion’s two endings leave the resolution of its plot to the taste of 
individual readers, who might or might not share the feminist agenda that 
my preference for the revised ending reveals. But the alternate endings also 
gesture toward a propensity shared by many Austen enthusiasts for being 
impatient with the hasty closure of her novels, wanting the plots to continue 
into the details of the heroines’ marriages and beyond. The proliferation of 
sequels to Austen novels—going back as far as 1850 and increasing in num-
bers through the beginning of the present century—suggests that many read-
ers can’t resist filling in the blank left by the “etc. principle.”3 According to her 
nephew’s biography, Austen herself imagined futures for her characters that 
she did not include in the narration of her books but shared with friends and 
family members.4 Jane Austen was already thirty-six when she published her 
first novel, and she completed five more before dying at the age of forty-one. 
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Her too-short career as a professional author partly accounts for the appar-
ently insatiable public appetite for more Austen plots than she was able to 
produce, even at the astonishing rate she achieved in those last five years of 
her life.5 But I think the restlessness inspired by Austen’s endings has as much 
to do with the instability of her plots’ closure as with the scarcity of Austen 
texts. Gestures like the unnarration at the end of Persuasion (which I have 
detailed in Part One) suggest that the texts themselves resist the implication 
that the novel has really been “about” the marriage plot. According to my 
feminist narratological reading, Persuasion is less about Anne elliot’s quest 
for marriage to Frederic Wentworth than it is about the subtle but crucial 
ways in which the heroine achieves agency in circumstances calculated in 
every way to oppress her. The perfunctoriness of the way Austen ends her 
plots lets all the air out of the marriage plot, the machine that only seems to 
propel her novels forward.
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There is of course an extensive tradition of research on the temporal struc-
ture of stories, ranging from viktor Shklovskii’s work on plot as a structuring 
device, which established the foundational distinction between the chrono-
logical sequence of events told about (fabula) and the sequence in which they 
are told (sjuzhet); to Genette’s systematization of the temporal relationships 
that can obtain between these two sequences (Narrative Discourse 33–160; 
see also Herman, Story Logic 211–61); to Meir Sternberg’s analysis of strat-
egies for sequencing expositional material in the telling of a story, as well 
as those strategies’ effects on narrative processing (Expositional). Key ideas 
from this research tradition can be harnessed for an approach centering on 
the co-construction of storyworlds, and can be used to throw light on what 
I’ve characterized as the when aspect or dimension of world-creation.
 This temporal aspect of narrative worldmaking can be analyzed into 
a number of sub-aspects, each of which can be captured as a question for 
which interpreters seek to frame answers as part of the larger process of 
co-creating storyworlds—based on inferences about the global as well as 
local designs subtending acts of narration. Relevant questions include the 
following:
1.  How does the time-frame of events in the storyworld relate to that of 
the narrational or world-creating act (in Reichenbach’s terms, what is 
the relation between event time and speech time?).
2.  What is the relation between the temporal structure of events in the 
storyworld (insofar as that can be reconstructed) and the profile they 
assume in the process of narration? (As discussed below, this question 
encompasses issues of emplotment, that is, the way events are, in being 
narrated, set out in a particular order that in turn implies a particu-
lar way of understanding causal-chronological relationships among 
them.)
3.   How does the chosen narrational mode and/or method of temporal 
profiling affect the process (or experience) of co-constructing the nar-
rative world?
Taken together, these questions encompass the issues on which the present 
chapter focuses—time, plot, and progression—but allow those issues to be 
recast in the terms afforded by an approach centering on narrative world-
making. Thus, when Genette (Narrative Discourse 215–27) distinguishes 
among simultaneous, retrospective, prospective, and “intercalated” modes 
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of narration (as in the epistolary novel, where the act of narration postdates 
some events but precedes others), these narrative modes can be interpreted 
in light of the different kinds of structure that they afford for world construc-
tion—in ways that bear especially saliently on question 1 above. Likewise, 
connecting up with questions 2 and 3, Genette’s ideas about duration, order, 
and frequency highlight key aspects of the way narratives prompt interpret-
ers to configure events temporally, as part of the process of mapping textual 
cues onto the when dimension of a narrative world.
 In the case of simultaneous narration, like that used in sports broad-
casts or on-site news reporting about occurrences still underway, events are 
presented in concert with tellers’ and interpreters’ attempts to comprehend 
the contours and boundaries of the narrated domain; inferences about the 
impact of characters’ doings on the larger history of the storyworld remain 
tentative, probabilistic, open-ended. By contrast, retrospective narration 
such as Mcewan’s accommodates the full scope of a storyworld’s history, 
allowing connections to be made among earlier and later actions and events 
(Margolin, “Past”). Narration of this sort allows for flashbacks to formative 
occasions as well as proleptic foreshadowings (anticipations-in-hindsight) 
of the eventual impact of a character’s behavior on his or her cohorts—and 
also of future events over which the characters have no control. Thus, by 
alternating among narration of what transpires on Florence and edward’s 
wedding night, allusions to how their words and deeds will shape the future, 
and analeptic references to earlier actions and events that led them to this 
moment, Mcewan draws a time-line that zigzags between present and past 
while also shadowing forth a future time-frame when the present, too, will 
have become past. In doing so, he manipulates narrative order in a way that 
frames the present moment within a longer life-course that stretches back 
into characters’ past and extends forward into their future, grounding what 
they do or fail to do in larger patterns of motivation—sets of interconnected 
reasons for acting—that would otherwise remain inaccessible.
 Mcewan situates actions and events within a longer time-span, so that 
they can be evaluated more holistically, at a key point late in the novel. Just 
after Florence turns away from edward on the beach and walks back to the 
hotel, having said, “I am sorry, edward. I am most terribly sorry,” the narra-
tive continues:
Her words, their particular archaic construction would haunt him for a 
long time to come. He would wake in the night and hear them, or some-
thing like their echo, and their yearning, regretful tone, and he would 
groan at the memory of that moment, of his silence and of the way he 
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angrily turned from her, of how he then stayed out on the beach another 
hour, savoring the full deliciousness of the injury and wrong and insult 
she had inflicted on him, elevated by a mawkish sense of himself as being 
wholesomely and tragically in the right. (192)
Here Mcewan uses the subjunctive verbal mood (he would wake, he would 
groan) to provide a kind of thumbnail sketch of actions that, stemming from 
the episode on the beach, take place repeatedly in the future.6 Telescoping 
forward in time, the passage also compresses into a reportable sequence a 
wide array of occurrences—thereby bringing into relation edward’s angry 
spurning of Florence’s final gesture of conciliation and the years and indeed 
decades over the course of which that action bears the fruit of regret, self-
analysis, and ultimately self-contempt. In this way, the passage just quoted, 
like the novel as a whole, demonstrates how narrative provides equipment 
for modeling networks of temporal relationships in a world, whereby actions 
and events at one temporal location carry effects that are distributed across 
time.
 Then, in the final ten pages, after the couple’s angry exchange on the 
beach, Mcewan shifts to a strictly chronological mode of narration but now 
resets the parameter of duration. Covering a relatively long period of time 
in a relatively short span of text, Mcewan provides the narrative equiva-
lent of time-lapse photography, enabling readers to witness the unfolding 
of the consequences of characters’ actions over the longer term—especially 
for edward. And the parameter of frequency also comes into play. The text 
repeatedly alludes to the sailing trips that Florence took with her father and 
also to actions associated with Florence’s pursuit of a musical career, thereby 
highlighting the salience of these elements of the storyworld and prompting 
construction of a story line in which past sexual abuse by her father consti-
tutes a reason for Florence’s compensatory immersion in the world of music 
(see 152, 182)—and also for her actions on her wedding night. More gener-
ally, by starting with world-creation as a basic cognitive and communicative 
function served by storytelling, and then working backward to the formal 
structures that support this root function of narrative, it becomes easier to 
motivate—to provide warrant for—Genette’s foundational account of time 
in narrative. Fluctuations in the speed of narration along with manipula-
tions of frequency can be viewed as metrics of value or at least attentional 
prominence—that is, as means for distinguishing between focal and back-
grounded elements in a storyworld. For their part, flashbacks and flash-
forwards can be studied as means for “thickening” the history of a narrative 
world and for underscoring how no action can be understood in isolation 
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from the history of conduct from which it emerges and on which it impinges 
in turn.
 As already indicated in my previous comments about order, storytell-
ing constitutes a basic technology for modeling events in ways that facilitate 
their arrangement, or emplotment, into larger patterns.7 These strategies for 
event-sequencing produce text-specific plot structures that correspond to 
the entwined destinies of the characters as they pursue, with more or less 
success, sometimes conflicting goals in a narrative world. At another level, 
distinct modes of emplotment are also associated with generic or canonical 
plot types such as the marriage plot, of which Mcewan’s novel can be viewed 
as a postmodern debunking. At a still more general level, emplotment yields 
the patterns of causal-chronological connection that make a story a story, as 
opposed to a mere assemblage of events (as in a list).8
 Furthermore, even as methods of emplotment and other discourse fea-
tures cue readers to map textual designs onto the when dimension of a 
storyworld, that mapping process itself has a temporal structure—which is 
partly controlled by textual means (e.g., gapped-out information that is then 
returned to via analepses) and partly under interpreters’ own control (as 
when I flip back through Mcewan’s novel to connect up into a sequence the 
passages that can be read as figuring forth the story line of sexual abuse [8, 
20, 61–62, 123, 131, 140–41]). In the same vein, research by Sternberg (Expo-
sitional) and Perry highlighted processing strategies, such as the “primacy” 
and “recency” effects, that arise from the situation of a given event vis-à-vis 
the two temporal continua of story and discourse, or fabula and sjuzhet. 
events that happen early in story-time can be encountered late in discourse-
time, or vice versa, producing reading experiences different from those set 
into play when there is greater isomorphism between the time of the told and 
the time of the telling. Consider the different methods of world-construction 
that would have been set into play if On Chesil Beach had begun with an 
older edward looking back on lost opportunities, or alternatively with his 
first glimpse of Florence at the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament meeting 
in Oxford, many months prior to their wedding night (58–59). For that mat-
ter, rereading a narrative entails different modes of worldmaking than does 
reading it for the first time. Thus, with repeated readings of Mcewan’s novel, 
my own initial focus on reconstructing a time line for events has given way 
to an appreciation of the emplotment strategies that invite me to shuttle back 
and forth among present, past, and future and to explore how events have the 
significance that they do because of their relation to a larger world emergent 
in time.
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 My contribution to the next chapter discusses other aspects of the when 
dimension of narrative worlds. I have distributed this time-related material 
across the two chapters because, as Mink (146) argued, the hallmark of nar-
rative as a mode of representation is that it makes constant and necessary 
reference to the location of entities, situations, and events in a larger process 
of development (cf. Ricoeur). Hence, in narrative contexts, time must be fac-
tored into accounts of space; narrative representations of space in actuality 




Narrative beginnings are usually thought to be unproblematic. And to be 
sure, in most natural narratives and short stories, the beginning introduces a 
problem that needs to be solved. But as soon as we enter the larger canvas of 
a complex social world (or as soon as we are in the hands of an experimental 
writer), beginnings start to become more elusive. In life, things don’t simply 
start up from nothing. If one wishes to describe the life of an individual, it is 
not enough to start with his or her birth: the personal, social, and economic 
conditions of the child’s parents are relevant, as is the social milieu the child 
is born into. Biographers know this, and most provide the earlier history of 
their subject’s family and a general account of their social condition. Richard 
ellmann’s biography of James Joyce, for example, begins with a chapter titled 
“The Family before Joyce.” Novelists know this as well: Fielding gives us a 
detailed account of Squire Allworthy’s family history reaching back several 
decades before the birth of Tom Jones. As Henry James has observed: “Really, 
universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is 
eternally to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they will 
happily appear to do so” (171). It is for this reason that authors such as Bal-
zac or Faulkner can keep returning to the same fictional world and provide 
accounts of the antecedents of events already narrated and published. This is 
the same principle behind the Hollywood “prequel” that provides backstory 
to films that have already been produced.
 Many modernist authors push this practice still further by providing what 
Melba Cuddy-Keane has called “beginning’s ragged edge”: that is, numerous 
references to earlier events that are never fully related or explained. Modern-
ists also frequently delay the beginning of the central action, using the first 
part of the text to establish the work’s mood, set up symbolic correspon-
dences, and narrate parallel events that have little or no relation to the action 
of the main story line. Postmodern authors often mock or deconstruct the 
idea of a fixed beginning. The first words of Raymond Federman’s Double or 
Nothing (1971) state “This is Not the Beginning.” Italo Calvino’s If on a win-
ter’s night a traveler is a novel that is largely made up of beginning chapters 
of different novels. Rushdie plays with beginnings by having his narrator 
first hide and then reveal that he was born exactly at the moment that India 
achieved independence on August 15, 1947. At the beginning of the elev-
enth chapter, he refers to the beginning of the Ramayana, one the great epics 
of Sanskrit literature—and gets it wrong. Throughout, he suggests that the 
77
b r I a n  r I C h a r d S o n
beginning of a nation can also be an arbitrary, dubious, or fabricated event. 
He goes back in time thirty-two years to start the account of his life with an 
important incident from his grandfather’s life and, just like Tristram Shandy, 
takes so long to move forward in the narrative that Padma, the woman he 
is reading the manuscript aloud to, admonishes him: “At this rate you’ll be 
two hundred years old before you manage to tell about your birth” (37). 
Throughout, the narrator points to the interpenetration of beginnings, mid-
dles, and ends: “even ends have beginnings” (404), he notes, as a new stage of 
his life is about to emerge; at the beginning of the chapter titled, “Alpha and 
Omega,” he admits that this is “a curious heading for what will be my story’s 
half-way point, one that reeks of beginnings and ends, when you could say it 
should be more concerned with middles; but, unrepentantly, I have no inten-
tion of changing it” (255). There are in fact “beginnings here, and all manner 
of ends” (255).9
fABulA and sjuzheT
A fundamental distinction in narrative theory and analysis is that between 
(1) the story or fabula that one derives from the text and (2) the sjuzhet, the 
presentation of that story in the order that it appears in the text. Modern-
ist authors such as Conrad, Proust, and Faulkner frequently produced work 
that was presented in an extremely nonlinear sequence but from which a 
consistent, linear story could be readily extracted. In the work of many con-
temporary authors, the text from which the story is extracted has become 
increasingly unusual or unlikely. Such narratives may take the form of a dic-
tionary (Milorad Pavić, A Dictionary of the Khazars: A Lexicon Novel, 1988), 
a critical commentary on a poem (Nabokov’s Pale Fire, 1962), the index to 
a biography (J. G. Ballard, “The Index,” 1990), or a standard test question in 
arithmetic (John Updike, “Problems,” 1979). They may even consist of piles 
of unbound or unnumbered pages, which the reader must arrange into an 
order for it to be apprehended (B. S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates, 1969) or 
take the form of thirteen large playing cards that can be arranged in multiple 
possible orders (Robert Coover’s “Heart Suite,” 2005). The books that contain 
them may have two front covers and no back cover—and no instructions for 
reading such a Janus-faced text, as in Carol Shields’s Happenstance (1991).
 Contemporary antimimetic novelists transgress the principle that a 
coherent and chronological fabula should underlie the sjuzhet. Some of 
these narratives circle back on themselves, as the last sentence becomes the 
first sentence, and thus continue for eternity (Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, 1939). 
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In other works, time passes at different speeds for different groups of peo-
ple (Woolf ’s Orlando, 1928). Some invert temporality so that the charac-
ters move forward into the past (Time’s Arrow, 1991). Others have multiple, 
contradictory chronologies that are impossible in the real world (Robert 
Coover’s “The Babysitter,” 1969). Ana Castillo’s The Mixquiahuala Letters 
(1986) consists of a series of letters sent by one of the characters, but not 
all are intended to be apprehended by any reader. Instead, the author offers 
three different reading sequences depending on the reader’s sensibility. Thus, 
the conformist is told to begin with letters 2 and 3 and then to go to number 
6, while the cynic is to start with letters 3 and 4 before going on to number 
6. The quixotic reader is offered yet another different sequence: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Significantly, each sequence produces a different story.
 In none of the examples just noted can one easily extract a single, con-
sistent story from a fixed sjuzhet the way one might remove the plum from 
a pudding. Alain Robbe-Grillet, referring to the contradictory fabula in his 
antinovel Jealousy, stated: “It was absurd to propose that in the novel . . . there 
existed a clear and unambiguous order of events, one which was not that of 
the sentences of the book, as if I had diverted myself by mixing up a pre-
established calendar the way one shuffles a deck of cards” (New 154); he went 
on to state that for him there existed no possible order outside of that found 
within the pages themselves. An antimimetic narrative theory would incor-
porate these practices and stress that a text’s sjuzhet may be fixed, variable, or 
multiple, while its fabula may be fixed, multiple, indeterminate, unknowable, 
or denarrated.
 Rushdie also plays with these issues. In Midnight’s Children’s twenty-fifth 
chapter, “In the Sundurbans,” time follows unknown laws. In this jungle, an 
impossible temporality emerges: a literal 635-day-long midnight. The reader 
is treated to the kind of creative transformations of quotidian experience that 
are possible only in fiction. At the same time, the fictional experiences pro-
duce both a dramatization of the effects of trauma (unmoored temporality) 
and an allegorical vision of human evil (the endless night).10
progreSSIon
Phelan and Rabinowitz use the term “progression” in their section; I wish to 
clarify that I am primarily interested here in what they call “textual dynam-
ics,” that is, the principles of movement underlying the sjuzhet (and distinct 
from what they call “readerly dynamics”). Postmodern authors occasionally 
employ traditional narrative patterns in order to parody them; at other times 
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they create alternative ways of ordering their texts. The narrator of Mid-
night’s Children claims that Padma is attempting to bully him “back into the 
world of linear narrative, the universe of what-happened-next” (37). In fact, 
however, apart from a number of digressions and flashbacks, the book’s nar-
rative is generally linear, moving forward chronologically from the story of 
his grandfather’s doubts right up to the moment of the book’s composition. 
What is unusual is that so much of the book is devoted to events before the 
birth of the narrator and that the duration or time it takes to read the book 
is frequently referred to.
 Other authors employ different ways to establish the progression of their 
narratives. Some model the events of their texts on a sequence of events in 
an earlier text, as Joyce patterns Ulysses on Homer’s Odyssey; others may 
draw on musical forms the way Thomas Mann uses the sonata form to struc-
ture “Death in venice.” Still others use geometrical or architectural patterns. 
Rushdie parodies this practice by insisting that he has exactly thirty-one 
chutney jars to fill with the story of his life, which contains thirty-one years, 
in a book that has thirty-one chapters and whose narrative goes back thirty-
one years before Saleem was conceived.
 Many experimental authors use still more unusual methods of establish-
ing a narrative progression. James Joyce   as well as authors associated with 
the nouveau roman use pictures, key words, or ideas to generate their texts. 
In the “Circe” episode of Joyce’s Ulysses there is a good example of a ver-
bal generator producing a substantial stretch of text. As Bloom denounces 
tobacco, the prostitute Zoe retorts: “Go on. Make a stump speech of it.” What 
follows next in the novel is the figure of Bloom in workingman’s overalls, giv-
ing an oration on the evils of tobacco before an adoring populace (390–93); 
the phrase “stump speech” thus produces the event it names.
 Still other kinds of textual progression (and even regression) are pos-
sible. At the end of Midnight’s Children, shortly after the narrator announces 
the death of Shiva, a character who is closely linked to Saleem’s life and fate, 
the narrator makes a very strange confession: “I lied about Shiva’s death. My 
first out and out lie” (510). This practice, in which an author affirms certain 
aspects of a fictional world and then denies them, is one I have called “denar-
ration.” It is not uncommon in postmodern works, especially those written 
by or in the spirit of Samuel Beckett or Alain Robbe-Grillet. It points to the 
performative nature of fictional narration, that is, that people and events 
exist by the very act of a narrator’s affirming that they exist—unless or until 
the narrator goes on to deny their existence. This unnatural kind of narra-
tive construction and deconstruction is especially prominent in postmodern 
narratives, points again to the constructedness of every work of fiction, and 
3 :  T I m e ,  p l o T,  p r o g r e S S I o n
80
also gestures toward the self-interested and personally motivated aspect of all 
narrative composition.11
endIngS
In a natural or conventional narrative the role of the ending is to wrap up 
the plot, reveal all the mysteries to all the relevant characters, provide some 
sort of poetic justice, and resolve the major problems that generated the 
story in the first place. While victorian authors regularly attempted to satisfy 
these requirements, the more thoroughgoing realists and many modernists 
resisted such satisfying closure by pointing out its unreality: life simply does 
not usually resolve itself into happy units where all the threads are nicely 
knotted at one point in time; things always just keep on happening, and 
today’s resolution prefigures tomorrow’s crisis. Poetic justice is a rare com-
modity in life: when asked how her novel ended, Oscar Wilde’s Miss Prism 
responded: “The good ended happily, and the bad unhappily. That is the 
meaning of fiction” (26). Something had to change.
 Modernists developed a kind of conclusion that provided a sense of 
an ending without resolving all the major issues of the narrative. The final 
description of events in Ulysses or To the Lighthouse offers at most a fleeting 
moment of minimal resolution; we have no clear idea what will happen to 
Stephen or Bloom on June 17 or what will happen to the Ramsays after they 
return from the lighthouse. Joyce and Woolf do, however, provide a vivid 
sense of an ending through the works’ construction: we know that the book 
is completed even though the characters’ fates are up in the air. Conventional 
storytelling demands a conclusive ending, and these works refuse to provide 
one even as they signal their closure in other ways. In the final pages of To 
the Lighthouse, Lily finishes her painting and has her vision, Mr Ramsay fin-
ishes reading his book, the children become reconciled to their father, and 
the long-promised trip to the lighthouse is completed—ten years after it had 
been planned and long after the voyagers had forgotten its original purpose. 
Woolf provides a powerful sense of closure here even as she indicates that, 
in the real world, life goes on without any permanent resolutions or fixed 
boundaries.
 There are many antimimetic forms of ending. These include the ending 
that occurs but is not told to the audience (Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying 
of Lot 49); the ending that returns, Ouroboros-like, to the beginning of the 
story (Finnegans Wake); the ending that negates itself and presents a sec-
ond, revised ending (John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman); and a 
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multiple ending that offers different possibilities for a reader to choose from 
(Malcolm Bradbury’s “Composition”). An especially interesting kind of end-
ing is present in Midnight’s Children. “One empty jar . . . how to end?” Saleem 
wonders self-consciously and then goes on to consider comic, melancholic, 
and tragic possibilities (531). The narrative is ceasing, the time of the nar-
rative has merged with the time of the writing, and the thirty chutney jars, 
each of which represents a year of his life, have been filled as the narrator 
contemplates the final one. The narrative thus symmetrically begins thirty-
two years before his birth and extends to the start of his thirty-second year; 
it begins with the story of Aadam Aziz and ends with the birth of a son, 
Aadam, named after his great-grandfather. Saleem himself feels that he is 
exploding, and he is about to stop writing, but the events around him refuse 
to settle into place. His personal fate is unknowable, and so is the fate of the 
Indian subcontinent. A historical narrative that ends in the present is not 
normally supposed to have any closure, and this narrative of (among other 
things) India’s history is similarly without any closure or tying up of narrative 
strands. The future remains open.12
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noTeS
 1. In Part Two of Experiencing Fiction, Jim discusses the relation of progression in 
narrative to progression in lyric and in portraiture, whose progressions are not governed 
primarily by change over time, and especially in hybrid forms of lyric narrative and por-
trait narrative. [JP/PJR]
 2. It is far easier to sketch a viable plan for resolution than to execute it, but here is 
ours: Twain should have shown Huck helping Jim escape from the Phelps farm and then 
shown the two of them coming up with a clever scheme to get Jim to the free states. [JP/
PJR]
 3. One bibliography on the World Wide Web lists at least forty-one continuations 
of, sequels to, or alternate points of view upon Austen’s completed and fragmentary 
novels, not including adaptations along the lines of Helen Fielding’s Bridget Jones’s Diary 
(1996) or the widely circulated Pride and Prejudice and Zombies, a 2009 spoof by Seth 
Grahame-Smith. See http://www.pemberley.com/janeinfo/austseql.html. [RW]
 4. “She would, if asked, tell us many little particulars about the subsequent career of 
some of her people. In this traditionary way we learned that Miss Steele never succeeded 
in catching the Doctor; that Kitty Bennet was satisfactorily married to a clergyman near 
Pemberley, while Mary obtained nothing higher than one of her Uncle Philips’s clerks, 
and was content to be considered a star in the society of Meriton; that the ‘considerable 
sum’ given by Mrs. Norris to William Price was one pound; that Mr. Woodhouse sur-
vived his daughter’s marriage, and kept her and Mr. Knightley from settling at Donwell, 
for about two years; and that the letters placed by Frank Churchill before Jane Fairfax, 
which she swept away unread, contained the word ‘pardon.’ Of the good people in 
Northanger Abbey and Persuasion we know nothing more than what is written: for be-
fore those works were published their author had been taken away from us, and all such 
amusing communications had ceased for ever” (Austen-Leigh, Chapter X). [RW]
 5. Anthony Trollope’s novels, similar to Austen’s in their focus on the marriage plot, 
have inspired few sequels, though Father Ronald Knox wrote a seventh Barsetshire novel 
in 1935 and in the late twentieth century the novelist’s descendant, Joanna Trollope, 
published a few continuations under the name of Caroline Harvey. Apparently, a six-
volume series like Trollope’s Palliser novels offers a sufficiency of the kind of chronicling 
that Austen’s fans seem to crave. [RW]
 6. In the Genettean terms that I go on to discuss, this technique can be character-
ized as iterative narration, a mode of frequency in which what happens more than once 
is narrated only once (Narrative Discourse 113–60). [DH]
 7. Thus, as with the concept of narrative referentiality, which I discussed in the 
introduction to this volume, I use the term “emplotment” in a broader sense than it has 
in the account that Dorrit Cohn develops in The Distinction of Fiction. In my approach, 
emplotment is a way of talking about the event-ordering potential of narrative—a po-
tential also suggested by distinctions between story and discourse, or the chronological 
sequence of events told about (fabula) and the sequence in which those events are told 
(sjuzhet). By contrast, Cohn suggests that the idea of emplotment is pertinent only for 
nonfictional narratives: “A novel can be said to be plotted, but not emplotted: its serial 
moments do not refer to, and can therefore not be selected from, an ontologically inde-
pendent and temporally prior data base of disordered, meaningless happenings that it 
restructures into order and meaning” (114). [DH]
 8. The three effects of emplotment described here correspond to the three under-
83
n o T e S
standings of the concept of “plot” identified by Abbott (“Story”). Meanwhile, my next 
paragraph is indebted to Dannenberg’s discussion of approaches to plot that foreground 
narrative dynamics (“Plot”). [DH]
 9. For further reading on Beginnings, see Cuddy-Keane and Richardson, Theory. 
[BR]
 10. For further reading on time, fabula, and sjuzhet, see Heise; Kafalenos; and Rich-
ardson, “Beyond Story” and “Denarration.” [BR]
 11. For further reading on progression, see Nelson; Richardson, “Beyond the Poet-
ics”; and Tyrkkö. [BR]
 12. For further reading on endings, see Miller (52–77) and Richardson, “endings.” 
[BR]
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James Phelan and Peter J. rabinowitz
Run a Google search for study questions on Huckleberry Finn, and, whether 
you click on reputable sites like the Duluth Library or the discount stores of 
academic wisdom like CliffsNotes, the role of the Mississippi River is liable 
to pop up.1 SparkNotes raises the issue in what might be its ur-form, at least 
for high-school education: “Discuss the use of the river as a symbol in the 
novel.” We shudder at that prompt for several reasons. Peter has hated “sym-
bols” since high school. Although he couldn’t articulate why at the time, in 
retrospect he believes that he was already wary of the dangers of abstraction. 
As he has argued elsewhere, such interpretive practices can result in the era-
sure of concrete particulars, often muting the politics of the text at the same 
time. For his part, Jim believes that symbol-hunting is a surefire method for 
transforming the complex experience of reading narrative into the deaden-
ing exercise of searching for neatly packaged Hidden Meaning.
 But at the same time, we acknowledge that questions about setting are 
both important and theoretically uncomfortable. It’s easy for us to criticize 
the impulse to interpret setting symbolically, but, despite some earlier nota-
ble efforts by A. J. Greimas and Gabriel Zoran, it is only recently, as a result 
of work by David Herman, Susan Stanford Friedman, and others, that nar-
rative theory has begun to take up more sophisticated questions about space 
and setting and to give them the attention they deserve. We believe that two 
interrelated difficulties have obstructed progress in this territory.
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the nature of its borders. Setting has a tendency to spread out from geograph-
ical space to the objects within it until it becomes synonymous with back-
ground in the broadest sense, even including the sociological or theological 
characteristics of the world of the work. In this broader sense, setting begins 
to merge with character—among other things—because “environment” and 
psychology begin to intertwine, both causally and symbolically. No surprise, 
really: interpretive analyses of setting tend to spill over into commentary on 
character precisely because so many narratives, including Huckleberry Finn, 
establish links between these elements. Still, we believe that it is heuristically 
useful to maintain the distinction, blurry as it sometimes is.
 The second problem is that setting is often conflated with “description”—
and hence serves as the portal through which a number of vexed issues enter 
the field. Among other things, blurring setting with description can turn 
setting (one element within narrative) into a discursive mode that is, from 
certain philosophical perspectives, in opposition to narrative.
 Given our pragmatic orientation, our aim is not to draw artificially sharp 
lines around “setting” or to resolve the philosophical debates about descrip-
tion and narrative, but rather to determine the rhetorical function of set-
ting within narrative. Or, more accurately, the variety of functions possible 
for setting within narrative. Fundamentally, setting, like character, has three 
components, the synthetic, the mimetic, and the thematic, any or all of which 
can take on important functions in a given narrative—depending on the 
nature of the narrative’s progression and purpose.
 First, we have the synthetic or the formal. As evelyn May Albright puts 
it in a guide for writers, the first “function of the setting is to furnish, in the 
best possible way for any given story, the conditions of time and place and 
characters which shall make that story possible and actual” (149). This fram-
ing dimension of setting is so fundamental to narrative that it largely goes 
undiscussed. What are the characteristics of that frame? At its simplest, we 
have what we might call the “contrastive” or the diacritic. Most narratives 
take advantage of the way representation of distinct spaces (from a minimal 
“here” and “there” to the complex topography of Proust’s In Search of Lost 
Time) can signify, support, or heighten differences of various kinds. At their 
most schematic, these distinctions are only loosely connected to the content 
of the setting: that is, it may be the contrast itself, rather than the inherent 
qualities of the settings, that’s crucial—as we can see if we think of an urban 
variation of “Little Red Riding Hood” in which the walk through the woods 
is replaced by a ride on the New york subway, and grandmother’s cottage by 
a Hundredth Street apartment. The River in Huckleberry Finn surely serves 
this kind of diacritic function.
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 But it is not only through contrast that setting can serve synthetic func-
tions. A plot may also demand a certain kind of location—or at least put 
some limits on location. Little Red Riding Hood could meet the wolf on a 
subway or in an elevator; but she couldn’t meet him in her prison cell and still 
have the plot work. Similarly, the plot dynamics of Huckleberry Finn depend 
on the River’s providing Huck and Jim with a means of transportation—and, 
as we’ll discuss later, Twain links this synthetic function with the River’s 
mimetic and thematic functions. Furthermore, this particular form of trans-
portation—one way, in a preordained direction, with certain constraints on 
variations in speed—evokes rules of configuration, that is, standard proce-
dures by which readers infer the shape and direction of the narrative and set 
up our expectations as the plot dynamics develop (for more, see our discus-
sion in chapter 3).
 Setting may also perform many other synthetic functions. Sometimes, 
for instance, the setting itself can instigate or alter the direction of the narra-
tive—as Raskolnikov’s living conditions influence his action.2 Settings famil-
iar to the authorial audience can serve as a backdrop to generate not only 
particular rules of configuration but also particular rules of notice, that is, 
standard procedures by which readers give greater emphasis to some textual 
signals than others. Then, too, the level and accuracy of a narrator’s account 
of setting can influence readers’ decisions about the reliability of the narra-
tion and, more generally, about the web of relationships between narrative, 
authorial, and actual audiences. The magnificence of Huck’s descriptions of 
the River, combined with our knowledge that Samuel Clemens had experi-
ence as a steamboat pilot, does a great deal to align Huck with Twain—and 
the authorial audience with both of them. That is, to the extent that we sense 
the authorial voice behind Huck’s descriptions, our sense of Huck’s reliabil-
ity about the River, about nature, and about other things relatively untainted 
by civilization is increased. Furthermore, to the extent that we are encour-
aged to see Huck’s descriptions as ones that apply to the world in which the 
authorial audience lives, we are encouraged to take seriously the ethical and 
political arguments in the novel.
 More generally, focusing on the synthetic functions of setting (like atten-
tion to the synthetic functions of character) highlights the complex relation 
between the mimetic and the synthetic components of realistic fiction. This 
relation is itself the consequence of the double logic of realism, both in terms 
of its construction and in terms of its reception. From the author’s perspec-
tive, as Ralph Rader has argued, realistic fiction entails creating the illusion 
that the characters are acting autonomously in a world like our own even as 
those characters are fulfilling an underlying constructive purpose. From the 
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reader’s perspective, realistic fiction entails responding to the characters and 
setting as if they were independent of any authorial construction (that’s in 
part what it means to read as the narrative audience) even as one retains the 
tacit awareness that the characters are doing the bidding of their authorial 
designer and that the setting is represented in the service of that authorial 
design (that’s in part what it means to read as the authorial audience). We 
shall return to this point when we discuss the River’s role in Huck and Jim’s 
sailing past Cairo and into the slave states.
When The  mimetic dimension of setting is discussed by theorists, it’s often 
treated as a weakness to be avoided. Brooks and Warren are typical. “Descrip-
tion of setting is not to be judged simply in terms of realistic accuracy; it is to 
be judged in terms of what it accomplishes for a story” (647–48). The second 
clause makes it clear that “realistic accuracy” has no value on its own, that 
it is useful only insofar as it serves the “higher”—and typically thematic—
needs of the story. This is merely one variant of a repeated refrain that rel-
egates the mimetic to a confined cubicle in order to create more office space 
for the synthetic and thematic.
 Of course, such dogmas are apt to engender radical counterpositions, 
and under the influence of poststructuralist theory, some critics, for example, 
Keith Cohen, have argued for the value of setting (or description) precisely 
to the degree that it does distract us from matters such as plot and character.3 
But between these two extremes lies a vast area of readerly pleasure in the 
purely mimetic aspects of setting and description: pleasure in its function as 
a window on what the reader views as the “real world.”
 Finally, setting can also have a thematic function, one evoked clearly by 
that dreaded and dreadful prompt with which we began: “Discuss the use of 
the river as a symbol in the novel.” It’s often the thematic function that res-
cues setting from disdain, since this function, to borrow a phrase from D. S. 
Bland, “lifts . . . description beyond utility” (316). Some obvious cases? The 
House of Usher, the courtrooms of Kafka’s The Trial, and the Arctic in Fran-
kenstein all have clearly symbolic roles. And even without resorting to sym-
bol-hunting, you can learn a lot about a culture by exploring the thematic 
function of the settings that take on a conventional status in a particular set 
of texts (say, the middle-class home of so many domestic sit-coms).
 But thematic functions can be far subtler as well, as we can see by consid-
ering the role of the Mississippi River in the progression of Huckleberry Finn.
 An important first step in appreciating the Mississippi’s functions is to 
remind ourselves that although the River is always part of the novel’s land-
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scape, it is not always in the foreground. Instead, it is one of several important 
settings in the novel, and, thus, we should consider its mimetic, thematic, 
and synthetic functions in relation to the functions of these other settings. 
We don’t have space (!) to give a full-scale analysis, but here’s a brief sketch of 
the initial settings. As we noted in chapter 3, before Huck and Jim take to the 
River, Twain places Huck in two main settings in the environs of St. Peters-
burg: the Widow Douglas’s house and Pap’s cabin. In both, Twain emphasizes 
the lack of fit between Huck and the place, though the lack of fit, stemming 
from a combination of elements of the setting itself and the people within it, 
is different in each case. The Widow’s house is a model of Christian, middle-
class respectability, a milieu that Huck can neither adequately comprehend 
nor comfortably conform to. Physically, we see the lack of fit in Huck’s exit-
ing and entering the house via his bedroom window rather than using the 
stairs and the door. As for the people, the Widow is kind and generous, and 
Miss Watson is strict and severe, but neither has the slightest idea of who 
Huck is or what he needs. At Pap’s cabin, Huck is in one sense more com-
fortable as he lives in nature away from “sivilization,” and, in this way, Twain 
begins to establish a thematic hierarchy of settings. But, in another sense, 
Huck’s life at the cabin is much worse because Pap, having kidnapped Huck, 
treats him as both prisoner and punching bag. Consequently, the first two 
settings, in addition to establishing the thematic hierarchy, also contribute to 
the synthetic function of establishing the mimetic and thematic dimensions 
of one of the narrative’s global instabilities: Huck is a young adolescent with-
out any adequate home or any adult who can properly guide him as he tries 
to find his way in the world. Twain reinforces the depth of this instability by 
having Huck fake his murder and by shifting the setting from Pap’s cabin to 
Jackson’s Island where Huck is initially alone. As we noted in chapter 3, this 
shift in setting coincides with the launch.
 Twain skillfully uses Jackson’s Island to begin complicating this global 
instability. Not only does he bring Jim as a fugitive to the Island, but he also 
gives it an important role in the intertwining of Huck’s story with Jim’s. Once 
Huck discovers Jim on the island, they join forces, first, to keep their pres-
ence hidden from everyone in St. Petersburg, and, second, to make a com-
fortable life for themselves. The setting reinforces the thematic hierarchy 
Twain has already established because Huck and Jim have a satisfactory life 
lived close to nature on the island, content in their makeshift home in the 
cavern on the island’s ridge and their ability to provide their own food. In 
addition, Huck and Jim’s shared outsider status enables them to connect in a 
way that Huck never connects with the Widow, Miss Watson, or Pap. Because 
Jackson’s Island is otherwise uninhabited, Huck and Jim have some freedom 
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to define their relationship, even as they carry with them their assumptions 
about how adult slaves and free white adolescents should behave toward each 
other. In this setting, they begin to establish some of the paradoxical quali-
ties of their relationship: Huck does not immediately grant authority to Jim, 
yet with respect to some important decisions—such as choosing the cavern 
as their home base—Jim takes the lead. In this way, the interlude on Jack-
son’s Island offers a glimpse of a positive direction for the trajectory of the 
instabilities surrounding Huck. But the instabilities surrounding Jim bring 
this interlude to a close in a way that emphasizes Huck’s intuitive sense that 
he and Jim are now a unit: as we noted in chapter 3, after Huck learns from 
Judith Loftus that her husband plans to search for the runaway Jim on the 
Island, Huck races back and awakens the sleeping Jim by shouting “They’re 
after us!” (81, our emphasis).
 Once they begin their journey on the raft, Twain uses the contrast 
between life on the River and life along the shore to underline his thematic 
point about the superiority of a life lived close to nature to one lived in alleg-
edly respectable civilization. But some of the functions of the River are more 
subtle than that, as we can see by examining the way that Twain handles its 
role in Huck and Jim’s missing Cairo and, thus, their opportunity to head for 
the free states. Twain gives the River a major synthetic function here, since 
this event allows him to contrast Huck’s adventures along the shore and his 
experiences with Jim and, in so doing, to sketch Huck’s informal ethical edu-
cation. Nevertheless, because having Huck and Jim miss Cairo runs the risk 
of appearing just a cheap plot device, Twain faces a challenge: how can he 
make the development mimetically plausible? It’s a sign of his artistry that 
as he does so, he complicates the River’s thematic functions and, at the same 
time, also finds a way to use the River’s mimetic function to deepen the ethi-
cal dimensions of Huck’s relation to Jim.
 Twain does two main things to make the passing of Cairo mimetically 
plausible. First, he has Huck and Jim miscalculate their progress on the River. 
At the beginning of Chapter Xv, Huck notes that they “judged that three 
more nights would fetch us to Cairo” (95), but since they have no maps and 
no locals to consult, their judgment is plausibly fallible. Second, Twain rolls 
in the fog on the second night and at the same time increases the swiftness 
of the current in the River. Consequently, Huck and Jim’s efforts to pull over 
onto a towhead ironically become the means by which they get separated, 
with Huck in the canoe and Jim on the raft. enveloped in the fog and at the 
mercy of the current, they focus entirely on their exchange of whoops until 
they lose contact and both fall asleep. Sometime during this night they go 
past Cairo and are understandably unaware that they have done so. Since 
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it is mimetically plausible for the fog to come in over the River and for the 
current to run swiftly at the same time, Twain is able to keep the synthetic 
function of the River backgrounded. But in drawing on this mimetic dimen-
sion of the setting, Twain complicates its thematic function. Whatever easy 
escape from civilization that the River seems to provide, the events of this 
night indicate that a life lived so close to nature is also subject to its dangers. 
The events also remind us that nature is both indifferent to and more power-
ful than human desire.
 even more impressively, Twain combines the mimetic functions of this 
night of fog and fast current with mimetic aspects of his characters to deepen 
the ethical stakes of Huck’s cruel joke on Jim once they are reunited. When 
Huck gets back to the raft, he convinces Jim that Jim has dreamed everything 
he’d experienced that night. Jim then develops an elaborate interpretation of 
this alleged dream. Huck springs the joke by asking Jim to interpret the all-
too-real detritus that has accumulated on the raft. Jim’s response is one of 
the novel’s most impressive passages, as it articulates the ethical difference 
between Jim’s and Huck’s responses to their ordeal and reunion:
“What do dey stan’ for? I’se gwyne to tell you. When I got all wore out wid 
work, en wid de callin’ for you, en went to sleep, my heart wuz mos’ broke 
bekase you wuz los’, en I didn’ k’yer no’ mo’ what become er me en de raf ’. 
en when I wake up en fine you back agin, all safe en soun’, de tears come, 
en I could a got down on my knees en kiss yo’ foot, I’s so thankful. en all 
you wuz thinkin’ ’bout wuz how you could make a fool uv ole Jim wid a lie. 
Dat truck dah is trash; en trash is what people is dat puts dirt on de head er 
dey fren’s en makes ’em ashamed.” (99)
Jim’s speech is powerful testimony about his own feelings during the night’s 
ordeal and about the cruelty of Huck’s joke. But Twain also invites the audi-
ence to recognize that Huck’s effort to make a fool of Jim is also shamefully 
insensitive in light of Huck’s own experience on the River that night. Twain’s 
masterful handling of Huck’s perspective is crucial to these affective and eth-
ical effects. Consider Huck’s description of how he felt to be alone in the fog:
I kept quiet, with my ears cocked, about fifteen minutes, I reckon. I was 
floating along, of course, four or five miles an hour; but you don’t ever 
think of that. No, you feel like you are laying dead still on the water. . . . If 
you think it ain’t dismal and lonesome out in a fog that way by yourself in 
the night, you try it once—you’ll see. (96)
91
J a m e S  p h e l a n  a n d  p e T e r  J .  r a b I n o W I T z
 It’s striking that Twain has Huck render his account of his own feelings 
through a hypothetical focalization of the narrative audience. In having Huck 
say that “if you experienced what I experienced, you would feel as dismal and 
lonely as I felt,” Twain gives him a Whitmanesque sense of connection with 
others. But when faced with the actual Jim who was out in the same fog, 
Huck’s first move is not to empathize with but to find a way to belittle him. 
To his credit, Huck recognizes that he needs to apologize to Jim. But Twain 
invites us to find the reason for Huck’s failure of empathy in Huck’s confes-
sion that it took “fifteen minutes” before he could “work [him]self up to go 
and humble [him]self ” to a slave. Despite their developing friendship and 
the role of their life on the River in that development, Huck still can easily 
revert to his assumptions about Jim’s inferiority and thus treat him as some-
one whose feelings can be manipulated for his own amusement.
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In spite of the narrator’s penchant for exposing her narrative as fictitious just 
as she and the reader are leaving it, Austen’s storyworld is vividly created and 
quite consistent from novel to novel. Indeed readers—and I am no excep-
tion—become strongly attached to their own ideas of what that storyworld is 
like and what can or cannot happen there. For example, at the end of an oth-
erwise-faithful 1995 BBC adaptation of Persuasion, Captain Wentworth and 
Anne elliot, having just come to an understanding in a scene drawn from 
the original, “canceled” chapter of the novel, walk out a doorway into a busy 
street in Bath, throw their arms around each other, and share a big, roman-
tic, Hollywood kiss. In the world created by Austen’s novels, they might just 
as plausibly have sprouted wings and flown to Florida for a vacation. Austen 
is vigilant in her handling of public and private space, public and private 
actions. Kisses are too private—or too banal, depending on how one inter-
prets Austen’s consistent refusal to narrate them—to be rendered as part of 
the narrative world. If heterosexual kisses were present in Austen’s world, 
though, they would never happen in a crowded street. In Austen’s version 
of the scene immediately following Wentworth’s communication of his con-
tinuing love, Anne and Wentworth meet by chance on bustling Union Street 
and then go by design to the “comparatively quiet and retired” Gravel Walk 
(193), a wide path behind the gardens of the houses on Gay Street, shielded 
by greenery from the surrounding roadways. A present-day visitor to Bath 
will find the Gravel Walk much as it was in 1817 and will understand that for 
Anne and Wentworth in this spot, “the power of conversation would make 
the present hour a blessing indeed” (193), because the two could find here 
the uninterrupted privacy they cannot, as an unmarried man and woman, 
share in any house or public building or on any street in Bath. Television 
adaptations are free to play fast and loose with setting for dramatic effect, but 
Austen’s handling of the interplay between gender and space is both subtle 
and detailed; the settings of her fictions play as significant a role in the cre-
ation of her narrative worlds as do the thoughts and actions of the characters.
 Feminist theorists working not just in literary studies but also in history, 
urban anthropology, and geography have established that nineteenth-cen-
tury upper- and middle-class British spaces were strongly gendered: home, 
or the domestic realm, was the “private” world associated with femininity, 
while “public” life—including the worlds of commerce, religion, higher edu-
cation, politics, and law—happened in spaces that were coded as masculine.4 
Living at home, men were supposed to be morally improved by the softening 
presence of the women who controlled the domestic domain, and women in 
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turn were supposed to have a positive effect on the public realm indirectly, 
through the influence they had over their husbands and sons. Austen’s fic-
tions do not directly challenge these assumptions, in that the novelist never 
created a female character who ventured into the public realm by trying her 
hand at any profession (not even authorship). Indeed, the masculine realm is 
literally invisible in Austen’s fictional world. In all six of her completed nov-
els, Austen never once wrote a scene dramatizing action between men with 
no woman present. Sometimes in Austen’s world, conversations or actions 
happen among men that get reported secondhand. This is particularly true 
of Persuasion, where the backstory of Captain Wentworth’s adventures at 
sea—including his acquaintance with the unfortunate Dick Musgrove—is so 
important to his re-emergence as Anne’s potential hero. But we learn about 
the details of Captain Wentworth’s achievement, as it were, only secondhand. 
In this novel as in her others, every scene Austen ever dramatized happens in 
the presence of at least one female character.
 This is not to say, however, that Austen restricts her represented world 
to the domestic realm. In a novel like Persuasion, Austen focuses not on 
the male/female, public/private binary, or on the differences between men’s 
world and women’s (in the way that Anthony Trollope, for instance, was to 
do in the next generation), but rather on the gradations of difference within 
the feminine realm of the “private.” As the scene of Anne’s and Frederick’s 
retirement to the Gravel Walk reminds us, some public spaces are more pri-
vate than others in Austen’s world—in fact, some public spaces can offer 
more privacy than home can. Women in Austen’s world operate within a 
wide range of private and public spaces. At home in Kellynch Hall, Anne 
has become used to the neglect and misprision she suffers from her father 
and sister—“She was only Anne” (11)—but prefers the privacy of country 
life to the prospect of moving to a crowded resort town. “She disliked Bath, 
and did not think it agreed with her—and Bath was to be her home” (17). 
venturing outside her own house to her sister Mary’s, and then to the com-
paratively public space of a walk in the countryside, Anne exposes herself to 
overhearing conversations she would rather not have known to have taken 
place, as when, shielded by a hedgerow, she becomes the reluctant audi-
tor to Frederick Wentworth’s flirting with Louisa Musgrove. The removal 
to Bath adds another degree of public exposure to Anne’s experience, as she 
must appear at Bath’s Assembly Rooms, Pump Room, and parties, the loca-
tions of her ever-increasing efforts to communicate her continuing interest 
in Wentworth.
 Being on display in a vacation destination provides many opportuni-
ties for Anne to see and be seen by her hero, but tourism grants an even 
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more important public occurrence, when Anne notices Wentworth notic-
ing Mr. elliot’s look at her on the steps to the beach at Lyme Regis. “It was 
evident that the gentleman (completely a gentleman in manner) admired 
her exceedingly. Captain Wentworth looked round at her instantly in a way 
which shewed his noticing of it. He gave her a momentary glance,—a glance 
of brightness, which seemed to say, ‘That man is struck with you,—and even 
I, at this moment, see something like Anne elliot again’” (87). Wentworth’s 
renewed appreciation of Anne’s attractiveness and the triangulation of his 
interest in her with Mr. elliot’s are both important developments in the plot. 
In Austen’s world, significant actions often happen in public places, and 
where something happens can carry as much meaning as the event itself. 
Lyme, home to the congenial family of Captain Harville, signifies what Anne 
comes to appreciate in her own ultimate union with a naval officer, a man 
from “that profession which is, if possible, more distinguished in its domestic 
virtues than in its national importance” (203). The domestic realm, for Aus-
ten’s happily married couple, is both a feminine and a masculine space.
 The beach at Lyme, or rather the Cobb, the harbor wall adjacent to it, 
also serves as the setting for the critical moment when Louisa childishly 
insists that she must be “jumped down” the steps one more time by Cap-
tain Wentworth and ends up falling on her head. The aftermath of Louisa’s 
accident puts Anne once again in Wentworth’s sights, as he relies on her 
levelheaded competence for help: “If Anne will stay, no one so proper, so 
capable as Anne!” (95). The public location of the incident allows a momen-
tary glimpse from a perspective rarely rendered in Austen’s fiction, the point 
of view of working-class folk.
By this time the report of the accident had spread among the workmen and 
boatmen about the Cobb, and many were collected near them, to be useful 
if wanted, at any rate, to enjoy the sight of a dead young lady, nay, two dead 
young ladies, for it proved twice as fine as the first report. To some of the 
best-looking of these good people Henrietta [who fainted on seeing her 
sister’s fall] was consigned. (93)
Finding working people even mentioned in Austen’s fiction is unusual, but 
finding a passage of free indirect discourse—even one so brief as “to enjoy 
the sight of a dead young lady, nay, two dead young ladies, for it proved twice 
as fine as the first report”—is remarkable.
 In Persuasion this passage signifies the novelist’s partial turn from the 
exclusively upper-middle-class view that dominates her previous fictions, 
a turn that is highlighted by Anne’s relationship with her old school friend, 
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Mrs. Smith. The very location of Mrs. Smith’s rooms (“Westgate-buildings 
must have been rather surprised by the appearance of a carriage drawn up 
near its pavement!” [128]) is as objectionable to Sir Walter as her common 
name (“an every day Mrs. Smith, of all people and all names in the world” 
[128]). Close to the highly populous baths and the mercantile center of the 
city, Westgate Buildings is an address without prestige, and Mrs. Smith (“A 
poor widow, barely able to live,” as Sir Walter has it [128]) subsists at a social 
level of dependency and near-destitution equaled in Austen’s fiction only by 
Emma’s Miss and Mrs. Bates. In terms of narrative perspective on the fic-
tional world, what makes Mrs. Smith’s condition particularly interesting is 
her access to people of even lower status than she, particularly Nurse Rooke, 
who circulates as a servant through the households of the rich and casually 
carries important intelligence back to Mrs. Smith. It is from Nurse Rooke 
that Mrs. Smith gathers she should warn Anne against her would-be suitor. 
What Anne can’t seem to find out about Mr. William Walter elliot’s disrepu-
table past from the social circles in which she usually travels, she can learn 
from Mrs. Smith because the lower-class perspective in this novel carries 
insights to which the heroine’s own point of view is blind.
 Anne benefits in this instance from opening herself to a network that is 
as strongly marked by gender as by class. Nurse Rooke gets her information 
by overhearing the conversations of the ladies she attends, and she repeats 
them to Mrs. Smith, whose connection to Anne originated in the homoso-
cial sphere of a girls’ school. Women’s way of knowing in this world comes 
through narratives, stories one woman tells another, intending for them to 
be passed on. To be uncharitable, one could call it gossip. Despite the nega-
tive connotations of this effeminate pastime, in Austen’s world the network 
of storytelling women wields enough power to thwart William Walter elliot’s 
designs on Anne—enough power, that is, to ensure that the novel reaches 
its happy ending. The power of Mrs. Smith’s knowledge is limited, though, 
because as a woman she cannot act on her own behalf to have her fortune 
reinstated. In the end, it is Anne’s husband, Captain Wentworth, who must 
exercise masculine prerogative by taking the necessary actions to restore 
Mrs. Smith’s financial security.
 After the first three chapters, perspective in Persuasion is almost exclu-
sively focalized through Anne. This makes Austen’s last published novel 
similar to all the rest except for the first, because only Sense and Sensibility 
extensively dramatizes episodes which neither elinor nor Marianne Dash-
wood witnesses. In Persuasion, as in Pride and Prejudice, Emma, Mansfield 
Park, and even Northanger Abbey, what the implied reader knows is, for the 
most part, limited to what the heroine knows. Like all of Austen’s novels 
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Persuasion begins with a perspective providing an “establishing shot” of each 
main character’s personality and circumstances, but after that, the perspec-
tive follows Anne but for a few telling exceptions. One is the brief insertion 
of the workingmen’s perspective on the Cobb. Another, more instrumental 
in developing the plot, is a glimpse into Frederick Wentworth’s perspective, 
shortly following his seeing Anne after their long estrangement.
He had not forgiven Anne elliot. She had used him ill; deserted and disap-
pointed him; and worse, she had shewn a feebleness of character in doing 
so, which his own decided, confident temper could not endure. She had 
given him up to oblige others. It had been the effect of over-persuasion. 
It had been weakness and timidity. . . . Her power with him was gone for 
ever. (54)
This passage gives the implied reader knowledge about Wentworth’s state of 
mind that Anne can only surmise. even this early in the novel, the implied 
reader takes Wentworth’s assessment of Anne’s past actions as mistaken, 
because the narrator has provided ample justifications for the heroine’s deci-
sion to renounce her engagement under pressure. A rare view of an Austen 
heroine from the hero’s perspective, Wentworth’s reflections build suspense 
in Persuasion, because after this point the implied reader knows no more 
than Anne does about the gradual rekindling of Wentworth’s love.
 More than suspense, though, hangs on the focalized perspective of Aus-
ten’s novels. Focalization is primarily responsible for the novel’s effective rep-
resentation of the heroine’s interiority. Not until Henry James did anyone 
articulate the practice of organizing a fiction around a central consciousness, 
and James himself certainly gave his great female forbear no credit for having 
anticipated his own technique: “Jane Austen, with all her light felicity, leaves 
us hardly more curious about her process  .  .  .  than the brown thrush who 
tells his story from the garden bough” (229–30). What James dismissively 
understood as the fruits of Austen’s “wool-gathering” over her needlework a 
feminist narratologist can recognize as a technical innovation representing a 
sophisticated development in the handling of perspective and characteriza-
tion in the British novel. Before Austen, only epistolary fiction (whether in 
the tragic mode like Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa or the comic like Fanny 
Burney’s Evelina) could bring into being as elaborate an illusion of female 
subjectivity as Austen’s narrative practice achieves, but the epistolary nov-
els—unlike Austen’s or for that matter James’s—always hold the possibility of 
offering multiple perspectives on the action. In Persuasion, as in her novels 
generally, Austen recreates for the authorial audience the epistemological 
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experience of living under the social and familial restraints placed on women 
during the first decades of the nineteenth century.
 Feminist theorists have embraced “standpoint epistemology” as a way of 
framing what can be known.5 While it is not a radical relativism—because it 
acknowledges that persons sharing certain identity categories are positioned 
to see the world similarly—feminist epistemology understands “objectiv-
ity” to be a politically and socially useful fiction. What one sees depends 
entirely on where one is standing while one looks. Austen’s focalized per-
spective anticipates this feminist insight, framing a narrative world as only 
a female—or to be more precise, a feminine—consciousness could know it. 
To the extent that Austen’s novels have engaged readers from across the gen-
dered spectrum of identity positions, they have exercised readers’ capacity 
for understanding Austen’s world from a feminine perspective. For Austen, 
this in itself was a feminist achievement.
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My discussion of emplotment in chapter 3 raised issues that extend beyond 
the when dimension to the what and where dimensions of narrative worlds. 
The emplotting of events entails creating not just a temporal sequence but 
a linked series of spatiotemporal contexts or environments (cf. Bridgeman; 
Dannenberg, Coincidence)—a series of situated actions and occurrences that, 
characterized from some vantage point on the storyworld, are connected 
with one another via the process of narration. At issue is what I termed in 
an earlier study the “spatialization” of storyworlds, the process of building 
mental representations of narrated domains as evolving configurations of 
participants, objects, and places (Herman, Story Logic 263–99).
 Again, the spatial aspect of narrative worldmaking—more precisely, the 
spatiotemporal configuration of narrative worlds—can be analyzed into 
a number of sub-aspects, each of which can be captured as a question for 
which interpreters seek to frame answers as part of the larger process of co-
creating storyworlds. Relevant questions include the following:
1.  Where did/will/might narrated events happen relative to the place of 
narration—and for that matter relative to the interpreter’s current situ-
ation?
2.  How exactly is the domain of narrated events spatially configured, and 
what sorts of changes take place in the configuration of that domain 
over time?
3.  During a given moment of the unfolding action, what are the focal 
(foregrounded) constituents or inhabitants of the narrated domain—as 
opposed to the peripheral (backgrounded) constituents?
4.  Whose vantage point on situations, objects, and events in the narrated 
world shapes the presentation of that world at a given moment?
Approaches such as deictic shift theory (Duchan, Bruder, and Hewitt) and 
contextual frame theory (emmott) can illuminate the cognitive reloca-
tion that enables interpreters to take up residence in a narrative world like 
Mcewan’s (question 1); such approaches can also elucidate how interpret-
ers are able to remain oriented within that world by monitoring changes in 
the space-time configuration of characters, objects, and places (questions 2, 
3, and 4). Also relevant for question 4 is work that rethinks narratological 
approaches to focalization or perspective via ideas from cognitive linguistics, 
which studies how the structure and use of language reflects the capacities 
and dispositions of embodied human minds (Herman, “Beyond”).
99
d a v I d  h e r m a n
 Consider the opening sentences of On Chesil Beach:
[1] They were young, educated, and both virgins on this, their wedding 
night, and they lived in a time when a conversation about sexual difficulties 
was plainly impossible. [2] But it is never easy. [3] They had just sat down 
to supper in a tiny sitting room on the first floor of a Georgian inn. [4] In 
the next room, visible through the open door, was a four-poster bed, rather 
narrow, whose bedcover was pure white and stretched startlingly smooth, 
as though by no human hand. [5] edward did not mention that he had 
never stayed in a hotel before, whereas Florence, after many trips as a child 
with her father, was an old hand. [6] Superficially, they were in fine spirits. 
[7] Their wedding, at St. Mary’s, Oxford, had gone well; the service was 
decorous, the reception jolly, the send-off from school and college friends 
raucous and uplifting. (3–4)
These seven sentences evoke a fictional scenario to which the world-building 
logic of the referring expressions (“They,” “a Georgian inn,” “the send-off ”) 
and deictic terms (“this,” “before”) invite me to relocate.6 Reading the pas-
sage in accordance with protocols for fictional world construction, I map 
these expressions and terms onto the space-time coordinates organizing 
the account being presented—rather than those associated with the worlds 
that Mcewan occupied as text producer or that I currently inhabit as text 
interpreter. In other words, while interpreting the narrative, I make a deictic 
shift to a particular night in 1962 (as stipulated by subsequent textual cues), 
which is in turn part of an autonomous, stand-alone world that contrasts 
with storyworlds evoked by accounts of the past that make a claim to fact. 
Granted, toponymns included in the title of the novel and in the text’s open-
ing pages (Chesil Beach; St. Mary’s, Oxford; the Dorset coast) provide gen-
eral geographic coordinates in which to situate the world of the novel. These 
toponymns function as what even-Zohar would term “realemes,” or units 
within a larger repertory of real-world elements deemed to be insertable 
within a given narrative. Generic conventions, authorial preferences, and 
text-specific patterns constitute criteria for realeme insertability in a given 
narrative; such criteria afford scaffolding for particular kinds of world-con-
struction and, while obviating the need to build the storyworld from scratch, 
also determine the degree to which (and ways in which) narrative worlds can 
be cross-referenced with the world(s) in which they are interpreted.
 The relative abundance of place names distinguishes Mcewan’s novel 
from the storyworlds of some science fiction narratives, for example, where 
tighter constraints on realeme insertability translate into different methods 
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of world-building. yet a note included at the end of the novel signals the 
divergence between, on the one hand, the fictional situations and events 
recounted in the novel and, on the other hand, circumstances and occur-
rences about which falsifiable claims can be made: “edward and Florence’s 
hotel—just over a mile south of Abbotsbury, Dorset, occupying an elevated 
position in a field behind the beach parking lot—does not exist” (205). This 
note underscores how interpreting Mcewan’s text requires making a deic-
tic shift away from the world of the here-and-now, and also the world of a 
(dis)confirmable historical past, to the world of the story. But understanding 
Mcewan’s text also requires shifting among different sets of space-time coor-
dinates within this narrative world. Here emmott’s idea of contextual frames 
can supplement deictic shift theory, indicating how narrative worlds are in 
fact composite constructs, built from a constellation of mentally projected 
scenes or contexts linking characters, locales, and events. Indeed, the dynam-
ics of frame shifting suggests that the traditional concept of “setting” oper-
ates at too gross a scale to capture the fluctuating relations between focal and 
peripheral elements as one navigates space-time regions of the storyworld.
 To parse the first sentences of the novel, readers who use the world-
building methods I am outlining have to move from the spatiotemporal con-
figuration, or contextual frame, that corresponds to the present moment in 
the narrated domain, or what can be called the story-now (sentence 1), to a 
frame associated with a gnomic statement anchored in the present moment 
of narration, or the discourse-now (sentence 2). There is then a shift to a 
different configuration immediately preceding that of the story-now (sen-
tence 3), followed by a further elaboration of the current frame (sentence 
4). Tracking such frame-shifts, and in longer episodes monitoring when cir-
cumstances and participants are bound into or out of a given frame, allows 
readers to navigate (by bringing into relation with one another) the what, 
where, and when dimensions of the storyworld under construction. Thus, 
recognizing the frame shift between sentences 5 and 6 allows readers to 
anchor referring expressions to appropriate subdomains of the storyworld. It 
is because of this frame shift that “they” in sentence 6 can pick out edward 
and Florence in the space-time coordinates corresponding to the story-now 
rather than during the separate lives they led in the past.
 Modes of perspective taking likewise bear crucially on narrative world-
making, suggesting the need to reorient accounts of focalization around the 
key question of how storyworlds are spatialized. Up to now scholars of narra-
tive have for the most part concentrated on developing taxonomies of modes 
of focalization, distinguishing, for example, between fixed modes of focaliza-
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tion, where the vantage point on the events being narrated does not change 
(as with Jack’s perspective in The Cement Garden), and variable modes like 
that used in On Chesil Beach, which switches back and forth between Flor-
ence’s and edward’s vantage points. Theorists have also contrasted internal 
or character-specific modes, where the action is filtered through the perspec-
tive of one or more characters, with external modes, where, as in the open-
ing pages of Mcewan’s novel, the vantage point is wider in scope than any 
character’s and is thus “ambient” rather than “strict,” to use Manfred Jahn’s 
terms. But an emphasis on worldmaking necessitates a less taxonomic and 
more functional approach to narrative perspective. Tracking frame-shifts of 
the sort just discussed requires monitoring what vantage point orients the 
configuration of circumstances, participants, and events in a given frame 
and across frames. In turn, in ways that can be illuminated by recent work in 
cognitive linguistics, perspective-marking features are part of the blueprint 
for world-building included in a narrative’s verbal texture.
 Cognitive-linguistic research (Langacker; Talmy) suggests how per-
spective-marking features of stories can be situated within a wider array of 
construal operations—ways of organizing and making sense of domains of 
experience—that are anchored in humans’ embodied existence and that may 
be exploited in different ways in different narratives (for fuller discussion, see 
Herman, “Beyond”). The opening of chapter 5 of Mcewan’s novel suggests 
the advantages of assimilating issues of perspective to a broader concern 
with the construal of situations and events in narrative worlds. Here, having 
hurried away from the honeymoon suite after her and edward’s unsuccess-
ful attempt at sexual intercourse, Florence watches edward approach her on 
Chesil Beach as the last of the daylight fades:
[1] She watched him coming along the strand, his form at first no more 
than an indigo stain against the darkening shingle, sometimes appearing 
motionless, flickering and dissolving at its outlines, and at others suddenly 
closer, as though moved like a chess piece a few squares toward her. [2] 
The last glow of daylight lay along the shore, and behind her, away to the 
east, there were points of light on Portland, and the cloud base reflected 
dully a yellowish glow of streetlamps from a distant town. [3] She watched 
him, willing him to go slower, for she was guiltily afraid of him, and was 
desperate for more time to herself. . . . [4] Briefly, she saw the outline of his 
shoulders against a silver streak of water, a current that plumed far out to 
sea behind him. [5] Now she could hear the sound of his footfalls on the 
pebbles, which meant that he would hear hers. (169; 172–73)
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In this passage, the retrospective narration is oriented around Florence’s 
sighting of a scene that, featuring edward as the focal participant, unfolds in 
the real time of the story-now. yet the scope of the construal fluctuates from 
sentence to sentence—indicating that, as with the concept of “setting,” dis-
tinctions like internal vs. external focalization operate at too gross a scale to 
capture moment-by-moment processes of worldmaking. Thus, within sen-
tence 1, the scope of the construal widens as one moves from the first to 
the second clause—a widening that continues in sentence 2, which presents 
elements of the scene that are situated behind Florence and thus outside her 
visual field. The scope then narrows again in subsequent sentences, with 
Florence’s standpoint orienting the narration of events, although in sentence 
5 Florence does imaginatively project herself into what edward must be able 
to hear as he approaches her on the beach. As edward nears the proximal end 
of the line of sight from which Florence watches his approach, the degree of 
detail of her visual and auditory perceptions increases, prompting continued 
spatialization of the scene from Florence’s standpoint.
 This passage thus underscores how what can be seen or perceived alters 
with the spatial coordinates of the embodied self who is doing the looking or 
perceiving. But more than this, it suggests that a self is in part constituted by 
what it perceives, and when and where such acts of perception take place—
with narrative being one of the principal means for situating selves, or per-
sons, in evolving sets of space-time coordinates. In the next chapter I build 
on these last remarks concerning the interconnections between perspective 
and character or identity. There I explore in more detail how stories portray 
model persons in narrative worlds, and in doing so at once draw on and con-
tribute to the models of persons circulating in a given culture or subculture.
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Narrative space can be approached from a number of vantage points: we 
may investigate geographical, psychological, social, metaphorical, allegorical, 
ideological, and self-reflexive sites and spaces. For an antimimetic approach, 
it is the ontological nature of the fictional storyworld—that is, what exactly 
exists in there—that most insistently demands our attention. The space of 
the fiction is also the site where mimetic and antimimetic impulses are often 
engaged in a dialectical interaction. We can see this particularly sharply 
in Ulysses. Unlike victorian realists, who might set a work in a partially 
invented (Hardy’s “Wessex”) or incompletely unidentified location (“In the 
town of _____”), Joyce uses the exact topography of 1904 Dublin. It is so 
accurate that reenactors can follow in the exact steps of the fictional char-
acters. At the same time, many of the spatial depictions are deceptive. eric 
Bulson observes that even with such precise coordinates, readers typically 
“get a fragmented image of Dublin, one responsible for a lot of wrong turns, 
dead ends, and retracing of their steps” (73), particularly in the labyrinthine 
“Wandering Rocks” episode. The routes traveled by the characters regularly 
trace out revealing geometrical designs, such as the “X” marked over the city 
of Dublin made by the intersecting paths of the representatives of the church 
and the state in this chapter.
 The mimetic/antimimetic dialectic affords us a clearer sense of the fab-
rication of space in fiction; Nabokov’s Pale Fire is a particularly instructive 
example. This work refers to a number of actual spaces in the real world, 
such as Paris and New york. Other areas are fictionalized versions of actual 
places (“New Wye” stands for a town in upstate “N.y.”). The ontological sta-
tus of the country of Zembla, “a distant northern land” (315), however, is 
much more indeterminate; it seems to be a Baltic state on the border of the 
Soviet Union. It may not exist at all; it may only be an elaborate figment 
of the imagination of Charles Kinbote, the book’s deranged narrator. John 
Shade, the poet in the text, does, however, refer to it as a country, suggest-
ing it may be “real” within the storyworld of the novel. On the other hand, 
its very name suggests an illusory existence; many of the descriptions of it, 
including those of its history and inhabitants, seem to come from a parodic 
version of a popular romance such as The Prisoner of Zenda. At the fur-
thest reach from the mimetic, we see a reference to Illyria, the fictional land 
invented by Shakespeare as the setting of Twelfth Night.
 Many other writers construct space in original ways; there are the dream-
like worlds of Kafka or the magical realists; the unreal psychotropic world of 
Anna Kavan’s Ice (1962), the postmodern fantastic realms of Angela Carter’s 
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The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman (1972) and Italo Calvino’s 
Invisible Cities (1972), and the impossible space of Mark Danielewski’s House 
of Leaves (2000).
 Samuel Beckett extends and distills many of these strategies. We observe 
him constructing indeterminate, contradictory, and what I call “denarrated” 
spaces. Some of Beckett’s spaces, like the world of Endgame, are inherently 
ambiguous zones. It refers to actual and fictional places, it has a dubious his-
torical setting, it makes several metadramatic allusions, and the very shape 
of the stage space it is enacted within has two windows that suggest two eyes. 
These multiple, mutually contradictory references simultaneously suggest 
historical, invented, postapocalyptic, purgatorial, psychological, allegorical, 
and metadramatic domains. The work partakes of each of these spaces with-
out being reducible to any one.
 An especially illustrative example of Beckett’s practice is found in the 
troubled narrative of Woburn in “Cascando.” In this piece, Woburn keeps 
trying and failing to establish the spatial setting of his story: “down . . . gentle 
slopes . . . boreen . . . giant aspens [ . . . . ] face in the mud [ . . . . ] soon the 
dunes . .  . no more cover [. .  .  . ] face in the sand . .  . arms spread . .  . bare 
dunes [. . . . ] face . . . in the stones . . . no more sand . . . all stones . . . that’s 
the idea . . . we’re there . . . no, not yet [. . . . ] no tiller . . . no thwarts . . . no 
oars . . . afloat [ . . . . ] face in the bilge” (138–41).
 Beckett clearly enjoys erasing or “denarrating” the spaces he has created; 
he affirms and then negates several descriptions in many of his works. In 
Worstward Ho we see him constructing, altering, and deconstructing the 
narrative space of his story. We may also note that here Beckett has come 
about as close as possible to creating a setting that has almost no space. The 
depictions begin with: “A place. Where none. A time when try see. Try say. 
How small. How vast. How if not boundless bounded. Whence the dim” 
(11). This attempt at invention leads at first only to: “Beyondless. Thence-
less there. Thitherless there” (12) and then to a “dim bit of void” (13). Two 
figures start to plod though the void, the dim, “far and wide unchanging” 
(17). They come to what is called “a grot in the void. A gulf. Then in that 
dimmest grot or gulf such dimmest light as never” (17). From now on the 
void only grows more encompassing: “Shades dimmed. void dimmed. Dim 
dimmed” (40). The characters start to vanish, the events are denarrated, the 
images fade. The drama of space in this text ends with the words, “At bounds 
of boundless void. Whence no farther” (47), as the void consumes all that it 
had held. While the discourse of Endgame suggests numerous possible, con-
tradictory spaces without any one established as definitive, “Worstward Ho” 
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never provides enough description for any coherent spatial setting to emerge. 
We remain, as it were, at the edge of space looking in on opacity.
 Perhaps the most fantastic impossible space is that contained within 
Borges’ Aleph:
The Aleph was probably two or three centimeters in diameter, but univer-
sal space was contained within it, with no diminution in size. each thing 
(the glass surface of a mirror, let us say) was infinite things, because I could 
clearly see it from every point in the cosmos. I saw the populous sea, saw 
dawn and dusk, saw the multitudes of the Americas, saw a silvery spider-
web at the center of a black pyramid, saw a broken labyrinth (it was Lon-
don), saw endless eyes, all very close, studying themselves in me as though 
in a mirror [ . . . . ] saw my face and my viscera, saw your face, and I felt 
dizzy, and I wept, because my eyes had seen that secret, hypothetical object 
whose name has been usurped by men but which no man has ever truly 
looked upon: the inconceivable universe. (283–84)
 Though not quite as radical as Borges or Beckett, Rushdie reconfigures 
space in a number of intriguing ways. He describes older spaces that are 
transformed by new names and identities, as during the creation of the state 
of Pakistan. Being “handcuffed to history,” Saleem and his family always 
improbably and unwillingly find themselves in the place where major his-
torical events are about to occur: in Amritsar just as the British assault is 
about to happen, in Gujerat during the language riots, in Pakistan as the new 
state emerges, in east Pakistan during its war of independence, and so forth 
(440). As the boatman Tai is about to enter the narrative, he is described as 
physically moving closer to it: “Tai is getting nearer. He, who revealed the 
power of the nose, and who is now bringing my grandfather the message 
which will catapult him into history, is stroking his shikara through the early 
morning lake” (9). Saleem comes to realize that he has experienced a number 
of unusual adventures in improbably confined spaces (439); this is especially 
true of the magical basket that transports him, invisible, back to India: “I was 
in the basket, but also not in the basket. . . . Present but insubstantial; actual, 
but without being or weight,” he explains obscurely (438). Most unnatural is 
the labyrinthine geography of the Sundarbans where, as we have seen, time 
is dislocated, self-identity dissolves, teleology collapses, and pseudohistorical 
events transpire. Here, the “jungle closed behind them like a tomb, and after 
hours of increasingly weary but also frenzied rowing through incomprehen-
sibly labyrinthine salt-water channels overtowered by the cathedral-arching 
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trees, Ayooba Shaheed Farooq were hopelessly lost” (414). They quickly sur-
render themselves to “the terrible phantasms of the dream-forest” (417).
WhaT IS The  purpose of all these strange, unnatural, or impossible spaces? 
The answer is as multiform as the spaces themselves. One, it points to the 
fabricated nature of descriptions and places set forth as real and often ges-
tures toward the ideological pressures that inform such constructions (think 
of “Greater Serbia” or “Manifest Destiny”). Postmodern metageographers 
like Rushdie show how new places come into being by verbal acts; this is no 
less true of Pakistan than it is of Utopia (etymologically, “No Place”) or the 
state of Cooch Naheen (literally, “no thing”) in Midnight’s Children. Post-
modern authors are especially deft in challenging existing allegorical con-
structions. The ancient association of the human body and the body politic is 
parodically set forth by Saleem’s geography teacher, Mr Zagallo, who uses the 
boy’s face as a map of India: the stains represent Pakistan: “Thees birthmark 
on the right ear is the east Wing; and thees horrible stained left cheek, the 
West! Remember, stupid boys: Pakistan is a stain on the face of India!” (265). 
Then, in a final illustration of India’s sundering by the creation of Pakistan, 
Zagallo rips Saleem’s hair out of his scalp. This kind of allegorical play with 
space is common among postmodernists.
 Finally, antimimetic constructs of narrative space also demonstrate the 
imaginative as well as the documentary power of fictional narrative. Actual 
spaces may be accurately depicted, or hitherto unthinkable ones may be 
invented. This in turn draws attention to what analytical philosophers refer 
to as the ontological status of fictional entities. When a work is designated 
as fictional, the status of all its elements becomes different from similar ele-
ments in works of nonfiction. No matter how realistic it seems, no descrip-
tion or event in a fictional text can be falsified by reference to nonfictional 
evidence. One cannot say that Proust got his geography wrong in the Recher-
che because, at the time his narrative takes place, there was no such town 
as Combray—in the fictional world he created there is indeed such a place. 
Similarly, in Ulysses, it makes no sense to say that there was no Leopold 
Bloom living at 7 eccles Street; in the fictional world of Ulysses Bloom does 
and will always inhabit this space, regardless of whoever actually lived there 
on June 16, 1904, the day the action of the book takes place (in fact, histori-
cally, the house was unoccupied that day; Joyce made sure that no “real” per-
son was displaced by the Blooms). It is this very fictionality that is extended 
and underscored by the unnatural and impossible spaces of postmodernism.7
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In addITIon To  a temporal and spatial setting, every narrative has a canon 
of probability that governs events in its world. Fictional worlds usually fall 
into one of four types: supernatural, naturalistic, chance, or metafictional. 
In a world with supernatural causal agency, some sort of superhuman force 
appears: gods, ghosts, angels, demons, or fairies are able to cause or influence 
events. In this realm, we usually observe an overarching order determined 
by the workings of providence, fate, or destiny. In a naturalistic world, which 
is the world of the nineteenth century realist novel, supernatural agents are 
banished and all events have strictly naturalistic causes. In many contem-
porary works and in the theater of the absurd, one finds a breakdown of 
conventional causal orders, as events seem to unfold randomly or with no 
discernible order. There is an unnatural proliferation of chance events and 
coincidences; indeterminacy or contingency reigns. Finally, in a metafic-
tional world, the narrator alters the causal laws of the world of the narrative, 
for example, by intervening to spare a protagonist who is otherwise doomed 
to a tragic end. Postmodern works that foreground the collapsing of their 
ontological frameworks are additional examples of this type.
 Characters often struggle to determine the laws of their world: in Oedi-
pus Rex, Jocasta believes that chance (tyche) rules all, and Oedipus and Laius 
both believe that human will can circumvent divine decree. All eventually 
learn that theirs is a thoroughly supernatural world where Fate cannot be 
eluded. Most realist and modernist authors establish naturalistic canons of 
probability as supernatural interpretations are shown to be illusory. A seem-
ingly naturalistic causal setting can in its turn be disrupted by too frequent 
irruptions of chance events and uncanny coincidences, as happens in Ulysses. 
Authors may also keep readers guessing as to which laws a work adheres to.
 Rushdie evokes all four types of governing causal systems in Midnight’s 
Children. Supernatural figures and actions are regularly mentioned and at 
times insisted on: prophecies always prove correct and “yes, magic spells 
can occasionally succeed,” we are informed concerning Saleem’s invisibility 
(440). More often, however, other, more quotidian means are available to 
explain away such events. Thus, the djinns that torment Saleem’s father turn 
out to represent a very ordinary kind of spirit: gin. The ability of his mother 
to perceive the dreams of her sleeping daughter is also suggested to be merely 
a case of a mother’s intuition of her daughter’s desires. Chance, determinism, 
and fate jostle together; Saleem himself can’t decide which rules his world: 
the preternatural powers of the children born on the day of India’s indepen-
dence are due to “some freak of biology, or perhaps owing to some preternat-
ural power of the moment, or just conceivably by sheer coincidence (though 
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synchronicity on such a scale would stagger even C. G. Jung)” (224). In the 
end, we discover that fate is not preordained; human will can sometimes alter 
an apparent determinism. Saleem recognizes that the next generation will 
not be “looking for their fate in prophecy or the stars, but forging it in the 
implacable furnaces of their wills” (515). While supernatural explanations 
tend to get naturalized, these naturalistic parameters are themselves regularly 
exploded by the intrusion of antimimetic events, as supernatural marvels are 
replaced by playfully fictional ones. Chance remains unnaturally powerful 
as a series of wildly improbable coincidences land Saleem and his family in 
the most historically volatile areas year after year all over the Indian subcon-
tinent. This in turn points to a metafictional intelligence that is arranging 
the events, even as it usually acknowledges the generally unalterable force of 
history. The book ends in a kind of stalemate between metafictional and his-
torical/naturalistic ordering powers. Taken together, these examples disclose 
that the establishing of the canon of probability that governs a fictional world 
is of central importance and that characters and readers alike may be drawn 
into an interpretative drama concerning the precise nature of the storyworld.
foCalIzaTIon  is normally thought to be the perspective from which the 
narrated events are presented; this perspective is typically that of one or more 
individuals located at a particular point in space. In a mimetic first-person 
narrative told by a character, the only possible focalization would be the per-
ceptions experienced by the narrator: after all, how can one individual know 
for certain exactly what any other is seeing, hearing, or feeling? Antimimetic 
fiction provides for many other options. An omniscient third-person nar-
rator can abruptly lose his or her omniscience, as Gogol’s famously does in 
“The Overcoat.” First-person narrators in works of fiction can occasionally 
break into the minds of others, as when Marcel depicts the final thoughts of 
the solitary Bergotte in In Search of Lost Time. The focalization of collectives 
in “we” or “they” narratives is always intriguing, since all individuals in a 
group almost never have identical perceptions; there is always some varia-
tion among different observers. In extreme examples of this kind of narra-
tion, contradictory perceptions are set forth or shared thoughts stretching 
over centuries are delineated. The example of Borges’ Aleph offers us one 
impossible space that provides the literal viewpoints of an infinite number of 
different spaces. In Midnight’s Children, Saleem not only depicts his own per-
ceptions but also offers the hypothetical focalization of his father (“maybe, 
yes, why not, my father sees a dark flurry of monkey out of the corner of an 
eye,” 94); he also visualizes an illicit image privately seen by his mother (97). 
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He even learns how ghosts perceive the world (438). At other points he hears 
the private thoughts of other minds. The main source of these unnatural 
perceptions is what the narrator calls “All India Radio,” or his ability to over-
hear others’ streams of thought. This too is spatially situated: “In the street, 
I learned how to identify the mind-stream of passing strangers [though] the 
law of Doppler shift continued to operate in these paranormal realms, and 
the voices grew and diminished as the strangers passed” (192–93). Antimi-
metic texts thus locate impossible perceptions in natural spaces as well as 
fixing ordinary perceptions in impossible spaces.
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 1. Thus, the Duluth Library website, asks us, “What is the role of the Mississippi 
River in this book?” Sometimes the question is disguised (CliffsNotes asks us to “Com-
pare and contrast the environment on shore and the environment on the raft”), but you 
can count on its presence in one form or another. [JP/PJR]
 2. Thanks to Michael Harwick. [JP/PJR]
 3. Keith Cohen, taking a cue from Roland Barthes, argues that some kinds of de-
scription (in particular, ekphrasis) can be valuable artistically because they produce a 
kind of jouissance, a “textual thrill, when the ordinary limits of signification are exceed-
ed . . . [and] the normal communication process is . . . short-circuited. . . . If ordinary 
pleasure confirms me and my cultural expectations, textual thrill unsettles me, decenters 
my worldview, challenges all symmetries” (Cohen, “Unweaving Puig’s Spider Woman,” 
18). [JP/PJR]
 4. For examples of feminist geographical scholarship, see the journal Gender, Place, 
and Culture, published by Routledge; the founding editors were Liz Bondi and Mona 
Domosch. See also Joni Seager and Lise Nelson’s Companion to Feminist Geography and 
the work of Linda McDowell. [RW]
 5. Feminist standpoint theory was first outlined by Nancy Hartsock; Sandra Hard-
ing and Patricia Hill Collins extended standpoint epistemology to the disciplines of 
science and to include perspectives from all marginalized groups, including, but not 
exclusively, women. [RW]
 6. Deictic terms like “I,” “here,” and “now” are expressions whose meaning changes 
depending on who is uttering them in what discourse context. [DH]
 7. For further reading on narrative worlds, space, setting, and perspective from 
an unnatural narratology perspective, see Alber; Doležel, Heterocosmica; Grishakova; 
Richardson, “Poetics”; and Shen. [BR]
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Two of the persistent questions about character in fiction are how seriously 
we should take its mimetic potential and whether character or plot is the 
more important element. One position on the first question is that only naïve 
readers take that mimetic potential seriously because characters are only 
words on paper, brushstrokes on canvas, images on celluloid, and so forth. 
Structuralist narratologists with their interest in laying out the grammar of 
narrative by identifying its fundamental units and the rules for combining 
them offer one version of this position. They define character as a set of 
predicates grouped under a proper name that performs one or more plot 
functions (e.g., sender, receiver, helper, opponent). A competing position, 
which can be traced back to Aristotle’s Poetics and which has seen a con-
temporary flourishing in work on narrative’s ability to exercise our Theory 
of Mind (Zunshine; Palmer), makes the mimetic potential of character its 
defining property. Our position is that we should eliminate the competition 
between these positions by recognizing that character has both mimetic and 
synthetic components—and thematic components as well. Characters do 
resemble possible people, they are artificial constructs that perform various 
functions in the progression, and they can function to convey the political, 
philosophical, or ethical issues being taken up by the narrative. For example, 
Miss Watson is a straitlaced, conventional, single, Christian woman who 
has no problem being a slave-owner, and we react to her as representing a 
kind of person we might actually meet if we time-traveled to pre–Civil War 
Character
5
5 :  C h a r a C T e r
112
Hannibal, Missouri. At the same time, Twain uses her to perform three main 
synthetic functions: to help demonstrate that Huck and “sivilization” are not 
a good match; to provide the spur for Jim’s flight by entertaining the offer 
to sell him; and to resolve the global instability about Jim by granting him 
his freedom in her will. In addition, Miss Watson helps Twain make his the-
matic arguments about one brand of Christianity, about slave owning, and 
about the connection between those two things. While this view of character 
eliminates what we regard as an unnecessary theoretical competition, it also 
raises the question of how the three components of character interact in any 
given narrative. We can better answer that question after we take up the sec-
ond persistent question, the one about the relative importance of character 
and plot.
 This question also has its roots in the Poetics, where Aristotle identifies 
plot as the soul of tragedy and views character as subordinate to plot. Henry 
James famously tilts the balance back toward character by suggesting that 
events and characters are so interdependent that they blend into each other: 
“What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but 
the illustration of character?” e. M. Forster goes further than James by argu-
ing that character is ultimately more important than plot, and many subse-
quent critics and theorists, including Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg in 
their influential Nature of Narrative, share Forster’s view. Consistent with 
our pluralism, our first response to the question is that it depends on the 
nature and purpose of your inquiry. If you are interested in how the shapes of 
actions in literary texts reflect or influence social reality (e.g., how the nine-
teenth-century marriage plot ties in to cultural practice), then plot is clearly 
more important. If you are interested in literature as a window into psychol-
ogy, then character is more important. Our second response is that even 
from the perspective of rhetorical narrative theory, once we locate character 
and plot as elements of the textual dynamics, their relative importance will 
depend on the particular progression of the narrative under consideration. 
In Tom Jones, for example, Henry Fielding subordinates character to plot as 
he directs our interest not to the psychological complexity of his characters 
but rather to the marvelous sequence of events that takes Tom first to the 
point of almost having a noose around his neck and then to his engagement 
with Sophia. In Mrs. Dalloway, on the other hand, virginia Woolf subordi-
nates plot to character as she directs our interest in the events of the novel 
not toward their contribution to any significant change in Clarissa’s life but 
rather toward what they reveal about who she is and why she matters.
 Similarly, the relationship among the components of character in any 
given narrative (or at any given point in a narrative) depends on the under-
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lying purpose governing the progression. Some progressions will direct our 
interest primarily toward one component, some primarily toward two of the 
three (Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler plays down the mimetic 
in favor of the synthetic and thematic), and some toward all three—and no 
interest or set of interests is inherently superior to the others. Nevertheless, 
we can generalize about some tendencies in the relationships among the 
components and draw out some other important principles.
 1. The mimetic and synthetic components are often (though not always) 
on a seesaw. When a progression increases our interest in one, it tends to 
decrease our interest in the other. Indeed, as we’ve already noted, the art 
of realistic fiction consists of conveying the illusion that the characters are 
acting autonomously even as their actions serve the implied author’s overall 
purpose. From the perspective of this standard mimetic-synthetic seesaw, 
we can more clearly discern a problem with Tom Sawyer’s delayed revelation 
that Miss Watson freed Jim in her will. Although Tom’s delay is consistent 
with the mimetic component of his character—indeed, it explains both to 
Huck and to the authorial audience why Tom would side with the “lowdown 
Abolitionists” (for “the adventure of it”)—Miss Watson’s action all but punc-
tures the novel’s illusion that the characters are acting autonomously at this 
crucial point. Her decision comes across less as the logical consequence of 
her mimetic character than as the consequence of Twain’s desperate need to 
resolve the global instability of Jim’s story line.
 2. The thematic component is a congenial partner of both the mimetic 
and the synthetic components. One typical underlying constructive purpose 
of mimetic characters is to link their mimetic traits with thematic functions. 
Furthermore, one typical consequence of an author’s foregrounding the syn-
thetic component of character is the heightening of our interest in the the-
matic. In If on a winter’s night a traveler, Calvino flaunts the constructed 
quality of his protagonist, whom he calls simply Reader and addresses in the 
second-person, in order to direct our attention to his thematic exploration of 
readerly desire and its dependence on both the internal dynamics of narra-
tive and the various institutions that support, profit from, or otherwise take 
advantage of that desire. Nevertheless, these frequent connections between 
the thematic and the other two components do not mean that the thematic 
component will necessarily be the dominant interest. Think again of Woolf ’s 
Mrs. Dalloway, which generates multiple thematic interests (about the effects 
of World War I, the chaos of life, the value of Clarissa’s parties, etc.), but 
keeps our focus primarily on the mimetic component of Clarissa’s character.
 3. It is useful to distinguish between dimensions and functions of char-
acter—that is, to distinguish between the attributes that serve as the building 
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blocks of character and the coalescence of those attributes into a larger entity. 
Thus, sometimes characters have a collection of mimetic traits but the pro-
gression does not convert those various traits into an overarching mimetic 
function. For example, over the course of Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, 
Gulliver is sometimes patient, sometimes impatient, sometimes perceptive 
and sometimes obtuse—and similarly inconsistent in relation to many other 
traits. In this sense, Gulliver has multiple mimetic dimensions, but these 
dimensions do not work together to produce a coherent mimetic charac-
ter. In offering this analysis, we are not finding fault with Swift. Instead, the 
analysis helps support the points that different authorial purposes will lead 
to different relationships among the components of character and that judg-
ments about the effectiveness of different relationships should be made in 
relation to those purposes. In our view, Swift’s decision to give Gulliver mul-
tiple but inconsistent mimetic dimensions enables Swift to achieve his the-
matic—more precisely satiric—purposes far more effectively than if he had 
felt obligated to work with a mimetic character who was consistent across his 
different travels.
 At other times a mimetic dimension of a character will contribute to her 
mimetic function but the progression will not thematize that dimension. In 
Pride and Prejudice, elizabeth Bennet is given to spontaneous outbursts of 
feeling as when she expresses her shock at Charlotte’s decision to accept Col-
lins’s proposal (“engaged to Mr Collins! my dear Charlotte,—impossible!”) 
and then later unguardedly expresses her grief in Darcy’s presence about 
Lydia’s flight with Wickham. This trait adds an important dimension to her 
mimetic character, and though Austen uses it to accomplish thematic or 
synthetic purposes (highlighting Charlotte’s plight in the marriage market; 
disclosing to Darcy news that eventually allows him to demonstrate the best 
aspects of his character), she does not thematize the trait itself.
 4. The particular balance of components of a character may or may not 
match the balance of components of the larger progression. In 1984, for 
example, George Orwell directs our attention primarily to the mimetic and 
thematic components of Winston Smith’s character, but he also foregrounds 
the synthetic component of his storyworld—one in which clocks strike thir-
teen and many other elements do not conform to Orwell’s world in 1948. 
This foregrounding of the synthetic reinforces our central interest in the 
progression to the thematic component—Orwell’s exposure of the evils of 
totalitarianism—even as we never lose our strong mimetic interest in Win-
ston. That emphasis and the treatment of Winston also mean that 1984 is 
an exception to the usual rule about the seesaw relationship between the 
mimetic and the synthetic components of character. Because mimetic Win-
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ston exists as an integral part of this clearly synthetic storyworld, we also 
direct more attention to his synthetic component, particularly his function 
as the individual who initially rebels against but ultimately conforms to the 
totalitarian state.
 5. The mimetic component of character may or may not alter over the 
course of a narrative, but, if it does, the change will typically be tied to the 
thematic functions of the character and hence to the thematic purposes of the 
narrative. The bildungsroman, for example, is a subgenre of the novel built 
on the principle that the protagonist will undergo some significant change 
not just in fate but also in character. In just about every case, the progression 
will tie the change in character to the thematic component of the narrative. 
For example, the change in Huck’s character from someone with little convic-
tion about the best way to act toward Jim to someone with firm conviction 
about how to act is clearly tied to the novel’s thematics. Huck’s change allows 
Twain to demonstrate the superiority of Huck the outsider’s instinctive judg-
ments, based on his direct experience of Jim, to the judgments that follow 
from shore society’s links between Christianity and the legality of slavery. 
One of the problems with the evasion is that it works against Twain’s the-
matic points by undermining our sense that Huck has changed.
 6. Our interest in the different components of character meshes with 
our theory of audience, which we discuss in more detail in the next chap-
ter. Briefly, our interest in the mimetic component is a function of our par-
ticipation in the narrative audience, which takes the events in a fiction as 
history and the characters as real people. Our interest in the synthetic com-
ponent is a function of our participation in the authorial audience, which 
seeks to discern the underlying constructive purpose of the story as a whole. 
Our interest in the thematic component is always part of our participation 
in the authorial audience and sometimes part of our participation in the 
narrative audience (at minimum whenever the narrative engages in overt 
thematizing).
 7. The synthetic component of character includes its contributions not 
only to plot dynamics but also to narratorial dynamics. As we noted in chap-
ter 2, character–character dialogue, which typically heightens our interest 
in the mimetic component, can simultaneously be used—reliably or unreli-
ably—to report, interpret, or evaluate. This aspect of the synthetic compo-
nent deserves more attention than it has received so far.
 8. As Alex Woloch has pointed out, the progression of some narratives 
can direct readerly attention to their “character systems,” that is, the distri-
bution of textual space allotted to each character and the larger network 
of relationships among those characters. In Middlemarch, for example, in 
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order to understand the fates of individual characters such as Dorothea and 
Lydgate, we need to recognize how they exist within the whole web of Mid-
dlemarch society. That recognition in turn highlights the tight link between 
the mimetic and the thematic, since one of eliot’s themes is the power of that 
web-like society.
CharaCTerIzaTIon and CharaCTer fUnCTIonS In 
huCkleBerry finn
To illustrate many of these points, we turn to the Boggs-Sherburn episode in 
Chapters XXI and XXII. This is one of the episodes in which the local pur-
pose is to reveal the nature of shore society, but, since that purpose is shared 
by many other episodes, if Twain had not included it, we wouldn’t notice a 
gap in the progression. More specifically, the episode has the thematic func-
tion of getting us to recognize the evils of the lynch mob—in particular, to 
convince us that mobs exist in part because ordinary people fail to resist their 
sway. This thematic point will be all the stronger if Twain can temporarily 
convince the narrative audience, if not to join the mob, then at least to watch 
with interest from the outskirts.
 Twain achieves his purpose through his characterizations of Boggs, 
Sherburn, Boggs’s sixteen-year-old daughter, the Bricksville bystanders who 
witness Sherburn’s shooting of Boggs and then go after Sherburn with the 
intention of lynching him, and Huck. One of the synthetic functions of the 
Bricksville bystanders is to characterize Boggs through their interpretive and 
evaluative comments, which paint a thematic-mimetic portrait of a variation 
on the town drunk, an ultimately harmless man, who, fortified by drink, 
nevertheless periodically raises a ruckus. But even as the bystanders perform 
this synthetic function, Twain is also giving them mimetic and thematic 
functions. Huck refers to them as “loafers,” a mimetic description that fits 
with their regarding Boggs only as a figure of fun whose monthly drunken 
rampage is a source of entertainment. That description in turn supports their 
thematic function of representing the deficient values of shore society. Twain 
then uses Sherburn, whom he mimetically presents as a proud, imperious, 
and cruel man, to represent another side of those deficient values. When the 
drunken Boggs does not obey Sherburn’s command to cease harassing him 
by one o’clock, Sherburn guns him down in cold blood—and in front of his 
sixteen-year-old daughter. Why? Simply because he can. Twain uses Boggs’s 
daughter to underline the self-indulgent viciousness of Sherburn’s act: she 
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has enough of a mimetic function to make her grief over her father plausible, 
even moving, but her main function is synthetic. Her presence adds to our 
repulsion at Sherburn—something ought to be done to punish this man.
 Thus, as we watch the bystanders deciding that they should lynch Sher-
burn, Twain has set things up so that we have a least some sympathy with 
their goal—not enough, perhaps, to join the mob but enough to watch their 
actions with a certain detached curiosity (in radical contrast, say, to the abso-
lute horror with which we watch the lynch mob in Richard Wright’s Uncle 
Tom’s Children). Thus, when Sherburn calls their bluff, we’re caught as well—
because to a certain extent, his criticism is directed to the narrative audience 
as well as to the “loafers” in the mob. In our momentary thematic shock, 
we do not notice a certain slippage from the mimetic toward the synthetic. 
The Sherburn who gives his speech is an authorial spokesman, a reliable 
interpreter who shows a wisdom and understanding of human nature and 
social debilitation (note his discussions of the legal system, the press, and the 
military) that seems inconsistent with the self-centered pride and cruel dis-
regard for Boggs and his daughter he displays earlier. even if we can imagine 
a plausible person who combines these traits, a little reflection reveals that 
the length and careful logic of Sherburn’s speech is not mimetically moti-
vated: rather than being what such a man would say in such a situation (he’d 
give another terse ultimatum), it is what Twain needs him to say in order to 
accomplish his thematic purposes. In a sense, Twain has made a sacrifice 
here, trading his usual concern for mimesis for greater thematic power—but 
the progression of the scene is so artful that we are likely not to register the 
sacrifice as we read.
 And what about Huck here? Throughout this episode Huck’s primary 
function is synthetic, as he reliably reports but only lightly interprets the 
events. But at the very end, after having Huck report that all the loafers fled 
from Sherburn’s house, Twain moves his mimetic function back into the 
foreground of the narrative: “I could a staid, if I’d a wanted to, but I didn’t 
want to” (148). This is a rare instance of estranging unreliability in the novel, 
as Huck misreports and misevaluates his motives for leaving in order to 
have his narrative audience think that he is not as scared of Sherburn as the 
Bricksville bystanders are. The estranging effects are not great, because we 
still sympathize with Huck in this situation—especially since we have nearly 
been there ourselves and, in fact, have watched the unfolding of the scene 
from Huck’s perspective. Huck should have left much earlier—but we didn’t 
notice it at the time any more than he did. In the end, then, the estrang-
ing effects contribute to the larger synthetic function of the whole episode 
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in the progression. The episode gives Huck—and the authorial audience—
experiences of shore society that provide a compelling contrast to Huck’s 
experiences with Jim, a contrast that Huck registers at some level and that 
ultimately informs his decision (and our approval of that decision) to go to 
hell rather than act in a way that would return Jim to slavery.
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For many fans and students of Jane Austen, her characters are people. Such 
readers speak of Anne elliot, Frederick Wentworth, Lady Russell, Sir Walter, 
and everybody around them as though they possessed agency and auton-
omy outside the confines of the text, speculating about whether Frederic 
“really” still loved Anne even though in his resentment he denied it at first, 
or whether Anne “was actually mature enough” to have handled getting mar-
ried at nineteen. Indeed, given the vividness and the singularity with which 
Austen’s characters are endowed, the temptation to think of them as if they 
were persons is very strong. The novelist herself was having fun with this 
conceit when she told her friends and family members what “happened” to 
some of her characters after their novels’ plots had played out, as I mentioned 
in a footnote to the previous section. For both narrative theory and feminist 
criticism, however, remembering that characters are not people is crucially 
important. Characters are marks on the page, made up of the alphabetical 
characters that spell out “who” they are. They have no psychology, no interi-
ority, no subjectivity. Characters are the representational effects the novelist 
creates in structuring the novel. The way characters like Austen’s can leave 
the impression of being real people is one of the miracles of literary writ-
ing, and it produces one of novel-reading’s greatest pleasures. But to achieve 
the ends of feminist narratology—that is, to understand how narrative par-
ticipates in the construction, reinforcement, and subversion of gender—the 
critic who can feel the effects of Austen’s characterizations needs to focus on 
how those effects are achieved.
 In classical narratology (as inspired by linguistics and proposed by 
vladimir Propp and A. J. Greimas), individual characters are superseded by 
“anthropomorphic actants” performing “functions” in the story; at the level 
of deep structure, they have attributes which, in combination with their ficti-
tious actions, constitute their role in the narrative syntagm. Thinking about 
characters in this bare-bones way does not go very far toward understanding 
the subtleties of Austen’s work, but it can be useful in describing the strongly 
gendered macro-structure her six completed novels have in common. As I 
have mentioned above in my discussion of the marriage plot, Austen’s novels 
always center on an unmarried heroine between the ages of fifteen (Cath-
erine Moreland) and twenty-six (Anne elliot) and always present her with 
an apparent choice between the right suitor (e.g., Henry Tilney, Frederick 
Wentworth) and the wrong suitor (e.g., John Thorpe, William Walter elliot). 
Following the long-established precedent of romance fiction, the heroine 
is invariably paired with at least one female foil or rival, who is in some 
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ways like her but in important ways different (in Sense and Sensibility eli-
nor’s foil is Lucy Steele, Marianne’s is elinor; Pride and Prejudice presents 
Charlotte Lucas, Miss Bingley, and Jane Bennet as foils to elizabeth; emma 
Woodhouse’s foil is Jane Fairfax; Fanny Price’s is Mary Crawford; Catherine 
Moreland’s is Isabella Thorpe; and Anne elliot’s are her sisters and Louisa 
Musgrove). By her similarities to her foil (youth, eligibility for upper- or 
upper-middle-class marriage, attractiveness to men, quickness of mind and 
of perception) we know the heroine’s character type; by her differences, we 
know what sets her apart as the character who gets to be the heroine. (elinor 
is more well bred and less narcissistic than Lucy, while Marianne, a sort of 
junior heroine, is more expressive than her sister; elizabeth is more romantic 
and less mercenary than Charlotte, less vain or snobbish than Miss Bingley, 
and more forthcoming than her sister Jane; emma is more candid than Jane 
Fairfax; Fanny is more self-aware and far less sexually knowing than Mary; 
Catherine is much nicer and a little smarter than Isabella; and Anne is worlds 
above her sisters and Louisa in intelligence, manners, capability, education, 
sensitivity to others, and depth of feeling.)
 Sometimes the heroine’s evident superiority to her foil is vast, as with 
elinor and Lucy or Anne and Louisa; sometimes it is not so obvious—or 
indeed, for some readers, it is debatable—as with emma and Jane or Fanny 
and Mary. However, the familiar configuration of characters, the recogniz-
able pattern of good suitor/bad suitor, heroine/foil, is not just a framework 
on which to build a plot but is also part of the substance of what the indi-
vidual figures signify. Typical of generic patterning in general, the Austen 
novel rounds up the usual suspects in order to spotlight the variations on 
that pattern which the presence of secondary characters can introduce. To 
give just a few examples of deviations from the normal pattern: one chal-
lenge in interpreting Sense and Sensibility arises from the doubling of the 
heroine figure in elinor and Marianne; the proliferation of foils for elizabeth 
Bennet adds extra facets to those characteristics of the heroine that distin-
guish her from the women who are not-the-heroines; the introduction of a 
female peer and friend who is neither the heroine’s rival nor her foil, such as 
Northanger Abbey’s eleanor Tilney or Persuasion’s Mrs. Smith, increases the 
opportunities for registering the heroine’s best qualities as they are reflected 
in her friend’s affectionate regard. In short, we come to know a character by 
seeing examples of who and what she is not and by understanding how she is 
perceived by other characters, even as we attend to the attributes and func-
tions assigned to her. This is especially true in nineteenth-century fictions 
about women, where the creation of characters is governed by the logic of 
what Helena Michie has called sororophobia—the cultural assumption that 
121
r o b y n  W a r h o l
women exist in and through dyads of rivalry, love, and conflict with each 
other—as well as the paradigm of homosocial bonding that eve Sedgwick 
has identified between pairs of men who compete over women in novels.
 Another strong temptation for readers is to think of the attributes and 
situations of Austen’s characters as an indication of what “life” was like in 
Austen’s time and place. But the fictitious experiences of characters actu-
ally reveal nothing about the author’s historical period except for the atti-
tudes and assumptions that are reflected in and influenced by the text. To 
be sure, upper-class British women of the early nineteenth century were in 
an emotionally and financially unstable position if they were still unmarried 
at age twenty-six and therefore dependent, as is Anne elliot, on patriarchs 
who might be no better at knowing the value of their money than the value 
of their daughters. But if we think about it candidly, practically everybody 
except upper-class men (those who could hang onto their resources more 
effectively than Sir Walter) was in a precarious condition in that economy, 
and women of all social classes beneath hers suffered more significant dis-
comforts than Anne elliot’s disappointment in love. Longing, as many lovers 
of Jane Austen do, to have been alive during Austen’s time reflects a naïve 
though understandable assumption that people in that world were like char-
acters in Austen novels, with motives that were legible, actions that were 
consistent, and conversational diction and syntax that were superb. Like Wil-
liam Shakespeare’s, Austen’s characters are vehicles for conveying some of the 
most beautifully constructed sentences in the english language. One need 
only look at Austen’s own letters or the draft of the canceled chapter of Per-
suasion to realize that not even the author herself “really talked like that.” As 
part of my practice of feminist narratology, I try to encounter characters in 
all their facets as functions of discourse, not as mirrors of or windows on the 
extradiegetic world.
 Characters, then, are creatures of the discourse of gender in Persuasion, 
the discourse most interesting to me as a feminist narratologist. An obvi-
ous way in which characters serve this function is by talking directly about 
gender, as Anne does in her important debate with Captain Harville about 
whether women or men love “longest, when existence or when hope is gone” 
(189). While dialogue about gender can mark a novel as explicitly feminist, 
as I believe that scene does for Persuasion, the construction of gender in the 
creation of the characters themselves is more subtle and probably more effec-
tive in both reflecting and influencing the culture’s beliefs about masculinity 
and femininity. Austen presents secondary characters who embody gendered 
stereotypes, sometimes in the extreme, in order to challenge those stereo-
types through other, more fully delineated characters with traits that com-
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plicate the expectations raised by the cultural norms. For instance, Anne’s 
sisters exemplify different veins of the negative stereotypes of femininity 
which Austen’s immediate predecessor, Mary Wollstonecraft, identified as 
the inevitable result of women’s existence in a patriarchal system. If one 
binary assumption about gender was that because men are strong, women 
must be weak, Mary’s ineffectual hypochondria and perpetual demands for 
attention seem to prove it; if another is that men are careless about their 
appearance and women are vain, then elizabeth fills the negative feminine 
type perfectly. In a sense, these secondary characterizations suggest that Aus-
ten represents those stereotypes of femininity as in some way “true,” or that 
she even endorses the binary reasoning behind them. To be sure, Austen 
is no gender radical. A character’s complete reversal of gender norms is an 
index of that character’s devaluation in the novel: Sir Walter combines Mary’s 
selfish uselessness with elizabeth’s personal vanity to present the epitome of 
an objectionably effeminate man, strongly contrasting with the admirable 
and hypermasculine Admiral Croft, who, like Wentworth, is a self-made 
man (“having acquired a very handsome fortune” [23]) and unlike Sir Walter 
is not at all addicted to having multiple mirrors in his dressing-room (“Such 
a number of looking-glasses! oh, Lord!” exclaims the Admiral. “There was no 
getting away from oneself ” [104]). Admiral Croft’s character fits the norms 
of the new nineteenth-century masculinity almost as closely as Mary’s and 
elizabeth’s conform to the negative types of femininity, but in the Admi-
ral this conformity to the norms is presented as a good thing—particularly 
since he is willing to be led by his very savvy wife in matters of business and 
in driving, a flexibility that mitigates the consistency with which he fits the 
masculine type.1
 To be an admirable character in Austen’s world, then, a figure must be 
grounded in comprehensible gender norms but depart from them in selected 
and significant ways. Far from being a simple inversion of negative traits 
associated with femininity, Anne embodies many “feminine” norms: mas-
culine men are supposed to be bold, but Anne is gentle; men are boister-
ous, while Anne is quiet; men project self-confidence, while Anne’s reticence 
expresses a feminine self-effacement. As the heroine, Anne does represent 
the inversion of many negative traits culturally marked as feminine: she 
is wise, though it is feminine to be silly; she is efficacious, though women 
are supposed to be passive; she is unselfconscious about her own increas-
ing physical attractiveness, though as a woman she ought to be vain. And, 
perhaps most importantly, though it was “feminine” to be not just sexually 
chaste but cold, Anne is represented as a fully sexual being whose ardent 
desire for Captain Wentworth expresses itself repeatedly in her trembling 
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bodily reactions to moments of contact with the hero. Anne’s conformities 
to and divergences from the gender norms of Austen’s period are a key to the 
political positioning of the text.
 Whereas secondary characters in Austen are mainly built out of narra-
tor’s generalizations, bits of dialogue, story-functions, and other characters’ 
reactions to them, their social identities are partly constructed through Aus-
ten’s characteristic use of free indirect discourse (fid).2 Attitudes and expres-
sions assigned to the secondary characters through free indirect discourse 
in Persuasion generally reflect what they say (or what they would say) out 
loud, as in the example of Sir Walter’s free indirect discourse I have analyzed 
in the section on Narration. Lady Russell’s character is formed chiefly by the 
opinions attributed to her in passages of free indirect discourse like this one, 
which summarizes the reasons she held for advising Anne against her initial 
engagement to Captain Wentworth:
Anne elliot, with all her claims of birth, beauty, and mind, to throw her-
self away at nineteen; involve herself at nineteen in an engagement with 
a young man, who had nothing but himself to recommend him, and no 
hopes of attaining affluence, but in the chances of a most uncertain profes-
sion, and no connexions to secure even his farther rise in that profession; 
would be, indeed, a throwing away, which she grieved to think of! Anne 
elliot, so young; known to so few, to be snatched off by a stranger without 
alliance or fortune; or rather sunk by him into a state of most wearing, 
anxious, youth-killing dependence! It must not be . . . (27)
The exclamation points, the repetitions (“throw herself away at nineteen; 
involve herself at nineteen”), the hyperbole (“no hopes of attaining afflu-
ence,” “to be snatched off by a stranger”), and the effect of “thinking aloud” 
that comes through in the building up and revising of Lady Russell’s thoughts 
through the course of the passage (“to be snatched off  .  .  . or rather to be 
sunk by him”) all suggest what Lady Russell would sound like, if she were 
to express these thoughts. Indeed, the passage implies that Lady Russell did 
express them to Anne. Perhaps because the novelist needs to craft Lady Rus-
sell as a character with whom the implied reader can sympathize, she also 
uses free indirect discourse to render thoughts Lady Russell cannot be sup-
posed to have said out loud, for example, her objections to Mrs. Clay’s going 
in Anne’s place to Bath with the elliots: “Lady Russell was extremely sorry 
that such a measure should have been resorted to at all—wondered, grieved, 
and feared—and the affront it contained to Anne, in Mrs. Clay’s being of so 
much use, while Anne could be of none, was a very sore aggravation” (32). 
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Here the narrator embeds a bit of free indirect discourse coming from Sir 
Walter or elizabeth (“Mrs. Clay’s being of so much use, while Anne could be 
of none”) in Lady Russell’s thoughts, which are in turn rendered in free indi-
rect discourse that reflects her own diction (“extremely sorry,” “wondered, 
grieved, and feared,” “affront,” “sore aggravation”) but that would contradict 
her punctilious sense of propriety if spoken aloud. The effect of such a pas-
sage is that Lady Russell emerges as one of the few characters in the novel 
who seems to have an interiority. In the very brief glimpse into his feel-
ings I discussed in the section on Perspective, Wentworth is another. But 
the novel’s focalization through Anne means that she possesses by far the 
most detailed consciousness in the text. every page of Persuasion contains 
passages of free indirect discourse reflecting Anne’s thoughts, feelings, and 
bodily sensations, adding up to the powerful illusion of an independent psy-
chology comparable to that of a “real person.” Technically speaking, this is 
what makes Anne the heroine of the novel, more than any of her admirable 
characteristics or actions. For me as a feminist narratologist, the fullness with 




In the approach to be sketched here, characters in fictional narratives like 
Mcewan’s are textually grounded models of individuals-in-a-world (cf. Mar-
golin, “Character” 70–76). More specifically, characters can viewed as a par-
ticular subsystem of the what dimension of narrative worlds; they constitute 
a subset of the entities that, on the basis of textual cues, can be inferred to 
populate the storyworld. This subset, consisting of more or less prototypical 
members of the category of “persons,” is a special class of entities. Captur-
ing what distinguishes characters from other elements of the what, and how 
those differences bear on the process of narrative worldmaking, requires tak-
ing into account the fundamental contrast between persons and things, or 
personal vs. nonpersonal entities.
 This contrast is based on more or less widely circulating models of what 
a person is and of how persons relate to the world at large. Modes of char-
acterization specific to particular narrative genres (e.g., picaresque tales, 
novels of manners, detective fiction), and for that matter modes specific 
to a given author’s oeuvre, provide further scaffolding for the construction 
of individuals-in-a-world, who can conversely be used to throw light on—
and potentially reshape—a culture’s or subculture’s understandings of per-
sons. Hence my focus in this chapter is on interactions between, on the one 
hand, schemes for understanding persons (schemes that emerge from prior 
encounters with stories and other kinds of texts, as well as everyday social 
encounters) and, on the other hand, text-guided inferences about human 
individuals in narrative worlds.
ConTraSTIng approaCheS, foUndaTIonal ISSUeS
Here again I should stress that although it explores issues that are broadly 
relevant for mind-oriented research on character, my account takes its place 
within a variety of approaches to this area of inquiry—a variety that in itself 
suggests the vitality of the scholarship in this domain. For example, Alan 
Palmer foregrounds intratextual over intertextual approaches to fictional 
minds; he focuses on how the cues included in a given text prompt read-
ers to ascribe to characters reasons for acting, rather than on how that text 
draws on (or relates to) wider repertoires of mind-indicating cues (41–43). 
By contrast, to use terms that I discuss further below, my approach seeks to 
balance (1) an emphasis on how individual narratives trigger the construc-
tion of character profiles, or what I term model persons, with (2) an emphasis 
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on how those profiles relate to broader models of persons—models deriving 
in part from the narratives circulating within a given culture or subculture 
(cf. Jannidis, “Character” and Figur; Schneider, “Toward”). Meanwhile, Lisa 
Zunshine uses ideas from evolutionary and cognitive psychology to argue 
that readers of fictional narratives recruit from an innate “Theory of Mind” 
to link what characters say and do to inferences about underlying mental 
states. The approach that I outline in the remainder of this chapter, however, 
grounds itself in different traditions of research in the philosophy of mind, 
social psychology, and other fields. This work, by scholars such as Lynne 
Rudder Baker, Jerome Bruner, Peter Hobson, Daniel Hutto, P. F. Strawson, 
and others, calls into question the assumption that there is a problem of 
other minds that must be solved by way of theory.3 The resulting shift in 
perspective allows the grammar of questions featuring the theory-of-mind 
concept to be surveyed anew, in ways that are consequential for research on 
characters in storyworlds.
 To elaborate further: in the research that informs my contribution to this 
chapter, the fundamental contrast is between not self and other but rather 
persons and things, or personal and nonpersonal entities. Thus for P.  F. 
Strawson the concept of person is part of human beings’ basic equipment 
for living, or the means by which they negotiate the world. Strawson argued 
further that the notion of “person” is a conceptual primitive; in other words, 
the idea of a person indissolubly combines mental or personal predicates 
(“intends to take a walk”; “doesn’t feel well”) with material predicates having 
to do with persons’ bodies and those bodies’ situation in space and time (“is 
currently seated on the couch”; “is lying down with a flushed appearance”). 
On this account, being able to ascribe mental as well as material predicates to 
one and the same entity—an ascriptional practice made possible by observed 
behaviors in the case of others but not in one’s own case—is the criterion 
that establishes what counts as a member of the category “person.” But what 
is more, this way of treating the idea of person reframes the entire question 
of other minds. Other minds are not a problem to be solved but instead 
built into the very concept of a person (see Hobson 243–52; Noë 29–35; See-
mann). Hence the idea of person, from this perspective, entails that mental 
predicates will be self-ascribable in one’s own case and other-ascribable in 
the case of others.4
 On this view, narrators make sense of characters’ minds, characters make 
sense of one another’s minds, and readers make sense of both narrators’ and 
characters’ minds insofar as they situate those individuals in the domain of 
persons.5 At issue is a process not of theoretical reconstruction or simulation 
of another’s mind, but rather of categorization. When I categorize a being as a 
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person, I ipso facto assume that he or she embodies a constellation of mental 
and material predicates—predicates that are linked together in patterns spec-
ified by models of persons circulating in my culture or subculture. In turn, 
characters in novels can be viewed as model persons; these fictional individu-
als are at once shaped by and have the power to reshape broader conceptions 
of what a person is and of how persons can be expected to respond in par-
ticular kinds of circumstances.
engagIng WITh CharaCTerS In SToryWorldS
An approach to character that connects these ideas with issues of worldmak-
ing emphasizes not so much the assortment of psychological and physical 
predicates embodied in particular characters (or groups of characters) as the 
process that leads to the co-construction, or coordinated mental projection, 
of such individuals-in-a-world. At issue are the means by which, and the 
effects with which, texts evoke fictional individuals who can be inferred to 
possess more or less extensive constellations of personal traits, that is, fusions 
of mental and corporeal predicates that are a hallmark of persons. Once 
again, this aspect of narrative worldmaking can be analyzed into a number of 
sub-aspects, each of which can be captured as a question for which interpret-
ers seek to frame answers as part of the business of world-building:
1.  For which elements of the what dimension of the narrative world are 
questions about who, how, and why pertinent? In other words, in 
what domains of the storyworld do actions supervene on behaviors, 
such that it becomes relevant to ask not just what cause produced what 
effect but also who did (or tried to do) what, through what means, and 
for what reason?
2.  How does the text, in conjunction with broader understandings of 
persons, prompt interpreters to build a profile for the characters who 
inhabit these domains of action? Put otherwise, how do textual features 
along with models of personhood (deriving from various sources) cue 
interpreters to assign to characters person-like constellations of traits?
3.  Reciprocally, how does the process of developing these profiles for 
individuals-in-a-world bear on broader understandings of persons?
 In research in progress, I am drawing on work by Lynne Rudder Baker 
(Persons; Metaphysics) to argue that narrative is a mode of representation 
optimally suited for person-level phenomena. At issue are “medium-sized” 
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phenomena—objects, activities, situations, and events such as, respectively, 
tennis rackets, conducting a debate, living in a particular house, and wit-
nessing a car accident—that are situated at the level of the everyday world 
of human experience. Thus, in connection with question 1 above, one can 
expect that when it comes to the what dimension of a storyworld, actions 
will preponderantly supervene on behaviors—since stories are optimally 
calibrated for the representation of human actions (cf. Turner 26–37). Still, 
what might be termed the preponderance of the personal in narrative does 
not imply that storyworlds are wall-to-wall with characters. Rather, as in 
the world at large, in narrative worlds person-level phenomena unfold in a 
context consisting not only of other persons but also of nonpersons. Differ-
ences between kinds of narratives are based, in part, on different protocols 
for bringing into relation these personal and nonpersonal elements of the 
what (see Herman, Story Logic 140–69). Such protocols fall under the scope 
of both questions 1 and 2.
 Mcewan’s novel cues modes of worldmaking that range over the large 
middle zone that stretches between two poles. At one pole, the personal 
absorbs the nonpersonal, as with the use of anthropomorphic gods in ancient 
Greek myths; at the other, the nonpersonal absorbs the personal, as with 
the diminution of the personal in naturalism as well as the nouveau roman. 
For example, as the narrative unfolds, Mcewan (23, 173) hints at parallels 
between the storms that have shaped Chesil Beach and the tempestuous 
interchange between edward and Florence at that locale. The text thus raises 
questions about how to model the relation between, on the one hand, con-
duct explicable in terms of reasons and, on the other hand, behaviors driven 
by physical (including evolutionary) processes stretching back beyond the 
life span of any individual. But any suggestions of a parallel between the 
circumstances bearing on Florence’s and edward’s choices and actions and 
the meteorological processes that have shaped the beach remain just that—
suggestions. The narration places a question mark next to the scope of the 
personal, but without making fictional persons epiphenomenal (as in natu-
ralism) or overtly marking them as heuristic constructs (as in the nouveau 
roman).
 In any case, for sectors of the what in which issues of who, how, and 
why are indeed pertinent, though not necessarily readily or straightforwardly 
resolved, the second question listed above comes into play. Here the concern 
is how interpreters of narratives map discourse cues onto individuals-in-a-
world in a way that dovetails, in Strawson’s sense, personal with material 
predicates. To address how interpreters construct profiles of fictional per-
sons like Mcewan’s, I propose building on, and refining, Chatman’s analysis 
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of a character as a paradigm of traits. According to this analysis, a character 
is a “vertical assemblage of [a set of traits, or more or less enduring quali-
ties or attributes] intersecting the syntagmatic chain of events that comprise 
the plot” (127). Although thirty years of research have provided new ways 
of understanding how textual cues prompt interpreters to map person-like 
traits onto individuals represented in narratives (see Schneider, “Toward,” 
for an overview), I want to retain Chatman’s insight about the importance of 
“trait-codes” for understanding characters—repertoires of trait-names that 
are culturally and historically variable (123–26; cf. Culler 236–37).6
 I focus here on emotional traits in particular. My concern, more precisely, 
is how systems of emotion terms and concepts, which form one region or 
register of the trait-code(s) deriving from narrative genres as well as other 
kinds of discourses and also everyday encounters with persons, support the 
construction of character profiles. Recent work on such “emotionologies” 
suggests that to understand fictional characters, readers draw on models 
used to explain or predict how persons typically respond to particular kinds 
of situations. These models allow mental (here, affective) and material predi-
cates to be grouped together in more or less person-typical ways. But beyond 
being anchored to such repertoires of affective traits, fictional characters can 
also, as models of possible individuals, reciprocally affect broader under-
standings of the minds of persons—to pick up with my third question about 
who, how, and why.
 The concept of emotionology was proposed by Stearns and Stearns as a 
way of referring to the collective emotional standards of a culture as opposed 
to the experience of emotion itself (see also Harré and Gillett 144–61; Grei-
mas and Fontanille). The term functions in parallel with recent usages of 
the term “ontology” to designate a model of the entities, together with their 
properties and relations, that exist within a particular domain. Possessed by 
every culture and subculture, emotionologies are systems of emotion terms 
and concepts deployed by participants in discourse to ascribe emotions to 
themselves as well as their cohorts. At issue is a framework for conceptual-
izing emotions, their causes, and the ways in which participants in discourse 
are likely to display them. Narratives at once ground themselves in and help 
build frameworks of this sort, as when ghost stories and romance novels link 
particular kinds of emotions to recurrent narrative scenarios. Indeed, in nar-
rative contexts readers are able to understand characters’ behaviors as actions 
in part because of the models of emotion on which they rely to interpret 
the text. Mcewan’s characters’ activities can be construed as more than just 
a series of individual, unrelated doings because of the assumption, licensed 
by a model of emotions, that those behaviors constitute a coherent class. At 
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stake is the class (or fuzzy set) of actions in which sexually inexperienced 
newlyweds, for example, are more or less likely to engage when motivated 
by anxiety about their wedding-night encounter, or alternatively the set of 
actions in which a person struggling with a (repressed) history of sexual 
abuse may engage at the prospect of that same encounter.
 Mcewan’s novel reflexively calls attention to how systems of emotion 
terms and concepts make it possible to understand behaviors as actions—
even as it prompts interpreters to use those systems to make sense of the 
characters’ conduct. At a global level, the text models how emotionologies 
are shaped by sociocultural factors and are thus subject to change over time, 
leading to different methods for understanding one and the same form of 
conduct—for example, as idiosyncratic or not. For instance, when edward 
learns of the accident on the railway platform that left his mother brain-
damaged and then begins to keep to himself more, the text reads: “the term 
‘teenager’ had not long been invented, and it never occurred to him that the 
separateness he felt, which was both painful and delicious, could be shared 
by anyone else” (93). But the narrative also underlines how emotion concepts 
organize thought and conduct at a more local level as well. As Florence and 
edward dine in their honeymoon suite early in the novel, edward self-con-
sciously recruits from an emotionology in order to project a demeanor that is 
at odds with how he actually feels: “To show that he was not troubled by the 
presence of the waiters, though he longed for them to leave, edward smiled 
as he sat back with his wine and called over his shoulder, ‘Any more of those 
things [i.e., the glazed cherries served with their meal]?’” (14).
 At the same time, the novel suggests the interpretive difficulties that can 
result from not having such emotionological facility; these difficulties trans-
late into a disconnect between the mental and material predicates that must 
be linked together to construct profiles of persons, fictional and otherwise. 
A disconnect of this sort, arguably rooted in the repressed trauma that splits 
off Florence’s experiences from any ability to take the true measure of their 
emotional impact, results in Florence’s coming to the conclusion that she 
does not really know her own mind:
Falling in love was revealing to her [Florence] just how odd she was, how 
habitually sealed off in her everyday thoughts. Whenever edward asked, 
How do you feel? or, What are you thinking? she always made an awk-
ward answer  .  .  .  she lacked some simple mental trick that everyone else 
had, a mechanism so ordinary that no one ever mentioned it, an immedi-
ate sensual connection to people and events, and to her own needs and 
desires. . . . (75–76)
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Similarly, when family disputes break out at home, Florence finds that she 
has only a theoretical knowledge of how emotions inform conduct and make 
it recognizable as such. Unable to comport herself in ways specified by the 
emotionology that orients other members of her family, Florence resorts (or 
rather, regresses) to a simplified, literally cartoonish model of how emotions 
relate to action. This model reduces emotion to a physical process, shifting 
the locus of interest from the domain of action to the domain of behavior: 
“She knew very well that people fell out, even stormily, and then made up. 
But she did not know how to start—she simply did not have the trick of it. . . . 
She could only blame herself then, when she felt like a character in a news-
paper cartoon, with steam hissing from her ears” (63).
 In portraying how edward and Florence attempt, with more or less suc-
cess, to draw on emotionologies to make sense of their own and others’ con-
duct, the novel uses fictional individuals to explore, reflexively, the scope and 
nature of models of what a person is. Such models, which include but are not 
limited to those associated with a culture’s or a community’s emotionology, 
in turn afford readers a basis for framing inferences about how a character’s 
mental predicates are linked with her material predicates, in ways that make 
her behaviors legible as actions-in-a-world. In the next chapter I broaden my 
investigation of how readers’ inferences bear on the worldmaking process. 
Indeed, as I hinted in the remarks that conclude chapter 2, the approach 




Literary characters are agents within a work of fiction. They derive from a 
number of very different sources and fulfill several disparate functions in a 
narrative. We may begin with Phelan and Rabinowitz’s model that argues 
for mimetic (realistic), thematic (ideological), and synthetic (formal) com-
ponents, modify and extend their model, and add to it a fourth category, the 
intertextual.
mImeTIC
Many characters are thought to be modeled on human beings, but this is a 
considerably more difficult operation than is usually imagined. It is doubt-
less more accurate to say that realistic or mimetic characters are based on 
perceived, accepted, or imagined personalities of actual people. And these, 
of course, may be entirely fictional. Certain character types, for example, 
the miser or the braggart soldier, can be found in both literature and lived 
experience, but a large number of other such types are literary, cultural, or 
ideological fabrications.
 Literature traditionally uses shortcuts: a characterization may be too sim-
ple (two-dimensional) or otherwise insufficiently complex to capture the 
behavior of actual people; thus, Proust’s delineation of diffuse and partially 
self-negating characters is often praised for its verisimilitude in present-
ing human subjects in all their inconsistencies and contradictions. In other 
cases, pseudoscience precludes accurate depictions: Ben Jonson’s characters 
are based on the false theory that four basic elements or “humors” govern 
human psychology; many dubious figures in nineteenth-century fiction 
embody personalities derived from the pseudoscience of phrenology; and 
characters studiously based on Freudian, Jungian, or Rankian psychoanaly-
sis often prove to be equally false. Ideology is another powerful distorter 
of ideas regarding human behavior: for centuries, women and non-whites 
were depicted stereotypically and negatively in Western literary works. each 
worldview should be expected to have a distorted presentation of human 
beings and to attempt to disguise those distortions. even if one draws on the 
entire annals of narrative literature, it is very difficult to single out any indi-
vidual character and say convincingly, “This one is entirely realistic: there are 
real people just like that.” For the most part, “realistic” characters are merely 
characters whose essential fictionality is unacknowledged.
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ThemaTIC
Many other characters are not intended to be realistic portraits of humans. 
Some represent animals or extraterrestrial beings, though most of these usu-
ally wind up being thoroughly anthropomorphized. Many more or less realis-
tic figures also represent themes or ideas in a text: in e. M. Forster’s Howards 
End (1910), Mrs Wilcox stands for traditional england while her son repre-
sents the new, amoral capitalist order. Other characters are avowedly alle-
gorical figures, from the personages in Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress (1678) to 
voltaire’s Candide (1759) to Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945). Here the ideologi-
cal work is upfront and straightforward. The characters represent not types 
of people but rather particular ideas or, in the case of Orwell, groups at spe-
cific points before and after the Russian revolution. Writers often embody an 
idea without being fully aware of doing so; literary history is full of pseudo-
realistic presentations of egregious cultural caricatures. This is especially true 
of the repetition of cultural stereotypes: women, aboriginal peoples, Muslim 
Arabs, and black Africans and their descendants have been the subject of 
centuries of insistent stereotyping. This is sadly and ironically the case in 
eugene O’Neill’s attempt in The Emperor Jones to provide a positive depiction 
of a black protagonist which nevertheless incorporated a number of negative 
perspectives from the white mythology of the time.
SynTheTIC
Characters also have artificial or synthetic functions; that is, they act as part 
of a fabricated literary narrative. Characters in fiction are, after all, words on 
a page; they are both more and less substantial than human beings. On the 
one hand, we can know the thoughts of a character much better than we can 
ever know the mental processes of most people; on the other hand, any fact 
about them left unsaid by the narrator (did the protagonist have a large mole 
on her left shoulder?) can never be known. Characters may be elaborately 
developed or not developed at all; some are three-dimensional, some two-, 
and some one-dimensional, reduced to a mere function. If a tale requires that 
a door be opened or a hero stymied, a figure may emerge to open the door 
or block the protagonist. In a story, such figures may not be anything more 
than their function in the work.
 Authors frequently order the arrangement of characters so they form 
parallel or opposite patterns, and even create or re-form characters to 
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produce this effect. The result of this kind of patterning is to illuminate the 
personalities of the individuals as well as to create formal, architectural sym-
metries. In Shakespeare’s 1 Henry IV, young Harry Percy (“Hotspur”) is the 
exact opposite of young Prince Hal. Hotspur is proud, valiant, impetuous, 
and a good son; he lives for glory in battle. Hal is circumspect, cautious, a bit 
of a wastrel, and a disappointment to his father; he plans to exhibit his better 
self at a later, more appropriate time. The two have systematically opposed 
careers and, naturally, meet up for a decisive, man-to-man duel at the end of 
the play. To achieve this symmetrical effect, Shakespeare had to distort the 
historical record considerably. At the time of the actual battle of Shrewsbury, 
Prince Hal was only sixteen, while Hotspur was thirty-nine—older than Hal’s 
father, King Henry Iv. There is no historical record of the two meeting dur-
ing the fight. In the real battle, Prince Hal was shot in the face by an arrow 
and nearly died. Shakespeare also invented the character of Falstaff to pro-
vide a number of other parallels and oppositions. When it came to creating 
good drama, Shakespeare never let mere history stand in his path.
 In avant-garde and postmodern fiction, the idea of a self-consistent, sin-
gle, unified, human-like character is regularly rejected. Postmodern char-
acters transcend the limits of the merely human in a number of ways: they 
may be too flat or insubstantial, too fragmented or discontinuous; they may 
be self-contradictory, or multiple and fused with other selves. In short, they 
may far exceed or fail to embody the essential nature of a possible person. 
Ana Kavan’s Ice (1967) consists of depictions of a hero’s repeated attempts to 
save a weak young woman from the ravages of a cruel warden who holds her 
captive. At several points in the text, however, the hero notices a strange feel-
ing of unity with the warden and suspects they are in fact the same person. 
The narrator of Beckett’s The Unnamable consistently deconstructs its own 
identity as it claims both to have engendered characters in Beckett’s other 
works and also to be the creation of someone else. Robbe-Grillet’s edouard 
Manneret in La Maison de rendez-vous (1965) is entirely and impossibly 
self-contradictory, as are many of the other personages in the book. Martin 
Crimp, in his play Attempts on her Life (1997), presents a series of scenes 
and discourses about a woman (or several women) named Anne, Anya, or 
Annie. They are presented as different people with different life stories in 
different situations: the girl next door, a performance artist, a rich woman, 
a terrorist, a scientist, a porno actress, a character in a script, even a new 
brand of car. Throughout the piece, Crimp refuses to provide either multiple 
discrete identities or a single, consistent identity for his protagonist(s); she/
they remain insistently indeterminate, simultaneously one person and sev-
eral people.
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 In addition, some characters acknowledge that they are fictional enti-
ties invented by someone else. In the case of Borges’s “The Circular Ruins” 
(1941), this is a bitter discovery made by the protagonist; in Raymond Que-
neau’s The Fall of Icarus (1968), the character escapes from the novelist and 
starts frequenting a café in Paris. especially affecting is the fate of Harold 
Crick in Marc Forster’s film, Stranger than Fiction (2006), who gradually 
discovers that he is a character in a novel, reads the entire draft of that novel, 
and nobly agrees that he needs to die in order to preserve the aesthetic integ-
rity of the work. This kind of characterization is the least studied and is rou-
tinely neglected by narrative theorists. In summary, we can conclude that the 
synthetic category of characterization should be expanded to include three 
separate facets: (1) functional aspects that help keep the narrative moving 
along; (2) aesthetic aspects that produce, for example, an architectural sym-
metry; and (3) an antimimetic aspect that provides for the appearance of 
truly unnatural figures.
 We see many antimimetic features in the characterizations in Midnight’s 
Children. Saleem Sinai both represents all Indians of his era and is partially 
composed of other individuals. The evil Shiva is his double or “anti-self ” and 
represents the part of modern India that Saleem would suppress. And Saleem 
contains still more individuals: “I have been a swallower of lives; and to know 
me, just the one of me, you’ll have to swallow the lot as well. Consumed mul-
titudes are jostling and shoving inside me” (4). This develops the idea of a 
multipersoned character even as it alludes to the god Krishna, whose special 
powers were discovered by yasoda when she looked down his throat and saw 
the entire universe there. Krishna is also an avatar or incarnation of vishnu, 
and Rushdie uses the trope of the avatar to refer to similar personalities in 
different people separated over time.
 At other times, as we have seen, Saleem can lose his individual identity. 
As he is fighting in the atrocity-filled war with east Pakistan, his actions 
are so horrific and he is so ashamed of himself that he becomes unable 
to refer to himself in the first person: “I insist: not I. He. He the buddha. 
Who  .  .  .  would remain not-Saleem; who, in spite of running-from, was 
still separated from his past” (414–15). Rushdie is invoking the discourse of 
Buddhist strivings to free the soul from the ego and its desires in order to 
describe Saleem’s very different slide into non-Being, one that bears more 
resemblance to what I have called the “pseudo–third-person” narration 
found in Borges and Beckett (Unnatural 10–13, 110–11). Still more radical 
character transformations occur in Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (1988); in 
the book’s opening scene, the figures Saladin Chamcha and Gibreel Farishta 
exchange identities as they fall through the air, becoming “Gibreelsaladin 
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Farishtachamcha” (5) as they become “metamorphic, hybrid” (7) in the first 
of many such transformations throughout the novel.
InTerTexTUal
A last source of characterization is literary history itself. An author may stay 
with a source text and go on to narrate the central characters’ further adven-
tures, as in Ödön von Horváth’s Figaro Gets a Divorce (1936), a continuation 
of the Beaumarchais’ The Marriage of Figaro (1778). Alternatively, the author 
may wish to tell the other side of the story of the earlier text, fleshing out the 
lives of characters left undeveloped in the original version, as Jean Rhys does 
in her extension of Jane Eyre in Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) and Robin Lippin-
cott attempts in his novel, Mr. Dalloway (1999).
 Authors also create new versions of older fictional characters. To fully 
comprehend the behavior of Leopold Bloom or the anonymous Citizen in 
Ulysses, we need to know something about the characters they are modeled 
on: Homer’s Odysseus and Polyphemous. Some characters will be closer to 
their literary models, while others will stray, but in each case it is essential 
to know the original story in order to follow the later incarnation. There are 
many motives for such rewritings; some authors may wish to place the same 
characters in a very different setting, as happens in Throne of Blood, Akira 
Kurosawa’s cinematic remake of Macbeth set in feudal Japan. Others want 
to provide more realistic or current versions of distant figures and events 
(Turgenev’s “A King Lear of the Steppe”). Authors can play with these expec-
tations and make readers wonder how much of the original character will 
be retained and how much will be altered. At the beginning of Joyce Carol 
Oates’s “The Dead,” there are no obvious parallels for Gabriel, Gretta, and 
Michael Furey; as the story progresses, the reader naturally wonders who is 
going to emerge as whom.
 Postmodern rewrites often exaggerate, distort, or parody the practice 
of literary reincarnation by refusing to maintain the identities of the origi-
nals; in Julian Rios’s Loves That Bind (1998), the narrator recounts his love 
affairs with twenty-six literary characters, beginning with Proust’s Albertine. 
In Midnight’s Children, Saleem Sinai is a kind of version of Tristram Shandy, 
both as a frustrated narrator who has trouble telling his story economically 
and as one who experiences repeated difficulty with his nose and his penis. 
The point of the refiguring of this character would seem to be a demonstra-
tion of its portability across cultures and centuries and an affirmation of 
a cosmopolitan sensibility. At the same time, Rushdie’s treatment provides 
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more of a political bite than Sterne’s does, as it shows how nations as well as 
literary characters are created by the stroke of a pen. There is also a touch of 
Scheherazade in Saleem: she narrated the tales of the 1001 Nights in order to 
stay alive, while Saleem fears he will die once he reaches the end of his nar-
rative. In these works, a major source of the characters’ nature and behavior 
is an earlier literary text; this source is at least as important as the character’s 
mimetic, thematic, or synthetic functions. These intertextual components 
need to be included in an expanded theory of literary character.
The dIfferenT aSpeCTS  of character that I have enumerated here may fuse 
together more or less seamlessly, as is often the case in Shakespeare. In Rush-
die, we see recognizable portraits of fallible historical individuals, a playful 
allegory of the narrator’s body as the body of the state of India, creative trans-
formations of the idea of an individual character, and the refiguration of Tris-
tram Shandy in the person of Saleem. At other times, these different aspects 
may be in a more disharmonious relationship. Howards End has often been 
critiqued because its allegory finally runs roughshod over its pretentions 
to verisimilitude: some of the key decisions made by the central characters 
breach psychological consistency so that Forster can sustain allegorical cor-
respondences. In a similar vein, Marxist critic Georg Lukács once claimed 
that Dostoevsky slandered his more left-wing characters by causing them 
to act in psychologically inconsistent ways so that the author could more 
easily dismiss the characters’ revolutionary politics. Other writers advocat-
ing a liberal, egalitarian agenda at times unwittingly deconstruct their own 
worldview by reinscribing social hierarchies into their texts, as unrealistic 
stereotypes take the place of more probabilistic portrayals. Overly schema-
tized literary patternings can also be at war with psychological consistency, 
especially as the end of a work approaches and characters need to rapidly 
repent, forgive, or otherwise transform themselves in ways that will no lon-
ger obstruct the work’s impending resolution. Antimimetic authors tend to 
be particularly alert to the different components of character outlined above 
as well as to the ways they often fail to fuse; their vigorous deconstruction 
of traditional characterization no doubt stems in part from this awareness.7
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noTeS
 1. For recent treatments of the developing notions of masculinity in Austen’s pe-
riod, see Garofalo; and Kramp. Wilt wrote a classic treatment of the topic, tracking the 
shift in ideal masculinity from Mr Woodhouse’s old-style gentility to the more modern 
mode. [RW]
 2. See Finch on how Austen uses fid to construct the voice of an entire community. 
[RW]
 3. See also Noë, Out of Our Heads; Slors and Macdonald; and, for a fuller discus-
sion of this tradition of research and some of its implications for narrative inquiry, Her-
man, “Storied Minds” and “Post-Cartesian Approaches.” [DH]
 4. As Strawson put it, “the concept of a person is to be understood as the concept 
of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predi-
cates ascribing corporeal characteristics [specific to human bodies], a physical situation 
etc. are equally applicable to an individual entity of that type” (104). For other accounts 
of the concept of person, see Goldie; Rorty; and Taylor. [DH]
 5. The same goes for readers’ attempts to make sense of authors’ minds, as dis-
cussed in chapter 2. [DH]
 6. See Goldie for a taxonomy of personality traits (which Goldie characterizes as 
dispositions), including ways of acting, habits, temperaments, emotional dispositions, 
enduring preferences and values, and skills, talents, and abilities (11–13). [BR]
 7. For further reading on issues of character from an unnatural perspective, see 
Cixous; Docherty; Fokkema; and Richardson, “Beyond Poststructuralism.” [BR]
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Not all literary approaches need to consider the reader, at least in detail. It’s 
possible, for instance, to explore the structures of particular genres or the 
ways in which texts reflect particular historical values or situations without 
paying close attention to the interpretive activities of readers or the differ-
ences among them. But once you accept rhetoric as your governing para-
digm, reception becomes key to analysis and evaluation. But exactly who 
is the reader of the text? The rise of reader-oriented theories starting in the 
1960s brought with it a number of different concepts: ideal readers, implied 
readers, postulated readers, real readers. each has its use for certain kinds of 
inquiry; but in this chapter, we’d like to set out in more detail the tripartite 
system—the actual, authorial, and narrative audiences—that we mentioned 
in our introduction and that stands at the center of much rhetorical narrative 
practice today. The nature of and the interrelations among these audiences 
vary from narrative to narrative, and attending to those interrelationships 
helps reveal any single narrative’s distinctive qualities.
 every individual reader is different—and fabulously complex. As writers, 
we never fully know the audiences we address, which is why, for instance, it 
can be so difficult to calibrate a letter—say, a request for a favor or an expres-
sion of sympathy—even to someone we think we know well. How do authors 
of more widely read texts manage to write for the many people in their audi-
ence—an actual audience that they don’t even know?
reception and the reader
6
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 There’s a mythology that serious artists don’t pay attention to their audi-
ences but instead focus only on expressing their visions. But it’s impossible 
to make meaningful rhetorical choices without some sense of whom you 
are addressing—about their beliefs, background knowledge, values, taboos, 
sense of humor. For example, the implied Twain of Huckleberry Finn, in light 
of the occasion for his telling, had to decide whether or not to explain the 
system of slavery prevalent in the United States before the Civil War. In the 
absence of guaranteed knowledge about his actual audience, he had to make 
his best guess about what his imagined or “authorial” audience would know 
about that system. He decided to write for an audience that would be rea-
sonably well-informed about the “peculiar institution”—a reasonable choice 
since the Civil War was still a fresh memory for so many Americans in the 
early 1880s. But that choice may unwittingly lead to a problem for at least 
some modern actual readers who do not know such things as the details of 
state law that made it necessary for a fugitive slave from Missouri like Jim to 
travel all the way to Ohio rather than simply to cross the River into Illinois. 
One major function of footnotes in editions aimed at students is precisely to 
give them the information necessary to join the authorial audience.
 Works of fiction have another kind of audience as well. To the extent that 
a novel is an imitation of some nonfictional form (a biography, a memoir, a 
history), so the narrator (whether dramatized or not) is an imitation of an 
author; and just as an actual author always writes for a hypothetical authorial 
audience, so a narrator always writes for a “narrative audience” that treats the 
narrator as “real.” Reading a work of fiction therefore always entails at least a 
double consciousness: we can treat the work neither purely as what it is, nor 
purely as what it pretends to be, but must hold these competing (and mutu-
ally incompatible) perspectives simultaneously in our consciousness. We are 
not reading Huckleberry Finn intelligently if we treat the story as “real” and 
criticize it because there are no public records confirming the murder of 
Boggs. At the same time, however, we would be negligent if we refused sym-
pathy for Boggs’s daughter on the grounds that she and Boggs are not “real” 
people. In other words, to read a text as fiction, an actual reader needs to 
recognize that it is an invented artifact (and hence that fictional characters 
are synthetic constructs) and, at the same time, to pretend to be a member of 
the narrative audience who takes what he or she reads as history and treats 
the characters as real. Having this double consciousness is another aspect of 
reading in the authorial audience of fiction.
 The actual/authorial/narrative distinction helps us deal with numerous 
literary issues: it helps us to explain the relationship between truth and fic-
tion, to reconceptualize the notion of authorial intention (with particular 
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attention to the relationship between internal mental events and external 
conventions), to analyze the underpinnings of particular interpretive dis-
putes. In what follows in this chapter, we’d like to focus on a different issue: 
the ways in which understanding of the three levels of audience can help us 
understand the tone or flavor of particular books. In choosing this topic, we 
are returning to two related issues we have emphasized in previous chapters: 
rhetorical theory’s interest in the “purpose(s)” of narrative, and the way that 
this interest shifts analytical focus from the “meaning” (typically the the-
matic component) of narrative to the experience of narrative. We’d like to 
look briefly at two factors that can flavor this experience: the fuzziness of the 
authorial audience and the overlap between authorial and narrative audi-
ences. Our overarching interest, we hasten to add, remains the ways in which 
(implied) authors communicate with actual audiences.
 We said above that to experience a work as the author intended, we have 
to be members of the authorial audience “within some limits.” That’s because 
the authorial audience is fuzzy around the edges—although the nature and 
extent of that fuzziness varies from work to work and is, in fact, central to a 
work’s rhetoric. Some books—say, Nabokov’s Pale Fire—are sharply focused 
(in this case, written for a small group of extremely well-educated and care-
ful readers); others—say, Mcewan’s Amsterdam—may also require advanced 
knowledge (in this case, of music) but are more forgiving of reader igno-
rance; others, such as Mickey Spillane’s I, the Jury, have an authorial audience 
with very specific political beliefs—in Spillane’s case, about the evils of liberal 
politics. What about Huckleberry Finn? It’s fuzzier than any of these cases—
but it’s fuzzy in particular ways and in particular places.
 Consider a few salient examples. As is obvious from the Duke’s Shake-
spearean farrago, Twain was writing for readers with whom this kind of 
parody would resonate—but he wasn’t too specific in his presuppositions 
of exactly what they would know. He probably expected that some of his 
readers would recognize all or most of the quotes—but he also calibrated 
the speech for less astute readers, peppering some of the less familiar lines 
with distortions of some of Shakespeare’s most familiar (“To be or not to 
be; that is the bare bodkin”), setting up his readers to recognize the drift of 
the speech even if they can’t catch all the references. He also made sure that 
understanding this speech was not central to the novel—that is, he wrote 
the book in such a way that readers with slightly different educational back-
grounds (even people who had never read Shakespeare at all) would still be 
able to appreciate it, even if some understood it more fully than others. In 
this respect, Huckleberry Finn is a book that, among other things, encourages 
a broad feeling of community (something that supports its thematic develop-
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ment, too)—in contrast to Pale Fire, which fosters a sense of elitism in those 
who read it.
 yet the fuzziness around Shakespeare is not quite the same as the fuzzi-
ness around, say, religion: the book is written for an authorial audience pre-
pared to question at least some of the givens of standard nineteenth-century 
Christianity, and here, failure to join the authorial audience is a more serious 
barrier to appreciation of the novel. Take, for instance, the passage where 
Huck describes dinner with the widow Douglas. “When you got to the table 
you couldn’t go right to eating, but you had to wait for the widow to tuck 
down her head and grumble a little over the victuals, though there warn’t 
really anything the matter with them” (33). There’s a complex communica-
tion here, as Huck offers reliable reporting mixed with reliable and unreliable 
reading: he accurately recounts the dinner ritual and accurately (we assume) 
assesses the quality of the food, but he fails to recognize that what he calls 
grumbling the widow Douglas (along with Twain and the authorial audi-
ence) would call saying grace. The freshness of his “unsivilized” perspective 
allows him to raise the possibility that the saying of grace, even by someone 
as sincere as the widow Douglas, might be a rote and thoughtless activity. 
But the effect won’t work on someone who is not at least open to entertain-
ing the idea that the external trappings of religion are often a sham. And of 
course the book has an even more stringent set of expectations with regard 
to the ethics of race relations: the novel simply will not work for a reader who 
is ethically incapable of endorsing the friendship between a runaway slave 
and a young white boy. Put all these things together, and you are beginning 
to understand what it feels like to read Huckleberry Finn as a member of the 
authorial audience.
 Much of the flavor of a work also stems from the relationship between 
the authorial and narrative audiences—in particular, on the extent, nature, 
and area of their overlap. Offenbach’s Les Brigands, with a libretto by Henri 
Meilhac and Ludovic Halévy, takes place on the border of Italy and Spain. 
This setting not only opens a gap between the narrative and authorial audi-
ences—it opens a slightly absurd gap, one that, when combined with the 
authorial audience’s familiarity with Offenbach’s previous works, gives us 
good reason to expect a certain degree of whimsicality, and one that discour-
ages us from using too much real-world knowledge as we think about the 
plausibility of the operetta’s romantic intrigue. Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow 
works differently: its non-naturalistic scientific premise of reversing the 
direction of time’s march might seem to make it a fantasy, but in many other 
ways, it conforms to the conventions of realism and it anchors itself in the 
central event of the Holocaust. Consequently, the narrative and authorial 
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audiences share enough knowledge that our initial sense of fantasy morphs 
into a recognition that Amis is offering significant historical interpretations 
that are intended to be taken seriously by the authorial audience. Steinbeck’s 
Grapes of Wrath aims for a kind of nearly complete overlap that moves the 
novel almost to the point of nonfictional chronicle.
 As for Huckleberry Finn: We said above that we are not reading well if 
we try to determine the exact date of Boggs’s death. But while the authorial 
and narrative audiences treat the “reality” of this event differently, they agree 
about the general geography of the Mississippi River—in particular, about 
the problems of traveling south in order to escape from slavery. They agree, 
too, about the inequity of slavery and about the admiration that should be 
accorded to acting according to your conscience. These overlaps contribute, 
among other things, to how “seriously” we take the text.
 Attention to the rhetorical relationships among audiences can help us 
understand not only the particular tone of particular texts but also why cer-




For feminist narrative theory, “the reader” refers to two distinct entities, one 
of them made of text and one of them made of flesh and blood. Following 
the commonly accepted model of the narrative transaction proposed by Sey-
mour Chatman and refined by James Phelan, a feminist narratologist would 
distinguish the implied reader or authorial audience on the one hand from 
the actual reader on the other, making a further distinction between these 
two figures and the narratee or the narrative audience.1 Briefly, the narratee 
is constituted by the set of assumptions and attitudes the narrator invokes 
through word choices, explanations, direct address, and gaps in the storytell-
ing. The narratee—whose characteristics emerge through close reading of 
what the narrator does and does not need to say—exists only in the text, to be 
uncovered by a method similar to Mikhail Bakhtin’s strategy for finding dia-
logic voices in writing that only appears to be univocal. The actual reader, by 
contrast, is the embodied person who holds the book and reads. The implied 
reader is a figure hovering between these two entities, the virtual projection 
of a consciousness that can tune into the narrator’s message—an imaginary 
reader who “gets it,” even—or especially—when the narratee appears to be 
in the dark.
 Jane Austen’s most famous sentence, the opening of Pride and Preju-
dice, is a classic example of disjuncture between the narratee and the implied 
reader. When the narrator says, “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that 
a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife,” the 
narratee misreads the statement in an attempt to take it at face value. In fact, 
compendiums of literary quotations cite the sentence among other “Jane 
Austen quotes” as if it straightforwardly expressed an opinion Jane Austen 
held.2 The narratee agrees with Mrs Bennet’s view that an unmarried wealthy 
man is “in want of ” a wife, which many casual readers of Austen—or of Aus-
ten quotes—take to mean he must desire to have a wife. The implied reader 
of Pride and Prejudice understands that Mrs Bennet’s beliefs are strongly 
undermined by the dialogue with her husband that follows the narrator’s 
assertion, while appreciating the joke: “in want of ” doesn’t mean “wants” in 
the sense of “wishes to have” but means “wants” in the sense of “lacks.” To say 
as the narrator does that a single man lacks a wife is simply to couch a tautol-
ogy in a shapely periodic sentence. The statement is therefore not only stylish 
but true on a literal level, since everyone will acknowledge that a tautology 
is not false. The implied reader grasps that this subtlety of diction is over the 
head of Mrs Bennet and that the joke is on her.
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 The implied reader of Persuasion (and of most of Pride and Prejudice) 
has less work to do in moving from what the narrator says to what the text 
is saying. The implied reader knows how to attribute free indirect discourse, 
whether it comes from Anne or from the other characters, and how to tem-
per the narrator’s penchant for hyperbole. This implied reader enters into 
the heroine’s concerns about the ways people treat one another and about 
the appropriate attitudes to take toward such matters as class distinction. A 
single sentence (this one from the scene of Anne’s arrival at the apartment 
her father and sister have rented in Bath after leaving Kellynch Hall) reveals 
the attitudes the implied reader would share with the heroine:
She might not wonder, but she must sigh that her father should feel no 
degradation in his change; should see nothing to regret in the duties and 
dignity of the resident land-holder; should find so much to be vain of in 
the littlenesses of a town; and she must sigh, and smile, and wonder too, as 
elizabeth threw open the folding-doors, and walked with exultation from 
one drawing-room to the other, boasting of their space, at the possibility of 
that woman, who had been mistress of Kellynch Hall, finding extent to be 
proud of between two walls, perhaps thirty feet asunder. (112)
The implied reader, as critical as the heroine of the elder elliots’ behavior, 
smiles and sighs with Anne at the stubborn vanity that cannot distinguish 
the decline in status and responsibility that has come with the move to Bath. 
At the same time, the implied reader is participating in a snobbishness the 
text does not treat as vanity, that is, Anne’s assumption that this change in 
class status is “degradation,” a word more associated with morals than with 
living quarters. For Anne, elizabeth’s pride in the size of the small apart-
ment would more properly have been placed in an awareness that as mistress 
of Kellynch, she really had something to be proud of. The implied reader 
endorses this particular version of snobbery, as well as condemning the ver-
sion embodied by Sir Walter and elizabeth.
 The degree to which the actual reader can identify with the implied 
reader establishes the actual reader’s affective response to the text. If a 
twenty-first-century college student picks up Persuasion to find herself effec-
tively interpellated by the narration—if some part of herself answers the call 
the narrator sends out to the implied reader—her reading experience will be 
absorbing; if she is offended by class snobbery or can’t bring herself to care 
about the aggregation of tiny faux pas and minuscule interpersonal triumphs 
that add up to Austen’s plot, this can be attributed to her own inability to 
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identify with the implied reader. In approaching the topic of “the reader” in 
Jane Austen, a feminist narratologist could examine either the implied or the 
actual reader, or both. While their different positions in the narrative trans-
action are significant, the more important difference for feminism is the fact 
that the actual reader, unlike the implied reader, occupies a gendered and 
sexualized body in time and space. The implied reader is a virtual being. 
The actual reader lives in history, subject to the vicissitudes of cultural norms 
for gender and sexuality that sometimes seem dazzlingly mobile (it’s hard 
to imagine what Jane Austen would make of a transgender romance) and at 
other times frustratingly fixed (it’s even harder to understand why so many 
twenty-first-century women would be emotionally invested in Austen’s mat-
rimonial imperative, given the changes in women’s options that have devel-
oped over the last 200 years). I often tell my students that as far as gender 
norms are concerned, the present historical period is more similar to Jane 
Austen’s than different from it. Those among the students who can connect 
with Austen’s implied reader are the ones who understand what I mean.
 What a feminist narratologist would do with the figure of the implied 
reader might not vary much from what any narrative-centered critic would 
do. However, in attending to the actual reader, feminist narrative theory 
takes its biggest step away from its structuralist origins. I began my analysis 
of the narrator by speaking of how important the actual author is within Jane 
Austen studies. For Austen in particular, actual readers have also become the 
subject of much fascinating commentary, especially among feminist critics.3 
Unlike classical narratology, feminist narratology is free to draw on what 
can be known about actual readers to speculate about the impact of reading 
Austen novels upon individuals and, more importantly, upon the culture.
 Sources of information about Austen readers are abundant. The Jane 
Austen Society of North America (jasna) is rivaled in the community of 
nineteenth-century British novel readers only by the Dickens Universe in 
the longevity and vitality of its proceedings.4 Since its creation in 1979 it has 
grown to include more than 4,000 members who attend annual conferences 
and local chapter meetings, receive copies of Persuasions (an annual journal 
designed to address both scholars and well-informed nonacademic readers), 
and reread Austen’s six novels so frequently that some of them come to know 
the texts by heart. (Giving a paper at a chapter meeting of jasna can be a 
daunting experience for visiting scholars, who often find that the audience 
will courteously and relentlessly quiz them on the finest-grained details of 
all the scenes their presentation has failed to mention.) Alongside the highly 
organized and structured jasna there are countless spaces on the Internet 
where Austen readers congregate virtually. In the summer of 2009 I found 
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on the World Wide Web more than a dozen blogs devoted to Jane Austen 
discussions, including “Jane Austen Today,” “Jane Austen’s World Blog,” “Fol-
lowing Austen,” “AustenBlog,” “Austen-tatious,” “Thoughts on Jane Austen 
and Other Cultural Icons,” “Jane Austen Sequels,” and “All Jane Austen, All 
the Time.” Blogs on Charles Dickens—along with Austen the most popular 
of nineteenth-century British novelists—are few and far between, and blogs 
devoted to George eliot or the Brontës are even scarcer. Large numbers of 
Jane Austen’s twenty-first century readers are somehow more motivated to 
meet online to compare responses to novels, share historical anecdotes and 
information about Regency material culture, argue over how Austen’s char-
acters “really feel,” talk about parallels between Austen’s fiction and their own 
lives, and trash latter-day continuations of or sequels to Austen, which the 
bloggers always seem to read and seldom seem to like.
 The Internet and jasna make available to the feminist scholar a wealth of 
potential research material suitable for the kind of ethnography Janice Rad-
way conducted in the 1980s on a community of actual readers of dime-store 
romance novels. In many ways anticipating feminist narratology, Radway 
considered not only the content of the readers’ comments and reflections on 
their own reading but also the forms and conventions of the genre her sub-
jects loved to read. Inspired by Radway’s example, the feminist narratologist 
could draw on readers’ self-reports to address questions about actual readers’ 
expectations, interpretations, and evaluations of Austen’s fiction and to link 
the ethnographic findings with analyses of narrative form. A feminist narra-
tologist interested in discourse analysis, following the example of Ruth Page, 
might look at the construction of gender in the blogs themselves, scrutiniz-
ing not just what the fans say about gender but also how their own discourse 
performs gender. To do this kind of work responsibly, a researcher needs to 
keep in mind the demographic differences among readers. As I have said, 
actual readers have actual bodies, and those bodies are classed, raced, sexed, 
nationalized, and aged, as well as gendered. A drawback to using blogs as 
the subject or source of study is that one can make hypotheses or draw con-
clusions only about bloggers, who represent certain levels of economic and 
educational privilege, not to mention an enthusiasm for communications 
technology that could put them in the minority among Austen readers. How 
people represent their identity positions online is also a question to con-
sider.5 virtual spaces for conversation enable participants to perform virtual 
identities that may or may not align with their own physical self-presenta-
tion. While the feminist narrative critic using such sources can speak with 
confidence about what some actual readers say, there is no way to delimit the 
identity positions from which those readers are speaking.
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 In my own work I have relied on more anecdotal evidence to speculate 
about what I call the “susceptible reader” or the “cooperative reader,” any 
real-world person who is willing to engage in the set of emotional exercises 
set out in a narrative text. The susceptible reader shares much in common 
with the implied reader, one important difference being that the suscep-
tible reader is an actual person. To be a susceptible reader, an actual reader 
needs to anticipate and enjoy the characteristic narrative moves of a given 
genre, to be awake to divergences from those typical moves, and to be able 
to take on—if only for the time of reading—the feelings and assumptions of 
the implied reader: in short, to be a fan. All the subjects of Radway’s ethno-
graphic study were susceptible readers of Harlequin romance, and practically 
all the bloggers on the Jane Austen sites (and presumably all the members 
of jasna) are susceptible readers of their favorite novelist’s texts. My project 
in Having a Good Cry was to analyze the affective experience exercised in 
susceptible readers of certain popular narrative genres and to consider how 
those repeated emotive experiences contribute to the constitution of actual 
readers’ own gender performances. I have argued that susceptible readers do 
not necessarily imitate the gendered behavior of characters (indeed, as the 
sometimes-vehement debates on the blogs reveal, these readers are as likely 
to denounce their heroines’ gendered behaviors as to emulate them). Nor do 
the moves of “feminine” narrative appeal to some essential gender trait sup-
posed to be inherent in Austen’s readers. Rather, the predictable trajectory of 
the marriage plot—which I have outlined above in the section on Time, Plot, 
and Progression—pulls the susceptible reader through a patterned sequence 
of affects: from excited interest, to uncertain anxiety, to heightened excite-
ment, to gratification, to—in Austen’s case—a bemused detachment born 
of the novelist’s metaleptic refusal to come completely to closure. Repeat-
edly going through these affective motions, the bodies of actual readers are 
marked with the feelings the susceptible reader experiences. The susceptible 
readers’ bodies thus bear the imprint of the continually reiterated affects 
inspired by the novels and by everything else in culture that interpellates 
those readers. This affective imprint constitutes, at least in part, the actual 
reader’s gender identity and gender performance.
 I have known actual readers who said that they loved Persuasion but 
reading it made them cry. I don’t think this is solely the expression of self-
pitying disappointment among readers who haven’t found their own happy 
endings. A particular example I remember was a heterosexual professional 
woman d'un certain âge, unmarried and despairing of ever being able to 
find the life-partner she felt sure she wanted. She shed joyful tears for Anne 
elliot’s happy ending that were also bitter. For her, the metalepsis I have dis-
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cussed in the section on Narration pointed up the fictitiousness of Anne’s 
triumph, inspiring in my feminist friend a feeling of shame for investing so 
much emotion in an outcome for which she had a serious critique. Joy and 
pleasure, bitterness and shame are among the affects shaping the gendered 
experience of the susceptible reader of Jane Austen. The implied reader, then, 
is not the only creature of the text on this side of the narrative transaction: 
through its affective moves, the text comes to constitute the gender perfor-
mance of the flesh-and-blood reader, too.
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As I have tried to emphasize throughout, narrative worldmaking is made 
possible by the active, ongoing participation of readers. (In using the term 
“readers,” I mean to invoke the larger class of “story-interpreters,” including 
viewers of films, interlocutors in face-to-face conversation, listeners to radio 
narratives, etc.) Figure 1 provides a flowchart (or decision tree) representing 
how readers cooperate in the worldmaking process by making interpretive 
choices at key stages—although arguably, as discussed in chapter 2, many 
readers coming to Mcewan’s text even for the first time already have enough 
contextual and paratextual information to move directly to the final stage of 
the process. That said, in other contexts, interpreters of someone’s conduct 
or its results may have to make a first cut between caused behavior and rea-
son-driven action; next decide whether a given action is communicative or 
non-communicative (compare writing down sentences vs. unselfconsciously 
rubbing one’s arm because of a muscle cramp); and then, for communica-
tive actions, decide whether the conduct at issue falls into the category of 
narrative or not (compare writing sentences listing off all the objects sit-
ting on one’s desk vs. sentences telling a story about how a thief stole those 
objects).6 Finally, for the communicative actions that are in fact amenable to 
being interpreted as narratives, the two types of inferences mentioned in the 
opening chapter become relevant: (1) those concerning what sort of world is 
being evoked by the act of telling and (2) those concerning why or with what 
purposes that act is being performed at all.
 Hence, if “narration” refers to the process by which story creators cue 
readers to construct, inhabit, and gauge the communicative purposes of nar-
rative worlds, “reception” refers to the world-building practices of readers 
responding to those textual cues. Such practices can be studied diachronic-
ally or synchronically: contrast Rezeptionsgeschichte with attempts to model 
text–reader interactions at a given moment in the evolution of narrative 
forms—whether in a given culture or across different cultures (see Herman, 
“Introduction” to The Emergence of Mind 23–24). Reading practices can also 
be investigated via the observed conduct of others or else on the basis of the 
analyst’s own intuitions, typically in dialogue with those of a larger commu-
nity of experts. But however they are studied, readers’ world-building meth-
ods involve inferential activities of a particular sort.
 Readers use a textual blueprint, coupled with their prior familiarity with 
other texts and a repertoire of lived or imagined situations and events, to 
draw provisional inferences about the structure and inhabitants of a narra-
tive world; to update or, if necessary, reorganize their mental representation 
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of—and emotional responses to—that world, as they acquaint themselves 
with more details of the text while working their way through narrative; and 
to engage with the question of why the story creator has designed a narrative 
with these particular characteristics in this specific context or occasion for 
telling (Herman, Basic Elements 37–74). Crucially, inferences about both the 
internal structure and the communicative functions of storyworlds remain 
subject to revision, as when while rereading Mcewan’s novel a reader notices 
details skipped over on a first reading or (after visiting england) revises his 
or her mental estimate of the distance between Oxford and the Dorset Coast, 
or when it emerges that a text originally categorized as a memoir includes 
persons and occurrences that were invented whole-cloth. Likewise, if I have 
read a range of literary narratives and perhaps also some work in narrative 
theory and can situate Mcewan’s novel within this broader context, I will be 
likely to draw different conclusions about Mcewan’s textual designs than I 
would without such background knowledge.
 The revisability of inferences about narrative worlds over time—and 
the variability of worldmaking methods used by different interpreters at the 
same time—has led theorists to develop a range of reader constructs (for 
helpful overviews, see Prince, “Reader”; Schneider, “Reader Constructs”). 
These constructs are premised on the assumption that “[r]eal, concrete read-
ers . . . should be distinguished from more abstract readers” (Prince, “Reader” 
398); they range from textually inscribed addressees, which Genette and 
Prince discussed under the heading of “the narratee,” to the model reader, 
implied reader, or authorial audience (eco; Iser; Rabinowitz), which are in 
effect names for the profile that an interpreter infers the reader targeted by a 
given author to possess.7 Analysts have drawn on such constructs to suggest, 
for example, how characterized narratees can be used to model the (ideal or 
projected) responses of readers of the narrative as a whole (Williams) and 
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to explore the complex, shifting functions of textual “you” in second-person 
narration (Fludernik, “Second-Person”). yet there is in my view a danger 
associated with reader constructs and frameworks based on them, including 
the narrative communication diagram that assumes three levels or layers: in 
the outermost layer, the actual author and the actual reader; at the next level, 
the implied author and the implied reader; and finally the narrator and the 
narratee.8 The danger is again that of losing sight of the heuristic status of 
these models and reifying or hypostatizing the entities they encompass—of 
forgetting that reader constructs are ways of describing phases or aspects of 
the inferential activities that support worldmaking, not preconditions for 
understanding stories.
 Indeed, distinguishing between “real” and “abstract” readers seems to 
me to lead down a slippery slope toward hypostatization of this sort. Model 
readers, implied readers, and authorial audiences are less kinds or categories 
of readers than shorthand ways of referring to inferences about narrative 
texts—decisions about the structure of narrative worlds—arrived at by one 
or more actual readers and presented as having broad validity, that is, as 
interpretations on which other readers, given a particular text, should ide-
ally converge. Like any other statement about Mcewan’s novel, a statement 
characterizing the assumptions and beliefs of the implied or model reader 
of On Chesil Beach derives from a particular reader’s inferences about the 
nature and functions of the world Mcewan has aimed to evoke via the textual 
cues he has here assembled. But expressions such as “the implied reader” can 
have the effect of occluding the way they, too, designate interpretations that 
stem from inferences made by actual readers. As I see it, furthermore, this 
occlusion serves a legitimating function: if a wedge can be driven between 
actual and implied readers, a specific interpretation of a narrative text or 
specific method of world-construction can be presented as the interpretation 
called for by the text itself—if it is to be read “authorially” or from a position 
aligned with an implied reader who is by definition tuned to receive the tex-
tual signals emanating from the implied author.
 The approach that I am outlining in this volume makes no such claim 
for the storyworld that has emerged over the course of my discussion of 
Mcewan’s novel. Rather, I am making a claim for the general, trans-reader 
relevance of questions and subquestions of the sort discussed in my con-
tributions to previous chapters—based on my assumption that the practice 
of framing tentative, defeasible answers to questions of this kind is what 
enables narrative worlds to be made and remade. Granted, when it comes 
to resolving such questions, there will be areas of convergence among read-
ers who (1) make the initial determination that questions about time, space, 
153
d a v I d  h e r m a n
and characters are pertinent, in ways I have outlined, for a given text (i.e., 
that the text possesses some degree of narrativity); (2) share broad familiar-
ity with a larger tradition of narrative texts, competence in the language or 
other semiotic system(s) in which the story is told, and more or less com-
parable background knowledge; and (3) draw on the resources listed under 
item (2) to ascribe to story creators the aim of evoking a particular kind of 
world for particular reasons. Thus, my guess is that readers of the present 
volume would be likely to agree with me that On Chesil Beach does not evoke 
a world inhabited by green-blooded zombies who only act like normal peo-
ple. They would also probably agree that Mcewan is not seeking to convince 
readers to go back to older, pre-1960s social and sexual mores or to make 
a regular practice of handling arguments in the way that edward Mayhew 
does. But I need not appeal to the concept of the implied reader to account 
for the disparity between these strategies for worldmaking and the strate-
gies that I myself would be apt to use. Instead, factors (1)–(3) listed above 
constitute what can be described as constraints on the variable patterning of 
textual cues with inferences about storyworlds (Herman, Story Logic 12)—
constraints that affect how much divergence or convergence there will tend 
to be among interpretations of a given narrative. Reader constructs do not 
explain these constraints on worldmaking; the constraints, rather, afford a 
way of explicating the constructs.
 To be sure, there is no one-to-one relationship between textual blueprints 
and narrative worlds. Instead, a variety of discourse cues can prompt the 
same kinds of inferences about the world at issue, while the same cue can, 
if used in different contexts, prompt different sorts of inferences (Sternberg, 
“Proteus”). Thus a range of textual designs trigger the inference that Florence 
has been subjected to sexual abuse, whereas conversely Mcewan’s references 
to repressed memories serve different functions in connection with edward 
than they do in connection with Florence. But the variability, in a given case, 
is not limitless. I do not assimilate Florence’s mother’s views about Stalinist 
Russia (65), for example, to the story line of sexual abuse; nor do I assign 
positive valences to any of the details that are in fact associated with that 
storyline. To extrapolate: the implied reader, model reader, and authorial 
audience are ways of referring to what constitutes, for a particular inter-
preter, the permissible range of inferences that can accrue to one or more 
textual features in a narrative—given the operation of factors (1)–(3) listed 
in my previous paragraph. yet appeals to reader constructs can sometimes 
produce the impression that what is in reality the result of a chain of infer-
ences is instead its cause or precondition. Narrative understanding—recon-
structing a storyworld—is not contingent upon the actual reader’s stepping 
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into the role of the implied reader. To the contrary, the very division between 
an actual and an implied reader is contingent on using one’s understanding 
of a narrative text to distinguish between inferences that can be felicitously 
associated with the text and those that cannot, and then (for heuristic or 
explanatory purposes) defining the implied reader as one who is immune to 
all the inferences that one has deemed infelicitous. But this explanatory move 
itself stands in need of further explanation; it presupposes, rather than pro-
vides, a criterion for what constitutes a permissible or appropriate range of 
inferences given a particular set of textual cues. Put another way, interpretive 
claims based on reader constructs like the implied reader beg fundamental 
questions about the felicity conditions for narrative worldmaking.9
 As my appeal to felicity conditions here underscores, the practice of 
building narrative worlds, like other practices, is driven or organized by 
norms. My contribution to chapter 7 explores the nature and functions of 
these norms in the context of an approach that situates storyworlds at the 
meeting-point of narrative and mind.
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We may begin with the model of reception offered by Phelan and Rabinow-
itz and affirm its usefulness for dealing with the majority of possible audi-
ences. We may, however, need to mold these concepts somewhat if we are 
to include the central narratives of postmodernism and other antimimetic 
texts. We’ll start with an admittedly extreme example from Samuel Beckett. 
His text “Ping” (1966) begins: “All known all white bare body fixed one yard 
legs joined like sewn. Light heat white floor one square yard never seen. 
White walls one yard by two white ceiling one square yard never seen. Bare 
white body fixed only the eyes only just. Traces blurs light grey almost white 
on white” (193). This writing is so unnatural that it is difficult to imagine a 
narrative audience for it: who could possibly be addressed by this strange 
text? We may postulate an authorial audience for it; we can imagine an ideal 
reader who would understand and enjoy the string of monosyllables, the odd 
syntax, the absence of verbs, the obscure setting, the vague figure, and the 
general suspension of narrative. Unless of course the authorial audience is 
any bright individual who refrains as far as possible from putting into place 
the normal rules of reading that Rabinowitz has outlined elsewhere (1997); 
such an audience would instead make only personal, provisional islands of 
meaning here and there and then move on to the next strange passage. And 
there is another possibility: as Rabinowitz shrewdly observes in the same 
work, sometimes a story “does not provide enough internal evidence for the 
actual reader to determine correctly the nature of the authorial audience” 
(42). Without the premise of a stable, retrievable meaning, the ideas of the 
narrative and the authorial audiences may become indistinct, irretrievable, 
or seemingly infinite. In this way, antimimetic texts play with and problema-
tize our conventional reading practices.
 More specifically, we may affirm that antimimetic texts generally tend to 
diffuse, or collapse, or multiply narrative and authorial audiences. Let’s look 
at the interesting case of “autotelic” second-person narration at the begin-
ning of Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler (1979): “you are about 
to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a winter’s night a traveler. 
Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought. Let the world around you 
fade. Best to close the door; the Tv is always on in the next room” (3). Who 
exactly is this “you”? Arguably, it is simultaneously the narrative, the autho-
rial, and the actual audience. There are gaps between these conceptions; the 
actual reader starts to slip away almost immediately. It is not the case that 
he or she is “about to begin reading,” but that he or she has just begun read-
ing the book. As the scene is depicted with greater detail, the actual reader 
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increasingly diverges from the authorial or narrative audience. If one is in 
fact reading the book in a library, one need not worry about television sets. 
This information is all noted and processed by the authorial audience, who 
presumably enjoys the way the distance shifts between the actual and the 
narrative audience. Moreover, the narrative audience becomes personified 
as a character in the text and enters the narrative’s storyworld. This in turn 
produces a new narrative audience to which the adventures of this character, 
called “The Reader,” are told. In this work we see the three audiences first 
fuse, then separate, then multiply, and later fuse and diverge again at differ-
ent points: “One thing is immediately clear to you: namely, that this book has 
nothing in common with the one you had begun” (53). It would seem that 
every actual or theoretical audience could agree with this statement.
 Postmodern texts regularly foreground the act of reading and often pro-
vide extravagant scenarios of processing words. The protagonist of Danilo 
Kiš’s “encyclopedia of the Dead” (1983) finds a library that contains an 
impossibly complete narrative of every aspect of his life; Orhan Pomuk’s 
The New Life (1994) follows the adventures of characters whose lives have 
been disrupted and transformed after having read a particular, charismatic 
book; and in Julio Cortázar’s “The Continuity of Parks” (1956), a reader is 
murdered by a character in the novel he is enjoying. especially compelling 
is Borges’s “The Book of Sand” (1975), in which an infinite book without 
beginning or ending is discovered and then deliberately lost.
 The actual reading practices required of such works are, fortunately, rather 
less spectacular. Antimimetic works typically address an authorial audience 
that is well aware of the conventions of traditional fiction and is interested in 
their abrogation. In some texts, such as “The Continuity of Parks” or Fowles’s 
The French Lieutenant’s Woman, the antimimetic component appears with 
little foreshadowing and abruptly dissolves the mimetic framework that had 
been in place. In other cases, an antimimetic work addresses two or more 
authorial audiences, a “naïve” audience that keeps expecting some kind of 
mimetic narrative, and a more sophisticated audience that looks forward to 
antimimetic strategies. Umberto eco has explained that what he designates a 
“metatext” must “be read twice: it asks for both a naïve and a critical reading, 
the latter being the interpretation of the former” (205). This idea of a double 
reading directed toward two different, incompatible authorial audiences will 
be of use in understanding many postmodern texts. Let us look at the begin-
ning sentences of Midnight’s Children:
I was born in the city of Bombay . . . once upon a time. No, that won’t do, 
there’s no getting away from the date: I was born in Doctor Narlikar’s Nurs-
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ing Home on August 15th, 1947. And the time? The time matters too. Well 
then: at night. No, it’s important to be more . . . On the stroke of midnight, 
as a matter of fact. Clock-hands joined palms in respectful greeting as I 
came. (3)
The first clause, “I was born in the city of Bombay” reads like the beginning 
of a realist novel by someone like Dickens. But it is followed by “once upon a 
time,” which is the traditional opening of fairy tales. This contrast within the 
first sentence suggests that the reader would do well to anticipate unexpected 
patterns and combinations throughout the book, including a juxtaposition 
of the realistic and the fantastic, of history and fable. The next sentences 
reproduce an oral discourse, as if the writer were pretending to be correct-
ing himself as he speaks aloud. “And the time? The time matters too.” These 
lines seem like half of a dialogue, as if the speaker is answering a real or likely 
objection to his account, by either an actual interlocutor or one internalized 
in his mind. This pseudodialogue in turn foreshadows the curious speech 
situation of the narrative, in which Saleem reads his written text aloud to 
the illiterate Padma and then transcribes their discussions about the narra-
tive into his text, as the status and the time of the writing become somewhat 
unfixed. This practice inverts the classic situation of vyasa, who dictated the 
Sanskrit epic, the Mahabharata, to the god Ganesh for transcription.
 The reference to the clock hands making a greeting refers to the Añjali 
Mudrā, the Indian custom of pressing upright palms together in respect-
ful greeting, typically accompanied by the word “Namaste”; this detail is 
something that a reader familiar with Indian culture would note, though 
a typical Western reader might miss. The date given in the text is also very 
important and is again primarily directed to those readers who appreciate its 
significance. Rushdie knows that many of his actual readers will, however, be 
ignorant of this fact, so he has his narrator address them, too: “Oh, spell it 
out, spell it out: at the precise moment of India’s independence” (3). Rushdie 
employs this practice throughout the book, utilizing Indian expressions or 
practices and then contextualizing many of them so a non-Indian reader will 
be able to follow along. This addressing of a dual readership is particularly 
powerful in the second chapter as Aadam Aziz finds himself in the Jallian-
wala Bagh compound in Amritsar on April 6, 1919. Those with some knowl-
edge of Indian history will realize well in advance that which will surprise the 
less well-versed: the British massacre of 400 unarmed Indians is about to take 
place.
 Indian writers have a long tradition of writing for multiple audiences. To 
elude censorship, colonial authors often had to write in a kind of code, one 
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that seemed innocuous to the imperial power but that could be quite sub-
versive to indigenous audiences who were able to “read between the lines,” as 
it were. Postcolonial authors often write to a slightly different pair of autho-
rial audiences: one that is aware of indigenous culture, geography, and his-
tory, and a second, more traditional metropolitan audience that needs to be 
instructed in these areas.
 The next few paragraphs of Midnight’s Children allude to Scheherazade, 
the narrator of the 1001 Nights, and the account in the Quran of the creation 
of man from drops of blood. These allusions are soon followed by references 
to popular culture in the form of Bombay musical films; Rushdie’s range of 
reference is both eastern and Western, high and low culture, local and cos-
mopolitan, classic and postmodern. The authorial reader is modeled in the 
following passage from the book’s third chapter: “And there were so many 
stories to tell, too many, such an excess of intertwined lives events miracles 
places rumors, so dense a commingling of the improbable and the mundane” 
(4). This sentence might serve as a partial description of typical postmodern 
practice, and it further prepares the authorial reader for the book’s extrava-
gant content, unusual events, playful narration, and idiosyncratic style. The 
reader is told to expect the unexpected, to look forward to unnatural juxta-
positions in the story and a frequently antimimetic style of narration.
 The avant-garde has still more radical kinds of text. Some of these, for 
example, Gertrude Stein’s or Samuel Beckett’s more hermetic pieces, require 
the reader to act as a kind of collaborator, producing the interpretation of a 
multiform, protean work. Here, eco’s concept of the open work will prove 
very useful, as will Roland Barthes’ concept of text: this kind of writing, he 
explains, “is plural. Which is not to say it has several meanings, but that 
it accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely 
acceptable) plural” (159). The same may be said of many hypertext fictions.10
159
n o T e S
noTeS
 1. I have commented at length on the gendered dimensions of the model of nar-
rative transmission in “Teaching Gender and Narrative.” Following the assigned topic, 
the present essay concentrates on the actual and implied readers but does not treat the 
narratee in detail. [RW]
 2. See, for example, “Think/exist” at http://thinkexist.com/quotes/jane_austen/ or 
the Jane Austen page at “Brainy Quote,” http://www.brainyquote.com. [RW]
 3. See especially Deidre Lynch’s collection, Janeites. [RW]
 4. The Dickens Project, hosted by the University of California Santa Cruz, has for 
more than twenty-five years held a weeklong “Dickens Universe” involving hundreds of 
faculty, graduate students, undergraduates, high-school teachers, elder-hostel partici-
pants, and Dickens fans in lectures and discussions of a single Dickens novel each year. 
[RW]
 5. See Cherny and Weise, eds.; and O’Farrell and vallone, eds. [RW]
 6. Though figure 1 represents the narrative/non-narrative decision as binarized, 
see Herman, Basic Elements, and Ryan, “Toward,” for arguments that narrativity should 
be viewed as a gradient, more-or-less feature of texts or representations rather than a 
binary, either-or feature. [DH]
 7. As a textually inscribed reception position, the narratee has a different status 
than the model reader, implied reader, or authorial audience—these being labels for 
strategies of reception triggered by, rather than represented in, a given text. See, how-
ever, my next note. [DH]
 8. For Chatman (Story and Discourse 151), the actual author and the actual reader 
remain outside narrative transaction as such; it is the implied author and the implied 
reader who, along with the narrator and narratee, are situated in the domain of the text. 
For Phelan (Living to Tell about It 38–49), by contrast, the implied author, being a label 
for the persona or “second self ” adopted by the actual author while composing a given 
narrative, shifts to a position outside the text, while the implied reader remains internal 
to the text. I suggest, however, that debates about specific details of the narrative com-
munication diagram should give way to a reassessment of its broader historical and 
conceptual foundations (see Shaw for a different take on this project of reassessment). 
Putting the same point in the Wittgensteinian terms I used in the introduction, my aim 
is to “survey,” from the different vantage point afforded by a focus on worldmaking, 
the grammar of questions and claims based on the narrative communication diagram. 
Thus, in chapter 2, I discussed how my approach is informed by a thoroughgoing inten-
tionalism that sees the idea of the implied author as an unwarranted concession to anti-
intentionalist claims (see also my response in Part Two), and the narrator as a more or 
less salient concept depending on the structure of a given narrational act. In the present 
chapter, I extend my reassessment to the right-hand side of the diagram. Here I recon-
sider the descriptive status and explanatory force of heuristic constructs that should be 
viewed not as capturing conditions for successful interpretation but rather as shorthand 
ways of referring to (stages of) the inferential activity by means of which interpreters 
co-construct storyworlds. [DH]
 9. For further discussion of the issues outlined in this paragraph, see my response 
in Part Two of this volume. [DH]
 10. For further reading on these issues, see Barthes, “From Work to Text”; eco; Rabi-
nowitz, “Betraying the Sender”; and Richardson, “Singular Text.” [BR]
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Rhetorical narrative theory provides tools not only for analytical descrip-
tions of works of art but also for evaluations of them. We have touched on 
issues of evaluation before, especially in our discussions of Twain’s deploy-
ment of bonding unreliable narration and of his management of Jim’s role 
in the progression, but here we will address these issues directly. As noted 
in the introduction, the rhetorical approach considers three kinds of judg-
ments involved in readerly dynamics: interpretive, ethical, and aesthetic. We 
make aesthetic judgments both as we read and again once we have finished 
the narrative and can look back on it as a whole. But these judgments follow 
from our interpretive and ethical judgments and, indeed, from our experi-
ence of the overall progression (as it is unfolding and as it gets completed). 
In this respect, aesthetic judgments are made by actual audiences about the 
quality of our participation in the authorial audience. We will illustrate these 
general points by focusing not on what we regard as an example of aesthetic 
success but rather one of aesthetic failure: the evasion, and especially its nar-
ratorial dynamics. The success of Twain’s ending has been debated by readers 
for years, and, though we do not claim that the tools of rhetorical theory can 
definitively resolve the debate, we do believe that they can allow us to con-
tribute something substantially new to the conversation.
 Simply put, we believe that in the first two-thirds of the novel Twain 
skillfully creates a relationship with his authorial audience based on shared 
ethical values, including a mutual respect and trust that underlies the com-
Narrative Values, aesthetic Values
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munication of bonding unreliability, and that in the evasion he betrays that 
relationship, both ethically and aesthetically. Before we demonstrate why we 
think that’s so, however, we want to situate our analysis in relation to two 
defenses of the ending. These defenses are strong, in part because they begin 
by acknowledging some of the apparent problems with the evasion section, 
especially Huck’s going along with Tom Sawyer’s demeaning treatment of 
Jim.1
 Stacy Margolis contends that Twain uses the ending to stake out his posi-
tion in contemporary legal debates about the relations among intentions and 
consequences in cases of liability. In Margolis’s view, by showing that Huck 
maintains his good intentions toward Jim but fails to translate those inten-
tions into action, Twain sides with those who believe that consequences mat-
ter more than intentions—a position that applies not just to Huck’s relation 
to Jim but also to dominant white society’s relation to slavery. Toni Mor-
rison, in arguing that the ending is effective in spite of itself, finds a way to 
turn Huck’s behavior toward Jim to the novel’s advantage. Morrison deftly 
catalogues the problems with the ending, including its revelation that “free-
dom has no meaning to Huck or to the text without the specter of enslave-
ment, the anodyne to individualism,” but she concludes that the novel may 
still be “great” “because in its structure, in the hell it puts its reader through 
at the end, the frontal debate it forces, it simulates and describes the parasiti-
cal nature of white freedom” (309, 310). Although we find much to admire 
in each of these defenses, we find that they (and other defenses) are, as Huck 
might put it, too “intellectural”: while they make sense on an abstract level, 
they strike no places to harden us against the sense of disappointment we 
feel when we read the last twelve chapters, a good quarter of the novel.
  Margolis’s thematic justification has a certain logical plausibility, but it 
requires her to downplay the reader’s emotional and ethical experience of 
the progression through Chapter XXXI. As we have seen, Twain has sig-
naled to his audience that Huck’s decision to go to hell is the climax of his 
intuitive efforts to define his relation to “sivilization” and its dictates. In the 
final chapters, however, Twain undermines that climax by showing Huck 
aiding and abetting Tom’s treatment of Jim. Whatever the thematic point 
here, it does not compensate for the experiential disappointment arising 
from the way the ending counteracts the progression of the first thirty-one 
chapters.
 Morrison’s emphasis on the “hell [the ending] puts its reader through” 
actually offers support for our case about the disappointment so many actual 
readers feel in the final chapters. Morrison doesn’t deny the flaws but rather 
points out that they have unintended positive consequences. We would be 
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more persuaded by her argument if the pain in the final chapters were of a 
different sort. It’s not painful experiences in and of themselves that we are 
objecting to: the authorial audience has already dealt with considerable pain 
and anxiety in the text. But in such sections as the Grangerford–Shepherd-
son episode, our pain is rooted in sharing Twain’s implicit ethical judgments, 
and it engages us fully as members of the narrative audience. Here, in con-
trast, the pain has both aesthetic and ethical sources, both of which serve to 
distance us from Twain as we read because of the tedium brought on by the 
seemingly interminable execution of Tom’s plan, weakly justified as send-ups 
of chivalric romances—send-ups that are trivial in light of the serious social 
criticism that has marked the novel until then. Furthermore, the narratorial 
dynamics of the evasion weaken our engagement with the narrative audi-
ence as our puzzlement about Twain’s shift in tactics—including his sudden 
refusal to treat us as the sharp and sensitive readers he has addressed earlier 
in the book, and his apparent willingness to look down on us in the same way 
those “humbugs and frauds” (130), the King and Duke, look down on their 
audiences—greatly interferes with our concerns about the world of the novel 
and with our satisfaction in the ethical dimension of the implied author–nar-
rator–audience relationships.
 Consider one representative example of the change in Twain’s technique. 
The passage is from Chapter XXXvI, just after Tom and Huck have dug the 
hole underneath Jim’s cabin that would easily allow Jim to escape. Huck sees 
Jim for the first time since the King and the Duke sold him to Silas Phelps, 
but, while noting that Jim “was so glad to see us he most cried,” Huck says 
nothing about his own emotions. The authorial audience that Twain has 
trained in the earlier chapters is sufficiently sensitive to notice this restric-
tion—and sufficiently sensitive to see it as a mimetic implausibility and an 
ethical deficiency—a combination that makes it an aesthetic flaw: the Huck 
we’ve traveled with would, by this point in the novel, simply not treat Jim (or 
his narrative audience) in this way. Then after Tom explains all his elaborate 
plans to Jim, Huck reports Tom’s reaction to their adventures.
Tom . . . said it was the best fun he ever had in his life, and the most intel-
lectural; and said if he only could see his way to it we would keep it up all 
the rest of our lives and leave Jim to our children to get out; for he believed 
Jim would come to like it better and better the more he got used to it. He 
said that in that way it could be strung out to as much as eighty year, and 
would be the best time on record. And he said it would make us all cel-
ebrated that had a hand in it. (228)
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In this passage, Twain employs restricted narration as Huck reliably reports 
Tom’s speech but refrains from offering any interpretation or evaluation of 
it. And, as he did in Huck’s report about Tom’s robber gang in the first chap-
ter, Twain uses the technique to communicate far more than Huck realizes. 
But the effects here are significantly different: Twain asks his audience to see 
both the logical absurdity and the ethical deficiencies of Tom’s hopes, but the 
humor here is so broad and—in this context where we’ve already seen similar 
absurdities from Tom—so repetitious that the restricted narration weakens 
rather than strengthens our bond with Huck and consequently with Twain.
 We can understand why it might have been easy for Twain to fall into this 
way of writing. This is the same avuncular implied author we find in Tom 
Sawyer, and it’s a voice that Twain could ventriloquize easily and well—and 
one that sold well in the public marketplace. But while that self-presenta-
tion may work toward the beginning of Huckleberry Finn, by this point in 
the novel, both the implied Twain and the authorial audience have changed 
too much for that self-presentation to seem anything but out of place. Fur-
thermore, since the restricted narration requires Huck to shed much of the 
wisdom and understanding he had gained during the trip down the River, 
it comes at a very high price. The first thirty-one chapters build our appre-
ciation of the relationship between Huck and Jim and nourish our under-
standing of how it is affected by Huck’s efforts to find his place in the world 
and Jim’s efforts to become a free man. Now those overarching purposes and 
their accompanying multilayered communications are replaced by Twain’s 
ham-handed efforts to make us laugh at the excesses of a genre that the 
authorial audience of the first thirty-one chapters no longer takes seriously. 
This change is a serious come-down.
 Furthermore, when the restricted narration in Chapter I allowed Twain 
and the authorial audience to share a joke that Huck was oblivious to about 
the contradiction of respectability as an eligibility criterion for Tom’s band 
of robbers, there were no significant negative consequences of Huck’s naïve 
obtuseness. Here, however, the restricted narration means that Huck remains 
silent not only about the absurdity of Tom’s wishes but also about his demean-
ing assumptions about Jim, and that silence has estranging effects on our 
relation with Huck—and with Twain. Granted, Huck’s experiences on the 
River make him more aware of the absurdity of Tom’s games, but that only 
makes his silent acquiescence more troubling. How can the character narra-
tor who reviewed the value of Jim’s friendship so recently now report Tom’s 
hopes for keeping Jim in captivity another eighty years and not register his 
dissent? How can the implied author who wrote Chapter XXXI also write 
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this passage? Huck’s silence weakens our previously strong affective and ethi-
cal bonds with both tellers, and it detracts from the overall quality of our 
reading experience.
 The effects of this passage are, alas, repeated with small (depressingly 
small) variations at many other points in the concluding chapters. In epi-
sode after episode the pleasures and rewards of the first thirty-one chapters 
give way to the pains and disappointments of the last twelve. There are sev-
eral ways we might describe this implied author–audience relationship: (1) 
Twain, expecting readers who would follow the ethical eddies of the first 
thirty-one chapters and also enjoy the humor of the evasion, was writing 
for an in internally inconsistent authorial audience; (2) Twain, in the final 
chapters, is hypothesizing a different authorial audience from the one he’d 
been addressing until that point; or (3) Samuel Clemens, the actual author, 
constructs one implied version of himself in the first two-thirds of the book 
and a quite different and ultimately incompatible version of himself in the 
evasion. In any case, as two actual readers, we find that our rhetorical analy-
sis leads us to adapt Huck’s vocabulary as our final assessment: Huckleberry 
Finn, stretchers and all, is a true book in the sense that it offers a richly sat-
isfying affective, ethical, and aesthetic experience—until it gives way, during 
the evasion, to humbug and fraud.
165
robyn warhol
The title of this chapter, “Narrative values, Aesthetic values,” raises questions 
for the critic working from a politically committed perspective such as femi-
nism. Does the comma between the two phrases suggest an opposition, as 
if narrative values were recognizable through their difference from aesthetic 
values? Or does the comma signify an appositive, asserting that narrative and 
aesthetic values are one and the same? The feminist narrative theorist cannot 
really separate narrative values—which I take to mean the ethical commit-
ments reflected in the narrative structure of a text—from aesthetic values—
which means judgments about the beauty of texts. To me, the pairing of the 
two terms seems to highlight the absence of a third term that is only implicit 
in this section’s title: political values, the force behind the practice of any form 
of feminist criticism.
 Often I tell my students that literary critics generally approach a text 
through one or more of three questions: (1) “How is it put together?” (the 
project of poetics); (2) “What is it saying?” (the work of interpretation); 
and (3) “Is it good?” (critical evaluation). Undergraduates usually come in 
assuming that “Is it good?”—the only question they have been taught in high 
school to associate with “criticism”—is a matter of aesthetics, a judgment of 
how effectively the text meets prescribed standards defined through poetics, 
or of how “universal” the text can be made to appear through interpreta-
tion. For the feminist critic, though, the question takes on a more practical 
valence. A better way for a politically committed critic to ask “Is it good?” is 
to rephrase the question as “Whom is it good for? That is, “Whose interests 
does it serve?” A feminist narrative critic will implicitly or explicitly evaluate 
a text according to its relation to patriarchy: the important question about a 
text’s value is whether on the whole it operates to support patriarchal social 
and cultural arrangements or to subvert them.
 Because of feminist criticism’s focus on politics, aesthetics has dropped 
out of the feminist theoretical conversation, particularly in feminist narrato-
logical circles, where the question of textual beauty has never seriously been 
raised. Feminism’s challenge to the canon in the late 1970s and the 1980s 
sought to undermine the whole idea of using preconceived aesthetic stan-
dards as a basis for determining which texts deserved critical attention. If the 
reason there were so few “great” women writers was that not enough women 
had written texts that matched the aesthetic standards of their male con-
temporaries and critics, then, according to feminism, there was something 
wrong with a set of standards that could so effectively exclude the creative 
efforts of half of humanity. Feminist critics followed virginia Woolf ’s lead in 
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A Room of One’s Own, looking at women’s ways of writing and taking into 
consideration the conditions in which Jane Austen, for instance, educated at 
home because women were barred from universities, wrote domestic fiction 
and letters but not blank-verse epics. Austen had for most of the twentieth 
century hovered just inside the edge of the canon because her fiction meets 
so many of the aesthetic standards required of the “classics”: she has always 
received credit for the beautiful symmetry of her periodic sentences and the 
post-neoclassical wit reflected in her dialogues and passages of narration, as 
well as for her vivid characterizations and her masterful management of free 
indirect discourse. By the end of the twentieth century, Austen had muscled 
her way onto the Columbia University reading list for the humanities survey 
course in literature. In 1937 there were no women on that two-semester syl-
labus, and in 1961 the list was still all male. Austen is on the 1991 list, how-
ever, along with Sappho and Woolf (but not George eliot, who sometimes 
also appears on standard “great books” lists from the twentieth century).2
 Since Austen had long been one of the few exceptions to the implicit 
rules of the Western canon, second-wave feminist critics did not need to 
“recover” her texts from obscurity. Rather, they worked to rehabilitate Aus-
ten for feminism, uncovering the subversive shadows behind her highly con-
ventional marriage plots. When Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar introduced 
the first edition of the Norton Anthology of Literature by Women in the early 
1980s, their selection from Jane Austen’s writing caused a controversy in the 
popular press. Instead of choosing by an aesthetic standard, which might 
have meant including the whole of a novel like Persuasion to demonstrate 
the author’s mastery of her craft, they excerpted a bit of Love and Freindship, 
the satire on eighteenth-century romance novels Austen wrote as a teenager. 
Gilbert and Gubar were looking for signs of feminism. Austen’s spoof of 
the vapid and hypocritical heroines of the worst popular romances carries 
the same powerfully feminist significance as George eliot’s caricatures of 
“Silly Novels by Lady Novelists,” published half a century later. The co-edi-
tors’ choice raised skepticism and even hostility among commentators who 
believed an anthology’s job was to represent the best of all the good literature 
that has been written. “Good for whom?” was Gilbert and Gubar’s implicit 
question.
 Still, it would be disingenuous for me to claim that no novel is better 
than another on aesthetic grounds. To remind myself that I do make distinc-
tions despite my skepticism about the biases implicit in aesthetic standards, 
I need only pick up one of the many sequels to Austen novels published over 
the last ten years. Browsing through Barnes and Noble in January of 2010, I 
was frankly astonished at the number of novels I found that rewrite or con-
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tinue Pride and Prejudice in particular. When I followed up my impression 
on Amazon.com, I was even more surprised at the quantity of these sequels 
and continuations: Mr. Darcy’s Daughters: A Novel (2003); Mr. Darcy Takes 
a Wife: Pride and Prejudice Continues (2004); An Assembly Such As This: A 
Novel of Fitzwilliam Darcy, Gentleman (2006); Darcy and Elizabeth: Nights 
and Days at Pemberley (2006); Mr. Darcy’s Diary: A Novel (2007); Pemberley’s 
Promise (2007); And This Our Life: Chronicles of the Darcy Family: Book I 
(2008); The Darcys and the Bingleys: A Tale of Two Gentlemen’s Marriages to 
Two Most Devoted Sisters (2008); The Darcy Connection: A Novel (2008); The 
Darcys Give a Ball: A Gentle Joke, Jane Austen Style (2008); Loving Mr. Darcy: 
Journeys Beyond Pemberley (2009); Mr. Darcy’s Dream: A Novel (2009); Mr. 
Darcy, Vampyre (2009); Pemberley Manor: Elizabeth and Darcy, for better or 
for worse (2009); Vampire Darcy’s Desire: A Pride and Prejudice Adaptation 
(2009); Pride/Prejudice: A Novel of Mr. Darcy, Elizabeth Bennet, and their For-
bidden Lovers (2010). According to the Amazon website, this represents only 
a portion of the list (and of course I haven’t even mentioned Pride and Preju-
dice and Zombies [2009]). Sometimes I open one of these volumes in hopes 
of finding some glimmer of the reading pleasure that surely inspired so many 
present-day novelists to undo the tentative closure of Austen’s book and to 
keep the story going. What I invariably find are passages that strike me as 
wildly out of synch with Austen’s texts. In one self-published sequel available 
on Amazon.com, Mr. Bennet assures Mr. Darcy that elizabeth returns his 
affection, saying, “Lizzy has never acted as she did last night with anyone. I 
am quite sure that you were her first kiss. She would not have allowed it had 
she been disinterested” (White Lies and Other Half-Truths 14). If the author, 
Barbara Tiller Cole, does not know that “disinterested” does not mean the 
same thing as “not interested,” someone like Mr. Bennet surely would have, 
just as surely as an upper-class Regency father would neither have had reli-
able access to information about whether his daughter had kissed any young 
man nor would ever have discussed such a matter with one of her suitors.3 
Indeed, in the entire text of Pride and Prejudice, Austen uses “disinterested” 
three times  and “disinterestedness” once (something I can assert with con-
fidence thanks to a Google Books search), in each case to mean someone 
is not motivated by expectations of personal advantage. Austen’s word, in 
the extremely unlikely case of this episode’s occurring in one of her novels, 
would have been “indifferent.”
 In another sequel, Darcy approaches his wife:
He embraces her lissome frame with stunned amazement. She is so small! 
Nearly from the moment his eyes touched hers at the Meryton Assem-
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bly, elizabeth Bennet has loomed larger than life, to his reckoning. Her 
vibrancy, sharp intellect, and bold presence offset her svelte physique. As if 
designed specifically, her head rests perfectly on his breastbone and tucks 
exquisitely under his chin, while his arms easily surround her, broad hands 
flattening on her back. With a shock, he recognizes her fragility, coupled 
with an overwhelming strength. He could snap her bones facilely, yet she 
grips him with an unbelievably strong clench. (Mr. and Mrs. Fitzwilliam 
Darcy: Two Shall Become One 284)
I have to give Sharon Lathan points for gamely attempting a bit of free indi-
rect discourse (“She is so small!”), but I can only laugh at her anachronistic 
diction (“svelte physique”? “unbelievably”? “clench”?), her resurrection of 
dead metaphors (“loomed larger than life”), her infelicitous adaptations of 
clichés (“his eyes touched hers”—really?) and the dopey absurdity of the 
interiority she assigns to Austen’s inscrutable hero (he realizes with a shock 
that he could break his wife’s bones “facilely”—is that a word?—in spite of 
the powerful grip with which she seizes him). The writing is just—well—bad. 
For a feminist critic to say so is to raise an irreconcilable paradox: who am 
I (a privileged, overeducated snob, strongly influenced by the old New Crit-
ics who taught me and the old copy of Fowler they said I ought to read) to 
say that novels are bad if some feminine readers are enjoying them?4 Bad for 
what, besides the development of an ear for authentic Regency prose?
 It would be equally disingenuous, though, for a feminist critic to say that 
this kind of writing provides harmless pleasure for the devotees of Austen fan 
fiction. Like most of the other sequels and adaptations, Mr. and Mrs. Fitz-
william Darcy is not a satire but an evidently earnest attempt to give Darcy 
and elizabeth’s relationship a bodily dimension that is lacking in Austen’s 
original. But what sort of eroticism suggests a woman might find it exciting 
to know that a man who says very little is actually fantasizing about snapping 
her bones? When I demonstrate an elitist dismissal of pop-culture aesthetics 
by laughing at the novel’s prose style, I violate feminist principles of social 
egalitarianism and diversity. But when I consider the attitudes about gender 
that such novels are perpetuating, my feminist politics obligate me to call 
them bad books.
 Feminist theory asserts that all literary critical approaches are political 
but that some are more honest about their politics than others. In my contri-
butions to this book, I have tried to be consistently forthright about the ways 
that feminism guides and motivates my narrative–theoretically informed 
practice. Narrative values, aesthetic values, political values: from where I 
stand, they all come down to the same thing.
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In chapter 6 I discussed how questions about reception and the reader ulti-
mately lead, in my account, to questions about the role of norms in narra-
tive worldmaking. More generally, my focus on storyworlds raises questions 
about what sorts of narrative worlds (and worldmaking practices) are valued 
by readers, in what contexts, and why—and with what implications for the 
attempt to develop an approach that foregrounds the nexus of narrative and 
mind. In this chapter I suggest how norms orient worldmaking practices 
on multiple levels, while conversely narratives orient the construction and 
ongoing reassessment of normative frameworks. At the same time, as I dis-
cuss in my concluding paragraphs, I view questions about how norms shape 
and are shaped by storytelling practices as separable from questions about 
the aesthetic value of particular (literary or other) narratives.
 Like all practices, which are by definition rooted in the traditions and 
institutions of a culture or subculture, the practice of using textual blueprints 
to build storyworlds can be characterized in terms of norms viewed as codi-
fied sets of expectations. These expectations have developed through a pro-
cess of negotiating what should or should not be done in particular domains 
of conduct (cf. MacIntyre; Rouse). There are norms, specifying preferred 
and dispreferred modes of conduct, associated with practices ranging from 
table etiquette to academic writing; thus, in contemporary North America it 
would be frowned upon to spear one’s food with a thumb tack or a pocket 
knife during a formal meal, just as claiming as one’s own words written by 
another would violate the norms of academic conduct. More generally, a 
culture’s moral and legal codes can be viewed as distinct but overlapping 
domains in which principles are developed to map norms for conduct onto 
the full range of recognized or attested practices. For its part, the domain of 
ethics concerns itself with how and why these mapping principles emerge—
as well as their exact scope of applicability. Since narration constitutes a form 
of (communicative) practice among other culturally embedded practices, 
worldmaking through stories can be situated within this same broadly nor-
mative context, as well as the meta-normative domain of ethics.
 At least four (overlapping) kinds of interconnections between norms and 
narrative worldmaking can be identified, and Mcewan’s novel can be used 
to illustrate salient issues associated with each kind. Analysts can explore (1) 
how systems of norms shape what sorts of stories get told in what contexts. 
But they can also investigate, conversely, how (2) the telling of particular 
kinds of stories in particular contexts provides scaffolding for the construc-
tion of normative frameworks. Further, (3) the degree to which what goes on 
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in a storyworld disrupts normative or canonical situations is a factor contrib-
uting to the narrativity of a given text—that is, the degree to which it lends 
itself to being interpreted as a story in the first place. Finally, (4) narratives 
can reflexively model the nature and force of norms by representing how 
they operate within storyworlds, including how they affect characters’ own 
(embedded or hypodiegetic) narrative practices.
 In connection with (1)—the question of how norms shape the kinds 
of stories people tell—norms of several sorts are relevant, including norms 
pertaining to particular forms of communicative interaction, as well as the 
larger socio-ideological field in which such interaction takes place. Thus, as 
discussed in more detail in Herman (Basic Elements 37–74), narratives are 
told in the context of specific kinds of “occasions” with which various story-
telling protocols are associated. People rely on different protocols to tell and 
assess stories told in a classroom, via an experimental literary fiction, or dur-
ing an argument among family members. Narrators and their interpreters 
bring different protocols to bear on these storytelling situations because they 
frame them as different kinds of activities, to which different sorts of norms 
apply (cf. Levinson; Wittgenstein). The different norms guiding the read-
ing of literary narratives as opposed to storytelling of the he-said, she-said 
variety in informal talk among peers lead to differences of story structure. 
Hence in Mcewan’s text, a compelling abstract or pre-announcement of the 
narrative’s topic is not required to clear the floor for the story’s telling; rather, 
contextual and paratextual features are sufficient to secure readers’ engage-
ment with the narrative. Different narrative occasions thus entail contrasting 
expectations about what sort of story warrants being attended to, and how to 
attend to its telling.
 Meanwhile, both narratives told in everyday conversation and written, 
literary texts like Mcewan’s stand in a certain relation to more or less domi-
nant storylines or master narratives about the way the world is (Bamberg 
and Andrews; compare Abbott, Introduction 46–49). Such master narratives 
likewise work to constrain what stories can or should be told in a given con-
text. In a way that involves norm–narrative interconnections of both type (1) 
(norms shaping stories) and type (4) (stories modeling the force and effects 
of norms), On Chesil Beach positions itself in relation to global cultural nar-
ratives concerning sexuality and gender, the way family affects one’s sense of 
self, the story-disrupting power of trauma, the institution of marriage, and so 
forth, with each such master narrative embedding a normative framework. 
As the novel suggests, there may be an emergent cultural script in conflict 
with a dominant-but-receding one, as was the case with global narratives 
about sexuality, and their associated systems of norms, in england in the 
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early 1960s. But in any case, rather than simply shoring up a culture’s major 
storylines, postmodern literary narratives like Mcewan’s engage with them 
(and the normative frameworks that they embed and work to reproduce) 
in a more or less critical or reflexive manner. That said, because of complex 
ways in which the institutions and practices of literary writing intersect with 
broader cultural institutions and practices, there is no a priori guarantee that 
a given literary text will align itself with the array of “counternarratives” cir-
culating in a given setting, in opposition to more dominant storylines.
 As these last remarks indicate, narratives do not merely convey or react 
to normative frameworks but also help constitute them—per norm–narra-
tive interconnections of type (2), where stories provide scaffolding for sys-
tems of norms. Theorists such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor 
have explored this process at the level of actions performed by individuals. 
Arguing that “[n]arrative history of a certain kind [is] the basic and essential 
genre for the characterization of human actions” (208), MacIntyre suggests 
that narratives enable people’s doings to be characterized as actions because 
they profile those behaviors as goal-directed and norm-driven forms of 
practice (215–16).5 Mcewan’s text thematizes the way stories provide naviga-
tional resources of this sort. The novel suggests that Florence’s and edward’s 
mutual misunderstandings result from their inability to construct larger sto-
rylines (e.g., about Florence’s history of sexual abuse or edward’s prone-
ness to violent outbursts [112–18]) that would allow them to make sense of 
their own and one another’s conduct—in terms of reasons for acting whose 
intelligibility derives, in turn, from constellations of norms. But On Chesil 
Beach also reveals the dangers of overestimating the power of any single 
story to account for a person’s goals and the norms shaping his or her pursuit 
of those goals. Thus edward constructs an account of Florence as dishon-
est and deceptive only by “smoothing out the rough edges and the difficult 
transitions, the bridging passages that lifted free of his own uncertainties” 
(164–65).
 Turning to interconnections of type (3), which concern the relationship 
between norms and narrativity, work by Bruner (Acts; “Narrative Construc-
tion”) highlights how a basic orientation toward the normative helps define 
narrative worldmaking as a representational practice. Narratives do not 
merely evoke worlds more or less distant from or proximate to the world 
of the here and now; more than this, as early theorists such as Propp and 
Todorov emphasized, stories place an accent on unexpected or noncanoni-
cal events—events that disrupt the normal order of things for human or 
human-like agents engaged in goal-directed activities and projects, and that 
are experienced as such by those agents. Granted, what counts as normal 
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or canonical will vary from world to world, narrative to narrative—as will, 
therefore, what counts as disruptive, disequilibrium-causing, noncanonical 
(Herman, Basic Elements 133–36). But the more general point is that “while 
a culture must contain a set of norms, it must also contain a set of interpre-
tive procedures for rendering departures from those norms meaningful in 
terms of established patterns of belief. . . . Stories achieve their meanings by 
explicating deviations from the ordinary in a comprehensible form” (Bruner, 
Acts 47).
 Thus, the interest-bearing events in Mcewan’s text are those that con-
stitute a deviation from an expected or canonical sequence: the random 
accident that causes edward’s mother’s brain injury, with consequences that 
affect the entire Mayhew family and that edward’s father conveys to his son 
by way of a narrative (85–94); the trauma of sexual abuse that, for Florence as 
well as edward, remains at the edge of the comprehensible, precisely because 
of its resistance to narrativization; and the event-sequence of the wedding 
night itself, so much at odds with the canonical models of honeymoon 
encounters that Florence has picked up from “a handbook that was sup-
posed to be helpful to young brides” (9) and that edward has absorbed from 
more diffuse sources in the culture. Indeed, the shocking disparity between 
edward’s preconceptions about his wedding night and the actual unfolding 
of the encounter helps explain why it takes so long for edward to be able to 
construct a narrative of the encounter that allows him to make sense of this 
noncanonical sequence of events: “Now [many years later], of course, he saw 
that her self-effacing proposal [that they remain married but that edward 
have sex with other women, if necessary] was quite irrelevant. All she had 
needed was the certainty of his love, and his reassurance that there was no 
hurry when a lifetime lay ahead of them” (202). At another level, Mcewan 
in the closing lines of the novel explicitly frames the narrative as one that 
uses a fictional storyworld to explore, counterfactually, possible responses to 
the non-fulfillment of normative expectations, and to suggest the damaging 
effects of an unyielding attachment (like the young edward’s) to contingent, 
context-bound systems of norms.
 Finally, as I have already touched on in my discussion of the other types 
of norm–narrative linkage, Mcewan’s novel also demonstrates how stories 
can (4) reflexively model systems of norms by showing them in operation 
in a specific storyworld—and by using this counterfactual scenario to probe 
their scope, interrelations, and potential variability across different contexts. 
Thus, when toward the end of the 1960s edward thinks back on the pro-
posal that Florence made on their wedding night just a few years earlier, her 
suggestion has taken on an entirely different coloration, because of newly 
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dominant master narratives about sexuality, marriage, and related institu-
tions and practices: “her strange proposal  .  .  .  no longer seemed quite so 
ridiculous.  .  .  . In the new circumstances of the day, it appeared liberated, 
and far ahead of its time.  .  .  . Man, what an offer! his friends might have 
said” (196). On Chesil Beach reveals in this way what might be called the 
central paradox of narrative values. Using narrative to unmask narrative’s 
own normative force, the novel stages in a fictional storyworld the ability 
of master narratives to occlude the contingency and variability of norms for 
conduct. The text thus dramatizes how pervasive, deeply rooted stories can 
suppress the capacity to imagine other possibilities for action—possibilities 
that, however, other narratives bring to light, through story-enabled forms 
of imagining.
I  ConClUde with some brief remarks concerning aesthetic values. As men-
tioned at the beginning of my contribution to this chapter, I hold that ques-
tions about aesthetic value are separable from—orthogonal to—questions 
about the normative dimensions of storytelling practices. One reason why 
these two sorts of questions are distinct is that narrative, as a representational 
practice, exceeds the domain of literary art, providing resources for world-
making in everyday interaction, courtroom trials, letters to the editor, and 
many other settings. In one sense, therefore, questions about norms and acts 
of narration are broader in scope than questions about the aesthetic value 
conferred on the result of any such act. What sort of story is it appropriate 
to tell when eulogizing a friend or a family member? How should I, as the 
witness of a crime, narrate what I saw—given that I must reconcile what I 
remember about what I saw with the constraints imposed by the legal system 
on persons giving testimony at trial? And, conversely, what criteria should 
I use, as an attendee at a funeral or a member of a jury, in order to evaluate 
the success or effectiveness of these narrative performances in their respec-
tive contexts? It seems safe to say that though producers and interpreters of 
stories do bring norms to bear on these storytelling practices, the norms are 
not aesthetic norms—or rather, the norms are not only aesthetic in nature.
 The hedge used at the end of my previous sentence is telling, however, 
and points up a second reason why questions about narrative values should 
not be collapsed into questions about aesthetic values. The second rea-
son is, in effect, the converse of the first: just as narrative practices extend 
beyond the domain of literary art, requiring the analyst to study how a broad 
range of norms impinge upon the diverse contexts in which stories are told, 
the domain of the aesthetic extends beyond any particular set of human 
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practices, including those associated with artistic creation and interpreta-
tion. Here I take my cue from arguments outlined by John Dewey more than 
seventy-five years ago and recently re-framed and re-articulated by Richard 
Shusterman. In Dewey’s account, the aesthetic is better thought of as a strand 
of or “strain in human experience rather than an entity in itself ” (330). As 
Dewey puts it in Art as Experience: “When artistic objects are separated from 
both conditions of origin and operations in experience, a wall is built around 
them that renders almost opaque their general significance.  .  .  . A primary 
task . . . is to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of 
experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and suf-
ferings that are universally recognized to constitute experience” (4). Thus, 
rather than being treated as part of an autonomous domain of practice that 
can be cordoned off and compartmentalized—for example, in museums or 
exhibits, or for that matter in literary narratives—aesthetic experiences need 
to be understood as part of the broader ecology or environment of human 
experiences from which they emerge and toward which they reflexively redi-
rect our attention in new ways (cf. Shusterman 34–61). From this perspective 
the sharp division between the fine arts and the productive crafts, for exam-
ple, can be questioned (Shusterman 49)—just as the pleasure and engage-
ment afforded by literary narratives can re-integrated with a broader array of 
narrative pleasures and engagements, all stemming from the way storytelling 
practices are anchored in human experience.
 For Dewey, one way to tear down the wall between art and experience 
is to consider how form itself relates to the structure of intelligent agents’ 
interactions with their surrounding environments: “Interaction of environ-
ment with organism is the source, direct or indirect, of all experience and 
from the environment come those checks, resistances, furtherances, equi-
libria, which, when they meet with the energies of the organism in appro-
priate ways, constitute form” (147). Dewey’s remarks here open out onto a 
whole program of research that lies beyond the scope of my contribution to 
this chapter. That larger research program concerns how aesthetic norms or 
values might relate to the specific sensorimotor capacities of humans and to 
the way humans use those capacities to negotiate social and material worlds. 
What range of world-types does humans’ organismic structure enable them 
to “take in” experientially, and where does a storyworld like Mcewan’s fit 
within that range? Furthermore, how can the basic sensorimotor capacities 
shared by humans be reconciled with the different metrics of aesthetic value 
developed across different cultures, not to mention different communities 
within the same culture?
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 In keeping with the general tenor of a still-emergent framework for 
studying the art of narrative, as well as individual works of narrative art, I 
conclude with these far-reaching questions. They suggest breathtakingly vast 
areas of inquiry—areas that would not have come into view, arguably, in the 
absence of an approach (better, a family of approaches) dedicated to explor-
ing the nexus of narrative and mind.
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Brian richardson
The naTUre of narraTIve
victor Shklovsky once stated that the outrageous narrative Tristram Shandy 
is the most typical novel in world literature; its unexpected features lay bare 
and “denaturalize” the conventions of the novel. A primary value of antimi-
metic strategies of narration is to draw attention to the way narratives are 
constructed as well as to identify the desires that such constructions serve. 
There is perhaps no better way to point out the conventional nature of most 
kinds of ending than to refuse to provide them; this can be seen by the con-
sternation and even outrage that John Fowles produced in some readers 
by the unexpected alternate endings to his novel, The French Lieutenant’s 
Woman.
 Antimimetic poetics has regularly provided a wonderful source of liter-
ary playfulness ever since Aristophanes’ The Frogs was produced in 405 b.c.e. 
The work dramatized the contest in Hades that was to determine whether 
Aeschylus or euripides was the greater tragic poet (to see whose words were 
“weightier,” each author had a line of his verse placed on one side of a scale). 
Unnatural narrative practices readily align themselves with parody, above all 
the parody of predictable or outworn narrative formulas.
 We might also note some paradoxical aspects of antimimetic fiction. 
Instead of constantly pretending to be nonfiction, antimimetic works are 
often nonillusionistic; that is, they openly acknowledge their own fictional-
ity. As such, they are arguably more authentic in their self-presentation than 
are realistic pieces that try to disguise all signs of their fictionality. Repeated 
self-reference also introduces another layer of meaning: just as we follow the 
convolutions of the narrative within the storyworld, we can also trace out the 
developments of the narrator in his or her world, with its distinct temporal 
and spatial setting and its own dramas. We have, that is, the story that is told, 
and the story of its telling.
 Antimimetic strategies also create a certain amount of distance between 
the reader and the text. They work against easy identification with charac-
ters and plot trajectories, they discourage conventional responses to stock 
devices, and they promote a critical stance that is at variance with illusion-
ism or sentimentality. They are more Brechtian than Aristotelian; to extend 
Robyn Warhol’s important concept of the “engaging” versus the “distanc-
ing” narrator, antimimetic narrators are typically emotionally disengaged 
with their protagonists but deeply engaged with their more understanding 
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and ironic readers. The antimimetic distancing is not one that maps readily 
onto gender types, unlike the types of victorian narrators Warhol discusses. 
A large number of feminist authors have used antimimetic techniques to 
foreground the gender bias of many traditional narratives; these techniques 
include second- and first-person plural narration (Mary McCarthy’s “The 
Genial Host,” Joan Chase’s During the Reign of the Queen of Persia [1983]); 
multiperson and passive-voice narration (Fay Weldon, The Cloning of Joanna 
May [1989], Kathy Acker, “Humility” [1990]); denarration (Margaret Drab-
ble, The Waterfall [1969]); antinomic temporality (Ilse Aichinger’s “Spiegel-
geschichte” [1952]); fragmented characterization (Djuna Barnes, Nightwood 
[1936]); unusual narrative progressions (Hélène Cixous, Partie [1976]); 
unconventional endings (Angela Carter, The Passion of New Eve [1977]); 
frame-breaking (Jeanette Winterson, “The Poetics of Sex” [1993]); and 
nearly all of these at once (Monique Wittig, Les Guérillères [1969]). In these 
works, antimimetic strategies are utilized both as alternatives to conventions 
associated with patriarchy and as devices to draw attention to insidious patri-
archal cultural practices. In a somewhat similar manner, many gay authors 
have “queered” their texts by producing carnivalesque forms (G. Cabrera 
Infante’s Three Trapped Tigers [1965]) or antimimetic narratives of illusion, 
masking, and unfixed identities (Severo Sarduy, Cobra [1972]).
polITICS and Ideology
Many antimimetic forms of narration have been effectively used as vehicles 
of social criticism and ideological critique. First-person plural or “we” narra-
tion typically comes highly charged politically, though it is used in opposed 
ways. It has been deployed to contest deindividualized social conformity as 
well as to articulate the shared social history and collective sensibility of mar-
ginalized or oppressed groups such as peasants, women, colonial subjects, 
and members of the African diaspora.
 Authors can, with equal ease, defamiliarize a trope, a dogma, or a con-
vention of representation. Thus, it should be no surprise that antimimetic 
practices readily lend themselves to a Rabelaisian mockery of the highly seri-
ous, the sacrosanct, the revered, and of all species of sacred cow, as is readily 
disclosed by a glance at Aristophanes’ antiwar plays, Coover’s depiction of 
Richard Nixon in The Public Burning (1977), and Rushdie’s scathing portrait 
of Ayatollah Khomeni in The Satanic Verses (1988). This conjunction is par-
ticularly prominent in Joyce’s joint attack on Christian dogma and on British 
imperialism (in the form of the Royal Navy) in his parody of the Apostles’ 
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Creed in Ulysses: “They believe in rod, the scourger almighty, creator of hell 
upon earth, and in Jacky Tar, the son of a gun, who was conceived of unholy 
boast, born of the fighting navy, suffered under rump and dozen, was scari-
fied, flayed, and curried, yelled like bloody hell, the third day he rose again 
from the bed, steered into haven, sitteth on his beamend till further orders 
whence he shall come to drudge for a living and be paid” (270). In Midnight’s 
Children we see a sustained political satire on numerous historical figures 
whom Rushdie considers despotic, fanatic, or corrupt.
 Antimimetic narratives, by contesting conventional or official accounts, 
invite us to imagine alternative narratives of the world we inhabit. Further, 
some authors have argued that antimimetic strategies help to expose the 
unreality of conventional ideas of order. Robbe-Grillet states that the unprec-
edented kind of textual order he constructs in a work like Jealousy “has the 
great advantage of calling attention to its own artificiality, of pointing to its 
mask with its own finger, instead of hiding behind the appearance of some-
thing natural, in essence, an ideological trap”; in this way it indicates the arti-
fice of conventional mimetic orders. “One can only work against ideology,” 
he continues, “on the one hand by pointing it out, and on the other hand by 
making it grind, so it can be heard, so that it will not be innocent, so that it 
will lose in fact that beautiful mask of innocence” (“Order” 5, 19).
 Just as a number of feminist and gay authors have used antimimetic 
strategies to attempt to produce an original, egalitarian narrative form, so 
have other oppressed people, including U.S. ethnic and postcolonial authors. 
Though there is no necessary or logical connection between a particular 
ideology and any narrative form, there is often a perceived psychological 
connection; authors representing an oppressed group often reject the rul-
ing class’s preferred narrative styles and move instead to create alternate or 
original ones. My suspicion is that repressive governments tend to favor 
traditional, fixed, or neoclassical cultural forms and thus tend to view the 
innovative as oppositional. Looking at the poetics historically, one finds a 
proliferation of antimimetic texts during periods of major historical trans-
formation: the Renaissance, romanticism, the years around the 1960s, and 
our own postmodern period.
repreSenTIng UnnaTUral evenTS
Perhaps most compellingly, unnatural techniques are often used to depict 
traumatic or horrific actions that seem to defy the normal methods of ordi-
nary narratives: the subjects of antinomic temporality, for example, include 
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collective disasters and genocide. Martin Amis, author of the temporally 
regressive narrative Time’s Arrow (1991), has stated that the Holocaust 
seemed to him “the only story that gains meaning backwards” (cited in Chat-
man 52). Trauma produces a skewering of normal perceptions of temporal-
ity as powerful past events come unmoored in time and haunt the present 
experience of the disoriented sufferer. Writers can and do reproduce these 
extreme situations for readers to experience in a way analogous to that of 
the protagonists. Toni Morrison has stated that she deliberately made the 
opening pages of Beloved to be confusing, so that the reader would be in a 
situation similar to that of a slave abruptly thrust into a new, unknown, dan-
gerous situation.
 As noted above, Rushdie’s narrator experiences a particularly unnatural 
kind of temporality in the twenty-fifth chapter of Midnight’s Children, “In 
the Sundurbans.” Like other soldiers in the Pakistani army, Saleem Sinai has 
committed atrocities against the citizens of Bangladesh; feeling mortified, he 
cannot acknowledge his own identity or use the pronoun “I.” He takes on a 
new name that suggests nothingness, and his body starts to become invisible. 
The betrayal of his personal values, that is, is represented by the transforma-
tion of conventional markers of the self: name, body, and the ability to say “I.” 
Time is unnatural throughout the chapter as an allegorical long, dark night 
of the soul is given a literal embodiment; here, horrific events are given an 
appropriately unnatural presentation.
aeSTheTIC valUe
In my own work on antimimetic narratives, I continually find myself con-
textualizing a particular strategy within the framework of the text’s central 
thematic concerns. These techniques, that is, are often selected to depict a 
specific textual situation rather than arbitrarily employed or chosen merely 
for the sake of novelty. A narratological analysis of such works typically leads 
us into a deeper understanding of the internal logic of the text and thereby 
helps us discern larger aesthetic designs. It is also the case that among the 
authors regularly considered the most prominent in Western literature, a 
large number often use antimimetic strategies; this suggests that there is 
some correlation between the kind of self-consciousness that produces liter-
ary value and that which exposes outmoded literary conventions. It seems 
plausible that a thorough account of aesthetic value in narrative will have 
to take antimimetic practices into account. It is certainly the case that the 
antimimetic elements of Joyce’s Ulysses add to its undisputed stature as one 
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of the two or three greatest novels of the twentieth century. A similar claim 
may be made of Midnight’s Children—its antimimetic poetics was surely a 
factor in its winning the Best of the Booker prize in 2008 for the greatest 
Anglophone novel of the previous twenty-five years.
 In the same general vein, it may well be that the more forced and for-
mulaic the narrative is, the less aesthetic interest it provokes. This equation 
may lie behind one of the narrator’s aesthetic warnings which is given as he 
is about to describe his period of forgetfulness: “With some embarrassment, 
I am forced to admit that amnesia is the kind of gimmick used regularly by 
our lurid film-makers. Bowing my head slightly, I accept that my life has 
taken on, yet again, the tone of a Bombay talkie” (402). Though Rushdie’s 
works incorporate many aspects of Bollywood movies, his self-conscious and 
parodic emplotment of events differs radically from that of commercial cin-
ema, especially when it comes to the use of formulaic patterns. This fact may 
in turn point toward the kind of aesthetic that postmodernism rewards. In 
general, few texts, by definition, are less formulaic than those experimental, 
antimimetic texts that defy all formulas. Readers who value creation, varia-
tion, and innovation will be drawn toward and rewarded by the more suc-
cessful antimimetic narratives.
To ConClUde,  antimimetic texts thus provide an interrogation of the 
basic elements of narrative, a critique of overused narrative conventions, 
a challenge to official public narratives, an original vehicle for the self-rep-
resentation of the oppressed, an exceptional way to express extraordinary 
events, and a different, challenging kind of aesthetic experience. The most 
innovative and exciting works of much of the twentieth century and the 
twenty-first century—late modernist, avant-garde, nouveau roman, écriture 
féminine, magical realism, postmodernism, and hypertext fiction—require 
an antimimetic theoretical framework in order to be fully comprehended. 
It is high time these works are fully included and centrally featured in the 
theory and analysis of narrative.6
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 1. For a more extensive discussion of defenses, see Phelan and Rabinowitz, “‘A True 
Book, with Some Stretchers’—and Some Humbug: Twain, Huck and the Reader’s expe-
rience of Huckleberry Finn.” [RW]
 2. See Denby. [RW]
 3. White Lies and Other Half-Truths turns out to be a self-published book produced 
by a service that Amazon.com offers for a fee. Perhaps it is unfair to criticize so severely 
a text that came out without the benefit of copyediting or peer review. even so, it does 
present an excellent example of truly bad writing. [RW]
 4. Henry W. Fowler’s 1926 A Dictionary of Modern English Usage. [RW]
 5. For criticisms of such narrative-based approaches to questions of identity as well 
as ethics, see Strawson. For a rejoinder to those criticisms, see Ritivoi. [DH]




As noted in the Preface, this section contains responses in which we 
comment on one another’s contributions to Part One. As also noted 
there, we view this section as only the first round in a discussion 
that we hope will continue on the companion blog for this book, 
generously created by The Ohio State University Press at https://
ohiostatepress.org/Narrative_Theory_Debates. We invite com-
ments from readers who may wish to respond to our responses or 
to other aspects of the volume. We look forward, in short, to con-
tinuing the conversation with the help of other voices—and other 
stories.
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As rhetoricians, we value conversation. We especially value this conversation 
with Robyn Warhol, David Herman, and Brian Richardson because their 
work is so important to the larger project of narrative theory and because 
engaging with that work allows us to sharpen our sense (and, we hope, 
yours) of what the four perspectives have in common, what is distinctive 
about each, and what the stakes of the differences are. If you’ve gotten this 
far in the book, you won’t be surprised by our two most general claims: (1) 
we find much in the work of our collaborators to be theoretically and inter-
pretively persuasive; and (2) our dialogue with them strengthens, rather than 
diminishes, our commitment to rhetorical theory. As we seek to explain why 
we insist on both points—and how they relate to each other—we aim to go 
beyond what we said in Part One, deepening and extending our account of 
narrative as rhetoric.
 Three interrelated principles guide our discussion. (1) The a posteriori 
principle: theory should not precede narrative, stipulating what it must be 
and do, but should rather follow from the myriad practices of actual sto-
rytellers; thus, we are inductive, rather than deductive, theorists. Since we 
are constantly encountering new narratives, and since storytelling practices 
constantly change, rhetorical narrative theory is a perpetual work-in-prog-
ress. Granted, our rhetorical orientation does influence our starting points 
and our general emphasis on progression and on author–narrator–audience 
relationships, but our goal is to develop theoretical concepts that are suffi-
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ciently flexible to be useful across as wide a range of narratives as possible. 
To put this point another way, the a posteriori principle does not mean that 
we approach our theoretical project without a general conception of what 
narrative is but rather that we approach any individual narrative without 
a priori assumptions about what that text must do or how it must do what 
it does. (2) The pluralist principle: rhetorical narrative theory is only one of 
many worthwhile approaches. Inquiries that originate in conceptions dif-
ferent from ours—in particular, inquiries that originate in questions differ-
ent from those we are asking—often generate knowledge that is at least as 
valuable as the knowledge rhetorical theory can generate. Consequently, we 
actively seek out the insights of other approaches in order to identify and, 
in accord with the a posteriori principle, to remedy weaknesses in our for-
mulations. More than that, our engagement with other approaches reminds 
us of the limitations built in to any theoretical commitments: pursuing cer-
tain kinds of knowledge inevitably means not pursuing other kinds. (3) The 
some-answers-are-better-than-others principle: still, we are pluralists not rela-
tivists, because we recognize that different theoretical positions and interpre-
tive claims may share enough common ground that they represent genuine 
and substantial conflicts. In these cases, we seek to adjudicate the conflicts 
by testing the explanatory power of the different positions and claims against 
that common ground.
 These three principles lead us to our two-part strategy for discussing the 
relationship between rhetorical theory and each of the other approaches. 
The first part follows from the a posteriori and pluralist principles as we 
focus on “differences, overlaps, and complementarities.” The second part fol-
lows from the some-answers-are-better-than-others principle as we focus on 
“disagreements.”
 One further clarification: the four perspectives in this book are not per-
fectly parallel. Robyn Warhol, David Herman, and the two of us develop 
“Narrative as X” approaches based on differing conceptions of narrative as 
a whole: Narrative as a Site of Feminist Politics, Narrative as Worldmaking, 
and Narrative as Rhetoric, respectively. We build our theories and interpre-
tive practices on the foundation of our respective views of what narrative is 
and does. Brian Richardson’s, in contrast, offers a “Theory of X” (X in his case 
being antimimetic narrative) that focuses on a particular type or aspect of 
narrative—although that focus, too, ultimately has profound effects on how 
he approaches narrative more generally.
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robyn Warhol’S femInIST approaCh
Differences, Overlaps, and Complementarities
For Warhol, gender, race, class, and sexuality are intrinsic aspects of narrative 
form, and form is always situated in history. In addition, her views of form 
and of feminism are capacious. She draws on work across the broad sweep of 
narrative theory, and her view of a feminist perspective has expanded over 
the years as feminist theory has itself evolved. What began as the study of 
“the impact of culturally constructed gender upon the form and reception of 
narrative texts” (p. 9) has now widened to include the study of the effects of 
such other culturally constructed identity markers as “race, sexuality, nation-
ality, class, and ethnicity” (p. 9). Consequently, in her analysis of Persuasion, 
Warhol shows how the novel’s formal components reveal Austen’s attitudes 
toward these “politically significant and historically grounded differences” 
(p. 11), and she discusses the relation between Austen’s attitudes and those 
of the dominant culture of early nineteenth-century england.
 Warhol comments on the relation between her approach and ours: 
“For  .  .  .  James Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz  .  .  .  considerations of gender, 
sexuality, race, or class are only incidental to the fact that a genuine commu-
nication occurs when a person picks up a narrative text and reads it” (p. 10). 
We believe that her description, in particular the phrase “only incidental,” 
understates the flexibility of our approach. Where Warhol always makes such 
considerations central to her analysis, we follow our a posteriori principle, 
taking our lead from the narrative we are considering. Thus, to us a more 
accurate description would be: “For Phelan and Rabinowitz the importance 
of gender, sexuality, race, or class in any narrative depends on the nature of 
its particular communication (including, crucially, the nature of the autho-
rial audience).” To put it in different terms: we agree with Warhol about the 
centrality of gender and class to an understanding of Persuasion—but we 
locate this centrality in the specific rhetorical design of Persuasion not in the 
nature of narrative in general.
 Consequently, the degree of our interpretive differences with Warhol 
will vary from text to text—although they will often show up as differences 
of emphasis rather than as fundamental disagreements. If a reader were to 
analyze Huckleberry Finn following Warhol’s lead, we suspect that she would 
reinforce our attention to issues of race, but she might foreground issues 
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of gender and class more than we have done. This reader might focus, for 
example, on Twain’s use of gender and class stereotypes in his characteriza-
tions. Like Myra Jehlen, she might also play up the significance of Huck’s 
cross-dressing. Furthermore, she might emphasize the roles of gender and 
class both in Twain’s presentation of Huck’s initial situation and in the ongo-
ing complications of his story. Part of the gap between Huck on the one side 
and the Widow and Miss Watson on the other is attributable to the gender 
divide. Part of Pap’s dysfunctional parenting is a consequence of his class- 
and gender-related assumptions about the relationship between masculinity 
and fathering. The raft is an exclusively male space, and such things as Huck’s 
cruel practical joke on Jim, his apology afterwards, and the relations between 
the two of them and the King and Duke are all inflected by Huck’s under-
standing of norms about gender as well as about race. In the end, such an 
analysis would complement, rather than conflict with, our analysis, adding 
to and refining, rather than overturning, our account of the novel’s textual 
and readerly dynamics. For that reason, Warhol’s approach and ours can be 
productive partners.
Disagreements
Still, we believe that our theoretical position allows us a flexibility that War-
hol’s does not allow her. This difference emerges when we ask how to deter-
mine the centrality of a particular issue to a given narrative. We suspect 
that Warhol would add nuance to her commitment to the centrality of gen-
der, race, class, sexuality, nationality, and ethnicity by bringing in a ques-
tion that she suggests in her discussion of aesthetic value—“more central 
for whom?”—arguing that in any given narrative, different readers would be 
likely to establish different hierarchies of centrality. For example, some read-
ers might want to argue that Huckleberry Finn’s take on sexuality (recall Les-
lie Fiedler’s famous “Come Back to the Raft, Huck Honey” with its attention 
to the erotic overtones of the Huck–Jim relationship) is more central than 
its take on race, claiming that the overt racial politics function as a screen 
behind which the novel plays out a more radical sexual politics. Similarly, 
some readers may find that Persuasion’s tacit assumptions about whiteness 
make issues of race more central to our understanding than issues of gender. 
For Warhol, we infer, these differences are all to the good.
 Our a posteriori approach leads us to different claims about the relative 
centrality of gender, race, and sexuality in Twain’s and Austen’s novels. (1) 
Race is more central to the narrative communication of Huckleberry Finn 
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than gender or sexuality, and gender is more central to the narrative commu-
nication of Persuasion than race or sexuality. (2) The narrative communica-
tion of both novels depends on other factors that are not adequately captured 
by the categories of gender, race, class, sexuality, nationality, and ethnicity. 
For example, the delicious ironies of each implied author, while often related 
to their gender, class, and sexuality, can’t be fully explained in terms of those 
categories. (3) Our meta-claim: these positions do not come either from 
some general assumption about what’s central in novels or from how it will 
manifest itself—indeed, Peter has argued elsewhere precisely that the overt 
racial politics in Nella Larsen’s Passing provide a screen for covert lesbian 
politics. Rather, our positions come from observations about the particulars 
of the novels at hand. To put it in different terms: if we could not defend our 
judgments through an analysis of their role in the particular narratives’ rhe-
torical designs, we would drop those claims.
 When we move to the question of how to determine interpretive start-
ing points, we have an even more profound disagreement with Warhol, one 
located in the contrast between our a posteriori approach and some a priori 
commitments in her critical practice. Warhol confesses that she is always 
looking for “signs of feminism in Jane Austen’s texts,” a search tied to her 
“sincere wish . . . for [her] favorite author not to have been an instrument 
of patriarchal oppression” (p. 11). Warhol consequently looks for “narrative 
practices that pull against received notions of what is suitable to a female 
character’s life or a female novelist’s text” (p. 12). While we share the politics 
underlying these starting points, we find her strategy methodologically prob-
lematic. As decades of reader criticism have made clear, texts do not enforce 
their meanings, and a sharp and committed reader can easily find whatever 
she sets out to find. The a priori commitment to discovering signs—espe-
cially covert signs—of forward-looking consciousness can thus easily over-
ride attention to the author’s shaping of the narrative, and even reduce the 
text to a mirror of the reader’s desire. For the most part, Warhol avoids this 
problem by attending carefully to Austen’s communication, but she makes 
one significant claim that strikes us as a telling example of readerly desire 
trumping justice to the novel and its author:
[T]he restlessness [in readers] inspired by Austen’s endings has as much to 
do with the instability of her plots’ closure as with the scarcity of Austen 
texts. Gestures like the unnarration at the end of Persuasion  .  .  .  suggest 
that the texts themselves resist the implication that the novel has really been 
“about” the marriage plot.  .  .  . Persuasion is less about Anne elliot’s quest 
for marriage to Frederic Wentworth than it is about the subtle but crucial 
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ways in which the heroine achieves agency in circumstances calculated in 
every way to oppress her. The perfunctoriness of the way Austen ends her 
plots lets all the air out of the marriage plot. . . . (p. 70, emphasis added)
 It’s clearly possible to read the novel in this way—but how do we judge 
whether it is the “text itself ” or the reader doing the resisting? What measure 
is being used to determine that Persuasion is “less about” a quest for mar-
riage than about the achievement of agency? Obviously, we believe that the 
appropriate measure is the novel’s overall design, and we believe that Anne’s 
quest to marry Wentworth is fundamental to that design—as a brief look 
at its textual and readerly dynamics indicates. Anne’s thought at the end of 
Chapter Three that “a few months more, and he, perhaps, may be walking 
here” not only generates the authorial audience’s interest in this traitless “he” 
but also activates a desire that he can provide a means for her to escape from 
the elliot household. The novel’s middle represents Anne’s unmerited suf-
fering as she watches Wentworth get involved with Louisa Musgrove—even 
as it includes a few signs of Wentworth’s solicitous attention to Anne. Both 
developments further nourish the authorial audience’s desires for Anne and 
Wentworth to reunite. Given these dynamics, if the novel had actually “let 
the all air out of the marriage plot,” Austen’s ending would have introduced 
a disruption similar to (albeit on a smaller scale than) the one that Twain 
introduces in the evasion section of Huckleberry Finn.
 But does Austen’s ending in fact puncture the tire? While Warhol astutely 
calls attention to the unnarration in the passage that begins “Who can be in 
doubt of what followed?” (p. 42), that passage significantly occurs after the 
arrival, that is, the resolution of the global instability: Anne’s engagement to 
Wentworth. Furthermore, that resolution is far from perfunctory, involving 
as it does the following elements: (1) Anne’s indirect but passionate appeal to 
Wentworth in the speech to Harville; (2) Wentworth’s response in his direct 
and equally passionate proposal by letter; (3) her acceptance of the proposal 
with a look while in the company of Charles Musgrove; (4) their private col-
loquy shortly after in the gravel walk; and (5) their subsequent discussions of 
the past. Indeed, this more extended resolution is additional evidence for its 
superiority to the relatively perfunctory resolution in the canceled chapter. 
It gives greater play to the audience’s own affective and ethical responses to 
Anne’s long-deferred happiness, even as the narrator reminds us of what was 
lost in that deferral. Then, too, despite the unnarration, Austen’s text in fact 
gives considerable detail about what happens after the engagement—par-
ticularly about how other characters are affected.
 Furthermore, the novel’s progression does not establish an opposition 
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between Anne’s quest for marriage and her achievement of agency but rather 
binds these two components together. Indeed, recognizing the crucial role of 
Anne’s agency in bringing about the marriage does not make the marriage 
any less important but instead highlights Austen’s skilled handling of the 
progression. She chooses a protagonist who, unlike her past heroines, does 
not need to change either in feeling or in ethical character and puts her in a 
situation where she must wait for her male counterpart to change. Neverthe-
less, Austen shows that Anne, by being true to herself in Wentworth’s pres-
ence (e.g., in her level-headed response to Louisa’s fall) and, as Warhol shows, 
by seizing the limited opportunities she has, is at least as responsible for that 
change—and thus for her own happiness—as Wentworth himself. Far from 
taking the air out of the marriage plot, Austen’s connecting Anne’s engage-
ment to Anne’s exercise of her agency is a key means by which Austen seeks 
to increase her audience’s satisfaction in that resolution.
davId herman’S approaCh To narraTIve 
aS WorldmakIng
Differences, Overlaps, and Complementarities
David Herman’s conception of “Narrative as Worldmaking” is an effort to do 
for our age what the structuralist narratologists of the 1960s and 1970s tried 
to do for theirs: develop a systematic account of narrative as part of a larger 
domain of inquiry. The structuralists located narrative under the domain of 
sign systems, and because they regarded language as the paradigmatic sign 
system, they turned to linguistics as their model. By contrast, Herman locates 
both language and narrative under cognitive studies, and he turns to “the 
sciences of mind”—including cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, 
and certain subfields of philosophy—for insights into how narrative works. 
Furthermore, where the structuralists typically established a one-way flow 
from linguistics to narratology, Herman establishes two-way traffic: just as 
the sciences of mind can illuminate narrative so too can narrative illuminate 
aspects of mind.
 Herman’s contribution here is grounded in a conception of both sto-
rytelling and “storyreceiving” as cognitive activities that converge in the 
process of worldmaking. Creators of stories produce “blueprints for world 
construction” and consumers of stories try to follow those blueprints as they 
build mental models of storyworlds. More specifically, from the perspec-
tive of the receiver, “engaging with stories entails mapping discourse cues 
r e S p o n S e  b y  J a m e S  p h e l a n  a n d  p e T e r  J .  r a b I n o W I T z
192
onto the when, what, where, who, how, and why dimensions of mentally 
configured worlds” (p. 17). The result is an elegant account of the interplay 
among these dimensions, which is to say an elegant mind-oriented account 
of narrative itself.
 Herman’s approach, like our rhetorical one, aims less at generating origi-
nal interpretations than at identifying the underlying logic that grounds the 
interpretive process of worldmaking. For this reason, our approaches over-
lap with and complement each other on various points. Take our respec-
tive discussions of character: Herman’s definition of characters as “textually 
grounded models of individuals-in-a-world” (p. 125) is consistent with 
our view of characters as having both mimetic (“individuals-in-a-world”) 
and synthetic (“textually grounded”) components. Granted, Herman puts 
primary emphasis on the mimetic both in this phrase and throughout the 
chapter, while we contend that different narratives balance the mimetic, the 
thematic, and the synthetic in different ways, depending on the author’s pur-
poses. Nonetheless, Herman’s account of the interactions between “schemes 
for understanding persons” and “text-guided inferences” about character (p. 
125) enriches our analysis of the mimetic component and particularly of how 
readers develop their conceptions of mimetic characters.
 Despite our sympathy for Herman’s aims, however, we ultimately con-
ceive of the activity we’re engaged in differently. There are two especially 
significant aspects to our response here, the first a matter of emphasis, and 
the second a matter of scope. Although Herman’s other work provides ample 
evidence that he is adept at analyzing how the components of individual 
narratives do (or do not) work together, in his contribution here he is more 
concerned with descriptive poetics. His careful analysis illuminates the logic 
of On Chesil Beach’s worldmaking; but it does not then engage, as we would, 
with such key interpretive and evaluative challenges as those presented by the 
abandonment of Florence’s perspective after the wedding night, the glossing 
over of edward’s marriage (what were his thoughts on that wedding night?), 
and the gender politics associated with the novel’s handling of Florence’s 
sexual abuse. As we’ve argued in Understanding Narrative, we emphasize and 
value the interaction of theory and analysis, and we hope our practice in Part 
I reaffirms that position. Were we writing about Mcewan’s novel, we’d seek 
to test our theory against its ability to meet those interpretive challenges.
 As for scope: we value Herman’s explanations of the cognitive logic 
underlying readers’ acts of worldmaking but find that his account leaves out 
aspects of communication that are significant to our experience of count-
less narrative worlds—especially but not exclusively those found in literary 
narratives. Consider his “decision tree for narrative worldmaking” in the 
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chapter on Reception and the Reader (p. 151). The tree captures one possible 
sequence leading from the initial observation of some kind of conduct to the 
conclusion that the kind is storytelling and that it therefore evokes a world 
for a certain purpose. But because the decision tree is restricted to what we 
would call interpretive judgments, Herman ends up with a far more limited 
notion of purpose than ours. In effect, he equates purpose with thematic 
points. In our view, he underplays too many of the other aspects of readerly 
dynamics—ethical judgments, their affective consequences, and aesthetic 
judgments—that are crucial to the multi-leveled experience of reading and 
to any account of narrative purpose.
Disagreements
Since Herman trumpets his disagreements with the concepts of the implied 
author and the authorial audience, we naturally want to respond to his 
objections. But first we want to underline the significant overlap between his 
stance and ours: we share Herman’s interest in “reclaiming intentions,” and 
we agree with his argument that “a form of narration is a form of commu-
nicative action whose interpretation .  .  . requires .  .  . ascriptions of reasons 
for acting” (p. 47). Herman’s formulation endorses two key points of our 
model: authors design narrative communications for particular purposes; 
and one fundamental act of critical understanding involves reasoning back 
from the felt effects of those purposes to an identification of their sources in 
the authorial design of the text.
 From this perspective, Herman shares some of our key goals but objects 
to some of our key means. His two main objections to the concept of the 
implied author are that it “arises from efforts to accommodate an anti-inten-
tionalist position that . . . it is preferable to dispute from the start” and that 
it “entails a reification or hypostatization of what is better characterized as a 
stage in an inferential process” (p. 50). Herman extends this second objection 
to his argument against the authorial audience: “distinguishing between ‘real’ 
and ‘abstract’ readers [such as the authorial audience] seems to me to lead 
down a slippery slope toward hypostatization” (p. 152). He uses James Frey’s 
purported memoir A Million Little Pieces to illustrate his preference for a 
model that characterizes inferences about intention as stages in an inferential 
process.
[Reading without knowledge of the controversy caused by Frey’s fabri-
cations,] I will assume that the storyworld evoked by the text is capable 
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of being disconfirmed through triangulation with other accounts of the 
events at issue. Once I know that James Frey concocted incidents in his 
putatively non-fictional account, however, I will use different strategies 
for world construction.  .  .  . Specifically, I will interpret the text as one 
purposely—intentionally—designed by its author to prompt infelicitous 
modes of world building. (p. 49)
 We agree that it is important to dispute anti-intentionalism from the 
start (see Chapter 2 of Jim’s Worlds from Words for an early effort—or Peter’s 
“Shakespeare’s Dolphin” for a much more recent effort—to do just that). But 
Herman’s focus on one of Booth’s motives—specifically, his choice to avoid a 
direct dispute with the New Critics—leads Herman to neglect the significant 
theoretical component of Booth’s scheme. Booth has many reasons for his 
formulation, whatever his relationship to the New Critics, and one of them 
is to emphasize the kind of intention rhetorical theory is primarily inter-
ested in: not conscious, unconscious, or other kinds of psychological, private 
intention but rather “textualized intention,” inferable from the shape of the 
text (these signs in this order) and from its appearance in a particular public 
arena marked by a particular set of shared beliefs. At the same time (as the 
Frey case will make clear), initially private (even consciously hidden) inten-
tions can be important to our understanding as well—and that is one reason 
why we still need the notion of actual author in our analytic arsenal.
 This understanding of our interest in textualized intention helps meet 
Herman’s second objection. If the implied author’s intention were private, 
then positing such an intention would “entail reification or hypostatization,” 
but since it is public and testable against the “completed artistic whole,” any 
such positing is a defeasible hypothesis, and its power depends on how well it 
survives testing against alternatives. From this perspective, Herman’s objec-
tions to the implied author and the authorial audience are objections less to 
the concepts themselves than to their misuse. In fact, the process of formu-
lating, testing, and revising hypotheses about the implied author’s intentions 
and of the characteristics of the authorial audience is wholly consistent with 
Herman’s preference for a model that emphasizes phases in the inferential 
process of worldmaking.
 With respect to the authorial audience (and similar hypothetical audi-
ence constructs) Herman claims that
the very division between an actual and an implied reader is contingent on 
using one’s understanding of a narrative text to distinguish between infer-
ences that can be felicitously associated with the text and those that can-
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not, and then (for heuristic or explanatory purposes) defining the implied 
reader as one who is immune to all the inferences that one has deemed 
infelicitous. But this explanatory move .  .  . presupposes, rather than pro-
vides, a criterion for what constitutes a permissible or appropriate range of 
inferences given a particular set of textual cues. (p. 154)
Herman here misses the heuristic purposes of the concept of the authorial 
audience. One purpose is to illuminate important dimensions of the read-
ing experience that follow from the similarities and differences (of knowl-
edge, beliefs, values, judgments, and so on) between actual audiences and 
the hypothetical audiences that writers address. For example, we do not share 
Jane Austen’s views about the roles of chastity and of marriage in a woman’s 
life, but we temporarily try on those views when we read her novels—and 
this aspect of our move into Austen’s authorial audience highlights a signifi-
cant component of the readerly dynamics of her narrative. A second purpose 
of the concept is to be a testable hypothesis that, if it survives comparison 
with alternative hypotheses, helps build a more general “understanding of a 
narrative text.” To put it in different terms, to the extent that the characteris-
tics and activities of the authorial audience are presupposed in the interpre-
tive process, they are regarded as provisional and subject to revision in light 
of the next moves in the progression. Furthermore, the interpretive process 
is typically a complex one which, as we said in Part One, typically leaves us 
with a fuzzy conception. The process of discovery varies from work to work, 
and it may require scrutinizing textual features, exploring the cultural and 
historical context in which the work was produced and received, folding in 
what we know about the author’s intentions from external evidence, and 
other activities. The process is rarely clean, but that’s because narrative itself 
is often messy. Consider the first sentence of On Chesil Beach, which Herman 
also quotes: “They were young, educated, and both virgins on this, their wed-
ding night, and they lived in a time when a conversation about sexual diffi-
culties was plainly impossible.” Does the phrase “plainly impossible” shift the 
narration from single-voiced, nonironic reporting into double-voiced indi-
rect thought? Clearly, any actual reader who wants to answer this question 
has to stretch outside her own initial reaction—but there are no pre-existing 
hard and fast rules for how to make that stretch.
 Frey’s A Million Little Pieces offers a useful common ground for testing 
our claim that our explanation of the relations among authors, texts, and 
audiences is more capacious and flexible than Herman’s. Herman promotes 
his account of stages in inferring Frey’s intention on the grounds of effi-
ciency: it avoids duplication of categories—we don’t need both implied and 
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actual author, and we don’t need both actual and authorial audiences. We 
share Herman’s interest in efficiency and, for that reason, in our engagements 
with certain specific texts, we wouldn’t invoke these distinctions. There is not 
much to be gained by distinguishing Chekhov from “the implied Chekhov” 
when talking about “Lady with a Dog.” But not all narratives conform to 
the model of “Lady with a Dog,” and Frey’s Million Little Pieces is one of the 
many cases where the distinctions simplify and clarify our understanding of 
the narrative communication, including its purposes and ethical dimensions.
 With respect to authors: In telling his story of addiction and recovery, 
Frey has, among his purposes, the aim of making himself look admirable. In 
order to achieve that purpose he intentionally deceives his audience by con-
structing a version of himself—as both character and author—that is more 
deeply tested and resilient than he actually was. Thus, we have two distinct 
and incompatible authorial figures: the unadmirable figure who intends to 
deceive his audience and the admirable alter-ego whom we come to know 
through reading the memoir. Having the concepts of both actual and implied 
author at our disposal not only allows us to name and describe those two 
figures but also clarifies their relationship and the ethical breach involved in 
the actual Frey’s construction of it.
 With respect to readers: We again have two incompatible positions. (1) 
That of the reader who takes all the memoir’s events as historically accurate: 
this reader is not simply making a temporary mistake that can be corrected 
through more careful examination of the textual information, but is rather 
correctly following the textual and paratextual signals that claim the narrative 
is a memoir. This position is that of the implied Frey’s authorial audience. 
(2) That of the reader who learns that many of the events are simply not 
true. This position is of course available to actual audiences. The distinction 
between the authorial audience and the actual audience allows us not only to 
name and describe these positions but also to explore the ethical problems of 
Frey’s storytelling. After all, the ethical problems do not lie within either of 
these audiences individually, but rather in the relationship between them.
 With respect to both authors and readers: Frey as actual author does 
not intend for his actual audience to become aware of his fabrications, and 
our distinctions between kinds of authors and kinds of audience allow us to 
account efficiently for this undercover feature of the narrative communica-
tion. By contrast, Herman’s account of a straightforward sequence of coming 
to understand Frey’s intention glosses over the against-the-grain quality of 
any reading that takes into account knowledge of Frey’s fabrications.
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brIan rIChardSon’S Theory of 
anTImImeTIC narraTIve
Differences, Overlaps, and Complementarities
As noted above, Brian Richardson’s approach is different from ours—and 
from Herman’s and Warhol’s—because it is motivated less by a different con-
ception of what narrative is and does than by an effort to enrich our knowl-
edge by accounting for a distinct and relatively neglected subset of narratives. 
That is, he seeks to fashion an account of narrative that is as adequate to the 
structures, techniques, elements, and effects of antimimetic narratives as it 
is to the characteristics of mimetic narratives. He remains in dialogue with 
what he might call the “Dominant Theory of Mimetic Narrative,” often argu-
ing that, in order to do justice to antimimetic narratives, theorists need both 
to alter concepts from dominant theory and to invent new ones.
 Richardson’s approach is also different in kind from ours—and from Her-
man’s and Warhol’s—because its underlying conception of narrative is looser. 
The contrast with Herman’s approach is especially illuminating: where each 
of Herman’s segments in Part One adds to his vision of the interconnections 
among the components of worldmaking, each of Richardson’s segments adds 
to his expanding database of antimimetic phenomena that are not necessar-
ily linked to one another. Nevertheless, by the end of Part One, Richardson’s 
loose conception of narrative emerges: he adopts concepts from structural-
ist narratology, feminist narrative theory, and rhetorical narrative theory, 
among others, without fully claiming kin with any one of these approaches 
or proposing an integrated synthesis of them. We note, for example, that in 
discussing progression, he embraces our concept of textual dynamics but 
breezes past its rhetorical dance partner, readerly dynamics. In discussing 
character, he adopts the rhetorical approach’s three components and adds a 
fourth called “intertextual” without asking, as we would, whether and how it 
intersects with the earlier three. Similarly, in his discussion of “narrative val-
ues” Richardson addresses the political and ideological implications of anti-
mimetic narratives but he stops short of making feminist narrative theory’s 
claims for politics an intrinsic part of narrative form.
 As pluralists, we have no problem with such a loose conception. In 
fact, it’s appropriate for Richardson’s project, since it facilitates his efforts 
to account for the diversity of formal experiments carried out in antimi-
metic narratives. More than that, looking at our work from his perspective 
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reveals a lot about our own position, in particular the degree to which we 
have sometimes failed to do justice to the range and importance of anti-
mimetic techniques. Indeed, we value Richardson’s work because it reminds 
us that rhetorical theory must be cautious about generalizing from examples 
in which the mimetic is dominant and because it highlights the way theories 
are influenced by their objects of study.
Disagreements
At the same time, looking at Richardson’s work from our perspective sug-
gests that he underestimates the ways in which our a posteriori approach 
to narrative as rhetoric cuts across his Theory of Antimimetic Narrative. 
Richardson implicitly—and in a few places explicitly—suggests that we are 
trapped by assumptions grounded in mimetic narrative. As should be clear 
by now, however, we seek to develop an approach that is sufficiently flexible 
to respond to narrative in all its variety, whether it be mimetic, nonmimetic, 
or antimimetic. This orientation means that we are less invested in drawing 
a thick line between mimetic and antimimetic narrative, and, thus, more 
inclined to see how these kinds are interrelated. Consequently, we would 
stress more than Richardson does that antimimetic narrative often depends 
on the foundation of mimetic fiction to do its work, a dependence that 
becomes evident through attention to the authorial audience of antimimetic 
fiction. Richardson distinguishes antimimetic narrative from “non mimetic” 
narrative, and devotes his attention to the former because it is more chal-
lenging in the way it “contest[s] the conventions of nonfictional and realistic 
representation” (p. 28). We agree with Richardson’s reasoning here; but, from 
our perspective, this contestation is possible because the authorial audience 
of antimimetic narrative has typically already incorporated the conventions 
of mimetic fiction—and because those conventions continue to be activated 
as the reader reads.
 Richardson believes our view of narrative is skewed because we use 
mimetic narrative as our default; not surprisingly, we believe that Richard-
son’s view of narrative is skewed because his focus on championing anti-
mimetic narrative leads him occasionally to oversimplify how narrative 
works in general. For example, he claims that there is no falsifiability in fic-
tion. “When a work is designated as fictional, . . . no matter how realistic it 
seems, no description or event . . . can be falsified by reference to nonfic-
tional evidence” (p. 106). In a weak sense, this claim is correct: if it is posited 
as true for the narrative audience that the White Rabbit in Alice in Wonder-
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land owns a watch, then you can’t falsify this condition by pointing to the 
facts about rabbits in the real world. But Richardson’s claim is stronger, as 
becomes evident when he argues that “any fact about [characters] left unsaid 
by the narrator (did the protagonist have a large mole on her left shoulder?) 
can never be known” (emphasis added). The claim is that gaps in the appar-
ent knowledge of the narrative audience cannot be filled from the repertoire 
of “real world” knowledge of the authorial audience. But there are frequently 
matters left unsaid in fiction that are knowable. Nothing in the text of Huck-
leberry Finn provides a motive for Huck and Jim to travel to Ohio rather 
than simply to cross the river into Illinois. even so, the authorial audience 
does “know” their motive because certain “facts” about slavery law are true 
in the novel, even though they are unstated—and because Twain designed 
his narrative with the expectation that his audience would use real-life legal 
knowledge to understand some of its action. The nature of the congruence of 
narrative and authorial audiences is text-dependent: they can overlap in radi-
cally different places and to radically different degrees. That often adds to 
interpretive difficulty—but it also adds immeasurably to the range of effects 
a narrative can have, including the effects that follow from the ways in which 
antimimetic narrative plays off mimetic narrative.
 Sometimes Richardson’s advocacy for the riches of antimimetic narra-
tive and the need for narrative theory to account for it lead him to be too 
quick to categorize other approaches, including ours, as flawed because they 
take mimetic narrative as the norm. His comments about unreliable narra-
tion are a case in point: “The practice of unreliable narration, in which it is 
apparent that the narrator is deficient in factual knowledge, interpretation, 
or judgment, has been clearly set forth by Phelan and Rabinowitz. These 
categories, however, are all based on a mimetic model of narration, that is, 
of human-like narrators making typically human distortions as they nar-
rate” (p. 53). Although the categories of unreliability may have originated in 
relation to mimetic narratives, they are not themselves “based on a mimetic 
model of narration.” They are based instead on the assumptions that nar-
rators, whether they are mimetic, nonmimetic, antimimetic, or anything 
else, typically will perform three main functions—reporting, interpreting, 
and evaluating—and that even in anti-mimetic narratives, we can gauge the 
distance between the narrator’s reporting, interpreting, or evaluating and 
the implied author’s own view of those actions. Thus, from our perspective 
a character narrator’s reporting of antimimetic features of a storyworld will 
be reliable or unreliable not on the basis of comparing his reports against 
some standard of mimesis but rather against the implied author’s stance 
toward those reports. More generally, Richardson’s discussion of kinds of 
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antimimetic narrators—the fraudulent, the contradictory, the permeable, 
and so on—is consistent with this view of a narrator’s typical functions.
 This response to Richardson’s account of unreliable narration sheds some 
light on the ultimate challenge to the rhetorical model presented by Rich-
ardson’s Theory of Antimimetic Narrative. How much does our model need 
to be revised? Our answer, despite Richardson’s claim about the neglect of 
antimimetic narrative by “nearly all theories,” is “some but not as much as he 
implies.” Here’s why: (1) the a posteriori principle means that we have always 
been open to whatever writers have chosen to do—and that includes com-
posing antimimetic narratives; and (2) our interest in the synthetic compo-
nent of characters and narrative progressions means that we have routinely 
incorporated attention to antimimetic narratives—and antimimetic compo-
nents of otherwise mimetic narratives—into both our theorizing and our 
interpretive work. Jim’s concepts of “paradoxical paralipsis” and “redundant 
telling” are two examples of the consequences of this attention. Similarly, 
Peter’s theory of audiences grew out of attempts to explain Nabokov’s Bend 
Sinister and, later on, Pale Fire.
 Nevertheless, Richardson’s work has convinced us that to this point rhe-
torical theory has not yet done adequate —much less full—justice to the 
synthetic component of narrative and its various consequences for textual 
and readerly dynamics. We look forward to continuing to learn from his 
detailed investigations—and from Warhol’s and Herman’s—as we seek to 
refine, expand, and otherwise improve our perpetual work-in-progress.
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a femInIST narraTIve TheorIST reSpondS To 
phelan and rabInoWITz’S rheTorICal narraTIve approaCh
Rhetorical narrative theory, as defined by Jim Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz, 
and feminist narrative theory as I conceive it, are in substantial agreement 
on our fundamental assumptions. Both see narrative as an act of genuine 
communication that has consequences in the material world. Both take into 
account the motives of implied authors (though the rhetorical narrative 
theorists are more inclined to impute those motives to real-world authors), 
deducing those motives from textual evidence. And both are interested in 
the impact that reading narratives, whether visual or verbal, can have on 
flesh-and-blood readers—a term coined by rhetorical theorists that brings 
a welcome acknowledgment of embodiment to the narrative theoretical 
enterprise. Phelan and Rabinowitz’s dedication to considering the ethics of 
narrative transactions is both congruent with and useful as a model for the 
practical application of feminist and queer narrative theories to texts. Indeed, 
there is significant theoretical overlap between our two approaches. For 
example, Phelan’s distinction between “estranging unreliability” and “bond-
ing unreliability” does for first-person narration what my own first project 
in feminist narratology attempted to do for extradiegetic narrators by distin-
guishing between “distancing” and “engaging” modes of narrative address; 
and I believe Phelan and Rabinowitz’s reading of the way Huck’s unreliability 
works toward a “bonding” effect goes a long way toward accounting for the 
complex responses Huckleberry Finn can inspire. Of the four approaches in 
resPoNse 
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r e S p o n S e  b y  r o b y n  W a r h o l
202
the present volume, rhetorical and feminist are the two that go hand-in-hand 
most readily. But rhetorical and feminist narrative theory are not the same 
approach, for reasons I will outline here.
 One of the features of rhetorical narrative theory I like best is its adher-
ence to an inductive methodology. Looking at individual narratives and then 
abstracting what you see seems to me to be the only rational way to go about 
creating narrative theory. But results derived inductively depend altogether 
on the questions you ask before you start looking. I find myself emphatically 
shaking my head when Phelan and Rabinowitz say, as they are describing 
their a posteriori way of proceeding, “Of course we recognize that some nar-
ratives give special prominence to” issues or elements of gender (p. 5). To 
assume that gender is an element with more or less prominence in any given 
text is not to understand that gender is a part of everything people in this 
culture do, speak, write, or read. Gender actually has equal “prominence” 
in every cultural artifact under patriarchy. Recently I had an undergraduate 
challenge this assertion in class, thrusting her hand up and shouting at me 
after I called on her, “you don’t know that!” All I can say is that I know it 
as well as so broad a statement can be known, and as I told that student, it’s 
a good idea to read the accumulated research of forty years’ work in femi-
nist history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, econom-
ics, philosophy, linguistics, art history, and literary and cultural criticism 
before drawing a conclusion about whether the assertion is true. Gender 
always signifies in this culture, as do race, age, sexuality, class, disability, and 
other categories of identity that structure social and cultural hierarchies and 
oppression. (Has anyone ever been in a class where a female student did 
anything as belligerent as yelling “you don’t know that!” at a male full pro-
fessor? I asked my friend Jim Phelan—who has taught for a long time in the 
department I recently joined—whether this had ever happened to him, and 
he laughed aloud before saying no. I laughed with him, because the very idea 
was so unthinkable.)
 If you say that only certain texts give prominence to “issues” like gender, 
that means your default is male, masculine, and straight. But just as white-
ness is structured as a race, masculinity is a gender, too, and—as a cultural 
construct—it can’t help structuring the production and reception of texts. An 
act of communication can’t exist outside the system of gender any more than 
it can exist without some form of language or sign system, verbal or nonver-
bal. If the deployments of gendered gestures in narrative are not readily vis-
ible to those of us who practice narrative theory, it is only because we haven’t 
looked carefully enough, and we haven’t adequately acknowledged that gen-
der performance happens along a sliding scale, with macho-masculinity and 
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ultra-femmy-ness at the two extreme ends. In the wake of poststructuralism, 
critics and theorists can’t use the binarism of man/woman to analyze the 
gendering of texts, and even if we could, that would be boring. It would also 
leave out the perspective developed by the growing population of persons 
who identify as neither male nor female, but as transgender. To look at the 
gendering of acts of communication, narrative theorists need more informa-
tion about which ways of speaking and writing are considered appropriate to 
men in dominant culture (i.e., “masculine”), which are considered appropri-
ate to women (i.e., “feminine”), and how and when they combine and cross 
in acts of discourse, as well as—to invoke the rhetorical theorists’ priorities—
for what purposes.1 We need more information about the circumstances in 
which men have used feminine gestures and women have used masculine 
ones, and about the purposes and material effects of such gender-crossing. 
A more comprehensive account of the gendered connotations of narrative 
gestures is what feminist narratology has been working on since the 1980s, 
when Susan Lanser and I made our tentative forays into the boys’ club of nar-
rative theory, where the few women who were working in the field followed 
centuries-old academic practice by ignoring gender or treating attention to 
it as a case of special pleading.2
 Though many women are now using narrative theory to do important 
work in feminist criticism, they are still outnumbered dramatically by men: 
when I did everything I could to include women’s contributions to narrative 
theory in an introductory graduate course I taught ten years into the twenty-
first century, the syllabus ended up representing the work of forty men and 
twenty-seven women.3 This might not sound so bad, given the gendered 
makeup of english faculty in the United States, where MLA statistics show 
that in 1995, “The largest group of white men were full professors [45.72 per-
cent of all white men who are faculty members in english], the largest group 
of men of color were associate professors [35.66 percent], the largest group 
of women of color were assistant professors [33.62 percent], and the largest 
group of white women were instructors, adjuncts, or of similar rank [35.66 
percent]” (201). However good the work of assistant professors, instructors, 
and adjuncts might be, it does not often find its way onto graduate syllabi, 
though there are a handful on mine. The disparity expresses itself another 
way when you consider the proportion of men to women who are senior 
scholars in english: of faculty who had completed their english PhDs before 
1980, “White men had the highest percentage and white women the lowest 
percentage of full professors” (205). Indeed, at the rate we have been going, 
women won’t be 50 percent of all full professors in the United States before 
the year 2149.4 Imagine my dismay as I found—when my graduate students 
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in the narrative theory survey asked me to distinguish between required and 
recommended readings—that unless the topic were feminist/queer narrative 
theory or narrative approaches to emotion and affect, I found myself giving 
priority to books and articles written by men because I had to acknowledge 
they were the most central to the field of narrative theory.
 I freely admit that this digression from my direct response to the rhetori-
cal approach is an example of what virginia Woolf saw in Jane eyre’s solitary 
ruminations about the constraints on victorian women’s lives—Woolf called 
it the “swerve” that distorts a text when gender-based “indignation” makes its 
way into the writing.5 Recognizing that it is awfully indignant, I considered 
putting the previous paragraph into a footnote, but I decided not to because 
the gendering of the professoriate is so telling an example of what gets put 
aside whenever gender is treated as a secondary category of analysis, as it is 
at present in rhetorical narrative theory. As I said at the outset, it seems to 
me today that the project of feminist and queer narrative theory could be 
completely compatible with the methodologies of rhetorical narrative theory. 
Of course I recognize that Phelan and Rabinowitz don’t make this a prior-
ity (in the sense that they don’t want to take gender on as a first principle, 
a priori, as they say), though both have been scrupulous about including 
the dynamics of gender, race, and sexuality in their analysis of texts where 
those categories stand out as “prominent.”6 In their social consciences and 
explicit politics, they are both feminists, without a doubt, but I would say 
their methodology and readings show that just as culture and academia are 
still segmented by gender, so are narrative theoretical methods. Much as I 
would love to have it happen, I don’t expect to see what they call “that hybrid 
version of [their] actual selves . . . [the] version that readers come to know” 
come out as a feminist narrative theorist any time soon (p. 33).
 Conversely, the reason I don’t style myself a rhetorical narrative theorist 
is the same as the reason I doubt I can ever cross over into a cognitive or 
neuroscientific approach: that is, the presence of a normative or universal-
izing “we” in the critics’ own writing.7 Here I am not referring to the “we” in 
Phelan and Rabinowitz’s text whose referent is the “hybrid self ” whom the 
two theorists create in their combined writerly persona, as in “As our tone 
suggests, we greatly admire Twain’s handling of the relationships” (p. 37) or 
“We will discuss what we regard as Twain’s far less successful narration.” I 
know from previous collaborations with Diane Price Herndl and with Hel-
ena Michie that there is pleasure in coming to the consensus represented by 
that particular usage of “we” and that the continual exchanging and revising 
of each other’s drafted paragraphs yields a more rigorous and more readable 
product than I can produce by myself. When I am writing literary criticism 
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alone, though, I use “we” very sparingly, and I try to be careful to specify the 
referent when I use the first-person plural: it might be “we feminist theo-
rists,” or “we narratologists,” or “we susceptible readers,” but I try to avoid 
saying “we readers” or using a universalizing “we” (or a universalizing “the 
reader”) that implies what I am saying can speak for all persons who do 
not share my identity categories or political practices. even the uses of the 
first-person plural pronoun I have just cited are problematic. If I speak for 
“feminist theorists,” I can’t be sure that what I am saying holds as true for 
feminists of color, queer feminists, feminists who write from positions of 
disability, and so forth, as it does for me and for those who have gendered 
experiences similar to my own. In their contribution to this volume, Phelan 
and Rabinowitz continually speak with well-warranted authority for “us rhe-
torical theorists.” As their excellent, close-grained reading of Huckleberry 
Finn shows, however, they sometimes use a “we” whose referent is not “we 
rhetorical theorists,” but rather “we, the members of the authorial audience.” 
This presents a problem for feminist theory, because it suggests that the critic 
speaks from a position that is universally accessible to any careful reader 
of Huckleberry Finn. This “we” interpellates readers who can identify with 
Phelan and Rabinowitz’s reading position, but it will marginalize actual read-
ers whose identity categories incline them to come to different conclusions 
about the intentions of the text.
 For example, consider the following passage from Phelan and Rabinow-
itz’s section on Narrators:
Thus, when Huck makes his decision to tear up that paper and—in a return 
to unreliability—evaluates his action most negatively, we feel our strongest 
sympathy and our greatest ethical approval of his actions. (p. 36)
Or this extract from their analysis of Progression and Plot:
Among other things, this revelation means that we recognize the woeful 
inadequacy of Huck’s judgment of his situation after the kidnapping when 
he says “it warn’t long .  .  . till I was used to being where I was, and liked 
it, all but the cowhide part” (50). This recognition in turn influences our 
positive ethical judgment of Huck’s later decision to fake his own murder. 
(p. 59)
These are strong statements. “We feel.” “We recognize.” “Our positive ethi-
cal judgment.” Do all readers share those feelings? If they do not, are their 
feelings wrong? What if they are reading from subject positions that lead 
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them to a different interpretation of the text’s intentions?8 The rhetorical 
narrative theorists would say that such readers have not made the imagina-
tive leap necessary to becoming a part of the authorial audience. They also 
say they are pluralists, which is certainly true in that both Phelan and Rabi-
nowitz are interested in and influenced by readings derived through other 
approaches to narrative. They might take a cue from Suzanne Keen, who 
suggests that “More self-consciousness about our own experiences of narra-
tive empathy depends in part upon identifying where we stand as members 
of the diverse audiences reached by authors’ empathetic representations” 
(223). Keen speaks here as a rhetorical narrative theorist influenced by neu-
roscientific approaches, not as an explicitly femininst narratologist; but her 
“we” is not normative because the pronoun here refers to a multiplicity of 
subject positions among the “diverse audiences.” Ironically enough, Keen 
cites the earlier work of my friend Peter Rabinowitz as a model for how 
to take diverse audiences into account.9 I would like to see the composite 
persona created by Phelan and Rabinowitz drop the “we” when speaking of 
the authorial audience that they have done so much to identify and define, 
and refer in the third person to “the authorial audience(s)” (what I in my 
own critical practice have called “the susceptible reader” or “the cooperative 
reader”), thus acknowledging through their own rhetoric that their take on 
the text’s intentions, careful and logical as it is, is the product of an interpre-
tive act inevitably colored by their own subject positions and cannot speak 
for the reading experience of everyone.
a femInIST narraTIve TheorIST reSpondS To 
davId herman’S CognITIve approaCh
Reading David Herman’s account of cognitive narrative theory, I am lost 
in admiration. The theoretical sophistication and logical integrity of his 
approach are impeccable. The direct line of relevance between this work 
and the project of the original structuralist narratologists is both distinct 
and indisputable. His approach’s integration of scientific and psychological 
research into the workings of cognition represents a profoundly interdisci-
plinary expertise, not to mention methodology. And the descriptive power 
of terms he elucidates here and elsewhere in his work—especially storyworld, 
which has permanently altered the way I teach the concept of diegesis—is 
invaluable. I understand why gender is not part of his analysis of the oper-
ations of the human brain—indeed, speaking as an anti-essentialist femi-
nist, I am glad that cognitive narrative theory does not in any way emulate 
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certain kinds of sociobiology by assigning gender to particular mental func-
tions. However, cognitive theory is making a political decision when it avoids 
addressing gender difference, a decision that looks progressive when con-
trasted with essentialist models of gender but less so when the cultural his-
tory of gender oppression comes into the picture. David Herman’s cognitive 
narrative theory eschews politics. The power dynamics among hierarchies of 
social categories such as race, class, gender, sexuality, or disability do not fig-
ure in his analysis. As a feminist, I must ask, “What is at stake in the cognitive 
approach to narrative? Whose interests does it serve?” Perhaps predictably, I 
find I can discern a politics in this rigorously apolitical method.
 Read from a feminist perspective, On Chesil Beach is a novel about the 
persistent damage done to victims of sexual abuse and to those they love 
most intimately. Because it is a historical novel, On Chesil Beach under-
lines the pathos of people in Florence’s generation who suffered from that 
damage in a moment of history just before a popular discourse of recovery 
from sexual abuse came into existence. Ian Mcewan’s text brilliantly man-
ages the theme by keeping sexual abuse in the periphery of the actions that 
are narrated, thus mimicking the way memories of abuse hover at the edges 
of the survivor’s consciousness, present to the mind only as a glimmer but 
powerful in their effect. As Herman usefully points out in his treatment of 
“frequency” in the section on Time, Plot, and Progression, the narrator of 
On Chesil Beach repeatedly brings up sailing trips that Florence took with 
her father during her childhood, “prompting construction of a storyline in 
which past sexual abuse by her father constitutes the reason for Florence’s 
compensatory immersion in the world of music . . . and also for her actions 
on her wedding night (p. 73).” The abusive actions themselves are never 
named in Mcewan’s text, but the narrator alludes to them through descrip-
tions of Florence’s post-traumatic feelings in her father’s presence on those 
and other occasions. Indeed, it would be possible for a careless reader to fin-
ish the novel without gathering that Florence has this history with her father. 
Writing in the twenty-first century and having access to the range of liter-
ary conventions available today within the genre of realist fiction, Mcewan 
might have chosen to foreground the abuse, even to dramatize it as a series 
of directly rendered flashbacks in the novel. His choice to keep the clues of 
abuse out of the center of the novel’s action has the powerful effect of keeping 
Florence’s feelings and motives partially obscure, not just from edward and 
herself but also from the interpreter of the text. The actual reader who picks 
up the clues of Florence’s past comes to understand her better than Flor-
ence can understand herself and to comprehend the young couple’s situation 
within a framework that is not accessible to either of them but fully present 
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in the text, that is, the twenty-first century belief that the process of remem-
bering and telling about trauma is the key to recovering from its effects.
 Admitting that my previous paragraph proceeds from an explicitly femi-
nist-narratological analysis of the novel’s narrative structure, I was neverthe-
less surprised that Herman did not mention sexual abuse in his introduction’s 
summary of the salient features of the novel’s plot. I was even more surprised 
(though relieved at last), to find that he did not mention Florence’s trauma 
until chapter 3 (p. 73) of his essay. While the novel’s treatment of the abuse 
is indeed a perfect illustration of the point Herman is making on that page 
about narrative frequency, Herman’s approach has the consequence of sub-
ordinating the fictional actions that a feminist narrative theorist would see 
as central to the novel’s organizing principle. The way Herman finishes his 
introductory summary of the novel, too, seems to me to miss the point of 
the novel’s ending, for the same reason. Herman says of the last few pages of 
the novel, “Most of this final section is refracted through the vantage point 
of edward, who eventually comes to the realization that  .  .  .  ‘all [Florence] 
had needed was the certainty of his love, and his reassurance that there was 
no hurry when a lifetime lay ahead of them’ [202]” (p. 19). Herman’s plac-
ing this quotation at the end of his summary (and returning to it in the final 
pages of his own contribution to this volume) gives it a degree of authority I 
do not believe is warranted by the text. Particularly interesting to me is Her-
man’s characterization of edward’s thought as a “realization,” implying that 
the conclusion edward has come to is correct. I would argue that the novel 
knows edward is wrong about this: the narrator’s handling of the incidents 
of abuse suggests an awareness that childhood sexual trauma is not so easily 
overcome. Sweet though it may be, edward’s belief that all Florence needed 
was time and a good man’s love to get over her revulsion is simply mistaken. 
The aftereffects of trauma are more insidious than that, the process of recov-
ery much less dependent on the power of romantic or conjugal “love.” In 
my reading, the novel does not condemn edward for this still-naïve view 
of the mysteries of his bride’s sexuality any more than it condemns either 
edward or Florence for the badly misguided ideas about sex they play out 
on their wedding night. Mcewan makes an interestingly gendered move by 
giving the final section wholly to edward’s point of view, but I don’t think 
the absence of Florence’s perspective here undoes the detailed construc-
tion of her subject position the novel has achieved up to this point. For a 
reader who focuses on the ways gendered subjectivity takes shape in a nar-
rative text, part of the pleasure of reading On Chesil Beach is the excruciating 
awareness of the inexorable difference the novel establishes between the two 
protagonists’ masculine and feminine subject positions, inexorable because 
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of the moment they occupy in history. The novel achieves that awareness by 
giving equal time to Florence’s and edward’s perspectives until the ending, 
where the swerve to edward’s point of view only underlines the irony of his 
present belief that he understands the past. I think that Herman’s approach 
overlooks this irony and, in so doing, misses a crucial part of the novel’s 
point.
 I am conscious as I write this that the cognitive approach would advise 
more caution than I am exercising in assigning agency to the actions per-
formed by a text such as On Chesil Beach. In the previous paragraphs I have 
ascribed actions and reasons to the narrator, the novelist, the text, and some-
thing I call “the novel,” which I suppose is my working attempt at a substitute 
for the controversial term “implied author.” I am intrigued by how intensely 
Herman is invested in getting rid of the implied author, and I am fascinated by 
his characterization of the communication model of narrative transmission 
as positively dangerous. He says, “There is a danger associated with reader 
constructs and frameworks based on them. . . . The danger is that of losing 
sight of the heuristic status of these models and hypostatizing the entities 
they encompass—of forgetting that reader constructs are ways of describing 
phases or aspects of the inferential activities that support worldmaking, not 
preconditions for understanding stories” (p. 152). I find this puzzling. What 
harm or injury is risked by thinking of reader constructs as preconditions 
for understanding stories? Again I am moved to ask, “What is at stake?” The 
problem Herman wishes to solve by banishing the implied author is clear: he 
is committed to assigning narrative actions, and therefore also the reasons 
that motivate them, to the author, thus obviating the need for the implied 
author. Carefully he counters the anti-intentionalist arguments of Wimsatt, 
Beardsley, and Booth, and logically he arrives at the conclusion that he can 
appropriately impute the reasons for telling to the author, by which I think 
he means the flesh-and-blood person, Mcewan himself. He also rejects the 
extradiegetic narrator as the potential agent of narrative choices or actions, 
reasoning that a “non-personified, uncharacterized” narrator removes the 
need to “draw inferences concerning the teller’s (in contradistinction to the 
author’s) reasons for narrating events” (p. 48). I am persuaded by his refuta-
tion of arguments posed against intentionality within the Anglo-American 
critical tradition of the 1950s and 60s. But I want to know how the cogni-
tive narrative theorist answers the poststructuralist characterization of “the 
author” as a product of discourse. After Bakhtin, Foucault, and Barthes, the 
idea of the author-as-person pales in the light shed by an awareness of any 
given text’s place in the larger discursive system. And after Lacan, the author 
as unified subject with discernible reasons for actions becomes a chimerical 
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figure, just another product of discourse. For this reason, the implied author 
(or what I pusillanimously call “the novel”) is, I believe, a more appropriate 
object of analysis, because it is a discursive structure, not a person. I certainly 
appreciate Herman’s faith in empiricism, for instance, his contention that the 
literary critic can look to “textual structures” to find “warrant for inferences” 
about the beliefs and attitudes that motivate particular narrative choices. In 
analyzing the moves of the implied author, that is exactly what I want to do. 
And yet I can’t put aside my poststructuralist, feminist theoretical convic-
tion that the object of Herman’s analyses, the author, the person, Mcewan 
himself, is an irreducible Other. So is my friend David Herman: No matter 
how adept I might become at Theory of Mind, I am not capable of deducing 
from his actions or utterances what his real intentions are in every case—
can he be certain about mine? Or about Ian Macewan’s, either? Thanks to 
the workings of the unconscious, the sway of ideology, and the discursive 
constructedness of all subjective experience and of representation itself, not 
even I can know precisely why I make the choices I do, in storytelling or in 
any other activity.
 The implication that the critic can know the Other is what puts the 
cognitive narrative approach in starkest contrast to the feminist approach. 
To be sure, the capa model is congruent with feminist narrative theory in 
its emphasis on the Context of narrative acts. Attempting to pin down the 
Actions performed by narrating, however, or to know with certainty the Per-
son performing those actions, or especially to Ascribe intentions to the per-
former of narrative acts, reflects an assumption of critical authority that I 
would have to call immodest at best, oppressive at worst. The cognitive nar-
rative theorist—however logical, empirical, and indeed brilliant he may be 
in drawing inferences—cannot know the reasons governing the actions of 
someone who occupies a completely different subject position from his own. 
In the belief that he can, I see a genuine danger: the danger of arrogating to 
himself the authority to account for the subjectivity of others, that is, of prac-
ticing a politics that is never made explicit in the approach itself. The univer-
salism of the cognitive approach overlooks the differences born of identity 
positions. As long as persons occupying various identity positions continue 
to be in differential relations of power with one another, it is too early in the 
history of cultural theory to put those differences aside.
 What I like best about Herman’s approach, however, is his way of think-
ing about characters. In contrast with what I see as his personalization of the 
author, he depersonalizes characters in a way that holds them up for rigorous 
analysis as textual constructions.10 Characters, for Herman, are collections of 
traits intersecting with plot. Building here on Seymour Chatman’s concep-
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tion, Herman is beautifully demonstrating how not to confuse the signifi-
cance of fictitious persons with that of real ones. Commenting on the way 
Florence and edward draw on emotionologies “to make sense of their own 
and others’ conduct,” Herman very usefully says that “the novel uses fictional 
individuals to explore, reflexively, the scope and nature of models of what a 
person is” (p. 131). I could not agree more. I would only add that gender and 
sexuality (not to mention race, class, nationality, etc.) are central enough to 
contemporary culture’s assumptions about “what a person is” that our criti-
cal models ought to take them into account as primary categories of analysis. 
Not to do so is to serve the interests of dominant culture and its pernicious 
insistence that because identity differences should not matter, they don’t mat-
ter. Unfortunately, they still do—part of the point of learning “what a person 
is” through studying texts is to bring that awareness to our interventions in 
the deployment of power in the extradiegetic world.
a femInIST narraTIve TheorIST reSpondS To 
brIan rIChardSon’S anTImImeTIC narraTIve approaCh
Contemporary narrative theorists of all stripes owe a big debt to Brian Rich-
ardson’s immersion in postmodernist fiction. His approach—which he and 
others have called “unnatural” narratology to underline the way it builds 
upon and responds to the linguistically based “natural narratology” so influ-
entially proposed by Monika Fludernik—takes seriously the need for bring-
ing classical narratological insights together with the history of the material 
world. The formal features of texts that interest Richardson are always linked 
to the historical times and geographical spaces in which the texts are written 
and read. In this respect, his work parallels that of the contextually situated 
narrative theorists who focus in our analyses on gender, race, sexuality, or 
postcolonialism. What is “unnatural” about Richardson’s work is not actu-
ally his narratology but rather the antimimetic texts he likes to write about. 
His analyses point to the many departures from the realist tradition that take 
place in contemporary novels, while the analyses also expand the narrative-
theoretical lexicon to give names to these new developments in fiction. It is 
difficult to imagine reading a book like Midnight’s Children without applying 
the insights Richardson has brought to novels of this kind, and it is impos-
sible to achieve a thorough structural or stylistic analysis of Rushdie’s works 
that would not use what Richardson has added to narrative theory. Richard-
son has taught us how to read what he calls in his contribution to this volume 
the “playful and outrageous kinds of texts” of literary postmodernity (p. 25).
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 I admire the breadth of a perspective on literature that allows Richard-
son to make declarations like his claim that the biggest difference between 
fiction and reality is death. Whereas in fiction “characters can plead with 
their authors to spare their lives, temporality can be run backwards so the 
dead come back to life, or a figure can die several times . . . and miraculously 
appear alive again in the next chapter,” Richardson observes that in life “there 
is only one death, and it is irreversible” (p. 23). I also admire the ethical 
commitment that inspires Richardson’s statement of the difference between 
“altering the historical record in a work of fiction and falsifying historical 
facts in nonfictional discourse.” The former, according to Richardson, “is a 
serious kind of play, the latter a sordid lie” (p. 23). Part of what makes this 
tendency toward aphorism in Richardson’s prose so striking is its adherence 
to a set of binary categories: fiction versus life, deathlessness versus mortal-
ity, playing versus lying, seriousness versus contemptibleness, fictional works 
versus nonfictional discourse. That he is comfortable navigating such terri-
tory suggests that Richardson is no poststructuralist, committed though he 
is to comprehending the products of postmodernism. I know from my own 
structuralist-influenced work on narrative that this binary habit of thought 
comes in handy when you are working on taxonomies of narrative structure, 
and Richardson has used it to advantage. However, in addition to raising 
specific questions about identity positioning, the responsibility of the femi-
nist critic is to question binarisms whenever they crop up, and so, before 
discussing the role of gender in the structure of Rushdie’s novel, I will engage 
Richardson’s excellent discussion on one point of distinction where I think 
he draws the lines too brightly.
 That distinction is the starting point for Richardson’s argument: the dif-
ference between mimetic and antimimetic narrative texts. everything that 
he has to say about antimimetic narrative gestures rings true to me, and 
every example he musters to illustrate his taxonomies of postmodernist nar-
rative is persuasive. (His section on Story, Time, and Progression is typical 
of the comprehensiveness of his corpus, containing impressive and useful 
catalogues of recent novels from all over the world which play with varia-
tions on narrative conventions.) I question, though, the lines he is drawing 
between narrative in the realist tradition and narrative that departs from the 
conventions of realism. For Richardson, realism is mimetic and postmodern-
ism is antimimetic. In a general way this is certainly true, but some of the 
examples Richardson mentions inspire me to question the firmness of the 
distinction. For instance, Richardson claims Tristram Shandy as a forebear 
of antimimetic fiction because of its many transgressions of narrative level 
and temporality, including those that link it directly to Midnight’s Children, 
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such as the narrator’s complaints about the difficulty of getting to the scene 
of his own birth before he meets his death. Such ruptures of the narrative 
fabric are metalepses, and Richardson rightly points out that they violate the 
realist contract, the traditional readerly expectation that the novel will not 
betray any awareness of the fictitiousness of its storyworld. As Richardson 
puts it, “Mimetic narratives typically try to conceal their constructedness 
and appear to resemble nonfictional narratives, while postmodern narratives 
flaunt their artificiality and break the ontological boundaries that mimetic 
works so carefully preserve” (p. 20).
 Well, yes and no. I have always thought of Tristram’s antics as a kind 
of hyper-verisimilitude, a constant reminder that the way time progresses 
in fiction, for instance, is purely conventional and that paying attention to 
the time that it would actually take to put the words on the page is a way 
to remember what is really real, that is, that someone has written the text. 
Robbe Grillet, Richardson’s other canonical example of an antimimetic nov-
elist, claims he “do[es] not transcribe” but “constructs,” but I have often won-
dered how Robbe Grillet differs in that practice from a canonical realist like 
Henry James. Robbe Grillet’s novels can be read as exercises in focalization 
through a non-normative consciousness, constructing a world as it might 
look if you were viewing it from the subject position of someone with an 
extreme cognitive or emotional disability. How different is that, really, from 
constructing the world that “Maisie knew”? It is a difference in degree of dis-
ability (a non-normative person’s as opposed to an ordinary child’s), but not 
necessarily in kind of narrative construction.
 Richardson mentions James’s annoyance at those moments in Trollope’s 
fictions where the narrator draws attention to his authorial power over the 
fates of the characters, thus committing a “serious crime,” as James has it, 
against the mimetic effect. But if Trollope is not an example of the typi-
cal practices of the realist tradition, then who is? Charlotte Brontë, maybe, 
but then we would have to overlook the antimimetic effect of Lucy Snowe’s 
explicit refusal to bring Villette to narrative closure, not to mention those 
many metaleptic passages of Jane Eyre directly addressed to her Reader; or 
maybe George eliot, but then we must ignore the profound effect of the sev-
enteenth chapter of Adam Bede, “in which the story pauses” while the nar-
rator discusses the parallels between her novelistic project and the paintings 
of the Dutch Masters; or maybe Dickens, but then what about the unsettling 
effect of the constant switching between first- and third-person narrators 
and past- and present-tense narration in Bleak House?; or Thackeray, but 
then there are those pesky references to his characters as puppets in Van-
ity Fair. In other words, realist novels have been indulging in antimimetic 
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practices for as long as realist novels have been written. Sometimes they do 
it just for play, but sometimes they do it for a more serious purpose ironi-
cally modeled on Tristram Shandy’s hyper-verisimilitude. For realist novelists 
such as Harriet Beecher Stowe or elizabeth Gaskell who earnestly wish to 
change the world, the metaleptic effect can bring the implied reader back to 
an awareness of the “really real,” the extradiegetic world where the novelist 
writes and where actions like those being represented in the fiction cry out 
for real-world action. To be sure, Richardson is fully aware of the potentially 
subversive politics of Rushdie’s antimimetic narration. As a feminist critic 
interested in the history of fiction’s interaction with the material world, I see 
these antimimetic gestures more as a continuity from realist to postmodern-
ist narrative than as a break between them. Without question, Rushdie pres-
ents an extreme example of antimimetic practice, though, just as Richardson 
argues.
 Turning to gender, I find I am much more tuned in to the figure of 
Padma than Richardson appears to be. For him, Padma is simply the woman 
to whom the narrator “reads his written texts aloud” and notes her com-
ments (p. 157). Richardson does not discuss her technical function as nar-
ratee. A lower-caste woman who does the cooking and housework while 
Saleem writes, who shares his bed despite his claim of impotence, and who 
frequently comments on both the style and the substance of Saleem’s story, 
“our Padma” is a continuous presence in the narrative discourse. The fre-
quent epithet of “our” is a gesture of condescension or patronage, typically 
used in casual British english to refer to a young brother or sister, or to a 
servant of the house. If Padma is not literally a servant, her illiteracy and her 
household tasks mark her as Saleem’s social inferior, and yet her emphatic 
criticisms often shape or even distort the way he tells the story, especially the 
pacing. Like a narratee in an extradiegetically narrated realist novel, Padma 
is sometimes referred to in the third person but more often in second-per-
son direct address, a practice that heightens the antimimeticism of the text. 
(Where is Padma supposed to be when Saleem is commenting on her in 
the third person, if she is present when he speaks directly to her?) Saleem’s 
reports of Padma’s nodding, fidgeting, and expostulating while he reads are 
constant reminders that his selection of details at least partly reflects what 
this inferior figure already knows and what she desires to know, as well as 
his own desires variously to gratify or to thwart her. The narratee is thus a 
gendered and classed filter standing between Saleem and the implied reader, 
and the actual reader’s interpretation and evaluation of the story will vary 
according to his or her potential to share the attitudes associated with the 
social and cultural positions Padma occupies. Her announcement at the 
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novel’s end that she and Saleem will marry is a parody of the realist conven-
tion that requires marriage for the protagonist to achieve comic closure, but 
in its extreme irony it also serves as the only kind of closure an antimimetic 
text like Midnight’s Children could provide.
 That Rushdie would choose such a woman to be Saleem’s narratee is 
interesting; that he would name her “Padma” is fascinating to the consumer 
of twenty-first-century popular culture, although it is admittedly a detail 
utterly irrelevant to narratology per se. Thinking about how gender affects 
the reception as well as the production of texts, feminist criticism often takes 
into account as many intertexts as possible, even when to do so is to com-
mit an anachronism. Nearly a quarter of a century after writing Midnight’s 
Children, Salman Rushdie married Padma Lakshmi, a model and cookbook 
author who rose to B-list celebrity status in the late 2000s as host of the reality 
television competition series, Top Chef. They divorced just three years later, 
but for now their names are still closely linked in Google searches and in the 
popular memory—and hence in the minds of readers of Midnight’s Children 
who are tuned in to this intertext. This Padma presents a strong contrast to 
“our Padma”: gorgeous, tall, classy, and accomplished, she self-presents as a 
hyper-sexy woman of steel, like a character in an action movie being played 
by Angelina Jolie. Her out-of-wedlock pregnancy in the 2009–10 season only 
intensified her image as a postfeminist icon, the woman who can have and 
do it all, all by herself. One of the things that makes Lakshmi interesting to 
a feminist theorist is her famous scar, a pronounced seven-inch vertical gash 
along the front of her upper arm, the result of a car accident in her teens. The 
other is her history of being the first Indian fashion model to have an inter-
national career. In 2001 she told Vogue magazine that at first her scar was a 
serious impediment to getting jobs, but a life-transforming photo shoot with 
Helmut Newton (and a newly developed cultural taste for bodies marred by 
tattoos and piercings) turned it into a trademark. Now she favors dresses and 
tops that bare her shoulders and arms, and she poses—as she often did as a 
couple with Rushdie—with her scarred arm turned to the camera. On Top 
Chef she comes across as a super-feminine dominatrix, always polite but sub-
ordinate to no one (not even to Tom Colicchio, her aggressively authoritative 
co-host), but ironically the thing she does best is the same thing that “our 
Padma” does: cooking. Like Saleem’s Padma, Padma Lakshmi has a body 
marked by race, sexuality, sex, and gender, and furthermore, this Padma is 
marked by the angry-looking flaw in the beautiful skin of her upper arm. But 
Lakshmi’s glamour and personal power are not compromised by her scar, 
nor can they be by her race and gender. Seeing her pictured with Rushdie, I 
get the sense that in the end she must have left him in the dust; “our Padma” 
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completes her story with a marriage, but this Padma’s story continues, as her 
degree of personal celebrity continually rises postdivorce. Lakshmi hovers 
in the back of my mind as I read Rushdie’s novel, and the contrast she pres-
ents to Saleem’s Padma places the latter at an even greater disadvantage with 
respect to the role she plays in the narrative transaction. Rushdie could not 
possibly have anticipated this development while writing Midnight’s Chil-
dren (if he could have, perhaps he would not have Saleem hammer so insis-
tently on the derivation of the name “Padma,” which he paraphrases as “dung 
lotus”), but the connection nevertheless signifies for the feminist reader. I 
would predict that my friend Brian Richardson, as a feminist reader himself, 
would find this connection intriguing. His antimimetic approach would not 
be likely, though, to discover it or to bring it to bear on his reading of Rush-
die’s text.
noTeS
 1. Ruth Page does this with reference to linguistics, building on the work of Debra 
Tannen and others.
 2. See Lanser (“Toward a Feminist Narratology”) and Warhol (Gendered Interven-
tions). Alison Case followed the example of Gendered Interventions to look at gender-
crossing among narrators of victorian novels. Women scholars doing gender-blind 
work in narrative theory in the 1980s included Cohn, Banfield, and Lanser herself in 
her first book (Fictions of Authority). Diengott declared that feminism and narratology 
were antithetical methodologies that could not (and should not) be synthesized.
 3. The women whose contributions to narrative theory made it onto that syllabus 
in the spring of 2010 are (in alphabetical order): Kathryn Abrams, Paula Gunn Allen, 
Rita Charon, Hillary Chute, Amy Coplan,, Mieke Bal, Hélène Cixous, Dorrit Cohn, 
Melba Cuddy-Keane, ellen Dissanayake, Monika Fludernik, Susan Stanford Friedman, 
Carolyn Grose, emma Kafalenos, Suzanne Keen, Susan Sniader Lanser, Laura Mulvey, 
Beth Newman, Martha Nussbaum, Ruth Page, Judith Roof, Marie-Laure Ryan, Dan 
Shen, ellen Spolsky, Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, Katharine young, Lisa Zunshine, and 
myself. This leaves out important past and present work by Nancy Armstrong, Alison 
Booth, Hilary Dannenberg, Helen Davis, Rachel Blau duPlessis, Amy elias, Judith Fet-
terley, Susan Fraiman, Joanne Frye, Catherine Gallagher, Jane Gallop, Laura Green, 
Diane Price Herndl, Marianne Hirsch, Molly Hite, Margaret Homans, Barbara John-
son, Irene Kacandes, elizabeth Langland, Deidre Lynch, Kathy Mezei, Sharon Marcus, 
Helena Michie, Nancy Miller, Mary Anne O’Farrell, ellen Peel, Sally Robinson, valerie 
Rohy, Hilary Schor, Naomi Schor, eve Sedgwick, Linda Shires, Amy Shuman, Sidonie 
Smith, Hortense Spillers, Rebecca Stern, Susan Suleiman, Julia Watson, Susan Winnett, 
Kay young, and many others whose research continues to develop the project of gender- 
and sexuality-inflected narrative theory.
 4. See Alpert. The projected date is based on the rate of increase of female full pro-
fessors between 1975 and 1988. I wish I could find statistics indicating that the rate has 
sped up since then, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it has not.
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 5. See Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (73).
 6. For examples of admirable rhetorical treatments of novels foregrounding race, 
gender, and sexuality, see Rabinowitz (“‘Betraying the Sender’”) and the section on San-
dra Cisneros’s “Barbie-Q” in the introductory chapter to Phelan’s Living to Tell about It, 
especially pages 6–12.
 7. Rather than using “we” to refer to readers as cognitive narrative theorists have 
often done, Herman in his most recent work has more scrupulously referred in the third 
person to “interpreters.”
 8. Keen (“A Theory of Narrative empathy,” 2006), who sees “narrative empathy as 
rhetorical,” distinguishes among strategic uses of it that are “bounded” (addressed to an 
in-group), “ambassadorial” (addressed to an audience of “chosen others with the aim of 
cultivating their empathy for the in-group”), and “broadcast” (calling on every reader to 
empathize, by stressing universality in “our common vulnerabilities and hopes”) (223). 
In their identification of moments of empathy in Twain’s text, Phelan and Rabinowitz 
are concentrating on “broadcast” strategies but are not taking into account the possibil-
ity of “empathic inaccuracy” that attention to the other two categories would allow.
 9. In addition to Rabinowitz’s Before Reading and his essay “Betraying the Sender,” 
Brian Richardson’s “Singular Text, Multiple Implied Readers” serves as a model for ac-
knowledging the multiplicity of reading positions implicit in narrative texts.
 10. Alan Palmer, who refers to “the effect of characters’ mental functioning” as 
something created by text (325), summarizes the cognitive approach to literary charac-
ter in a manner different from, but compatible with, Herman’s formulation: “A charac-
ter’s name is a space or a vacuum into which readers feel compelled to pour meaning: 
characteristics, dispositions, states of mind, causations” (329) This resistance to treating 
characters as people is congruent with poststructuralist feminist narrative methods.
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Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to all of my co-authors, from whom 
I have learned so much—not only through their insightful, field-extending 
contributions to this volume but also through the example they have set, and 
continue to set, as pioneers and innovators in the domain of narrative stud-
ies. Robyn Warhol’s emphasis on keeping issues of gender (and other “politi-
cally significant and historically grounded differences” [p. 11]) front and 
center in narrative research, Brian Richardson’s ongoing efforts to come to 
terms with the amazing formal and imaginative possibilities of experimental 
literary fictions, and Jim Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz’s productive insistence 
on viewing narrative as a communicative or rhetorical transaction rather 
than an object or artifact—all of this work is foundational for contemporary 
scholarship on stories and storytelling. It is thus a privilege to be able to par-
ticipate in a dialogue with this accomplished group of scholars, who have 
worked tirelessly to promote research and teaching in the field and to help 
make it an increasingly active (and exciting!) area of inquiry.
 Indeed, taking my cue from the quotation by MacIntyre that I have used 
as an epigraph for this response, I view it as a sign of the vitality of narrative 
theory that we have now reached a stage where open, vigorous debate about 
the methods and aims of scholarship on stories has become not only possible 
but necessary—that is, a basic or constitutive part of research activity in the 
resPoNse 
by david Herman
So when an institution . . . is the bearer of a tradition of practice or prac-
tices, its common life will be partly, but in a centrally important way, con-
stituted by a continuous argument as to what [that institution] is and ought 
to be. . . . Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict.
  —alasdair macIntyre, After virtue 222
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field. From this perspective, the contrasts among the approaches assembled 
in the present volume suggest that the domain of narrative inquiry is enter-
ing an optimal stage of disciplinary development. If incipient areas of study 
are too inchoate to be bearers “of a tradition of practice or practices,” a larger 
tradition that at once informs and is informed by current research; and if 
moribund disciplines are those in which current practices are only the echo 
of past achievements, with prior research dictating what sorts of questions 
can be asked and how they can be answered; by contrast, disciplines that are 
coming into their own are marked by productive “continuities of conflict” 
in which practitioners are more or less visibly engaged, even when framing 
statements about particular, localized research questions. Accordingly, in 
writing the present response, I have set myself the goal of highlighting not 
the commonalities but the differences among my own and my co-authors’ 
perspectives.1 Without substantial areas of agreement among practitioners, 
of course, there would be no coherent, identifiable field of study, and the 
organization of our volume around a shared list of topics confirms that prob-
lems of narration, character, the reader, and so on, constitute central con-
cerns for scholars of story. But as the contrasts among our contributions also 
suggest, narrative theory has now evolved into a bona fide scholarly tradi-
tion—one that not only accommodates but also thrives on different assess-
ments of what should count as best practices within the tradition and how 
those practices ought to be developed going forward.
 In the remainder of my response, in dialogue with my co-authors’ contri-
butions, I set out three basic assumptions undergirding the approach to the 
mind–narrative nexus that I have sketched in the previous chapters. I frame 
each of these three assumptions by contrasting them with what I see as key 
assumptions subtending my co-authors’ accounts—respectively, Warhol’s 
assumption that an approach that foregrounds issues of narrative and mind 
is unable to address matters of culture and context; Richardson’s assump-
tion that a sharp line separates “mimetic” and “antimimetic” narratives, and 
that different frameworks for inquiry are required for the narratives falling 
on either side of this putative divide; and Phelan and Rabinowitz’s assump-
tion that the narrative communication diagram is the best way to charac-
terize narrative as a transaction or exchange between authors and readers.2 
In explaining why I disagree with each of these assumptions, I also seek to 
clarify the different premises that underlie my own approach. Because of 
space limitations I will not be able to engage in detail with my co-authors’ 
readings of their focal narratives; rather, I will target what I take to be found-
ing assumptions on which their interpretations rest. By contrasting these 
assumptions with the ones informing my own focus on issues of worldmak-
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ing, and thus working toward a vantage point from which the grammar of 
narrative inquiry can be surveyed anew (in the Wittgensteinian sense), I con-
tinue to develop the analogy between metanarratology and metaphilosophy 
that I described in the introduction to this book.
paradIgmS In dISpUTe
ConTraSTIng aSSUmpTIonS for narraTIve Theory
Assumption 1: An approach that foregrounds issues of narrative and mind 
is not tantamount to an internalist focus on representational processes or 
contents in the human brain, and it need not exclude considerations of 
cultural difference, material embodiment, emotional engagement, or any 
other aspect of the larger social and physical contexts in which people 
produce and interpret stories. Instead, according to the research in which 
I seek to ground my approach, the mind is by definition embodied and 
emerges from the interplay between intelligent agents and the sociocultural 
as well as material environments those agents seek to negotiate. In short, 
minds are always embedded in broader contexts for action and interaction.
In her contribution to our introductory chapter, Robyn Warhol writes that 
“[o]f the contemporary approaches current in narrative theory, cognitive 
narratology of the kind that David Herman practices is the least closely 
linked to feminist narrative theory, because the study of processes in the 
human brain necessarily privileges similarities among people over differ-
ences. . . . feminist narrative theorists are not yet willing to make the jump 
from the culturally constructed to the universal, which seems to resonate 
with . . . essentialism” (p. 11). But an approach to narrative and mind need 
not—and, arguably, must not—focus solely on processes internal to the 
brain. I say “must not” because important strands of work in the philosophy 
of mind, robotics, psychology, and other fields underscore that the mind, 
though inextricably linked with brain physiology, is not reducible to it. This 
work stems from early research by vygotsky and Gibson and is now being 
elaborated in different ways by theorists developing ecological, external-
ist, and enactive approaches to cognition (A. Clark; Noë, Action and Out of 
our Heads). Despite important contrasts among their methods and empha-
ses, these approaches converge on a picture of the mind as fundamentally 
decentralized and distributed, cutting across brain, body, and world. Such 
research provides warrant for the claim that although human beings share 
basic sensorimotor capacities because of which their social and material 
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environments present a comparable range of affordances, or opportunities 
for action, there will be variation in how any one person or group exploits 
those affordances in a given case—for reasons that narrative theory itself can 
help bring to light.
 From a post-Cartesian perspective of the sort just described, there is 
no contradiction between assuming the existence of shared capacities for 
negotiating experience, on the one hand, and assuming that those capacities 
will manifest themselves differently in different cultural contexts and physi-
cal environments, on the other hand. Humans do have species-distinctive 
mental capacities and dispositions. That said, however, their opportunities 
for action—the worldly affordances that help constitute their perceptual 
and conceptual horizon (Gibson; Noë, Action)—will be inflected by gender-
based preconceptions and stereotypes, among other normative frameworks 
specifying what it is possible or appropriate to do in what range of contexts 
(see chapter 7). Further, in ways that are relevant for feminist narratologists 
concerned with the material bodies of story producers and story interpreters, 
the research in which I ground my approach suggests how mind-constituting 
affordances are rooted in nature as well as in culture. Just as different ani-
mals experience the world differently, because of differences of organismic 
structure, among human beings differences of sex and age, as well as the dif-
ferent modes of embodiment that have been socially constructed as forms of 
(dis)ability, impinge on the structure and quality of experience—and also on 
the particular strategies individuals, communities, and cultures use when it 
comes to engaging with their larger environments.
 Indeed, in my contributions to this volume, I have opted not to use terms 
such as “cognitive approaches to narrative” and “cognitive narratology,” pre-
cisely because I wished to avoid any conflation of the term “cognitive” with 
what some scholars of mind have characterized as “cognitivism,” or the view 
that the mind can be reduced to disembodied mental representations that 
are disattached from particular environments for acting and interacting. As 
varela, Thompson, and Rosch put it in their influential critique, “cognitivism 
consists in the hypothesis that cognition . . . is the manipulation of symbols 
after the fashion of digital computers. . . . the mind is thought to operate by 
manipulating symbols that represent features of the world or represent the 
world as being a certain way” (8). Proposing an alternative approach, varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch use the terms “enactive” (and “enactivism”) to suggest 
that “cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven 
mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a his-
tory of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (9). Like-
wise, a focus on the way the mind works with and through stories need not 
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entail a cognitivist separation between mental representations and the social 
and material environments that help shape—indeed, partly constitute—the 
mind.
 My approach thus stresses the need to study not detached, disembod-
ied representational contents but rather minds-in-context; the key issue is 
how worlds are made and remade thanks to the way a culture’s or subcul-
ture’s storytelling practices are geared on to humans’ always-situated mental 
capacities and dispositions. In other words, I assume that methods of nar-
rative worldmaking are always anchored in specific communicative contexts 
and are used (like other tools, whether physical, cultural, or psychological) 
to come to terms with specific social as well as material contingencies. In 
chapter 2, I argue that acts of narration can be parsed as such because of 
how they are embedded in larger contexts for (inter)action, which enable 
storytellers’ acts to be glossed in terms of reasons for acting. In chapters 3 
and 4, I ground processes of narrative worldmaking in modes of temporal 
and spatial embodiment, and chapter 5’s focus on emotion discourse, along 
with its exploration of the interplay between what I call “model persons” and 
“models of persons,” is meant to highlight the advantages of an approach to 
the mind–narrative nexus that remains situated at the level of persons and 
person–environment interactions.3 Chapter 5, like my approach as a whole, 
thus disputes reductionist programs for research alluded to by Warhol in the 
remark I quoted above—programs based on the assumption that the concept 
of person, and person-level phenomena, must yield to some other, more 
fundamental level of explanation, such as neuronal activity in the brain, 
information-processing mechanisms, or other causal factors operating at a 
subpersonal level. I hold, instead, that it is at the personal rather than sub-
personal level that narrative scholars are optimally positioned to contribute 
to—and not just borrow from—frameworks for understanding the mind. 
Finally, my contributions to chapters 6 and 7 engage directly with the issues 
of culture and context that surface in the study of narrative worldmaking as 
a collaborative, norm-governed practice. Any approach to narrative inquiry 
that takes seriously post-Cartesian accounts of the mind as embodied, situ-
ated, and extended must also come to terms with how storytelling prac-
tices at once shape and are shaped by culturally embedded norms, including 
norms associated with master narratives bearing on gender.
Assumption 2: Disputing the existence of any sharp divide or dichot-
omy between “mimetic” and “antimimetic” narratives, I assume that the 
approach outlined in my contributions is extensible to narratives of all 
sorts. In other words, the approach is not limited to or affiliated with any 
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particular narrative genre or subgenre, whether it be the realist novel or 
experimental fiction. My focus is on basic mental dispositions and abilities 
bound up with—both supporting and supported by—storytelling practices 
of all sorts.
I admire not only Brian Richardson’s illuminating analyses of Midnight’s 
Children but also his wide-ranging discussion of many other innovative fic-
tional texts. At the same time, I disagree with what I take to be one of the 
central assumptions of Richardson’s approach: namely, that the study of what 
Richardson terms antimimetic narratives requires a different analytic frame-
work than the study of what he calls mimetic narratives. More than this, I 
remain uncertain about what exactly constitutes an antimimetic narrative, 
because I feel that Richardson’s account simultaneously hyperextends the 
text-type category of “narrative” and downplays the complexity of mimesis 
itself. Further, I believe that Richardson conflates several non-equivalent 
rubrics or categories, including “natural,” “ordinary,” “conventional,” “rep-
resentational,” “mimetic,” and “realistic,” in a way that obscures the scope 
of his argument. By contrast, an approach that focuses on the mind-narra-
tive nexus by exploring how storyworlds are made and remade can capture 
differences among narrative genres and subgenres but without assuming a 
dichotomous opposition between kinds of stories. Such an approach can 
also avoid becoming entangled in the network of binary distinctions (e.g., 
natural/unnatural, conventional/nonconventional, representational/nonrep-
resentational) introduced in Richardson’s account—distinctions that do not 
bear closer scrutiny individually and that also fail to hang together coher-
ently as a group.
 In the first place, some of the techniques used in the texts that Rich-
ardson discusses strike me as being not antimimetic but rather antinarra-
tive—that is, purposely designed to thwart the worldmaking process.4 This 
difference is a crucial one because it entails different assumptions about the 
nature of narrative and about the best way to study it. For example, the pas-
sages from Beckett’s Worstward Ho and from Borges’ “The Aleph” that Rich-
ardson quotes in chapter 4 (p. 105) seem to me designed not just to inhibit 
but to derail attempts to build a storyworld, which, however, the passages 
also paradoxically invite. By blocking efforts to configure into a world the 
when, what, and where dimensions of the spatiotemporal domains that 
they evoke, these texts reflexively explore the (fuzzy) border between two 
different text-types: namely, “narrative” and “list” (or “description”) (see Her-
man, Basic Elements 75–105). The border in question is that between texts 
providing prompts for co-constructing a storyworld and texts engaging in a 
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non- or antinarrative listing of locales that do not add up to a world. But the 
magical realist features of the Rushdie passage that Richardson cites imme-
diately after the Borges text (pp. 105–6), are of a different sort. Rather than 
undermining attempts to connect objects, places, and time-frames into a 
storyworld, these features invite readers to recenter themselves in a fictional 
world that is governed by different physical laws (and that therefore accom-
modates different possibilities) than the world of everyday experience.
 To extrapolate: my approach assumes that narratives can more or less 
reflexively call attention to the methods of worldmaking on which they 
themselves rely, breaking frame to comment on the world-building proce-
dures that they activate. But I also assume that a text drops out of the domain 
of narrative if, during the process of interpretation, certain key questions 
lose their point—questions about the manner in which the when, what, 
where, who, how, and why dimensions can be configured into a story-
world. Hence, unlike Richardson’s, my approach assumes that a continuum 
or scale connects narratives that he instead arranges dichotomously, into 
discrete categories. The increments of the scale at issue correspond to differ-
ent degrees of reflexivity about the world-building procedures that a given 
text cues readers to set into play. Narratives that are relatively more reflexive 
about procedures of world construction, like Rushdie’s or (parts of) Mce-
wan’s, can be distinguished both from narratives that, like Twain’s and Aus-
ten’s, are relatively less reflexive about world-creation and also from texts 
that, like Beckett’s and Borges’, bracket the actual building of a world in order 
to foreground the complexity or impossibility of the construction process 
itself.5 Thus, whereas Richardson opposes mimetic and antimimetic narra-
tives, my approach assumes that a continuum spans texts that engage in more 
or less reflexive modes of narration, and that past a critical threshold for nar-
rativity this continuum then shades off into non- or antinarrative texts.
 My second objection to Richardson’s approach is that in setting up an 
opposition between mimetic and antimimetic narratives, he also downplays 
the complexity of mimesis itself.6 I understand what is traditionally called a 
mimetic representation to be one that is based on or mediated by a model of 
the world of everyday experience. Or rather, mimetic representations rely on 
a constellation of models, some of them deriving from narratives and other 
texts. Since it is impossible to gain wholly direct, unmediated access to the 
world of experience without deploying models deriving from other texts and 
from prior encounters with the world, no narrative could even in principle 
“reproduce a pre-existing reality”—to cite the phrase that, as Richardson 
notes in chapter 1 (p. 22), Robbe-Grillet used to repudiate prior novelistic 
practices. Indeed, since what has gone by the name of mimesis can be recon-
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ceived as a particular strategy for deploying world-models, a strategy that 
differs in degree but not in kind from the more reflexive use of world-models 
in the experimental texts on which Richardson focuses, in my own approach 
I choose not to use the term mimesis or its cognates or antonyms—for exam-
ple, in my account of the interplay between model persons and models of 
persons in chapter 5. Nor do I appeal to the mimetic-synthetic-thematic 
triad. Used by Richardson in his own treatment of character in chapter 5 (pp. 
132–35, 37) and by Phelan and Rabinowitz in a more general way through-
out their contributions, this triad in my view problematically draws sharp 
lines between domains that are overlapping and interlinked.7
 I turn finally to a third, related objection to Richardson’s approach—
namely, the way it relies on a network of binary distinctions that are fraught 
when taken individually and that furthermore are not brought into a coher-
ent relationship with one another over the course of Richardson’s account. I 
have already voiced my concerns about an approach premised on a dichoto-
mized or binarized distinction between what Richardson calls mimetic and 
antimimetic narratives, and I have similar concerns about other binary pairs 
that Richardson affiliates with the mimetic/antimimetic dichotomy, includ-
ing the natural/unnatural, realist/antirealist, and conventional/anticonven-
tional distinctions. For example, as it is used in Richardson’s account, the 
natural/unnatural binary effectively empties out the complexity and diver-
sity of stories told in contexts of face-to-face interaction. By equating every-
day storytelling with conventional narration,8 in the narrow sense of telling 
stories with predictable plotlines, clichéd endings, and so forth, Richard-
son voids face-to-face storytelling of the rich, multidimensional structure 
so brilliantly analyzed by elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps, among others. More 
generally, I dispute the implied equivalence between the left- and right-hand 
terms across this series of binary distinctions. Thus, everyday storytelling, 
besides being the site of remarkable artfulness and verbal creativity, regu-
larly involves tales about supernatural events and other physical impossi-
bilities; so there is no more warrant for equating such narration with the 
mimetic (as Richardson uses that term) than there is for equating it with the 
conventional.
 These conceptual difficulties can be avoided if instead of positing a sharp 
division between kinds of narrative in the way that Richardson does, one sit-
uates storytelling practices on a continuum and works to identify principles 
for worldmaking that are instantiated differently by the narrative practices 
located at different places along that continuum. And as I see it, identifying 
the principles in question requires an exploration of the nexus of narrative 
and mind.
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Assumption 3: The narrative communication diagram, despite its wide-
spread use in the field, is not the only (and I would argue not the optimal) 
way to explore how narrative worlds are made, why, and with what conse-
quences and effects. It is thus time to take a critical look at this heuristic 
model by exploring its genealogy and in particular the way it has been 
shaped, from the start, by anti-intentionalist arguments. The alternative 
heuristic framework that I propose, the capa model, can do everything the 
narrative communication diagram can do but with greater parsimony—
and in a way that avoids questionable presuppositions and entailments 
associated with the standard diagram.
I agree with Jim Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz’s assumption that narrative can 
be productively studied as a form of purposeful communicative action, that 
is, as a transaction or exchange between authors and readers. As my contri-
butions to Part One suggest, though, I have concerns about the history, cur-
rent use, and larger implications of the narrative communication diagram on 
which Phelan and Rabinowitz rely to characterize narrative in these terms. 
As I have argued in this volume, a focus on the mind-narrative nexus entails 
exploring not only how narrative worlds are made but also what motivates, 
and results from, their making. But this same focus on narrative and mind 
calls into question previous heuristic constructs, including the communica-
tion diagram, that have been used to study narrative worldmaking under its 
profile as an exchange, transaction, or (as it might also be put) collaborative 
practice. In critiquing Phelan and Rabinowitz’s use of the diagram, I will 
concentrate on how they deploy the constructs of the implied author and the 
implied reader, keeping in mind that Phelan and Rabinowitz subdivide the 
second of these constructs into what they call the authorial audience and the 
narrative audience.
 As discussed in chapter 2, Booth’s idea of the implied author emerged 
as a response to the anti-intentionalist position that Wimsatt and Beards-
ley had staked out in “The Intentional Fallacy.” I suggest, by contrast, that 
such anti-intentionalist claims should instead be attacked at their root. The 
claims can be countered by showing how they are at odds with relevant 
research in fields including philosophy of mind, comparative ethology, and 
the study of language acquisition, among others; this research indicates that 
ascribing reasons for acting, which take the shape of clusters of propositional 
and motivational attitudes such as belief and intention, is a core feature of 
human reasoning about actions, including communicative actions such as 
storytelling. In turn, by refusing to concede that reading for authorial inten-
tions counts as an instance of the genetic fallacy, one no longer needs to 
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appeal to the implied author as a narratological workaround—as a way of 
not committing the intentional fallacy while still accommodating humans’ 
proclivity to interpret texts as resulting from communicative actions that, 
like all other actions, are inferred to have been performed for particular 
reasons.
 Along these lines, I am not persuaded by Phelan and Rabinowitz’s jus-
tifications, in their section “Authors” in chapter 2 (pp. 29–33), for using the 
idea of the implied author. In the previous paragraph as well as in chapter 
2, I have proposed alternative ways of addressing the issues that Phelan and 
Rabinowitz mention in their second, third, and fourth justifications, which 
concern authorial intentions and the identity relations between story cre-
ators and the stories they create. Likewise, in response to Phelan and Rabi-
nowitz’s first justification, which is actually a version of their third, one can 
acknowledge that narration involves self-presentation without interposing 
the implied author, as a kind of intermediary agent, between the producer of 
the story and the story he or she produces. Positing such an agent amounts 
to reifying what I would instead characterize as an attitudinal stance that an 
interpreter defeasibly Ascribes to one or more storytelling Persons—on the 
basis of narrational Actions performed in particular Contexts of telling.
 As my use of capitalization here suggests, in disputing Phelan and Rabi-
nowitz’s account, I am drawing on the capa (Context, Action, Person, Ascrip-
tion) model that I mentioned in chapter 2. In proposing this model as an 
alternative to the narrative communication diagram, my working assump-
tion is that all social intercourse—and ipso facto all communicative interac-
tion—can be analyzed in the terms the model affords. Further, I suggest that 
capa avoids problems to which both anti-intentionalist accounts and Phelan 
and Rabinowitz’s approach are subject. The advantages of capa include the 
following:
(a) It assumes that ascriptions of communicative intentions to story cre-
ators, far from being extraneous to the process of narrative interpre-
tation, are rooted in the fundamentals of becoming a person who is 
capable of recognizing others as such. Here I allude to ideas discussed 
in chapter 5—more specifically, the work by P. F. Strawson and others 
suggesting that insofar as I treat observed behavior as the conduct of 
a person (or as the result of such conduct), I will make sense of what’s 
going on in terms of the mental as well as material predicates that I 
ascribe to the person engaged in that conduct.
(b) It accounts for the phenomena also targeted by the narrative com-
munication diagram but does so with a reduced roster of explanatory 
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entities, and in particular without relying on the ideas of the implied 
author or the implied reader.
(c) It offers a more unified picture of processes of narrative interpretation 
and everyday reasoning practices, as well as a single framework for 
studying the action of producing a narrative world, on the one hand, 
and the nonverbal as well as verbal actions of characters within narra-
tive worlds, on the other hand.
(d) It keeps constantly in view how inferences concerning story creators’ 
intentions—inferences about the reasons underlying local textual 
choices as well as more global representational purposes—arise from 
defeasible, context-bound, ascriptional practices. By contrast, mod-
els positing an implied author and an implied reader deflect attention 
away from how these and related constructs, rather than functioning 
as external, quasi-autonomous constraints on what kinds of inferences 
can be drawn from what sorts of textual cues and patterns, themselves 
emerge from processes of narrative interpretation.
To continue highlighting differences between my own capa-informed 
approach and Phelan and Rabinowitz’s approach, I will hone in on issues 
connected with items (b) and (d) in the preceding list. My overall claim is 
that the approach to narrative worldmaking that I have outlined in previous 
chapters, and that seeks to bridge narrative scholarship and research on the 
mind, in part via the capa model, allows for the study of narrative as a trans-
actional process (or practice) but in a way that avoids problems associated 
with the narrative communication diagram.
(b) reducing the roster of explanatory entities
At the end of the section titled “Authors” in their contribution to chapter 2, 
Phelan and Rabinowitz write: “we recognize that in many critical contexts 
there is no significant payoff to identifying the authorial agency [responsible 
for how a text is constructed] by the term ‘implied author’  .  .  . rather than 
simply ‘author’ . . .” (p. 33). yet many of the claims that Phelan and Rabinow-
itz go on to make hinge on the idea of the implied author, which functions 
as an enabling condition for their model. For example, in chapter 2 Phelan 
and Rabinowitz follow Booth in defining unreliable narration by appealing 
to the concept of the implied author (pp. 33–37), and the same goes for their 
account of the relation between textual and readerly dynamics in chapter 3, 
where they speak of “discourse-level dynamics arising from the interrelations 
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of implied author, narrator, and audience” (p. 58). Since engaging with narra-
tives of all sorts entails assessing degrees of reliability and having responses 
that are cued by textual designs, Phelan and Rabinowitz’s hedge concerning 
the implied author as optional, or dependent on critical payoff, seems to be 
at odds with their modus operandi.
 Nonetheless, the hedging statement does raise questions about the 
nature and degree of the critical payoff that might be expected, in general, 
from the heuristic apparatus in which the concept of the implied author is 
embedded. Compared with capa, the narrative communication diagram 
proliferates explanatory entities and levels, which are made necessary by an 
initial postulation of the implied author as a sort of cardinal hypothesis. But 
is this apparatus—the full range of heuristic constructs included on the pro-
duction and reception sides of the communication diagram—really needed 
to model how story interpreters use textual cues to co-construct narrative 
worlds?
 Consider the incident discussed in Phelan and Rabinowitz’s contribution 
to chapter 6, in which Huck recounts how the widow Douglas “grumbles” 
(= prays) over her food (p. 142). In my view, the analyst need not appeal to 
an implied author or an authorial (or narrative) audience to account for the 
nature and communicative functions of the disparity between Huck’s and 
Twain’s takes on this episode. In interpreting this incident, I ascribe to Twain 
the aim of evoking a storyworld that features a narrator-protagonist whose 
construal of events diverges from the construal that I provisionally assume 
the author—and not some implied author—intends readers to develop. 
These divergent construals, as Phelan and Rabinowitz note, themselves serve 
broader communicative goals; but again, I can generate inferences about 
those goals without appealing to a shadow agent hovering between author 
and narrator. Nor do I need to multiply types of readers or audiences to 
account for the divergent methods of event-construal that give this incident 
its structure and effects in the larger context of Twain’s novel. As I suggested 
in chapter 6, the implied reader is a name for the profile that an interpreter 
infers the reader targeted by an author to possess. Thus, in describing the 
authorial audience in chapter 1 as “the hypothetical group for whom the 
author writes  .  .  .  [and who] ground his or her rhetorical choices” (p. 6), 
Phelan and Rabinowitz do point to a key aspect of discourse understanding 
in general and narrative understanding in particular (see also endnote 7 in 
my contribution to chapter 2). But the question is how best to characterize 
this recursive ascription of intentions, whereby I impute to an author the 
intention of having me use textual cues as the basis for ascribing to him or 
her reasons for narrating events in a particular way. To explain this ascrip-
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tional process, Phelan and Rabinowitz, in their contribution to chapter 6, 
rely on the multi-tiered model associated with the narrative communication 
diagram, in which a narrator is an imitation of an author and communi-
cates with a different audience (the narrative audience) than the audience 
whom the author targets (the authorial audience) (p. 140). Arguably, though, 
assuming that narratives like Twain’s involve a nested structure of communi-
cative goals does not require assigning a distinct reading position—or audi-
ence type—to each level of this structure.
 Just as I don’t need to posit distinct explanatory mechanisms to account 
for how the subgoal of chopping onions relates to the higher-order goal 
of making spaghetti sauce, appealing to two distinct audience types is not 
required to account for (the communicative effects of) the praying episode 
in Twain’s novel. Instead, I ascribe to Twain the aim of triggering, through 
the design of this episode, ascriptions to him of an intention to evoke part of 
a world whose nature can sometimes—and to a greater or lesser extent—be 
brought into sharper focus via the narrating Huck’s intermittent inability to 
grasp fully what’s going on around him. From this perspective, a character-
ized narrator’s own acts of telling require for their uptake not readers occu-
pying audience positions located at two different levels in conceptual space, 
but rather interpreters working at a single level to situate Huck’s goals within 
Twain’s larger worldmaking project. Or to put the same point another way: 
a multi-tiered communicative design does not entail, in turn, a multiplica-
tion and stratification of audience positions; it entails only narrative designs, 
inferences about nested communicative goals, and a process of textual navi-
gation in which interpreters, by way of the recursive ascriptions of intention 
just described, tentatively map the designs onto the inferred goals (and vice 
versa).
(d)  The rhetoric of rhetorical theory, the idea of audience, and the problem 
of “speaking for”
More than this, however, I disagree with Phelan and Rabinowitz’s suggestion 
that interpreters of texts like Twain’s must obligatorily take up the (multi-
leveled) reading positions described in their approach, if they are to “under-
stand what it feels like to read Huckleberry Finn”—to use a phrase from their 
discussion of the praying incident in chapter 6 (p. 142). In my view, in its 
rhetoric if not its stated assertions, Phelan and Rabinowitz’s approach back-
grounds the defeasibility of the inferences on which their approach is pre-
mised—specifically, inferences about what sorts of readers are being targeted 
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by story creators like Twain. Through the repeated use of nominalized con-
structions (such as Twain and his audience or even the authorial audience), 
the idea of audience becomes detached from an interpreter’s assumptions 
about whom an author may have been targeting and takes on the role of an 
autonomous, quasi-external criterion for successful reading. equally telling, 
and related to the way Phelan and Rabinowitz frame their statements about 
audiences, is the repetition of statements featuring inclusive uses of the first-
person plural pronouns “we” and “our.” In statements of this sort, because of 
how they contribute to a downplaying of the defeasibility or context-bound-
edness of inferences concerning the profile of readers targeted by an author, 
Phelan and Rabinowitz effectively conflate their own reading experiences 
with the nature of the reading experience as such.
 These two problems, whereby inferences about reader profiles are rei-
fied or hypostatized and then used as a basis for making broad claims about 
reader response, surface together in a statement that appears in Phelan and 
Rabinowitz’s contribution to chapter 7: “the narratorial dynamics of the eva-
sion weaken our engagement with the narrative audience as our puzzlement 
about Twain’s shift in tactics .  .  . greatly interferes with our concerns about 
the world of the novel and with our satisfaction in the ethical dimension of 
the implied author–narrator–audience relationships” (p. 162). In this state-
ment, inferences about what sorts of story-recipients Huck may be target-
ing—that is, ascriptions of particular communicative intentions or goals to 
Twain via Huck’s own acts of telling—are reified in the form of the narrative 
audience, the nominalized label for which masks how this construct emerges 
from particular acts of ascription, performed by specific interpreters. At the 
same time, Phelan and Rabinowitz’s repetition of the first-person plural pro-
noun “our” elides the difference between the sort of reader whom they infer 
Twain to be targeting and other possible profiles that might be assigned to 
that target reader. The upshot (for me at least) is the sense that a wider range 
of possible responses to the text is being truncated or reduced in the service 
of a particular interpretation that, again, masks its own particularity via rhe-
torical strategies.9 Through the reiteration of first-person plural pronouns, 
other readers, who may be inclined to ascribe other sorts of intentions to 
Twain, are being spoken for. I have a similar reaction to Phelan and Rabi-
nowitz’s claim that when Huck tears up the letter to Miss Watson “we feel our 
strongest sympathy for and our greatest ethical approval of his actions” (p. 
36), as well as their claim that the ending of the novel causes an “experiential 
disappointment” (p. 161). In the first claim, exactly whose evaluative stan-
dards license the assertion about degrees of sympathy and approval? And in 
the second claim, precisely whose experience is at issue?
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I  ConClUde  with a remark about Phelan and Rabinowitz’s comments, in 
chapter 1, concerning a posteriori versus a priori approaches to narrative 
study. If, as Phelan and Rabinowitz assert, an a posteriori approach to nar-
rative study seeks “to understand and assess the variety of things narratives 
have done and the variety of ways they have done it” (p. 5), then it seems to 
me that their own approach has no special advantage in this respect when 
compared with any number of other approaches, including mind-oriented, 
transmedial, diachronic, and other perspectives. Indeed, I dispute the sug-
gestion that rhetorical theorists can avoid preselecting particular issues and 
concerns when it comes to the study of narrative. Phelan and Rabinowitz’s 
definition of narrative (p. 3), for instance, foregrounds (by specifying in 
more detail) the communicative or transactional aspects of narrative over 
its semantic or world-creating properties—properties that Phelan and Rabi-
nowitz refer to in comparatively gross, summative terms (“something hap-
pened to someone or something”). More generally, any approach prioritizes 
certain kinds of questions about stories and storytelling—and certain ways 
of addressing those questions. Hence to foster best practices in the field, 
narrative theorists should spotlight the analytic priorities associated with 
various approaches, reflexively examining the presuppositions and entail-
ments carried by different ways of framing questions about the phenomena 
under study. My hope is that the present response, along with my other con-
tributions to the volume, can help lay groundwork for this metanarratologi-
cal enterprise. My aim throughout has been to outline, within the broader 
context of contemporary scholarship on narrative, an approach that enables 
theorists to formulate what I see as especially productive questions about 
stories. These questions emerge when analysts bring together traditions of 
narrative scholarship and research on the mind to explore what stories are, 
how they work, and what they can be used to do.
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 1. The situation is slightly more complicated when it comes to my rebuttal, in the 
next section, of Warhol’s characterization of cognitive narratology. I dispute Warhol’s 
characterization, but I do so in order to emphasize how my own approach explores, by 
drawing on alternative traditions of research, issues that also concern feminist narra-
tologists.
 2. I should clarify that these assumptions are not necessarily held exclusively by the 
co-authors with whom I initially associate them. For example, all of my co-authors, not 
just Phelan and Rabinowitz, rely on the narrative communication diagram (in various 
ways) in their contributions.
 3. Along these lines, Warhol’s claim in chapter 5 that characters are merely “func-
tions of discourse” (p. 121), having “no psychology, no interiority or subjectivity” (p. 
119), removes any basis for exploring what I see as a key question for narrative theory: 
namely, how culturally situated practices of engaging with the minds of persons both 
shape and are shaped by readers’ engagements with fictional minds.
 4. Writing in 2005, Richardson himself used the term “anti-narrative” to designate 
“narratives that ignore or defy the conventions of natural narratives” (24).
 5. For reasons broached in this paragraph as well as my next one, I question the 
analogy that Richardson proposes toward the end of his contribution to chapter 1, in 
which he compares “[a] theory of narrative that excludes antimimetic works” with “a 
theory of art that treated all art as representational and could not discuss abstract art” (p. 
25). As I see it, narrative is by definition a kind or mode of representational practice: if a 
text does not represent situations and events in some world or another (however differ-
ent that world may be from the world of everyday experience), then it is not a narrative. 
Rushdie’s novel, for example, is surely representational in this basic sense.
 6. Contrast Ricoeur’s multidimensional account of mimesis, which distinguishes 
among three distinct levels or modes of mimetic representation: prefiguration, configu-
ration, and refiguration. See also Fludernik, Narratology (16–18).
 7. As I have already suggested, mimesis necessarily involves world-models re-
cruited from textual, cultural, and other sources, such that what my co-authors term 
“mimetic” components of stories overlap with what they call “synthetic” components, 
or features pointing to a narrative’s status as a constructed artifact. On another front, 
Doležel (“Thematic”) and Prince (Narrative as Theme 1–13) provide insights into how 
reading for themes requires parsing a text in terms of models or frames that are inferred 
to organize its construction—models allowing thematic meanings to be mapped onto 
particular units or classes of units. From this perspective, to explore what a text thema-
tizes is to interpret it via a model for meaning generation that readers ascribe to story 
creators; and in turn that model both informs and is informed by the construction of 
the storyworld with which the narrative’s themes are more or less densely interwoven. 
Here the overlap between the “thematic” and “synthetic” components is apparent.
 8. See, for example, the section “endings” in Richardson’s contribution to chapter 
3 (pp. 80–81).
 9. Phelan and Rabinowitz’s discussion of “the fuzziness of the authorial audience” 
in chapter 6 (pp. 141–42) did not allay my concerns in this connection, because they 
locate the fuzziness not in their inferences concerning what sorts of readers Twain 
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may have targeted but in the way Twain himself targeted them. Hence in Phelan and 
Rabin owitz’s account Twain’s target audience comes across as knowably fuzzy rather 
than, as it is in capa, fuzzily knowable.
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It is a pleasure to read the extremely impressive, perspicuous, and valu-
able work of the other authors of this book. It is also, however, necessary 
to draw attention to the general mimetic orientation that runs throughout 
this volume. From my perspective, each author skews his or her theory of 
narrative in a different manner and to a different degree. Phelan and Rabi-
nowitz, understandably enough, view their definition as a “default” position, 
to which other variants or permutations might be added. They often leave a 
generous place in their theoretical framework for the synthetic component 
of narrative, though the vast majority of their work revolves around mimetic 
and thematic concerns. I feel that their concept of the synthetic elements, 
especially the more extreme and unnatural ones, should be developed much 
further. Some chapters, such as the otherwise excellent discussion “Time, 
Plot, Progression,” seem to contain rather less space for the more unusual 
practices of postmodern and antimimetic fiction.
 They claim to provide a model that can capture “most of those works that 
are widely considered to be narratives in our culture” (p. 4). The key terms 
here are “most” and “our culture.” What is the residue left out of “most”? As I 
indicate throughout this book, I feel there is an entire literature from Aristo-
phanes to postmodernism that does not fit within such parameters; “most” is 
simply not enough for a comprehensive narrative theory. As to “our culture,” 
which of our cultures do they refer to? Most postmodernists would say that 
ours is a postmodern culture that is creatively represented by postmodern 
resPoNse 
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practices, ones that prominently defy more mimetic or realistic narrative 
practices. Phelan and Rabinowitz, such an argument would run, provide a 
model better suited to later nineteenth-century literary practices than our 
distinctive twenty-first century works.
 Phelan and Rabinowitz are rhetorically effective in presenting themselves 
as normative, opposing their position to that of Warhol and me, who are 
averred to limit our focus to feminist or antimimetic texts. Instead, I believe 
that Warhol and I are adding two essential perspectives that need to be pres-
ent if narrative studies are not to be hopelessly one-sided and incomplete: 
that is, either woefully andocentric or indefensibly mimetic. My own goal is 
not to provide some alternative, minority, or postmodern poetics, but rather 
to show what a complete, comprehensive narrative theory might look like. 
It would include the mimetic texts, models, and analyses that other theo-
rists provide, in this book as well as in most other guides, overviews, and 
handbooks of narrative theory, and it would also include and theorize the 
neglected antimimetic works that have been around almost as long as mime-
sis itself. This is why in many of my chapters I sketch or point to the standard 
or common positions that are useful and valid but need to be complemented 
by the antimimetic perspective if we are to have a thorough narrative theory.
 I believe it is just as inaccurate to assume that all narrative is mimetic as 
it is to claim that all narrative is antimimetic. In 1925 Boris Tomashevsky 
stated that there are two types of literary styles: one of them, common in 
the nineteenth century, conceals its literary devices and makes them seem 
imperceptible and natural. The other, unrealistic style “does not bother about 
concealing the devices and  .  .  .  frequently tries to make them obvious, as 
when a writer interrupts a speech he is reporting to say he did not hear how 
it ended, only to go on and report what he has no realistic way of knowing” 
(94). This other side of the history of literature is repeatedly neglected or 
forgotten.
 Robyn Warhol provides an exemplary, indeed paradigmatic, feminist 
account of narrative theory in this volume. She works with a primarily 
mimetic text and also points out its more self-reflexive and nonillusionistic 
moments, most notably when discussing the sly, self-referential discourse 
on endings at the end of Persuasion. One can easily imagine her taking an 
entirely antimimetic feminist work such as Monique Wittig’s Les Guérillères 
and performing the same careful, cunning, theoretical exploration of that 
text. But in this case, there is no pressing need to do so, since other feminist 
scholars and theorists have already provided such analyses (on Wittig, see 
Lanser, Fictions, 267–79). Finally, the very politics that Warhol expresses may 
well incline her toward a more realist text that is arguably more accessible to 
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a larger audience and its lessons more readily transferable than an analysis of 
a feminist avant-garde work might be.
 The narratological system presented by David Herman is extremely 
impressive, beautifully molding experimental cognitive research, analytical 
philosophy, and postclassical narrative theory into a powerful and compel-
ling synthesis. It is the most resolutely mimetic of the accounts in this vol-
ume. But it is also, perhaps necessarily, a very general poetics; by focusing on 
the features shared by or readily extended from nonfiction to fiction, Her-
man runs the risk of appearing to yield to overgeneralization, reductionism, 
and even missing altogether that which many of us value most in narrative 
fiction. Herman often seems to be looking at a distant planet through a pow-
erful telescope, one that is unable to discern the unusual, dark topographies 
invisible from earth. As useful as Herman’s macrocosmic study may be, it is 
not always clear how it might be extended to cover more unusual narratives. 
I do hasten to add that he has written brilliant, theoretically informed stud-
ies of experimental texts such as Patrick Modiano’s La Place de L'Étoile and 
the “Sirens” episode in Ulysses; it is simply not always apparent to me how 
other radical experiments could be placed effectively within his theoretical 
framework. Rather than trying to force antimimetic practices into a mimetic 
theory they were designed to subvert, we need instead to produce a more 
dialectical theory that can encompass both traditions.
 I find that the positions set forth by Phelan and Rabinowitz and, espe-
cially, Herman do not provide much help for dealing with many of the most 
distinctive and innovative aspects of a work like Midnight’s Children. The 
issue is even more pronounced if the subject of analysis were a more radi-
cally antimimetic text like Beckett’s Molloy, a text that does not embody but 
challenges or rejects the largely mimetic framework set forth by these theo-
rists. Is there a story here, in any accepted sense of the term? Is there only 
one story? Who or what is (or are) the narrator(s)? What kinds of unnatural 
figures are the characters? What space do they inhabit? Who is the narratee 
or the implied audience of such strange texts? A primarily mimetic approach 
will not get us very far; it might postulate that the work is like a madman’s 
delusion, or a dubious fantasy, or an imaged scene in hell, or an allegory of 
collapse, or some bizarre parody, or an exemplification of alienation in capi-
talist society, or whatever. But such approaches are entirely inadequate; more 
importantly, they trivialize Beckett’s astounding creative achievements. The 
omission of Beckett’s examples from most of the current discussions of nar-
rative theory is a very serious one: Beckett is one of the most important and 
influential figures in both Anglophone and Francophone literature; from the 
late 1960s to the early 1980s he was widely regarded as the greatest living 
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author writing in english, and he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. 
What must one make of a narrative theory that has little or nothing to say 
about such an eminent, important, and influential author?
 My own, very different approach will no doubt be judged by some to 
be idiosyncratic; I would respond that both this objection and my position 
are, in one form or another, reinscribed in some of the very texts I analyze. 
Rushdie’s wayward narrator, Saleem Sinai, is frustrated by his literal-minded 
and convention-bound narratee, Padma, who insists on a more traditional 
style of narration and is impatient with postmodern divagations, or what she 
terms “all this writing-shiting” (20). This opposition echoes similar ones in 
numerous experimental works by authors from Laurence Sterne to vladimir 
Nabokov and Italo Calvino, each of whom has included naïve, uncompre-
hending narratees within their works as negative models whose interpre-
tive practices are to be avoided by more astute readers. Ian Mcewan, as we 
will shortly see, has even invented a naïvely mimetic character who cannot 
understand the work of the author who created him.
 My position may be accused of being secondary or derivative, a kind of 
epiphenomenon of the more basic or foundational mimetic model of nar-
rative. To this, I respond that while an antimimetic narrative practice does 
presuppose the conventions of mimesis, it does not follow that it is somehow 
subordinate or less substantial. Irony presupposes literal meaning, writing 
can be invented only after spoken languages exist, non-euclidian geometry 
covers a different terrain than does its prior, euclidian counterpart, and an 
einsteinian universe can be conceived only after one has a thorough knowl-
edge of the Newtonian physics it supersedes. In each case, the earlier term is 
a precondition for the emergence of the later one; in none of the cases is the 
temporally prior one superior to the subsequent knowledge that is built on 
its foundations.
CharaCTer
My own response to the other theorists in this volume might best be clarified 
by looking at the concept of character, the point at which our respective theo-
retical formulations seem to be the most divergent. Phelan and Rabinowitz 
offer a rich model that includes mimetic, synthetic, and thematic compo-
nents. As I have argued above, I believe that the mimetic component is far 
more fragile than they indicate. More importantly, the synthetic component 
is much more complex, multiform, and dynamic than they suggest; indeed, 
we need to devote more attention to unnatural figures such as characters that 
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merge with other characters, ones that are too fragmented or contradictory 
to constitute a single individual, those who know themselves to be fictional 
creations, or impossible ones who can die more than once. I also assert that 
an additional category, the intertextual, is necessary to do full justice to the 
distinctive nature and origins of literary characters. It is inadequate to affirm 
that Saleem is primarily a mimetic, thematic, or synthetic construct, though 
one can, admittedly, get a lot of mileage out of the latter two categories. Sal-
eem is perhaps above all a reincarnation of Tristram Shandy. Saleem writes, 
“Our names contain our fates; living as we do in a place where names have 
not acquired the meaninglessness of the West, and are still more than mere 
sounds, we are also victims of our titles” (348–49). Here, he is alluding to 
Sterne—in fact almost literally taking a page from Walter Shandy’s Tristra-
paedia on the power that names have over the destinies of the characters 
who bear them—even as he playfully suggests he is identifying a distinctively 
non-Western nomenclature. Again, we need the intertextual background to 
fully comprehend Saleem’s name and fate, as well as an antimimetic approach 
to appreciate how naming can become destiny in ludic, fictional texts.
 Warhol rightly insists on the fictionality of fictional characters and on 
the significance of their ideological underpinnings. The other authors in this 
volume insist on the mimetic component, and to be sure it seems to me that 
part of the purpose of realistic fiction is to provide verisimilar characters. If 
they were not realistic, it would make no sense to ask of them, as one might 
ask of real people, how did things actually go after that concluding happy 
marriage had become a memory? Authors can and do write sequels that 
chart the fates of such characters; often it is the mimetic component that 
provides a crucial motivation for such continuations. On the other hand, it is 
important to insist on the inevitable entanglement of the intensely ideologi-
cal with the ostensibly mimetic: throughout history, especially the history of 
literary portraits of women, authors have deliberately or unwittingly propa-
gated sexist stereotypes in the name of realism.
 I would also add that that even those accounts that stress the fiction-
ality of characters, such as structuralist character theory, often have an 
unacknowledged mimetic bias. When describing a character as a cluster 
of predicates, structuralists rarely consider the possibility of insufficient or 
inherently contradictory predicates (though Roland Barthes, in a footnote, 
does praise Philippe Sollers for writing a novel, Drame, which “gets rid of 
the person” [105]). Though antipsychological and opposed to the concept 
of an essential self, structuralists typically provide an actantial model that 
imagines figures (e.g., the “hero”) repeatedly making choices between logi-
cally incompatible options, rather like humans do. The possibility of cross-
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ing these forking paths in a way that defies logic is usually not imagined 
by the theorists, though a range of authors from Borges to Robbe-Grillet, 
Robert Coover, Harold Pinter, and Caryl Churchill have embodied just such 
internally contradictory narrative possibilities. As Luc Herman and Bart ver-
vaeck have pointed out: “In postmodern novels characters lose many of their 
human traits: they blend into one another, they say they are the invention of 
the narrator or the text, they disappear as suddenly as they appear. Structur-
alism hardly knows what to do with such non-anthropomorphic characters, 
which proves the extent of its remaining anthropomorphism” (70).
 At his most general, Herman hedges his bets, defining characters as 
human or “more or less prototypical members of the category of ‘persons’” 
(p. 125). One may partially assent to such a claim, hoping that it will be suf-
ficiently qualified and emended as the argument proceeds. But as Herman’s 
section continues, its object becomes narrower: fictional individuals “can be 
inferred to possess more or less extensive constellations of personal traits” 
(p. 127). Again, there is some wiggle room here, though we see a dominant 
mimetic paradigm firmly in place. At this point I want to protest that some 
characters may not possess many human traits at all, that they may possess 
them in the wrong ways, that they may defy such a mimetic recuperation, 
and that it is insufficient to subsume these fascinating possibilities as mere 
variants of the “more or less prototypical” person—some are not less proto-
typical but instead antithetical. What is prototypical about a character who 
knows himself to be a fictional character, or one who, like Saleem, feels the 
unnatural consequences of becoming invisible (“present but insubstantial; 
actual, but without being or weight.  .  .  . I discovered, in the basket, how 
ghosts see the world” [438])? It appears that Herman, like Richard Gerrig 
and Ralf Schneider, two theorists he cites favorably, seems to be ignoring all 
non- or antimimetic aspects of literary characterization. At its worst, such a 
monocular approach will ignore or negate the impressive conceptual work 
on nonmimetic aspects of characters done by earlier theorists such as Joel 
Weinsheimer, Thomas Docherty, and Aleid Fokkema; further, it threatens 
to return us to the kind of naive or vulgar mimeticism that prevailed at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and that drove scholars like A. C. Bradley 
to ask seriously where Hamlet was when he learned of his father’s death and 
how many children Lady Macbeth had. Literary theory does not need to go 
back to this narrowly confined space.
 In short, a comprehensive theory of character needs several different 
components. Any single approach, whether mimetic, synthetic, or ideologi-
cal, is a necessarily impoverished one; much more work still needs to be done 
to retain and extend the analysis of antimimetic figures.
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SpeCIfIC poInTS
In the first portion of this book I often used the positions of Phelan and 
Rabinowitz to frame my own discussions; there is consequently little need 
to rearticulate specific differences that have already been noted and argued. 
Nevertheless, a few points may be mentioned here. I am surprised that, after 
their fine discussion of the narrator, they don’t go on to mention nonhuman 
or posthuman narrators, as well as the fact that a narrative does not need to 
have a single, overarching anthropomorphic narrator figure: postmodern-
ism shows us the possibility of what I have called the “death of the narrator” 
(Unnatural 1–3, 134–40). Similarly, Phelan’s excellent and important iden-
tification of six varieties of unreliable narration are all based on a mimetic 
paradigm; these would be nicely complemented by the addition of a few of 
the outrageous, distinctively postmodern types of unreliability, as I have sug-
gested elsewhere (Unnatural 103–5).
 In the same vein, their notion of the synthetic is markedly realistic in 
their discussion of space, setting, and perspective. They write that a plot 
may demand a certain kind of location and thus the meeting of the wolf and 
the girl in a rewriting of “Little Red Riding Hood” could not take place in a 
prison cell; furthermore, that the plot of Huck Finn depends on the Missis-
sippi providing the protagonists with a means of transportation. But these 
statements are true only of realistic narratives; in a postmodern rewriting of 
“Red Riding Hood,” such as Angela Carter’s “The Company of Wolves” (in 
which the young woman, ignoring her dead grandmother, winds up making 
love to the wolf man), any setting, internal or external, is possible. Likewise, 
a river is necessary and its corresponding constraints apply only in a mimetic 
text that adheres to the canons of verisimilitude; Marco Polo didn’t need a 
river (or any other particular means of transportation) to get around the 
imaginary China of Calvino’s Invisible Cities.
 I suspect that many of these absences stem from the insistently mimetic 
nature of their definition of narrative: “somebody telling somebody else, on 
some occasion, and for some purposes, that something happened to some-
one or something” (p. 3). I would offer instead the more flexible formulation: 
“Narrative is the representation of a causally related series of events.” And I 
would immediately go on to point out how some texts, like Beckett’s “Ping,” 
seem designed to challenge even this definition.
 I also wish to note that Phelan and Rabinowitz’s formulation of narrative 
audiences in this volume is especially effective and supple. The one area I 
would want to extend is in fact one that Rabinowitz addressed in 1994: the 
possibilities of multivalent or multiple authorial audiences. I would like 
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to stress that the implied reader of the antimimetic text has a double con-
sciousness; she notes the mimetic convention that is being abrogated as well 
as the playful antimimetic effect that is produced. Postmodern texts such as 
Molloy or Gravity’s Rainbow presuppose other narrative models, for exam-
ple, the modernist paradigm, that the novels then go on to transgress or 
transcend. Lolita presupposes knowledge both of the modernist paradigm 
and of the conventions of the detective novel. Modernist novels such as The 
Waves or The Sound and the Fury often play on and frustrate the expecta-
tions based on the conventions of the realist novel, and gay or minority texts 
are often addressed to both a more general and a more specific authorial 
audience. In works written to elude censors, two audiences are addressed: 
one that is intended to miss and another that is intended to find the text’s 
hidden, subversive meaning. For many works, it is often enough to iden-
tify the authorial audience and follow how it is constructed and engaged; 
with more complex texts, one would do well to seek to identify the multiple 
possible audiences, poetics, and paradigms being addressed, invoked, or 
eluded.
robyn Warhol  provides an excellent overview and compelling analysis 
of feminist narrative theory. I find her discussions of authors, plots, end-
ings, space, and the susceptible reader to be especially important. One point 
where we do differ is on the possible gendering of concepts like the implied 
reader (p. 144). The implied reader is indeed a virtual being, as Warhol notes, 
but that does not mean it can’t be gendered. Most entities in and behind 
a fictional narrative are in some important sense virtual: not only implied 
readers but implied authors, narrators, even characters; I don’t see why one 
should not recognize gendered identities. And many of these entities are dis-
tinctly gendered, as Patrocinio Schweickart has argued (38–44); the stories 
of Hemingway are clearly directed to a decidedly male authorial audience. 
Many other virtual entities are likewise gendered, such as gods, unicorns, 
faeries, GPS voice systems, and so on.
 Like many other feminists, Warhol has an ambivalent response to the 
question of aesthetic value. On the one hand, she states that the feminist 
narrative theorist cannot separate narrative values from aesthetic values, and 
the conjunction of these terms implies a third term: political values, imply-
ing that these are all intertwined. The same affirmation appears in the final 
statement of her final section. On the other hand, she makes and documents 
many aesthetic judgments at the level of style. Jane Austen regularly made 
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similar judgments; for her there was no shadow of a doubt concerning the 
reality and significance of aesthetic value.
 Warhol states that “if the reason there were so few ‘great’ women writers 
was that not enough women had written texts that match the aesthetic stan-
dards of their male contemporaries and critics, then, according to feminism, 
there was something wrong with a set of standards that could so effectively 
exclude the creative efforts of half of humanity” (p. 165). This is no doubt 
largely true. It may also be that Warhol is too generous here: I strongly sus-
pect that a corollary problem was that the same standard was often prejudi-
cially applied: when women writers did satisfy established aesthetic criteria, 
their work was dismissed by male critics because of their authors’ gender. 
This is no doubt why many women writers of the nineteenth century used 
male pseudonyms (George Sand, Currer Bell, George eliot) in order to gain 
a less biased reading. In my judgment, the brilliant work of edith Wharton, 
one of the greatest American authors, is insufficiently acknowledged; I have 
no doubt that her gender has played a major part in this undervaluation. 
This situation is at least equally true of women authors who extend or trans-
gress modernist paradigms, such as elizabeth Jane Howard, eva Figes, Anna 
Kavan, Angela Carter, Monique Wittig, and many others. In these cases, 
the problem is not the aesthetic standard but the biased way in which it is 
applied. Ultimately, I believe that an aesthetic argument, more so than a 
political, historical, or even a narratological justification, is the best way to 
ensure that great, neglected women authors of earlier periods continue to be 
read in the twenty-first century.
among The many  impressive points made by David Herman in his sec-
tions, one of the most helpful is his bold attempt to bring a robust concept of 
intentionality back into literary discourse. elsewhere, however, his approach, 
stressing the most general features of most narratives, has the curious con-
sequence of seeming not to need many of the distinctions that narrative 
theorists have developed over the past fifty years. He wants to dispense with 
the implied author and is dubious about the implied reader; he can do with-
out a focalizer; he is even wary about the concept of the narrator. He even 
seems at points to minimize the fiction/nonfiction difference, a distinction 
I have argued is crucial. His comments on the narrator are revealing: for his 
approach, which acknowledges the need to ascribe intentions to narrating 
agents, the category of “narrator” will be “more or less salient depending on 
the profile of a given narrational act” (p. 46). One might easily suggest that 
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this is largely true of most other concepts as well: all the elements of narrative 
theory that Herman is prepared to do without are not as important for the 
theory and analysis of conversational narratives or most eighteenth-century 
fiction.
 However, the numerous wayward, devious, and duplicitous narrators of 
modernism richly reward the concepts of both the narrator and unreliabil-
ity; indeed, it is very hard to teach the work of Joyce, Faulkner, or Nabo-
kov without these conceptual tools. The same is true of the concept of the 
implied reader or authorial audience. Herman suggests that “expressions like 
the implied reader can have the effect of occluding the way they, too, desig-
nate interpretations that stem from inferences made by actual readers” (p. 
152). This simply does not strike me as a serious problem. The concept of 
the implied reader may not always be absolutely necessary for understanding 
every audience response; though still helpful, it is probably not essential for 
a general understanding of the reception of the fables of Aesop or Pilgrim’s 
Progress. Once again, for modernist works where the authorial audience (or 
implied reader) differs radically from the narrative audience (or narratee), 
it can be extremely useful if not, in fact, indispensible. It is perhaps even 
more essential in cases where more than one authorial audience is being 
addressed, as in children’s stories that have one meaning for the child and a 
very different one for an adult.
 Likewise, the notion of the implied author is particularly helpful when 
dealing with a single work by multiple authors. To take Herman’s own exam-
ple, the multiple creators of the film The Cement Garden succeeded in pro-
ducing “the effect of a single act of narration” (p. 50); the same is true of 
Conrad and Ford’s collaboration on Part 2, Chapter 5 of Nostromo. Why not 
simply call this a single implied author, since this is the effect the different 
individuals involved were trying to produce? Other works notoriously fail 
to achieve such a fusion of sensibilities: it is evident which part of Pericles 
was written by Shakespeare and which by the anonymous journeyman play-
wright; similarly, most readers can readily tell that chapters of The Whole 
Family read as if they were written by different authors. In these cases, we 
clearly have multiple actual authors who fail to achieve the effect of a single 
act of narration. I see no problem in saying that in these works we can infer 
the presence of two or more implied authors.
 Another classic example is the case where an author fabricates an implied 
author who is very different from the actual writer. Generations of readers 
were shocked when it was discovered that the historical Thomas Mann had 
powerful homoerotic desires, and thus was quite unlike the implicitly het-
erosexual implied author he had constructed in all his published works (see 
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Tobin). This kind of opposition is so powerful that it has itself been the sub-
ject of fictions, such as Henry James’s “The Private Life” and Borges’ “Borges 
and I.” Postmodern writers presuppose the notion whenever they attempt 
to transgress it. Some actual writers will be unable to maintain their former 
“implied authorial self ” and, as in the case of the final works of Heming-
way, merely produce an unintended parody of what Wayne Booth calls their 
“career implied author.” Can one articulate these various relations without 
the concept of the implied author? Certainly. But I find that the concept gives 
us a very useful tool for assembling and discussing this entire range of pos-
sibilities. The danger of hypostatizing this figure is outweighed by its utility. 
This leads to the larger methodological question of when to retain, add, or 
discard narratological categories. My answer (and the practice of most nar-
rative theorists) is simple: we keep or develop the concepts that have a dem-
onstrated utility. The concept of the implied author is very useful for me to 
explain these and other textual features and relations (see my “Implied”). In 
a case like this one, it’s best to keep Occam’s razor in your pocket.
mISSIng Theory
If my account of the mimetic bias of narrative theory is correct, it should be 
no surprise that all the other theorists in this volume (and most other vol-
umes) use realistic texts for their central examples, that their conceptions of 
narrative are largely mimetic and that their range of reference is, with very 
few exceptions, exclusively mimetic. This is of course entirely understand-
able; a particular theoretical approach naturally gravitates toward certain 
texts or classes of texts, just as starting from a particular narrative usually 
leads in the direction of some theories rather than others. For this reason, we 
might usefully speculate on what the other accounts leave out of their theo-
ries and analyses, and then ask what specifically an antimimetic approach 
would add to the discussion of the creative authors analyzed by the other 
theorists in this volume.
 An antimimetic analysis of Huckleberry Finn would begin with the book’s 
first sentences: “you don’t know about me without you have read a book by 
the name of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, but that ain’t no matter. That 
book was made by Mr. Mark Twain, and he told the truth, mainly. There 
were things he stretched, but mainly he told the truth” (3). Here we have a 
fictional character commenting on the work of the author who created him, 
and testifying (with a few qualifications) to its basic veracity before going on 
to relate the continuation of the story himself. This is an antimimetic viola-
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tion of mimetic conventions—a character cannot know the fictional work 
within which he or she is a fictional character—as well as a familiar type of 
metalepsis, or violation of the ontological boundaries between a real author 
and a fictional being. This practice also has a rich genealogy, going back at 
least as far as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza’s incredulous reading of the 
inaccurate continuation of their story (published by a real author) at the 
beginning of the second volume of Don Quixote. Twain’s opening goes on to 
set up an intertextual drama that is intermittently returned to in the novel, 
most obviously in Tom Sawyer’s determination to free Jim by reproducing 
scenarios he has read in books, especially romantic or chivalrous ones, as 
Tom becomes a contemporary Quixote. The novel’s rhetorical situation here 
is not merely doubled, as Phelan and Rabinowitz point out at the beginning 
of their section of this book, but arguably tripled by this additional level of 
metafictional intertextuality.
 This thread would seem to be a useful one to use to explore other inter-
textual allusions and parodies in a novel so critical of book learning and the 
uses to which it is put. In a deliberate but revealing exaggeration, Twain once 
blamed the Civil War on Walter Scott’s novels, which were extremely popular 
in the antebellum South, because of their “romantic sense of the chivalry of 
combat” and their insistence on the “nobility of serving sentimental causes 
that were probably doomed to fail” (Beaty 449). Twain’s remarks are part of 
a continuing dialogue on the use and abuse of reading that was a regular 
subject of metacritique in novels that documented the unfortunate fates of 
insufficiently critical readers, including Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (a mod-
ern rewriting of Quixote), Hardy’s Jude the Obscure, Conrad’s Lord Jim, and 
extending forward to Faulkner’s “Old Man,” whose protagonist decides to 
commit a robbery after reading a number of popular crime stories. (He is 
immediately apprehended, to the surprise of no one but himself.)
 If one were to do an antimimetic analysis of one of Jane Austen’s works, 
one would select Northanger Abbey, her other posthumously published 
novel. This work engages in an exploration and critique of contemporary 
fiction, and it interrogates and lays bare a number of the basic elements and 
techniques of the novel. It opens by describing the characters of the Mor-
land family and simultaneously critiquing expected patterns of plot develop-
ment and character construction. Thus, Austen writes of Mrs Morland: “She 
had three sons before Catherine was born; and, instead of dying in bringing 
the latter into the world, as anybody might expect, she still lived on” (367). 
Anyone, that is, whose readerly expectations were too conventional. When 
Austen presents Catherine reading a novel about another character, the self-
reflexive practice is self-consciously noted and defended: “If the heroine of 
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one novel be not patronized by the heroine of another, from whom can she 
expect protection and regard?” (385), the narrator muses. The plot centers 
on reading and representation, specifically on the protagonist’s overly enthu-
siastic response to her reading Ann Radcliff ’s The Mysteries of Udolpho and 
the mistaken judgments this causes when she applies its scenarios to her own 
situation. The antimimetic tone is most clearly sounded in the narrator’s wry 
reflections on ending in Chapter 29, and her metafictional observation that 
readers “will see in the tell-tale compression of pages before them, that we 
are hastening together to perfect felicity” (540).
 David Herman has selected Ian Mcewan’s On Chesil Beach to work with. 
It is certainly an excellent choice for his theoretical framework. Readers of 
contemporary literature, however, might point out that this novel is one of 
his least experimental and therefore least typical novels. This text, although 
almost entirely realistic, does, however, have passages that stray from the 
narrow mimetic path, as when the narrator notes: “while one had heard of 
wealthier people going in for psychoanalysis, it was not yet customary to 
regard oneself in everyday terms as an enigma, as an exercise in narrative 
history, or as a problem waiting to be solved” (26). This comment is particu-
larly revealing since Mcewan’s characters sometimes are exercises in narra-
tive history; this is particularly true of the extrapolated, fictionalized later 
lives of characters presented as real by the duplicitous narrator of his earlier 
novel, Atonement (2001).
 Among Mcewan’s more adventurous and innovative fictions are his novel 
The Company of Strangers (1981), whose labyrinthine geography mirrors its 
snake-like plot, and The Child in Time (1987), a masterful work that creates 
an impossible temporality that cannot be included within Herman’s frame-
work. Still more important is Atonement (2001). In this work one finds, yet 
again, a novel whose theme is the incommensurability of fact and fiction, a 
novel that provides an intertextual commentary on modern British fiction. 
Mcewan has stated that its “every sentence contains a ghostly commentary 
on its own process” (59). It also includes a fictional letter from an actual 
novelist (elizabeth Bowen) to the fictional narrator that discusses the aes-
thetics of fictional representation. The work also includes a playful, powerful 
drama about the nature of its narrator, one which traditional, mimetic read-
ers often find annoying or perfidious, but which can be thoroughly enjoyed 
by readers with a more expansive, postmimetic sensibility (see Phelan, Expe-
riencing 109–32). Most telling of all is a brief passage in Saturday (205) in 
which the protagonist, an excellent brain surgeon, is befuddled by modern 
literature; his literalist imagination just can’t make sense of nonrealist fiction. 
Dismissing some of the books his literary daughter has given him to read, 
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he recalls incomprehensible heroes who “were granted a magical sense of 
smell, or tumbled unharmed out of high-flying aircraft. One visionary saw 
through a pub window his parents as they had been some weeks after his 
conception, discussing the possibility of aborting him” (66). These figures 
are, respectively, the protagonists of Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children and The 
Satanic Verses and Mcewan’s own The Child in Time. The implied reader will 
get the intertextual joke, and the comprehensive narrative theorist will want 
to be sure to move beyond the merely mimetic sensibility that Mcewan here 
mocks.
 One cannot fault Warhol for failing to select an admittedly unusual (if 
highly revealing) text by Austen, especially since she discloses key antimi-
metic passages in Persuasion. Nor should one chide Herman for passing on 
the most complex, innovative, and acclaimed work of Mcewan: his goal is 
not to explicate the work of Mcewan, but to illustrate his own theory. But 
these choices do suggest how the theoretical parameters we select go on to 
influence the narratives we gravitate toward and decide to foreground. They 
also reveal how much one’s theoretical perspective leaves out, whether in the 
analysis of a text or in our understanding of an author’s corpus. A mimetic 
approach naturally leads to mimetic examples, and naturally neglects unnat-
ural narratives.
 The other theorists have (most understandably, in the case of Warhol) 
left alone their chosen authors’ most complex and self-conscious interactions 
with the nature of literary narrative, engagement with novelistic tradition, 
and perceived limitations or failures of mimesis. Nevertheless, like Salman 
Rushdie, each of these novelists has written a book that alludes to and cri-
tiques contemporary practices of representation. These self-consciously fic-
tional works dramatically point out the radical difference of fiction, that is, 
the distance between fictional narrators and human storytellers, the ways 
that characters are not like people, and the artificiality of conventional meth-
ods of emplotment and resolution. They are all part of a larger and continu-
ous dialogue on the nature and goals of narrative representation that extends 
back to Aristophanes’ metadramas The Frogs and The Thesmophoriazusae. 
Twain, Austen, and Mcewan are all, in varying degrees in different works, 
profoundly antimimetic authors. Many basic elements of narrative theory 
that we have been examining in this volume—the nature and purpose of plot, 
character, perspective, and mimesis itself—are debated within their works of 
fiction, but there is very little mention of these metacritical acts by the other 
theorists. Neither is it entirely clear how such an analysis could be included 
in Herman’s paradigm or, to a lesser extent, that of Phelan and Rabinowitz, 
without a major revision of those models.
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 There is no getting around the incontrovertible fact that many com-
pelling narratives in the history of literature are substantially antimimetic 
or contain significant antimimetic scenes and reflections. And a primarily 
mimetic theory cannot, in principle, do justice to antimimetic practices; it 
can tell only half the story. What is necessary for narrative theory is a reori-
entation of the model of narrative away from a predominantly mimetic con-
ception toward a more flexible and comprehensive one that can encompass 
mimetic and antimimetic forms alike. To this end, postmodern, unnatural, 
and antimimetic theorists will continue to conceptualize and foreground the 
fascinating, unusual, extreme, and impossible worlds of narrative fiction.
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